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2Sammenfatning
Afhandlingen beskæftiger sig med risikostyringskonceptet Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), der fra
omkring årtusindeskiftet er advokeret som en ledelsesteknologi, der kan bidrage til 
erhvervsvirksomheders værdiskabelse. Tanken om at kunne kontrollere eller styre risiko er ikke ny.
Statistikkens og sandsynlighedsregningens udvikling ligger flere århundreder tilbage, og på store
homogene populationer har man kunnet tilknytte sandsynligheder for at givne hændelser vil indtræffe i
fremtiden. Når sandsynligheden tilknyttes konsekvens, har vi i den klassiske risikostyrings tankesæt
omformet usikkerhed til en forudsigelig risiko. Den kobling udnyttes mange steder, f.eks. er det selve
grundlaget for et forsikringsselskabs forretningsmodel. I den konceptuelle tankegang bag ERM forlades
det rationelle og objektspecifikke fundament, der kendetegner ovennævnte klassiske risikostyring. 
ERM-paradigmets grundtanke er, at en virksomheds samlede risikoeksponering kan anskues og
håndteres som en portefølje i en kontinuerlig proces, der integreres i virksomhedens strategiske
beslutninger. Den strategiske kobling betyder, at vi bevæger os ind i unikke relationer, hvortil der ikke
eksisterer historisk evidens for udfaldsrummet. 
Det konceptuelle spring og de praksisrelaterede konsekvenser, der kendetegner forskellene mellem
klassisk risikostyring og ERM, er afhandlingens fokus. Forskningsprojektet har strakt sig over mere end
12 år, og det har givet en sjælden mulighed for at følge en moderne ledelsesteknologis livscyklus fra
konceptualisering over praksisimplikationer frem til evaluering af konceptets værdi og fremtid. 
Afhandlingens kerne er 4 artikler, der hver især søger at belyse et af projektets 3 forskningsspørgsmål,
der 1) undersøger koncepternes ledelsesmæssige og organisatoriske orientering, 2) undersøger 
drivkræfter og motiver for virksomheders adoption af ERM som ledelsesteknologi, og 3) søger indsigt i
udfordringer og problematikker, som virksomheder støder på i anvendelsen af ERM-konceptet.
Artiklerne er udarbejdet successivt gennem projektets langstrakte forløb, og afspejler derfor
progressionen i konceptuel udvikling og praksisudfordringer, men også i min egen erkendelse.  
Den første artikel er en komparativ analyse af fire ERM-rammeværker, der var fremherskende i
projektets indledende fase. De er efterfølgende sammensmeltet til to, som til gengæld er blevet nutidens
helt dominerende standarder.  Analysens primære konklusion er, at rammeværkerne ikke bidrager til at 
etablere en kobling til de strategiske processer, idet deres indlejrede fokus er rettet mod strategi-
eksekvering, men ikke mod selve strategidannelsen. Det medfører, i modsætning til det konceptuelle
paradigme, at risikostyringsarbejdet begrænses til en negativ risikoopfattelse. Analysen indikerer
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Summary US 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore and analyze the German Judenpolitik in Denmark 
by focusing on the Aryanization of Danish-German trade relations and anti-Jewish policies in 
Denmark from 1937 until August 1943. As a second research goal, it examines the reactions of 
the Danish government to the German Judenpolitik. These goals have been developed into four 
research questions:  
 
1. How was Germany’s ambition to Aryanize its foreign trade developed into concrete 
policies, and how were these policies implemented into Danish-German trade 
relations as part of the German Judenpolitik in Denmark?  
2. How did the German legation assist in formulating and executing the German 
Judenpolitik in Denmark? 
3. How did the Danish government respond to the German Judenpolitik? 
4. Based on the model Stages of Persecution, which stages and forms of Judenpolitik 
can be identified in Denmark during 1937-August 1943? 
 
These are answered by using qualitative and primary historical sources. I therefore apply a 
historical method which is combined with a four tier analytical approach. The overarching one 
is Peter Longerich’s definition of Judenpolitik understood as a tool to describe and analyze the 
complex processes of German anti-Jewish policy and politics. This analytical and thematical 
concept is applied to the Danish-German relationship in the period from 1937 to August 1943. 
This dissertation suggests that two separate analytical terms are used to describe the Danish-
German relationship: collaboration and cooperation. The third analytical approach is the 
perspectives of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders. The main perspective is that of the 
perpetrators understood as the relevant German organizations and actors, but especially the 
German legation in Copenhagen and its top leadership. A secondary perspective is the bystander 
perspective of the Danish government. This dissertation applies a processual bystander view to 
accommodate for the changes in this position over time. The victim perspective is to a lesser 
degree represented but applied when possible. The fourth analytical practice is the application 
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of a ten-stage model: Stages of Persecution. This has been developed by building on previous 
research in order to identify Judenpolitik’s stages of persecution in Denmark. It consists of the 
following stages: 1) informal persecution, 2) formal persecution, 3) definition, 4) identification, 
and registration, 5) exclusion, 6) confiscation and robbery, 7) public stigmatization, 8) forced 
relocation, 9) deportation, and 10) murder. 
Overall, this dissertation shows that the organization the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel 
(RfA) from 1937 an onwards pursued an international Aryanization policy creating racial trade 
barriers which potentially affected companies perceived as Jewish in most countries abroad. In 
Denmark this policy was largely successful as most Danish-Jewish companies were barred from 
trading with Germany or restructured to appease German Aryanization demands. The German 
legation in Copenhagen served as an important partner in this endeavor as it charted, registered, 
and assisted in excluding Danish-Jewish companies trading with Germany. 
Denmark was subject to an intentional and racially motivated Judenpolitik between 1937 and 
August 1943. This mainly aimed at steadily excluding the Jews in Denmark from several areas of 
society, but most notably the business area. It was a patient and informal policy due to the 
nature of the cooperation between Denmark and Germany. In spite of this, a continuous 
progress in the exclusive Judenpolitik is traceable. We can identify the following typical stages 
of persecution in Denmark: informal persecution (stage one), and to a much lesser degree formal 
persecution (stage two). The definition of Jews (stage three), and identification and registration 
of Jews, partly in cooperation with Danish police (stage four). The exclusion of Jews, especially 
through Aryanization measures (stage five), and in one instance forced relocation (stage eight). 
The analysis of the Danish government’s reaction to German Judenpolitik revels a flexibility 
on this policy area which progressively accepted more informal German demands as the war 
progressed. However, a minority within the government was prepared to accept formal anti-
Jewish laws to accommodate for German demands. As a bystander the Danish government thus 
reacted to the German Judenpolitik by increasingly accepting informal German demands as the 
war progressed. From the beginning of 1943 the Danish government administrated a 
discrimination that secured Jews were not hired in higher public positions or the police. 
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Summary DK 
 
Formålet med denne afhandling er at udforske og analysere den tyske Judenpolitik i Danmark 
ved at fokusere på ariseringen af de dansk-tyske handelsrelationer og den øvrige anti-jødiske 
politik i Danmark fra 1937 til August 1943. I tillæg hertil undersøges den danske regerings 
reaktioner på den tyske Judenpolitik. Disse formål uddybes i følgende fire forskningsspørgsmål: 
 
1. Hvordan blev Tysklands ambition om at arisere sin udenrigshandel udviklet til konkrete 
politiske tiltag, og hvordan blev disse gennemført i de dansk-tyske handelsrelationer som 
en del af den tyske Judenpolitik i Danmark? 
2. Hvordan bistod det tyske Gesandtskab i udarbejdelsen og gennemførelsen af den tyske 
Judenpolitik i Danmark? 
3. Hvordan reagerede den danske regering på den tyske Judenpolitik? 
4. Baseret på modellen faser af forfølgelse, hvilke faser og former for Judenpolitik kan 
identificeres i Danmark fra 1937 til August 1943? 
 
Disse forskningsspørgsmål er besvaret ved brug af primære og kvalitative historiske kilder 
gennem anvendelse af en historisk metode, som er kombineret med fire analytiske tilgange. Den 
overordnede tilgang er den tyske historiker Peter Longerichs definition af Judenpolitik, som 
forstås som et redskab til at beskrive og analysere de komplekse processer i den tyske anti-
jødiske politik. Dette analytiske og tematiske begreb er anvendt på det dansk-tyske forhold i 
perioden fra 1937 til August 1943. Denne afhandling foreslår, at der anvendes to overordnede 
analytiske begreber til at beskrive det dansk-tyske forhold nemlig både kollaboration og 
samarbejde. 
Den tredje analytiske tilgang, der anvendes i afhandlingen, er perspektiverne ofre, 
gerningsmænd og tilskuere. Det primære perspektiv er gerningsmændenes, som forstås som de 
mest relevante tyske organisationer og aktører, men dog især det tyske gesandtskab i 
København og dets øverste ledelse. Et sekundært perspektiv er tilskuerperspektivet som 
udgøres af den danske regering. Denne afhandling anvender en processuel tilgang til 
tilskuerbegrebet, fordi det anerkender, at tilskuerpositionen forandrer sig over tid. 
Offerperspektivet er repræsenteret, hvor det har været muligt. Den fjerde analytiske vinkel er 
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anvendelsen af en ti-trins model: faser af forfølgelse. Denne er udviklet ved at bygge på tidligere 
forskning for at kunne identificere den tyske Judenpolitiks faser af forfølgelse i Danmark. Den 
består af følgende faser: 1) uformel forfølgelse, 2) formel forfølgelse, 3) definition, 4) 
identifikation og registrering, 5) udelukkelse, 6) konfiskation og røveri, 7) offentlig 
stigmatisering, 8) tvangsflytning, 9) deportation og 10) mord.  
Samlet set viser denne afhandling, at den tyske organisation Reichsstelle für den 
Außenhandel (RfA) fra 1937 og fremefter forfulgte en international ariseringspolitik som skabte 
handelsbarrierer der baserede sig på de nazistiske raceforestillinger. Denne politik ekskluderede 
potentielt set virksomheder, som fra tysk side blev opfattet som jødiske, fra den tyske 
udenrigshandel i de fleste lande. I Danmark var denne politik i høj grad vellykket, da det 
vurderes, at de fleste dansk-jødiske virksomheder blev udelukket eller omstruktureret for at 
tilpasse sig de tyske ariseringskrav. Det tyske gesandtskab i København var vigtig partner i denne 
bestræbelse, da det bistod med at kortlægge, registrere, og udelukke dansk-jødiske 
virksomheder fra den dansk-tyske samhandel. 
Danmark var generelt set genstand for en forsætlig og racemæssigt motiveret Judenpolitik i 
perioden fra 1937 til august 1943. Denne sigtede hovedsageligt på at ekskludere jøderne i 
Danmark fra flere områder af samfundet, dog primært handelsområdet. Denne politik blev 
gennemført på en tålmodig og uformel måde på grund af karakteren af den dansk-tyske 
samarbejdspolitik. På trods af dette kan der konstateres kontinuerlige fremskridt i den 
ekskluderende Judenpolitik. Vi kan derfor identificere følgende faser af forfølgelse i Danmark: 
uformel forfølgelse (fase et), og i en langt mindre grad formel forfølgelse (fase to). Definition af 
jøderne (fase tre), og identifikation og registrering af jøderne, i et delvist samarbejde med dansk 
politi (fase fire). Udelukkelse af jøder, især gennem ariseringsforanstaltninger (fase fem). I et 
tilfælde konstateres tvangsflytning (fase otte). 
Analysen af den danske regerings reaktion på den tyske Judenpolitik viser, at der eksisterede 
en politisk fleksibilitet på dette område, som bestod i en gradvis accept af flere og flere tyske 
krav om uformelle tiltag rettet mod jøderne. Imidlertid var et mindretal i den danske regering af 
flere omgange parat til at acceptere formel lovgivning rettet mod jøderne for at imødekomme 
tyske krav. Den danske regerings tilskuerposition er derfor karakteriseret ved, at den i stigende 
grad accepterede tyske krav rettet mod jøderne for slutteligt, fra januar 1943, at administrere 
en diskrimination der sikrede at jøder ikke blev ansat i højere offentlige embeder eller politiet. 
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Practical Notes and Abbreviations 
Please note that some of the results of this dissertation has been presented in a Danish article.2  
 
This dissertation is written using the American English language. Footnotes are set using the 
Chicago Manual Style 17th Ed. Full note with the use of Ibid.3 Footnotes are mostly kept in their 
original language unless a specification in English was needed. Online newspaper articles and 
online archival material (digitalized sources) are registered with dates. This means an accessed 
date is not provided, as the article or archival source is dated. (E.g. Aderet, Ofer. “Associated 
Press Admits It Fired or Transferred 6 Jewish Employees at Behest of Nazi Regime in 1935.” 
Haaretz, May 10, 2017. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/ap-admits-it-fired-6-jewish-
employees-at-behest-of-nazi-regime-in-1935-1.5470709.)  
 
As I use several source collections some source numbers are the same. In order to differentiate 
these sources, I have included abbreviations of the source collections in brackets. E.g.   
10. Das Auswärtige Amt an die Deutsche Gesandtschaft [DK-MAG] refers to Danske Magazin 50 
10. Eberhard von Thadden: Notitz [WBK vol. 3] refers to Werner Bests Korrespondance vol. 3.  
(Please, see reference list for full source details on Danske Magazin and Werner Bests 
korrespondance.) 
 
Some footnotes refer to Mediastream. Mediastream is a database of digitalized newspapers that 
is only available onsite at selected libraries in Denmark. I have chosen to consider this source a 
database rather than a web-site. The is also the case for Politikens Online Arkiv, which is paid 
service, and referring to a specific URL or access date will not warrant any usage. 
 
All translations are made by the author unless otherwise indicated.  
 
                                                     
2 Jacob Halvas Bjerre, “Samarbejdets diskrimination,” RAMBAM. Tidsskrift for jødisk kultur og forskning, no. 26 (2017): 107–21. 
3 For a full overview please see The Chicago Manual of Style, Seventeenth edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017). 
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All calculations of historical prices are based on the Danish Statistical Department’s price index 
calculator, which was last up-dated in 2017.4   
 
The words ‘Jew’, ‘Jews’, ‘full-Jews’, ‘half-Jews’, ‘Jewish question’, ‘Entjuding’, ‘Mischlinge’, 
‘Aryan’, ‘Aryanization’ and other words or phrases related to the language and definitions of the 
National Socialist dictatorship are not in inverted commas within the main text. This has been 
chosen in order to avoid an overflow of inverted commas, and in text explanations. I recognize 
the enforced characteristic of these terms which are oblivious to individual claims of identity, 
and part of a definitory language aiming at excluding, ultimately murdering, a constructed 
category of individuals.5  
 
Abbreviations: 
AA: Auswärtige Amt. 
CAU:  The Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel  
DAF: Deutsche Arbeitsfront  
DIIS: Danish Institute for International Studies 
DNSAP: Dansk National Socialistisk Arbejderparti  
DK MAG: Danske Magazin 
NSAP: National Socialistisk Arbejderparti 
DNVP: Deutschnationale Volkspartei 
NSDAP: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei 
NSDAP/ AO: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei /Auslandorganisation 
NSDAP-N: National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei - Nordschleswig  
PA: Politisches Archiv 
RA: Rigsarkivet, Danish National Archives 
RfA: Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel 
RSHA: Reichssicherheitshauptamt 
RuSHA: Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt  
                                                     
4 “Forbrugerprisindeks,” Danmarks Statistik, accessed May 1, 2018, https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/emner/priser-og-
forbrug/forbrugerpriser/forbrugerprisindeks#. 
5 This follows from Frank Bajohr, “Aryanisation” in Hamburg: The Economic Exclusion of Jews and the Confiscation of Their Property in Nazi 
Germany, Monographs in German History, v. 7 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 11. 
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RWM:  Reichswirtschaftsministerium 
SD: Sicherheitsdienst 
UM: Udenrigsministeriet 
VoMi: Volksdeutscher Mittelstelle  
WBK: Werner Bests Korrespondance 
ØK: Østasiatisk Kompagni 
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1 Introduction 
Research on the persecution of Jews in Denmark lacks behind other European countries. 
Subjects, such as looted art and dormant bank accounts, have not been systematically 
investigated in Denmark. The Danish Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies was created in 
2001 following the signing of the Stockholm Declaration, and among the center’s tasks was 
researching “the black spots in our history”. It never began thoroughly investigating themes 
researched in most other European countries. This is mostly attributable to organizational 
amalgamations. The Center was fused into the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 
which had an independent research branch of Holocaust and Genocide studies. However, this 
was cancelled out as part of the regular reshuffling of research themes in 2013. The last 
remnants of the Center largely disappeared as the educational obligations of it were outsourced 
in 2017.6 Its most important historical contribution was the Flygtningeundersøgelsen, which 
examined Danish refugee policies and its consequences between 1933 and 1945.7 
The foundation of the Center followed a European trend to establish national commissions 
investigating Holocaust-related issues. Twenty-three European countries began investigating 
e.g. historical Jewish bank accounts as a consequence of the well-known legal claims against 
Swiss banks in 1996. Countries like Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and even 
neutrals, such as Sweden and Switzerland, were part of this wave.8 These commissions often 
uncovered new sources and reinterpreted a nation’s relationship to Germany especially during 
the period from 1939 to 1943.9 In addition, international research from the 1990s and onwards 
reflects a renewed interest in events preceding the genocide focusing on the social, civil and 
                                                     
6 “Vi vil aldrig glemme. Statsminister Poul Nyrup Rasmussens åbningstale ved den officielle åbning af Dansk Center for Holocaust- og 
Folkedrabsstudier.” Statsministeriet, August 31, 2000, http://www.stm.dk/_p_7677.html; “The Stockholm Declaration,” Levande historia, 
2000, http://www.levandehistoria.se/english/about-us/stockholm-declaration. The Danish Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies was 
first incorporated into the Danish Center for International Studies and Human Rights in 2002, but in 2012 it became part of the Danish 
Institute for International Studies, and used to be an independent research area, which ceased to exist in 2013. The educational efforts on 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies were outsourced in 2017. 
7 Lone Rünitz, Af hensyn til konsekvenserne: Danmark og flygtningespørgsmålet 1933-1940, University of Southern Denmark studies in history 
and social sciences, v. 303 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2005); Hans Kirchhoff, Et menneske uden pas er ikke noget menneske: 
Danmark i den internationale flygtningepolitik 1933-1939, Dansk flygtningepolitik 1933-1945 (Odense: Syddansk universitetsforlag, 2005); 
Hans Kirchhoff and Lone Rünitz, Udsendt til Tyskland: dansk flygtningepolitik under besættelsen, Dansk flygtningepolitik 1933 - 1945 (Odense: 
Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2007); Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke, Demokratiets skyggeside: flygtninge og menneskerettigheder i Danmark 
før Holocaust, Dansk flygtningepolitik 1933-1945, v. 304 (Odense: Syddansk universitetsforlag, 2005) Until 2017 the remnants of the center 
carried out important educational work, which has now been privatized. 
8 Constantin Goschler and Philipp Ther, “A History Without Boundaries: The Robbery and Restitution of Jewish Property in Europe.,” in Robbery 
and Restitution. The Conflict Over Jewish Property in Europe, ed. Martin Dean, Constantin Goschler, and Philipp Ther, vol. 9, Studies on War 
and Genocide (Berghahn Books, 2008), 7. 
9 It was e.g. argued Swiss neutrality had been breached in several areas such as trade and transit of war materials Mario König and Bettina 
Zeugin, eds., Switzerland, National Socialism and the Second World War. Final Report. (Pendo Verlag GmbH, 2002), 508. 
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financial exclusion of the Jews.10  In contrast, the successful flight of 95% of the Danish Jews in 
October 1943 and the events surrounding it remains the focus of most publications in the 
historiography of the Danish Jews during the occupation.11 Besides the Flygtningeundersøgelsen 
only historian Sofie Lene Bak has recently expanded the subject, as well as the time frame, by 
focusing on Danish Anti-Semitism from 1930 to 1943, the exile in Sweden, and the immediate 
return of the Danish Jews after the Second World War.12 In spite of this, historian John T. 
Lauridsen’s  status from 2008 still rings true: 
 
“Research on the German policy against the Danish Jews during the occupation has 
very naturally been concentrated on the action in October 1943 and its immediate 
preconditions. On the other hand, the roughly 3.5 years preceding it have not been 
the subject of a thorough treatment since Leni Yahil published ‘Et demokrati på 
prøve’, 1967.”13 
 
Denmark still struggles with significant research voids, particular when compared to the 
international historiography of the past 25 years. Besides the ones already mentioned (looted 
art and dormant bank accounts) the words of the German envoy Cecil von Renthe-Fink in January 
1942 points towards several additional unanswered questions: 
 
“…we will continue our former policy. Our previous practice, whenever an 
opportunity presents itself to push back the influence of the Jews, or rather to 
                                                     
10 Katharina Stengel, “Einleitung,” in Vor der Vernichtung. Die Staatliche Enteignung der Juden im Nationalsozialismus, ed. Katharina Stengel 
(Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag GmbH, 2007), 9–11; For a thorough presentation see Claus Füllberg-Stolberg, “Sozialer Tod - Bürgerliche 
Tod - Finanztod. Finanzverwaltung und Judenverfolgung im Nationalsozialismus.,” in Vor der Vernichtung. Die Staatliche Enteignung der Juden 
im Nationalsozialismus, ed. Katharina Stengel (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag GmbH, 2007), 31–60; There is an abundant literature on 
this subject as well and one example is Jean-Marc Dreyfus, “The Looting of Jewish Property in Occupied Western Europe: A Comparative 
Study of Belgium, France and the Netherlands,” in Robbery and Restitution. The Conflict Over Jewish Property in Europe., ed. Martin Dean, 
Constantin Goschler, and Philipp Ther, vol. 9, Studies on War and Genocide (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 53–67. 
11 Hans Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, University of Southern Denmark studies in history and social sciences, vol. 464 (Odense: Syddansk 
Universitetsforlag, 2013); Bo Lidegaard, Landsmænd. De danske jøders flugt i oktober 1943. (København: Gyldendal, 2013). 
12 Sofie Lene Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945 (København: Aschehoug, 2004); Sofie Lene Bak, Ikke noget at tale om: danske jøders 
krigsoplevelser 1943-1945, 1. udg., 1. opl. (København: Dansk Jødisk Museum, 2010); Sofie Lene Bak, Da krigen var forbi: de danske jøders 
hjemkomst efter besættelsen, 1. udgave (København: Gyldendal, 2012). 
13 John T. Lauridsen, “Tyske akter vedrørende ‘Jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943.,” ed. Erik Nørr, Danske Magazin 50, no. 2 
(2008): 477“Research in the German policy against the Danish Jews during the occupation has very naturally been concentrated on the action 
in October 1943 and its immediate preconditions. On the other hand, the roughly 3,5 years preceding it has not been the subject of a 
thorough treatment since Leni Yahil published ‘Et demokrati på prøve’, 1967.” //  "Forskning i den tyske politik over for de danske jøder under 
besættelsen har meget naturligt koncentreret sig om aktionen i oktober 1943 og dens umiddelbare forudsætninger. Til gengæld har de knapt 
3,5 år forud ikke fået en dybdegående behandling siden Leni Yahil udsendte “et demokrati på prøve”. Leni Yahil, Et Demokrati på prøve 
(København: Gyldendal, 1967) Published in English with the title: The Rescue of Danish Jewry: Test of a Democracy (New York: Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1969). Leni Yahil (1912-2007) was an Israeli professor. 
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completely eliminate the Jewish influence, will be continued. Also, we shall continue 
to work towards a greater understanding of the Jewish question here.”14  
 
Based on this historical quote, one may ask: How were these eliminatory measures pursued? 
What was the role of the German legation in pushing back the influence of Jews? These 
questions indicate a research gap, which can be filled by a coherent and up-to-date analysis of 
the German policy against the Jews in Denmark during the first years of the occupation. At the 
same time, this would also create the opportunity for a renewed and closer examination of the 
responses of the Danish government to these eliminatory goals. 
This dissertation responds to this call by addressing a subset of these questions. Inspired by 
international research it departs from the traditional focus on the dramatic events surrounding 
October 1943. In the Danish historiography, it thus addresses a largely neglected area of Danish 
history from 1937 to August 1943. It sets out to explore and analyze the German Judenpolitik in 
Denmark by focusing on the Aryanization of Danish-German trade relations and anti-Jewish 
policies in Denmark from 1937 until August 1943. As a second research goal, it examines the 
reactions of the Danish government to the German Judenpolitik.  
The term Judenpolitik was used by the National Socialist dictatorship to describe anti-Jewish 
politics and policies, and it has recently been argued that "Judenpolitik carved out its own 
political territory comparable with that of foreign policy, economic policy..."15 A central part of 
the Judenpolitik in Denmark was Arisierung (Aryanization) and Entjudung (de-jewification). I 
follow German historian Frank Bajohr’s broad definition of the term Aryanization as “a synonym 
for the whole process of economic exclusion of the Jews…”.16 Entjudung is a much older term 
implying Jews were to be baptized and renounce their religion to become members of German 
society. Entjudung during the National Socialist dictatorship came to mean: “A) the step by step 
process of removing Jews, often ending in the complete removal of Jews, from the working life 
[Berufsleben] and the economy B) the abolishment of Jewish influences C) forced sales of Jewish 
                                                     
14 “23. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt,” January 7, 1942, DK MAG“...die bisherige Linie weiterverfolgen. Unsere bisherige Praxis, 
den Einfluss der Juden, wo immer sich eine Gelegenheit dazu bietet, zurückzudrängen bezw. die Juden ganz zu eliminieren, wird fortgesetzt. 
Ebenso wird weiter darauf hingewirkt werden, hier größeres Verständnis für die Judenfrage zu wecken.” 
15 Peter Longerich, Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews (Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4, 17. 
16 Bajohr, “Aryanisation” in Hamburg, 11 note 2. Dejudaisation (Entjudung) is used as a synonym. For a thorough discussion of the 
development of the term see; Ingo Köhler, Die “Arisierung” der Privatbanken im Dritten Reich: Verdrängung, Ausschaltung und die Frage der 
Wiedergutmachung, 2nd., Schriftenreihe zur Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte, Bd. 14 (München: Beck, 2008); The usage of 
Aryanization is rejected as too imprecise to be used by Christoph Kreutzmüller, Final Sale in Berlin: The Destruction of Jewish Commercial 
Activity, 1930-1945, English-language edition (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015). 
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business and confiscation of valuables D) deportation and murder of Jews.”17 I will apply 
Aryanization, Entjudung, and exclusion as synonyms, but Aryanization will mostly be used to 
describe the exclusion of Jews from the economic sphere. 
In the existing Danish literature (see section 1.1.3. for a full review) Aryanization is only 
present as a sub-theme in a few titles, but by drawing these together Aryanization appears to 
be the result of a more coherent German policy.18 This becomes even more evident if we draw 
in the works of Swedish researcher Sven Nordlund, who identifies and examines German 
Aryanization policies in Sweden.19  
Aryanization was part of the Judenpolitik in Denmark and we therefore need to address it 
within this context, but as already noted research on Judenpolitik in Denmark in the period at 
hand is largely based on research from the late 1960s. A full overview of the historiography is 
provided in section 1.1.2, at this point it should suffice to mention that on both Judenpolitik and 
the Danish Government’s reactions to it, we clearly lack a renewed historical analysis, which 
combines new sources and recent source collections.20 
 
1.1 State of the Art 
This section briefly reviews recent research in Danish occupation history in order to place the 
following review sections on the Danish historiography on Judenpolitik and Aryanization in 
context. This section concludes by reviewing the international literature on Aryanization in 
German foreign trade, which also provides an important context for this dissertation.   
                                                     
17 Daniela Schmidt and Dirk Schuster, “»Entjudung« – Wort, Phänomen, Programm. Zur Verwendungsgeschichte eines Begriffes,” PaRDeS. 
Zeitschrift der Vereinigung für Jüdische Studien 22 (2016): 168–70, 178 The term can be traced back to 1807. 
18 Ole Brandenborg Jensen, Besættelsestidens økonomiske og erhvervsmæssige forhold: studier i de økonomiske relationer mellem Danmark og 
Tyskland 1940-1945, University of Southern Denmark studies in history and social sciences 309 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2005) 
Chapter 2; Jacob Halvas Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945, University 
of Southern Denmark studies in history and social sciences, vol. 501 (Odense: Syddansk universitetsforlag, 2015), Chapter 4. 
19 Sven Nordlund, “Albikiades eller Akilles? Ariseringen i Sverige och reaktionerna på denna.,” Historisk Tidskrift (SWE) 125, no. 4 (2005): 575–
607; Sven Nordlund, “‘Tyskerne själva gör ju ingen hemlighet av detta.’ Sverige och ariseringen av tyskägda företag och dotterbolag,” Historisk 
Tidskrift (SWE) 125, no. 4 (2005): 609–41; His main piece is Sven Nordlund, Affärer som vanligt: ariseringen i Sverige 1933-1945 (Lund: Sekel, 
2009). 
20 The following have not yet been applied to a full examination of Judenpolitik in Denmark John T. Lauridsen, Werner Bests korrespondance 
med Auswärtiges Amt og andre tyske akter vedrørende besættelsen af Danmark 1942-1945, 10 vols. (Kbh.: Det Kongelige Bibliotek : Selskabet 
for Udgivelse af Kilder til Dansk Historie : i kommission hos Museum Tusculanum, 2012); Lauridsen, “Tyske akter vedrørende 
‘Jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943.”; John T. Lauridsen and Joachim Lund, eds., Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar 
Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1. udgave, vol. 1, 3 vols. (København: Historika, 2015); John T. Lauridsen and Joachim Lund, eds., 
Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 1. udgave, vol. 2, 3 vols. (København: Historika, 2015); John 
T. Lauridsen and Joachim Lund, eds., Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1943, 1. udgave, vol. 3, 3 vols. 
(København: Historika, 2015). 
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1.1.1 Recent Research in Danish Occupation History 
Research into the occupation period has since the 1990’s largely focused on the many grey 
areas of the cooperation, including a special focus on selected groups that in one way or another 
are cast as supporters of Nazism. Many independent and minor government funded projects 
have also shown the consequences of cooperation. We now recognize Denmark’s steady supply 
of food to Germany accounting for e.g. 14% of Germany’s meat consumption in the critical years 
of 1943-1945.21 Recent research shows Denmark was ranked 6th among countries importing to 
Germany. Imports from Denmark to Germany were worth 3.577 million RM and surpassed 
Sweden by five places on a ranked list.22 Most research has centered on the overall trade 
relationship with Germany, while some industry-focused studies have explored individual 
industries, namely, contractors and the farming industry.23 The use of slave labor by some Danish 
companies engaged in occupied Europe has been revealed, and this has resulted in 
compensation funds being established for former slave laborers.24 
Works on those who are categorized as supporters of Nazism range from political parties to 
women who dated German soldiers. These research contributions highlight the tendency to 
focus on groups or individuals who are portrayed as having crossed a moral line by supporting 
the dictatorship.25 The most recent works include a review of the approximately 50 medical 
doctors who supported Nazism by enlisting as SS-Soldiers or otherwise. A recent study on the 
German minority in Copenhagen also focused on the Danish branch of the National Socialist 
German Worker's Party's foreign branch Auslandorganisation (Organization of Foreign Affairs, 
NSDAP/AO).26 The most recent publication focusing on an individual is the memoirs of the well-
                                                     
21 Joachim Lund, “The Wages of Collaboration. The German Food Crisis 1939-1945 and the Supplies from Denmark.,” Scandinavian Journal of 
History 38, no. 4 (2013): 480–501. 
22 Sweden was 11th. on the list exporting for a value of 1.583 mill. RM. Norway was 16th on the list and Switzerland 14th. Jonas Scherner, “Der 
deutsche Importboom während des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Neue Ergebnisse zur Struktur der Ausbeutung des besetzten Europas auf der 
Grundlage einer Neuschätzung der deutschen Handelsbilanz,” Historische Zeitschrift 294/2012, no. 1 (February 2012): 112–13 The reference 
is to the statistics. The article revolves around the reconstruction of the actual import figures. 
23 Steen Andersen, De gjorde Danmark større: De multinationale danske entreprenørfirmaer i krise og krig 1919-1947 (Lindhardt og Ringhof, 
2005); Steen Andersen, Danmark i det tyske storrum: Dansk Økonomisk Tilpasning til Tysklands nyordning af Europa 1940-1941 (Lindhardt og 
Ringhof, 2003); Joachim Lund, Hitlers spisekammer: Danmark og den europæiske nyordning, 1940-43 (København: Gyldendal, 2005); Mogens 
R. Nissen, Til fælles bedste - det danske landbrug under besættelsen (Lindhardt og Ringhof, 2005); Jensen, Besættelsestidens økonomiske og 
erhvervsmæssige forhold: studier i de økonomiske relationer mellem Danmark og Tyskland 1940-1945; Philip Giltner, In the Friendliest 
Manner: German-Danish Economic Cooperation During the Nazi Occupation of 1940-1949, Studies in Modern European History, v. 27 (New 
York: P. Lang, 1998). 
24 Lund, Hitlers spisekammer, 224–27, 318–21. 
25 John T Lauridsen, ed., Over stregen under besættelsen (København: Gyldendal, 2007); John T. Lauridsen, Dansk nazisme 1930-1945 - og 
derefter (Gyldendal, 2002); Anette Warring, Tysker piger (København: Gyldendal, 1994) Republished in 2017. 
26 Andreas C. Johannsen, Danske læger under nazismen (København: Gyldendal, 2016); Ole Brandenborg Jensen, Landesgruppe Dänemark: 
NSDAPs udlandsorganisation i Danmark ca. 1932-1945, University of Southern Denmark studies in history and social sciences, vol. 547 
(Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2017). 
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known (in Denmark) Danish SS-volunteer Søren Kam, who murdered a Danish editor in 1943. 
The Danish government requested his extradition several times, yet repeating German 
governments refused this.27 In this body of literature, I should like to highlight the research 
dealing with the Danish volunteers in the SS, which hinted at compliance in the Holocaust by 
Danes. It was pioneered in 1998 and recently revisited in 2014.28 This caused the Simon 
Wiesenthal Center to demand legal action against the few SS volunteers still alive and triggered 
a public debate. However, demands were eventually rejected by the Danish Judicial system.29 
The occupation remains a popular theme in many areas of Danish society but it is by and large 
characterized by individual efforts and interests, rather than larger and collaborative research 
projects. 
1.1.2 Research Review on the Historiography of Judenpolitik in Denmark 
Scholarly attention to Judenpolitik in Denmark has mostly centered on events related to the 
action against Jews in Denmark on the night of the 1st and 2nd of October 1943. The 
approximately 480 Jews who were deported to the concentration camp Theresienstadt and the 
rescue of most of them by the white buses campaign has also seen a fair share of research.30 As 
a result of this many of the answers explaining why most Jews successfully escaped to Sweden 
have already been provided by previous research. 
The flight was successful due to a host of determinants thoroughly summed up by Danish 
historian Hans Kirchhoff in 2013.31 The Jews were warned of the pending action against them by 
the shipping expert at the German legation Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz. His warning was 
disseminated throughout the Jewish minority of 7,000 who mostly lived in the Copenhagen 
area.32 Most Jews reacted by immediately attempting to flee while others went into hiding with 
                                                     
27 Mikkel Kirkebæk and John T. Lauridsen, eds., Et liv uden fædreland: Søren Kams erindringer (København: Lindhardt og Ringhof, 2015). 
28 Claus Bundgård Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Peter Scharff Smith, Under Hagekors og Dannebrog. Danskere i Waffen SS 1940-1945, 2. 
ed. (København: Aschehoug, 2001); Therkel Stræde and Dennis Larsen, En skole i vold. Bobruisk 1941-1944. Frikorps Danmark og det tyske 
besættelsesherredømme i Hviderusland. (København: Gyldendal, 2014). 
29 Kim Faber, “91-årig dansk tidligere nazi-vagt slipper for sag om krigsforbrydelser,” Politiken, November 4, 2016, 
http://politiken.dk/indland/article5649306.ece. 
30 Hans Sode-Madsen, De hvide busser. 1941-1945. Reddet fra Hitlers helvede. (København: Lindhardt og Ringhof, 2015); Bo Lidegaard, 
Redningsmænd - skandinaviske aktioner for at redde fanger fra tyske kz-lejre i krigens sidste år (København: Politikens Forlag, 2015); The last 
chapter in Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 201–99. 
31 Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 27–30 He mentions: There was a small number of Jews, most Jews lived in Copenhagen, the time of the 
action was late in the war, the Swedes accepted the Danish Jews ad resistance groups could assist in the rescue. The Danish Nazi party was 
small and not decisively supported by Germany. The occupying forces were rather passive and the cooperation between Denmark and 
Germany also played a role. 
32 For a full account see Hans Kirchhoff, Den gode tysker: Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz: de danske jøders redningsmand, 1. udgave, 1. oplag 
(København: Gyldendal, 2013), 154–78. 
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the assistance of unknown helpers.33 The combination of the short distance to Sweden and a 
more yielding Swedish refugee policy allowed for the Jews to enter Sweden.34 
It has been increasingly recognized that the preconditions for the successful flight also rested 
on a series of German factors. The warning being the most important of these. In addition, the 
German police was ordered to refrain from using forced entry during the roundup, and the 
German Navy remained passive as most Jews succeeded in crossing the narrow sound.35 
International researchers continue to suggest that the German actions were part of a conscious 
policy aimed at gaining good-will with the Danish government by letting the Jews escape.36 
Danish researchers have largely rejected this explanation. However, most do recognize that 
many of the important preconditions for the flight were due to German decisions and 
reactions.37 
One of the most important preconditions highlighted is the nature of the cooperation 
between Denmark and Germany. Often a shield analogy is used to describe how the cooperation 
protected Danish Jews, while Israeli Historian Leni Yahil pointed to a specifically Danish and 
democratic mindset.38 The latter has been largely rejected by Danish and international 
historiography despite a recent, but brief revival.39 Yet, the shield analogy of the cooperation 
has been maintained in the literature.40 It stresses that from a German perspective the main goal 
was to uphold Danish food exports to Germany as well as using the country as an example of 
                                                     
33 Sofie Lene Bak, “Altruisme og Holocaust: Jødeforfølgelserne i Danmark og Italien; en sammenligning,” RAMBAM. Tidsskrift for jødisk kultur 
og forskning 8 (1999): 74–87. 
34 A nearby neutral country did not guarantee a flight possibility e.g. Switzerland only accepted 2.000 Jews from 1939-1945 König and Zeugin, 
Switzerland, National Socialism and the Second World War. Final Report., 110. 
35 Sofie Lene Bak, “Jødepolitik i Danmark: Deportation eller uddrivelse? Den tyske faktor i redningen af jøderne i oktober 1943,” in Nyt lys over 
oktober 1943, ed. Hans Kirchhoff (Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2002), 17–18. 
36 Gunnar S. Paulsson, “The ‘Bridge over the Øresund’: The Historiography on the Expulsion of the Jews from Nazi-Occupied Denmark,” Journal 
of Contemporary History 30, no. 3 (1995): 431–64. Paulsson argues the rescue was mostly possible due to a conscious German strategy to 
accept the Jews fled. His focus on the perpetrators does seem to have pointed Danish researchers in that direction. ; Recently, this argument 
has been traced back to Yahil’s work, while British intelligence sources support the argument the German’s consciously let the Jews escape. 
Please see, Orna Keren-Carmel, “Another Piece in the Puzzle: Denmark, Nazi Germany, and the Rescue of Danish Jewry,” Holocaust Studies 
24, no. 2 (2017): 174–76. 
37 Bak, “Jødepolitik i Danmark: Deportation eller uddrivelse? Den tyske faktor i redningen af jøderne i oktober 1943,” 17–18. 
38 Yahil, Et Demokrati på prøve, 22–23 Yahil seems to be the first to use the shield analogy. 
39 The idea of a specific Danish mind-set was picked up in Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. (New York: 
New York Viking Press, 1965), 175. This idea was refuted by Robert O. Paxton and Michael R. Marrus, “The Nazis and the Jews in Occupied 
Western Europe 1940-1944.,” The Journal of Modern History 54, no. 4 (1982): 710 who stressed a host of other factors. It was described as a 
myth in Sofie Lene Bak, “Between Tradition and New Departure: The Dilemmas of Collaboration in Denmark.,” in Collaboration with the Nazis. 
Public Discourse after the Holocaust., ed. Roni Stauber, Routhledge Jewish Studies Series (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 122–23; 
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how European countries could exist under German domination. These overall goals secured that 
the Germans accepted that formal anti-Jewish laws were not adopted in Denmark. I largely agree 
with this perception, still I would highlight historian John T. Lauridsen’s point that “it would be 
erroneous to stress that the Auswärtiges Amt…because of its special interest to maintain 
influence in Denmark protected or defended Denmark against anti-Jewish measures. In all of 
Europe the AA participated in solving the Jewish question and in Denmark too.”41 This does 
indicate that the image of the cooperation functioning as a shield for the Jews at least could be 
discussed. 
Central to understanding Judenpolitik in Denmark are the two Reichsbevollmächtigten: the 
diplomat Cecil von Renthe-Fink and his successor from November 1942, the SS-
Obergruppenführer Werner Best. Best had relocated to the AA after losing a career struggle with 
Reinhard Heydrich as head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA). In the literature, Renthe-
Fink is largely presented as a loyal career diplomat without political ambitions and in opposition 
to national socialism.42 He is often described as cooperating with the Danes to prevent anti-
Jewish measures from being implemented in Denmark.43 This perception probably traces back 
to Leni Yahil’s acceptance of Renthe-Fink’s postwar explanations. These are on par with the AA’s 
self- perception after the war according to which the AA functioned as a stronghold against 
Nazism.44 Renthe-Fink was not in the category of extreme perpetrators, but he has recently been 
characterized as adaptable to the policies of National Socialism, and German research has 
pointed to the anti-Semitic elements of his worldviews.45  However, this has not been tied into 
the research showing that Renthe-Fink was involved in promoting anti-Semitism in Denmark as 
well as supporting the registration of Jews.46 Despite these findings it remains a characteristic of 
                                                     
41 Det vil være fejlagtigt at betone, at Auswärtiges Amt...på grund af sin særlige interesse for at bevare indflydelse i Danmark, beskyttede eller 
forsvarede Danmark mod jødeforholdsregler. AA medvirkede overalt i Europa til løsning af jødespørgsmålet, også i Danmark...” Lauridsen, 
“Tyske akter vedrørende ‘Jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943.,” 478. 
42 Corinna Franz, “Cecil von Renthe-Fink,” Der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: Neue Deutsche 
Biographie (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003), 438–39; Henning Poulsen, “Cecil von Renthe-Fink,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: 
Gad, 2005), 302–3. 
43 For one example see Bak, “Jødepolitik i Danmark: Deportation eller uddrivelse? Den tyske faktor i redningen af jøderne i oktober 1943,” 16. 
44 Yahil bases her analysis of Renthe-Fink on a postwar correspondence in which he manages to convince her of his good intentions. One 
example is his argument that he only pretends to initiate economic policies against the Jews in order to buy time and satisfy a radical Berlin. 
Yahil, Et Demokrati på prøve, 76; Lauridsen also points to Yahil’s problematic acceptance of Renthe-Fink’s explanations see Lauridsen, “Tyske 
akter vedrørende ‘Jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943.,” 480; For a description of the AA’s self perception please see Eckart 
Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 1. Aufl (München: Pantheon, 
2012), 12. 
45 Lauridsen, “Tyske akter vedrørende ‘Jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943.,” 482; Conze et al., Das Amt und die 
Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 245. 
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the literature that it mostly focuses on Renthe-Fink’s successor Werner Best in regards to 
Judenpolitik in Denmark. This can probably be attributed to the fact that research has focused 
on events related to October 1943. 
German historian Ulrich Herbert has repeatedly shown that Werner Best was an academic 
who should be characterized as a radical and ideologically convinced supporter of National 
Socialism. In addition, Herbert revealed Best as the key legal aid to former members of the 
Gestapo and the RSHA in postwar trials.47 These arguments been embraced by Danish research, 
where Best was recently characterized as an ideologically convinced desk murderer who overall 
worked towards the political destruction of Denmark. However, Best was not in a hurry and 
tactically cooperated with the Danish government as long as it benefitted Germany.48 
Cecil von Renthe-Fink and Werner Best are both credited with keeping the Jewish question 
out of Denmark, and they are often depicted as being in opposition to an undefined and 
supposedly “radical” Berlin.49 At the same time research has shown that the policies of Renthe-
Fink and Best were continuously approved by both Joachim von Ribbentrop and Heinrich 
Himmler.50 In some ways this seems to create a paradoxical argument which could also be 
applied to argue that there was agreement on the Judenpolitik in Denmark between 
Copenhagen and Berlin. 
The small amount of research on Judenpolitik in the period from April 1940 to August 1943 
has identified crucial turning points, which coincide with crises in the Danish German 
relationship. The Danish signing of the anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941 is one of those 
peaks as Hermann Göring told the Danish foreign minister Erik Scavenius that Denmark would 
also have to settle the Jewish question at some point. In his memoirs Scavenius states that he 
told Göring that the Jewish question in Denmark was non-existent, and he would also pass this 
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message on to the Swedish envoy Gustav von Dardel.51 Yet, it should be noted that the internal 
minutes of the Danish civil servants present in Berlin do not provide evidence of such a denial.52 
The signing of the pact caused demonstrations against the Danish government and pressure 
from the Danish National Socialists to raise the Jewish issue, while a failed arson attempt against 
the main synagogue in Copenhagen occurred. The concerns were serious as the Minister of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, Vilhelm Fibiger, was sent to calm the Jewish congregation. However, the 
actual discussions among the government on these issues remain undisclosed.53 
The second point of escalation is the so-called Telegram Crisis of September 1942, apparently 
caused by Hitler’s rage against King Christian X. The King had received a greeting card on his 
birthday but had only thanked Hitler for it with a brief reply. This enraged Hitler who recalled 
Cecil von Renthe-Fink who was replaced by Werner Best a month later. The Germans demanded 
changes in government, and Erik Scavenius became Prime Minister while also serving as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, Ribbentrop wanted to deport the Jews of Denmark as well 
as in Bulgaria and Hungary. However, nothing came of this suggestion in any of the three 
countries.54 
Leni Yahil was the first to briefly identify the attempts to remove Jews from higher ranking 
public positions during these crises periods. She also revealed that in November 1942, Erik 
Scavenius supported this move and the initiative to prevent Jews from appearing on the radio.55 
Danish researchers have shown how Werner Best specifically warned against promoting Jews 
and giving Jews air time on the radio.56 These measures are often described over a page or two 
in the literature and Scavenius’ readiness to accept these steps appear largely unrecognized.57 
Instead, this willingness is interpreted the way the government would legitimize them at the 
time: as a precautionary measure to avoid harsher measures against the Danish Jews. 
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Besides the basic timeline accentuated by the two crisis periods, other areas have been 
identified such as Danish police’s racial examinations of Danish citizens. However, the issue has 
not been further researched and there is little reflection on the possible consequences of this 
registration. Instead the main source behind this important disclosure has been used as an 
example of Danish German cooperation.58 In addition, the Danish police’s involvement in racial 
categorization has not been tied to the knowledge of the German registration of at least 2,000 
Danish Jews.59 These findings have only slightly altered the main perception of the registering of 
Danish Jews, which is often dated to August 1943 and tied to the action in October.60 
The most thoroughly researched theme in this field is Danish anti-Semitism. Yahil’s brief 
analysis of the Danish variant of anti-Semitism remained unchallenged until the subject was 
revisited by Sofie Lene Bak in 2004. She followed the theme in several specific environments and 
organizations, and Bak was the first to show that the issue of race was more prevalent in 
Denmark in this period than previously acknowledged.61 In researching the archives of the 
Danish Anti-Jewish League and the weekly Kamptegnet, which was the Danish equivalent to the 
German Der Stürmer, Bak provides us with several examples of physical incidents of anti-
Semitism and points to the involvement of Danish Nazi organizations in acts of vandalism in 
November 1941.62 Her research unequivocally shows the presence of various kinds of anti-
Semitism in Denmark, which had been ignored by previous research. 
The attitude of the Jewish minority in Denmark, which was mainly controlled by the 
leadership of the congregation, requires a thorough reexamination. Yahil sees the congregation 
as aligned with the Danish government, and showed that it never began planning for the worst.63 
Few other historians have examined the congregation, and the most recent evaluation follows 
Yahil’s conclusion,64 while others represent more contesting views.65 Supreme Justice Judge Carl 
Bertel Henriques (C.B. Henriques) was head of the congregation, and it should suffice to cite and 
paraphrase his own perception on the period in order to underscore the congregation’s 
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leadership’s attitude at the time. To C.B. Henriques his role was to navigate through the war and 
his advice to scared members was to “Live just as you do now, and do nothing, because anything 
can promote repressive actions, and that hurts the Danish government, which has enough 
challenges.”66 It has been argued the leadership thus tied its destiny to the Danish government.67 
In conclusion, the congregation largely followed and trusted the advice of the Danish 
government. 
1.1.3 State of the Art – Aryanization in Denmark 
Aryanization in Denmark has not been thoroughly researched, but by combining the existing 
literature, which focuses on other subjects, Aryanization presents itself as a theme deserving 
more attention. Leni Yahil is again a pioneer when arguing that the German occupiers were 
reluctant to exclude the Jews from the economy, and she does point to the German Chamber of 
Commerce (GCC) as registering Jewish businesses. However, she recognizes that she has been 
unable to follow through on the theme due to a lack of statistics.68 
In recent years, it was in particular Sofie Lene Bak who revisited the issue. In her book on 
Danish anti-Semitism, she points to the GCC as a central organization in these matters, and 
shows how the issue of race had been discussed in some trade organizations. She showed that 
a willingness existed to take over contracts from Jewish companies and representatives as some 
companies specialized in such take-overs. While pointing to government reactions in Sweden 
and Norway, Danish ones were not examined, as it was not the main focus of her research.69 In 
her later work, she briefly illustrates, the predicaments of small Jewish businesses and draws out 
the contours of a more extensive Aryanization campaign.70 
Danish historian Ole Brandenborg Jensen has touched upon Aryanization in two books.71 He 
partly outlines the basic progress of Aryanization in Denmark and identifies some of the main 
organizations involved. The GCC is identified as the main organization involved in registration 
and Aryanization measures in Denmark. Brandenborg Jensen shows that a structure for 
Aryanization existed before the war as 3,600 Danish businesses were racially categorized by the 
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GCC on behalf of the German legation. However, he refrains from examining the role of the 
German legation, and inaccurately argues that structured Aryanization began in Denmark only 
in November 1942. He also shows that the NSDAP/AO was involved in examining Jewish 
companies in Denmark. In addition, he reveals that the GCC received specific guidelines from 
the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel (RfA) on how Mischlinge and even persons married to Jews 
were not to enter into contracts with German companies. Based on this he argues that similar 
guidelines regarding Jews probably existed, but he has not examined the RfA further.72 
It should be addressed that Ole Brandenborg Jensen does not include national and 
international research on Aryanization into his books. Unfortunately, this leads to conclusions 
which are outdated and flawed. This is especially prevalent in his second book where he e.g. 
mistakenly argues that German agents carried specific Hellenic inspired names, although 
Swedish historian Sven Nordlund in 2005 showed that these were actually part of a code 
language used by the RfA to categorize Aryan and Jewish companies. Brandenborg Jensen also 
concludes that the Danish minutes of the meeting in the Danish-German trade committee in 
1938 have been destroyed, although they have been used and analyzed in previous research.73 
In addition, he ignores the earlier works of both Leni Yahil and Sofie Lene Bak mentioned above. 
  In an earlier book I have shown how Aryanization in Denmark was part of the Foreign 
Ministry’s concerns and that it became a publicly debated issue, while also providing a few cases 
of Aryanization.74 The Danish government largely failed to protect its Jewish business minority 
before the occupation and largely forfeited protecting it in late 1940.75 This work lacks the 
adaptation of Yahil’s works as well as an important source collection.76 It also omitted the recent 
work on the Danish Film Industry which showed how Jews in the industry were discriminated 
against during the period 1933-1945. Lars-Martin Sørensen explains how contracts were 
cancelled, and Danish-Jewish actors were excluded from the industry before and after the 
occupation. Incidentally, Sørensen does not incorporate any of the previous research in 
                                                     
72 Jensen, Besættelsestidens økonomiske og erhvervsmæssige forhold: studier i de økonomiske relationer mellem Danmark og Tyskland 1940-
1945, 87–92, 112–14, 119; Jensen, Landesgruppe Dänemark: NSDAPs udlandsorganisation i Danmark ca. 1932-1945, 201–4. 
73 For the conclusion on codes and the minutes see Jensen, Landesgruppe Dänemark: NSDAPs udlandsorganisation i Danmark ca. 1932-1945, 
203–4, 206–7. Codes names are addressed in Nordlund, “Albikiades eller Akilles? Ariseringen i Sverige och reaktionerna på denna.”. The 
Danish minutes are analyzed in Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945, 
86–88. 
74 see chapter four in Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945. 
75 See chapter four in ibid. 
76 Lauridsen, “Tyske akter vedrørende ‘Jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943.” 
 32 
Aryanization.77 If combined, these works do suggest that Aryanization and Entjudung was more 
prevalent than previously recognized. 
1.1.4 State of the Art: Aryanization in the Foreign Trade 
Influential for our knowledge on the attempts to Aryanize German foreign trade was research 
originating from Sweden. Although counter-intuitive, research on Danish Aryanization can profit 
immensely from incorporating these results more systematically. In the wake of the public 
debates on Jewish assets in Swiss banks, Sweden commissioned a formal investigation in the 
existence of possible Jewish assets in Swedish banks. To the commission’s surprise they found 
that Aryanization attempts in Sweden were known by both the government and the public.78 
The commission’s findings in this area has been picked up by Sven Nordlund in several 
publications.79 
Nordlund shows that the German attempts to Aryanize their foreign trade began in 1937 and 
spanned all over Europe. He pinpoints the RfA as the main organization behind mapping Jewish 
businesses with the assistance of German diplomatic entities. This took place by using an 
elaborate set of codes which were used to racially categorize businesses abroad. In Sweden, 
German subsidiaries, and companies with Jewish management or ownership were targeted for 
Aryanization.80 To remove Jews from a Swedish company, the RfA and the German legation or 
German consulates in Sweden would apply a pressure e.g. the threat of terminating contracts. 
The German Chamber of Commerce in Sweden was assisted in these measures as well. 
Information on Jewish individuals was obtained from information bureaus as well as other 
Swedish businesses, but Nazi sympathizers would also assist in this endeavor.81 
Nordlund identifies 1940 as a turning point in the RfA as it tightened its policies to secure that 
all German business connections with Jews were to be severed. Swedish companies were 
approached by German authorities who pressured the companies to Aryanize. Otherwise they 
risked losing their import and export rights with Germany or their authorization to sell German 
goods. In addition, Swedish companies were required to sign a declaration supporting a Europe 
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without Jews. The Swedish government investigated Aryanization in 1939 and found that 
Göteborg’s chamber of commerce was contacted six to seven times a week on the matter. 
Nordlund concludes that this indicates a large number of Swedish companies were being 
investigated on the basis of race.82 
Nordlund characterizes the reactions of the Swedish government as tied to the progress of 
European events. Before the Second World War, Aryanization was a publicly debated issue and 
the Swedish Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler would in December 1938 speak strongly against it 
in a public speech. Nordlund argues that the speech was used to set the stage for the up-coming 
trade negotiations between the two countries and the debate quickly subsided. Nordlund shows 
that the speech had international consequences as it sparked a British inquiry into the matter 
and forced Germany to cease their Aryanization attempts in Great Britain. The Swedes also 
learned that Aryanization attempts had occurred in Denmark since 1937.83 
As war set in, Sweden’s imports and exports related to Germany rose to 80% from 1941 to 
1943 leaving Sweden fully dependent on trading with Germany. The main goal for Sweden was 
to maintain trade and avoid provoking Germany, which resulted in a concession policy during 
the first half of the war period.84 Nordlund argues that the Jewish minority was largely 
unprotected against Aryanization measures and describes events as “business as usual”.85  
Nordlund's work is a pioneer study into the subject of Aryanization in Sweden, as well as in 
presenting the important European scope of German Aryanization policies. It provides many 
important insights and openings for a more detailed study on how many companies were 
Aryanized and registered as well as the role of the German legation in Sweden. Nordlund pointed 
to the RfA as the central organization on international Aryanization, but with his intended focus 
on Sweden he did not undertake a more thorough examination of the RfA. 
In addition to Nordlund’s work, two articles shed further light on the RfA’s activities.86 They 
both center on the prominent German political theorist Theodor Eschenburg and his 
involvement in Aryanizations in Austria and the Danish company Knapp-Union. Knapp-Union was 
run by a German emigrant whose company had undergone Aryanization in Germany in 1938. 
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Theodor Eschenburg was a leading member of the Prüfungsstelle Bekleidungsindustrie 
(Vorprüfstelle Knopf- und Bekleidungsindustrie).87 He travelled to several countries, including 
Denmark and Sweden, possibly to discuss matters locally with representatives from the German 
legations.88 The articles show how elements of the practical work of international Aryanization 
took place. In conclusion, research in the international Aryanization policies emanating from the 
RfA has been identified, but still contain several unexplored opportunities. 
1.2 The Danish-German Relationship 
Central to the period from 1933 to 1945 is the Danish-German relationship, which continues 
to be a point of discussion especially on the occupation period. We should begin by briefly 
recapturing events before moving on to the debates on categorizing, and understanding 
Denmark’s relationship with Germany.  
It is generally accepted that Denmark followed a policy of neutrality in the period before the 
occupation on April 9th 1940. This was an attempt to repeat the country’s successful strategy of 
neutrality during the First World War when Denmark had capitalized on trade by selling goods 
to both warring parties.  The claims of the German dictatorship in the 1930s to incorporate 
German minorities was an ever-present concern for the Danish government as the country 
harbored a German minority in the border areas of Jutland. The issue moved to the top of the 
agenda as Germany took over Austria in the spring of 1938 and annexed the Sudetenland, a part 
of the former Czechoslovakia, in the fall. Germany’s territorial claims were backed by a rising 
military force, and while the conservatives in Denmark wanted to strengthen the military this 
was rejected by the Social Democratic-led Government. Denmark found itself militarily isolated 
as Great Britain declined to assist and talks of a Nordic military alliance fell through in 1937. 
Without allies, and anxious of Germany’s ambitions, Denmark signed a pact of non-aggression 
with Germany on May 31st, 1939.89  
The military attack on Denmark and Norway was codenamed Weserübung and began in the 
early morning hours of April 9th, 1940. The battle for Denmark only lasted hours, while the 
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Norwegians capitulated on the 10th of June.90 Denmark officially accepted the German 
explanation for the attack: it was not intended to violate Danish neutrality or political 
independence. Denmark was occupied and the historical term for the period remains 
besættelsestiden – the Occupation Period. 
International research still debates if Denmark’s diplomatic status should be categorized as 
neutral or in a state of war with Germany.91 Most Danish historians argue that Denmark was not 
in a state of war with Germany92, and Denmark is often described as being neutral, neutral 
occupied or peacefully occupied. This perception is historiographically termed as the peaceful 
occupation, (fredsbesættelsen) or the fiction of neutrality/sovereignty (Neutralitets- og 
suverænitetsfiktionen). Denmark was, also by contemporaries during the war, viewed as a 
special case compared to the rest of occupied Europe.93 It has recently been argued that the 
political actors of the period presented Denmark’s status in a diplomatically flexible manner 
ranging from neutral, non-belligerent, peacefully occupied and belligerent. The various 
applications of these terms were dependent on the developments of the war. For example, 
neutrality was mostly used in the beginning of the war, while being a belligerent was used to 
side with the Allies at the end of the war. The term peaceful occupation stands out, as it has 
largely been adopted in historiography. However, it was originally coined and used by the Danish 
government in 1940 to justify the country’s position. The term became dominant as it was used 
to describe Denmark’s international legal position by Den Parlamentariske Kommission (the 
Parliamentary Commission) which postwar examined and exonerated the Danish politicians’ role 
during the war.94 Further, it has been convincingly shown that historiography has largely ignored 
the war time voices from the leading politicians who spoke of breaches of neutrality or of 
Denmark being in a state of war.95 
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Contrary to other occupied countries, Denmark dealt directly with the German Foreign Office 
in matters relating to the occupation. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the connecting 
link to the occupiers, and most communication took place through it, but many minor and 
practical matters were solved without the involvement of the ministry.96 From a German point 
of view historian John T. Lauridsen argues that the German occupation policy in essence 
remained consistent until December 1943. He argues the main difference from a German 
perspective were who they negotiated with after the government stepped down in August 1943. 
He of course acknowledges the German take-over of combatting the Danish resistance 
movement as well as the removal of the Danish armed forces. However, the overall German goal 
remained the same: to maintain as much stability as possible and to avoid introducing a new 
German occupation policy.97 Likewise, Philip Giltner points to a remarkable consistency in the 
German-Danish relationship in the economic sphere, which lasted throughout the war.98 
In Danish historiography the arrangement between Denmark and Germany has caused 
continuous discussion on which term is the most suited to describe this relationship. The most 
dominant term is cooperation, while the discussions surrounding the term collaboration has 
influenced recent definitions of cooperation. In the following I will outline the discussions on the 
terms cooperation and collaboration in Danish historiography in order to show how they in 
recent definitions emerge as amalgamated. By bringing in recent international discussions, 
which questions the use of collaboration, I will end this section by defining the two terms 
separately for the use in this dissertation. 
1.2.1 The Use of Cooperation in Danish Historiography 
In recent Danish historiography, cooperation, or samarbejdspolitik, is the most widely used 
term but it lacks solid definition. It has been aptly pointed out that using cooperation “will only 
offend few, as everyone can place whatever meaning they want into it.”99 The origins of the 
term samarbejdspolitik (cooperation) traces back to the coalition governments of the four major 
Danish political parties the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne), the Social-Liberals, (Det 
Radikale Venstre), the Conservatives (de konservative) , and the Liberals (Venstre) during the 
                                                     
96 Klaus Kjølsen, “Udenrigstjenesten,” in Dansk Forvaltningshistorie II. Folkestyret forvaltning fra 1901-1953, ed. Knudsen, Tim, vol. 2 (Jurist - og 
Økonomforbundet, 2000), 764; Lidegaard, Overleveren, 1914-1945, 402. 
97 Lauridsen, Tysk besættelsespolitik i Danmark 1940-1945 : en introduktion til kilder og litteratur, 65–66. 
98 Giltner, In the Friendliest Manner: German-Danish Economic Cooperation During the Nazi Occupation of 1940-1949, 168. 
99 Lund, Hitlers spisekammer, 14–15“Da støder man kun få, for alle kan lægge i ordet, hvad de vil.” 
 37 
war.100 In this sense it could be argued that it has the connotations of a national union between 
these parties. On the other hand, the resistance movement criticized the government’s policies 
for aiding Germany and used the term as a critique.101 Using the term cooperation in 
historiography used to signify the standpoint that the Danish government had struck a morally 
or politically inappropriate deal with the occupiers.102 Cooperation has also been divided into 
passive and active for at least forty years, but this division appears somewhat undefined and 
rarely applied.103 In my opinion, Danish historiography still seems to struggle in defining the 
meaning of cooperation as it is applied as a value free term by historians.104 In turn, this might 
also explain its wide usage. 
1.2.2 The Use of Collaboration in Danish Historiography 
The opposite can be observed with regard to the term collaboration. It is not widely used but 
has seen some theoretical advancements based on the international literature.105 The term was 
introduced into Danish historiography in 1979 by historian Hans Kirchhoff in an attempt to 
internationalize the subject in Denmark. Despite few and important works building on it, 
Kirchhoff in 2015 concludes that it “never adapted into consensus Denmark, neither in the public 
nor among historians”.106 In spite of this, the introduction of collaboration has over time resulted 
in the removal of the term “Policy of negotiation” (forhandlingspolitik) from historiography. This 
term had been coined by Erik Scavenius, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1940 to 
1943 as well as Prime Minister from November 1942.107 The term was used by many historians 
who wanted to distance themselves from the popular views of the politicians as being German 
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friendly or even traitors.108 The few important attempts to apply collaboration in Danish 
historiography has brought us closer to understanding the motives of especially the political and 
economic elites as well as the intentional and unintentional consequences of their choices.109 
Kirchhoff divides collaboration into either ideological or enforced collaboration. He e.g. places 
local Nazi Parties and German minority groups working to incorporate Denmark into Germany 
in the category of ideological collaboration.110 Enforced collaboration removes the element of 
choice, prompting other historians to point to the fact that it was a conscious choice to 
collaborate.111 This developed a focus on the political and socio-economic elites who, within the 
structures of collaboration, maintained the power to make choices or as it was termed by 
historian Henrik Dethlefsen an elite that “still had the power and willingness to use it – despite 
the pressures of occupation”.112 It has been suggested to divide these choices into being either 
adaptive or reluctant. Adaptive choices mean to accommodate German wishes before they were 
made in order to gain political good-will; reluctant choices were made to stall the progress of 
German policies as well as to gain time.113 In a sense these two are located within the attempts 
to identify what the motives for collaboration were. These motives are described as the 
fundamental wish to protect the bureaucratic framework and population while maintaining a 
reasonable material standard of living. In addition, the wish to maintain power under the duress 
of occupation and the attempts by other groups to gain power has also been pointed to as a 
characteristic of collaboration.114  
Hans Kirchhoff has labelled the motives for collaboration as “the ethics of the lesser evil”,115 
in order to acknowledge the extreme pressure and limited options the collaborating politicians 
were facing. However, he stresses the fact that in both a European and Danish perspective the 
collaborating governments never followed through on their threats of stepping down. Instead, 
they fought for any remnant of the nation or the state’s sovereignty which could and should be 
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defended. Kirchhoff has labelled this the “inertia” of collaboration, while others have termed it 
the “logic of collaboration”. Danish politicians were well aware that their situation could become 
worse or even untenable, and this was an enforcing factor in the logic of collaboration. Meaning 
there was always a remnant of democracy to defend, which prevented a break-away from 
collaboration.116 This logic remained in place in Denmark for the duration of the occupation even 
though the government seized to function after the uprisings of August 1943, they were still 
consulted by the civil servants who kept the administration running. Yet, as a telling testament 
to Kirchhoff’s point the politicians attempted to form a new collaborative government in August 
1943 that only failed because the political parties feared losing public support.117 
In some ways the terms collaboration and cooperation have increasingly become 
synonymous in Danish historiography, while there has been attempts to re-define collaboration 
in order to remove the negative meaning of the word. Historian Aage Trommer (1930-2015) e.g. 
argues that technically speaking cooperation was collaboration. Later, he geographically split the 
terms’ usage into a Danish area (cooperation) and international area (collaboration).118 Joachim 
Lund posits “…collaboration is to be understood as cooperation in the value free sense of the 
word.”119  Steen Andersen argues like-wise that “collaboration…will…be applied as the neutral 
term for a cooperation…”.120 Most recently historian Therkel Stræde understands cooperation 
“as the Danish political system’s, the businesses’, and the population’s collaboration with the 
occupying forces”.121  
The Danish-German agreement resembles other forms of relationships between Germany 
and other European countries during the Second World War, and there have been several 
attempts at defining and categorizing occupied, collaborationist, neutral or allied states in order 
to point to differences and similarities.122 Collaboration has seen many international, but 
especially German, definitions as well as categorizations. In the historiography on occupation 
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during the Second World War collaboration comes across as the most theoretically debated 
term. At the same time there has been an increasing tendency to point to national peculiarities 
as well. In the international literature there is a current debate on the usability of the term 
collaboration.  
It has been suggested that the many theoretical discussions on collaboration reflect a 
fundamental problem: the meaning of collaboration is still associated with postwar trials and 
treachery.123 The historians who promote the use of cooperation argue the term collaboration 
has instead become a hurdle for historical analysis. This is because collaboration is often part of 
national discourses which places collaboration in opposition to patriotic reactions, while ignoring 
the many blurred lines between collaboration and resistance which occurred from the end of 
1943 and onwards.124 
The international researchers who suggest using cooperation and the ones who have applied 
collaboration in Danish historiography are in in several ways attempting to examine the same 
mechanisms. They both stress that the focus area is on the relationship between Germany and 
the occupied state, while the proponents of using cooperation underscore this term could be 
applied to examine the reactions of states who were not occupied.125 They both point to the 
German need for local cooperation which was often situated with local elites who intended to 
administrate, keep a lid on resistance, and maintain order.126 Historians using both collaboration 
or cooperation acknowledge that the overall circumstances for the relationship between 
occupier and occupied changed with progress on the battlefields seeing more adaptability in the 
in period from 1939 to 1942/43 compared to the last years of the war.127 
1.2.3 Defining Collaboration and Cooperation  
Inspired by these important international and national debates on collaboration and 
cooperation I will define the two terms separately. Collaboration is to be understood as support 
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of the occupying forces for reasons of personal self-interest or ideological conviction. 
Cooperation is the conscious acceptance of most political and socioeconomic elites to cooperate 
with representatives of Nazi Germany in a passive or activist manner. This was done in order to 
preserve political power from challengers on both sides of the political spectrum, while 
attempting to save Denmark’s political structures as well as maintaining material levels. These 
motives justified accepting increasing German demands in a self-enforcing logic of cooperation, 
which created unforeseen results. 
Passive cooperation is to understood as a policy which is used to gain time in order to 
preserve society, and active cooperation is to be understood as accommodating the occupier. 
Preferably, before demands were made in order to accumulate political goodwill. Unforeseen 
results mean, that while cooperation might have had specific intentions, the outcomes of these 
could differ from these.  
1.3 Judenpolitik  
Within the context of the cooperation between Denmark and Germany, this dissertation 
focuses on the area of race policies as a core component of Nazi ideology. Nazism’s racial ideas, 
and especially their anti-Jewish core, are often perceived as one of the most central and 
important characteristics of the Third Reich. One of the first publications to underscore this view 
was Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann’s book: The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945, 
in which they examine race as the main force behind most social policies. Their conclusion was 
that National Socialism wanted to redesign society on a global level according to the Nazi racial 
criteria. The racial ideas were not new but were reshaped “into a comprehensive program for a 
racial new order. Without a doubt, racial anti-Semitism was the key element in a program 
designed to achieve the ‘recovery’ of the ‘Aryan Germanic Race’”.128 Racial anti-Semitism is to 
be understood as a term describing a political conviction which was based on the belief that 
humans could be divided into races, while at the same time employing the stereotypes 
attributed to Jews by previous forms of anti-Semitism.129 Numerous studies have shown how 
the racial question became a pivotal policy area for most German organizations during the era 
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of Nazism.130 The term Judenpolitik was applied by the National Socialist dictatorship to describe 
anti-Jewish policies. 
Judenpolitik has been applied by many researchers but German historian Peter Longerich 
expands it in his book “Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews.”131 In the title 
and in his introduction, he defines Judenpolitik as “a term to describe and analyze the complex 
process of the persecution of the Jews”132 and dates it as having taken place from 1933 to 
1945.133  The years from 1933 to 1939 are seen as preparatory as Judenpolitik was developed as 
a policy area and saw the build-up of the organizational structures which became central to 
deploying it.134  
In order to build an analytical foundation for the use of Judenpolitik, Longerich identifies the 
following binaries, which dominate Holocaust research: intentionalism/structuralism, 
situation/disposition, center/periphery, and rationality/ideology.135 The 
intentionalist/structuralist debate divide the analysis into two areas. The intentionalists focus 
on the intentions of Hitler and his close associates, pointing to a master-plan of murdering the 
Jews tracing back to the end of the First World War. The structuralists, on the other hand, stress 
the bureaucracy as a key-factor in initiating and formulating policies against the Jews, which 
turned into a “process of radicalization” without knowing the end result would be the murder 
of the Jews.136 The Situation/disposition debate offered two explanations for perpetrators’ 
participation in mass murder based on the same set of sources. Daniel J. Goldhagen argues the 
reasons for killing Jews were to be attributed to an anti-Semitic disposition engrained in the 
killers’ environment since childhood.137 Christopher Browning employs a sociological approach 
focusing on situational factors such as peer pressure.138  Longerich welcomes more recent 
perpetrator research as it attempts to locate a perpetrators mind-set, initiative and 
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maneuverability within a specific contextual setting opposing the earlier depictions of 
anonymous desk-perpetrators.139 Centre/periphery studies claim to have been divisive in 
emphasizing either rationality or ideology. For example, the use of Jewish forced labor can be 
viewed “rationally” to secure production, while the ideological argument dictates an 
interpretation of mind-set.140 Longerich finds that these pairs have become too one-dimensional 
for a meaningful analysis of Judenpolitik. Instead, he synthesizes them into being mutually 
dependent in their analysis of the same problem: to explain the complex processes of the 
persecution and murder of the European Jews. 
Longerich boils intention and structure into one by placing the emphasis on human agency. 
An agency which has intentions and functions, while also being central to creating bureaucratic 
structures. The center and periphery studies are likewise linked to one another as regional 
initiatives are viewed as important contributions to the development of centrally issued policies. 
The rational and material elements such as confiscations of assets and e.g. forced labor are 
combined with the ideological arguments which legitimized these actions. According to 
Longerich the material policies in turn served as a proof of the success of the ideology.141 
By fusing the opposing standpoints, Longerich foregrounds the complexities of Judenpolitik, 
and essentially turns Judenpolitik into a meaningful and applicable meta-term. This serves as my 
starting point for the analytical and methodological approach in this dissertation. In order to 
stress the complexities of the term Longerich disposes of the idea to date when a decision to 
murder Europe’s Jews was taken, which was a main question of the Holocaust literature in the 
latter half of the 1990’es as well as the beginning of the 2000s.142 Longerich regards it as a futile 
question to answer, as it does not acknowledge the varied developments of Judenpolitik. 
Instead, attention should be directed at the complexities and inter-linkages with other policies, 
he argues. This idea builds on his findings in Politik Der Vernichtung143 from 1998 in which he 
located the escalating phases of the Judenpolitik. He especially showed how genocidal ideas 
were part of the decisionmakers’ mindset from 1939-1941, and combined them with their 
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application in a murderous campaign against a variety of Germans deemed racially inferior as 
well as the mass-murders of Polish citizens. 
There is a semantic problem in translating Judenpolitik as the German term “Politik” is two 
separate English terms: Policy and politics. Policy is understood as the long-term goals and 
strategies used to reach the utopia of a racially purified society by using measures of “exclusion, 
segregation and elimination of the Jews”.144 Longerich argues, this utopia was the very idea of 
National Socialism, which was to be reached for Germany and its’ people to fulfil their assumed 
potential. Longerich equates Judenpolitik with other recognizable areas of politics such as 
foreign- and social politics. He does so in order to underscore its importance and to place it 
within the context of political dealings. This means that Judenpolitik became an area which 
competed with other political  areas, but also influenced them greatly: as “the National Socialists 
tended to understand traditional political fields…in a racist manner and to redefine them along 
racist lines”. This means the policy of Judenpolitik to a greater or lesser extent became part of 
all political areas. In turn, the term politics is to be understood as the practical implementation 
of these policies.145  
Policies adopted the National Socialist idea of a racially purified society in a multitude of ways. 
Yet, Longerich highlights the fact that they were subject to both internal and contextual factors 
as well as being extremely complex in their interlinkages with other political areas. This means 
an analysis focusing on areas of Judenpolitik needs to take several factors into account. 
Judenpolitik functioned in an ever-changing political context, which caused tactical changes. 
Judenpolitik could thus be altered, withdrawn or accelerated if needed – it could even be 
contradictory, Longerich argues. To analyze the complexities of Judenpolitik it needs to account 
for German policies and alliances in occupied Europe. An analysis must also account for how the 
racial ideas became part of other areas in the contexts of e.g. trade and food issues.146  
 In addition, such an analysis must consider how perpetrators, victims and bystanders 
reacted. To Longerich perpetrators are “active protagonists who could operate on their own 
initiative and understand intuitively what the leadership required of them”. Implementing 
Judenpolitik commanded consensus on the basic principles in order to function, while also being 
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supported by parts of the population. Longerich also suggests that the actions and behaviors of 
victims and bystanders became increasingly important as the war progressed. He further 
underscores that focusing only on a perpetrator perspective after 1942 is unsatisfactory as the 
reactions of the other two groups increasingly affected Judenpolitik. A last subject to be 
considered in an analysis of Judenpolitik is the possible persecution of other groups.147 
In the context of this dissertation, Judenpolitik is understood as a tool to describe and analyze 
the complex processes of how German policy and politics related to Jews and their 
discrimination unfolded in Denmark from 1937-1943. In applying the descriptive and analytical 
term of Judenpolitik to the relationship of Denmark and Germany means to incorporate other 
policy areas, which affected Judenpolitik, as well as taking the political context, at any given time, 
into consideration. It should be stressed that Judenpolitik in general developed differently within 
the German dominated continent and could be scaled up or down at various instances. Since 
Raul Hilberg introduced the three categories of victims, bystanders, and perpetrators in 1992, 
they are used by most researchers in the field to gain differentiated perspectives on the events 
from 1933-1945.148 An exploration and analysis of the Judenpolitik in Denmark will also apply 
these perspectives in various degrees. 
1.4 Victims, Bystanders, and Perpetrators  
Raul Hilberg presented victims, bystanders, and perpetrators as three groups that 
experienced the events from 1933-1945 in distinct ways and applied their own set of attitudes 
and reactions towards them.149 These categories have become highly successful and are applied 
by almost all researchers who examine this period.150 The main perspective of this dissertation 
will be that of the perpetrators. Perpetrator research today is nuanced taking the organizational 
frameworks into account, while also acknowledging human intent, personal restrictions, and 
possibilities. The bureaucrats, or Schreibtischtäter, desk perpetrators, are no longer seen as just 
the proverbial cogs in an anonymous bureaucratic setting. Instead, the boundaries of initiative 
are examined, while there is also a clear tendency to analyze which initiatives came from the 
bureaucracy rather than from the top echelons of the Nazi party. Focus now rests on the 
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interchanging ideas between Berlin and locally situated organizations and individuals, in the 
development of both anti-Jewish policy and the murder process.151 
The main perpetrator groups in this dissertation are identified as primarily the organizations 
of the AA and RfA and to a much lesser degree the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (RWM) and 
NSDAP/AO. For the region of Denmark, the central perpetrator group is the German Legation 
(Gesandtschaft) in Denmark, but the focus lies mainly on analyzing Cecil von Renthe-Fink’s role 
(1937 to September 1942) and Werner Best’s (November 1942 to August 1943).  Clearly, the 
murder process did not ensue in Denmark, and the focus is on the perpetrator’s role in the 
development of the exclusive elements of Judenpolitik. 
 I acknowledge that this is an unbalanced analytical perspective, which is justified by the need 
to first focus on the groups and individuals that had the power to formulate and enforce the 
Judenpolitik in Denmark. I would argue that the insights to be gained from this perspective will 
provide for a firmer base for future research to thoroughly analyze the consequences for the 
victims, as well as their reactions. On the other hand, some sections of this dissertation are 
devoted to the categories of bystanders and victims. 
The understanding of the bystander category during the Holocaust has seen an increasing 
recognition of the complexities associated with defining and evaluating this category. The 
evaluation of the bystander role has been broadened, and the bystander is rarely described as 
only having two options: to assist or not. It has been suggested that in evaluating the bystanders’ 
options one has to focus on locating and describing the limitations of the bystanders’ actions.152 
The definition of the group itself appears difficult due to the relatively long time period of twelve 
years, while it geographically centers on the European continent. However, international 
bystanders were found in both Shanghai and the USA. Countries which both enforced strict 
refugee policies by having fixed limits on the number of refugees they would accept. At the same 
time bystanders range from individuals to governments in varied contextual settings, which 
often affected bystanders.153 
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To accommodate for these difficulties recent research suggests to clearly define the groups 
examined, and take on a processual view of the bystander(s) in order to acknowledge the 
circumstantial variations which took place in a dynamic historical setting.154 This has opened up 
for acknowledging the possibility of e.g. switching categories from bystanders to perpetrators, 
but also from bystanders to helpers.155 Robert M. Ehrenreich and Tim Cole argue that the 
category shift occurs when bystanders, often in a gradual process, assist the perpetrators to 
reach the perpetrators’ goals. On the other hand, perpetrators become bystanders if they stop 
aiding these goals or assist victims in e.g. hiding.156  The process analysis has been applied in a 
recent examination of Swedish refugee policies. This study concluded that Sweden slowly 
progressed from being a bystander nation employing discriminatory measures, which limited 
the number of Jewish refugees, only to initiate rescue initiatives later in the war.157  
Following the recommendations of international research in this area the Danish government 
is identified as part of the group of bystanders in this dissertation, which over time saw several 
changes (see appendix one). It operated with the following intentions and limitations:  
 
“The intention of the government policy was to maintain as much of the nation’s 
sovereignty as possible, and to secure the population and the democratic institutions 
against Nazification and German violence and against other disasters of the war. The 
measure was adaption to German demands and neutrality in the battle of the great 
powers”.158 
 
 The Danish government thus cooperated to reach these goals within the limitations of 
negotiation set by the German occupiers. Germany viewed this cooperation as being for the 
benefit of Germany in the period at hand due to e.g. the Danish exports. (See above). 
The victim category is a much less disputed area, but discussions of victim hierarchies and 
genocides have seen their share of discussions in relation to memorial representations and the 
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uniqueness of the Holocaust.159  In comparison to the perpetrator and bystander groups there 
will be less focus on the victims in this dissertation, but there will be several cases illustrating 
the predicaments of, especially, the Danish-Jewish business community. 
1.5 Stages of Persecution 
The persecution and murder of the Jews is largely viewed as a non-linear process. Longerich 
and others have shown that Judenpolitik in the 1930’s was mainly an attempt to push the Jews 
to emigrate from Germany. The onset of war began a motion towards a formalized policy with 
the intention to murder the Jews. This was developed during the murder of disabled German 
citizens and the killing of Polish intellectuals.160 
All areas under German domination were subject to either formal or informal forms of 
Judenpolitik. A wide array of Holocaust literature points to the importance of bureaucratic rules 
and hierarchy in the persecution and murder of the Jews, while underscoring that these formal 
rules were subject to independent self-initiative and local variations.161 Indeed, corruption, 
bribery, and spontaneous shooting sprees stand in contrast to formal rules.162 It has also been 
pointed out that informal measures often were just as effective as formally constructed 
bureaucratic measures in e.g. the area of Aryanization.163 Similarly, local exclusive measures 
against Jews in Germany were often ahead of national ones.164 
 In the context of the Holocaust the formality is bound in the legal, intentionally 
discriminatory, and anti-Semitic laws and decrees. These are mostly found in the Western 
European countries, but also in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. In contrast, Poland, Ukraine, 
the Baltics, and the conquered parts of the USSR were subject to many of the same measures as 
in countries with anti-Jewish laws and decrees, but more often than not this was in an informal 
manner. Overall, the killing of the Jews was never formulated in a legal context, but rather 
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ordered within a military structure, while murders were already commencing. One example is 
Himmler’s order on the 19th of July 1942 to murder the Jews of the General Gouvernement after 
having visited Auschwitz. However, the extermination camp of Chełmno, using air tight trucks as 
mobile gas chambers, had already been in use from the end of 1941, and from March 1942 the 
Belzec extermination camp was murdering Jews in gas chambers.165  In essence the genocide 
itself remained in a sense legally informal, but within a highly recognizable modus operandi. 
The flexibility of the informal and formal measures has been pointed to as being a trademark 
in the development of the persecution and murder of the Jews as it was tied to the importance 
of local circumstances.166 However, we should recognize that whether the measure was formal 
or informal it was always tied to prejudice as “…prejudice is crucial to the understanding of any 
case of genocide and the persecution of minorities. When genocide occurs, it is because a certain 
group has been singled out, turned into “the other”. Its victims are not randomly chosen.” 167 
Raul Hilberg might have said it best; “In the final analysis, the destruction of the Jews was not so 
much a product of laws and commands as it was a matter of spirit, of shared comprehension, of 
consonance and synchronization”.168 In this sense, and despite the non-legal Entjudung 
measures in Denmark, they were still aimed at a well-defined minority within the confines of the 
idea to remove or destroy the Jews. 
In order to provide a general overview of the most common phases of Judenpolitik I present 
a ten-phase model that categorizes the different elements of Judenpolitik. This is done in order 
to identify the various stages of persecution, which can be identified in Denmark. It expands on 
Raul Hilberg's four phases of definition, expropriation, confiscation and murder.169 In addition, 
it draws much inspiration from Gregory Stanton’s ten stages of genocide developed to identify 
and locate genocides in order to prevent them.170 The ten-phase model, Stages of Persecution,  
presented below is to be understood as a general tool to identify elements of Judenpolitik.171 
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The phases are not static and do not necessarily follow a set order rather, they are overlapping, 
happening simultaneously, or are skipped. Clearly, the national varieties in Judenpolitik are not 
contained in these stages as each country had a unique contextual setting often highly 
dependent on the relationship with the occupier, which to some extent shaped the response to 
persecution and murder of Jews. Just looking at Scandinavia reflects this diversity. In Denmark, 
persecution remained informal, in a legal sense, and went directly to the deportation phase. In 
Norway most phases were implemented through the collaborative nature of the Quisling 
government, while in Sweden the informal Aryanization attempts seem to have been the only 
phase employed.  
 
1. Informal persecution172 
Informal persecution emanates from specific groups, but it can be promoted and initiated by 
official parts of the bureaucracy, the police or the military. If that is the case persecution often 
presents itself as well-organized and expansive. There were many forms of well prepared and 
organized informal persecution measures during the Holocaust, but most notably were the 
deportations and mass-murders which were never formal in a legal sense. 
2. Formal Persecution 
The formal organization came from a host of bureaucratic entities which supported the 
judicial persecution of the Jews in creating and developing the anti-Jewish laws and decrees as 
well as taking the legal steps needed within the confines of these laws. 
3. Definition 
Defining whom to persecute is a necessary prerequisite for any discriminatory measure. The 
Nazi-German definition of who was Jewish was defined in the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, despite 
legal persecution taking place before 1935. The Nuremberg laws were later expanded to 
encompass two categories of so-called mixed-bloods (Mischlinge) the categories being defined 
as follows: 
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 A Jew had 3 or 4 Jewish grandparents. 
 Mischlinge of the 1st degree had two Jewish grandparents. 
 Mischlinge of the 2nd degree had one Jewish grandparent. 
 
On the surface, the definition was a blood-related one, but when defining whether a 
grandparent was Jewish or not, the definition became much more uncertain and essentially 
religious. The German Interior Ministry argued in November 1935 that race was still at the core 
of the laws, but due to the practical work in assessing who was Jewish or not, it was decided that 
a person who belonged to the Jewish religion also belonged to the Jewish race. In essence, this 
somewhat undermined the racial biological argument. Definitions in other countries followed 
the Nuremberg definitions, but could adopt local variations.173  
The Nazi dictatorship had a monopoly on defining who was Jewish. This was neither a 
personal nor a religious decision, but rather imposed on the individual from the outside.174 In 
the history of the Holocaust, there are numerous examples of people who never regarded 
themselves as Jewish, but by definition of the dictatorship were categorized as Jewish 
nonetheless. This was e.g. the case for Christians who had Jewish grandparents. 
4. Identification and registration 
After defining whom to persecute the identification and registration of individuals, and later 
companies, was needed in order to initiate discriminatory measures against them. Identification 
and registration were completed in several ways, such as a legal demand to register oneself, 
search for Jewish names in publications, or the use of confiscated lists from Jewish congregations 
or organizations. This information was often used to create elaborate registries of both Jews and 
Jewish companies. 
5. Exclusion 
This phase is characterized by the attempt to exclude all Jews from public life and the 
economy. Both formal and informal initiatives often targeted Jews in positions on state or 
regional level, but also Jews in prestigious positions in society such as professors, lawyers and 
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doctors. Companies were also targeted as well as Jews in the performing arts. Jews were also 
excluded from pursuing formal education in many instances. Later came the geographical 
exclusion from e.g. parks, restaurants and hotels. 
Aryanization overlaps phase five and six. It is a main theme of this dissertation and therefore 
it will be described in depth here. The term is regarded as problematic, however it remains the 
most widely used term which will be defined as measures designed to exclude the Jews from the 
economy and to transfer Jewish owned property to Aryans.175 In order to contextualize 
Aryanization we need to briefly revisit its development in Germany. Recent research has 
characterized Aryanization as coming from below, essentially being informal, until Germany 
absorbed Austria in March 1938 and a series of state laws were issued to formalize the 
process.176  
Before the spring of 1938 Aryanization involved different actors and had regional 
characteristics while the national government would only intervene if foreign affairs were at risk. 
This was the case if local Aryanization attempts e.g. targeted businesses with international 
ties.177 Half of the approximately 100.000 Jewish companies were closed or sold before being 
legally required to do so for various reasons, but the risk of persecution has been identified as a 
major contributor to these sales.178 It was e.g. a dominant characteristic of sales that prices went 
down as persecution intensified.179 
On the 14th of June 1938, the definition of Jewish companies and assets came into effect 
through the third addition to the Nuremberg Laws, and it has been characterized as the starting 
point for judicially based racism in the economy. The definition of Jewish companies was as 
follows: 
 
 There was one Jewish owner or partner in the company 
 There was one Jewish board member in the company 
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 25% of the stock was owned by Jews 
 Half or more of the votes belonged to Jews 
 The company was considered 'under practically Jewish influence' 
 A subdivision was regarded as Jewish if a Jew headed it.  
 
The phrase ‘under practically Jewish influence' is a very flexible category and should be 
viewed as presenting the possibility for discrimination in various situations. It should be noted 
that the definition in some cases made it simple to convert a company from Jewish to Aryan, as 
replacing a board member could be sufficient.180 
The Night of Broken Glass, or Kristallnacht, occurred on the night from November 8th to 9th 
1938. During that night, most Jewish stores and synagogues were destroyed or damaged all over 
Germany. It was staged and mainly perpetrated by the regime who attempted to frame it as the 
people’s revenge for the murder of the German diplomat Ernst vom Rath in Paris by the young 
Herschel Grynszpan, who was Jewish. Kristallnacht had numerous consequences for the Jews, 
but for Jewish businesses it is generally considered the final push. It became illegal for Jewish 
businesses to exist in specific business areas. 
as of the 31st of December 1938, while it became fairly impossible for the rest to maintain a 
business. Industrial enterprises and real estate owned by Jewish companies as well as their 
securities could be ordered to be sold by a given deadline. In essence these laws opened for the 
total liquidation of all Jewish businesses in Germany.181 
Most Aryanization initiatives and laws developed in Germany were later reformulated as laws 
and decrees in occupied Western Europe. This often occurred with the cooperation of the local 
administrations, but with local variations. For example, the valuables of the Norwegian Jews 
were kept in Norway to pay for the administration, while in the Netherlands the process was 
never completed, as 1,000 Jewish companies still existed in 1945. A marked characteristic of the 
Aryanization in Western Europe is the cooperation of national banks and administrative organs 
in the process.  The occupied Eastern areas were subject to a much more haphazard and informal 
process of Aryanization. Other aspects of Aryanization besides the confiscation of business or 
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transfer of business assets include the confiscation and robbery of personal belongings, such as 
money, jewelry, furniture, art, real estate, land, bank accounts, stocks and pensions. The 
complicity of local populations in buying or taking over Jewish assets and companies has been 
labelled a form of economic anti-Semitism.182 
6. Confiscation and Robbery 
The robbery of Jewish assets in all variations usually took place during all stages of the 
Holocaust in some form, but usually after registration of Jews and companies. Often it began on 
a small scale and was continuously increased. Wealth and other valuable assets were confiscated 
either partly or as a whole. This process took the formal form of taxation laws targeting Jews, 
forced deposits of wealth, bonds and stocks, but also laws demanding sales of property and real 
estate. Laws against owning specific items such as e.g. bicycles or radios were also applied. At 
the same time laws removed the rights to insurance payments and pensions. Informally the 
robbery took place in many instances from 1933 in enrichment searches by NSDAP members. 
Later, the “wild” enrichment raids were carried out in the proverbial East in local areas, the 
ghettoes, and the camps.183 After deportation, sales or robbing of Jewish homes would often 
take place. Even after the murder (stage ten) gold teeth were extracted from the bodies and 
some corpses were exploited for medical purposes. Proof of death was sometimes applied to 
secure valuables in other countries. 
7. Public Stigmatization 
Jewish individuals and business were stigmatized through publicly wearing or displaying a form 
of the star of David, which varied in design. Businesses were legally required to display their 
racial category by 1938, but earlier boycott attempts had identified most of these. For individuals 
the public stigmatization was first introduced in Poland in 1939 and in Germany in September 
1941.184  
8. Forced relocation 
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Forced relocations, forced concentrations and ghettoization took place in most countries as Jews 
were forced to move to designated areas. Afterwards these would often be forcibly moved to 
transit camps or ghettoes, which increased their concentration. Ghettoes were most prominent 
in Eastern Europe where the number of Jews were the greatest. The ghettoes were run by Jewish 
councils who would mostly enforce the decrees from their captors. The ghettoes were over time 
closed as the “inhabitants” were deported and the last larger ghetto, Lodz, was only closed in 
May 1944, and its “inhabitants” deported.  
9. Deportation 
After forced relocation the next step would often be deportation to a killing site. Deportations 
took place all over Europe and mostly by train. Poland was the primary destination as the two 
main ghettoes, Warszawa and Lodz, as well as the six extermination camps were located here. 
Jews were also to deported to the Baltic areas where extensive shootings took place. Many 
European Jews were deported to Poland, while Jews in Poland were taken to a ghetto or directly 
to an extermination camp. The Jews in the Baltics and the occupied parts of the former USSR 
were often murdered close to their home and were rarely deported. 
10. Murder 
The genocide of the Jews was done through shootings, use of gas vans, the exterminations 
camps, in concentrations camps and through the so-called death marches. The first 
Einsatzgruppen, killing squads, would kill leading members of the polish society in 1939. These 
squads would follow the advancing army into Russia to round up the Jews and shoot them. These 
units were often assisted by gas vans and this type of killing was also applied in the first 
extermination camp Chełmno. The other extermination camps had gas chambers. Auschwitz and 
Majdanek used the toxic cyklon B gas, while the others used the exhaust gasses from large 
engines. Jews were also murdered in the concentration camps through a conscious starvation 
and overworking regime. In these camps Jews were subject to arbitrary violence and medical 
experiments. As the eastern front closed in on the camps in Eastern Europe most “prisoners” 
were forced to walk to camps located in Germany. These have been labelled death marches as 
thousands died or were murdered. It is estimated that between five and six million Jews were 
murdered during the Holocaust.  
1.6 Analytical Approach and Research questions  
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This dissertation sets out to explore and analyze the German Judenpolitik in Denmark by 
focusing on the Aryanization of Danish-German trade relations and anti-Jewish policies in 
Denmark from 1937 until August 1943. As a second research goal, it examines the reactions of 
the Danish government to the German Judenpolitik. The analytical approach applies 
Judenpolitik, cooperation and the perspectives of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders as well 
as the model Stages of Persecution – all discussed in sections 1.2-1.5 above. This analytical 
approach will be applied to answering the following research questions: 
 
1. How was Germany’s ambition to Aryanize its foreign trade developed into concrete 
policies, and how were these policies implemented into Danish-German trade relations 
as part of the German Judenpolitik in Denmark?   
2. How did the German legation assist in formulating and executing the German 
Judenpolitik in Denmark? 
3. How did the Danish government respond to the German Judenpolitik? 
4. Based on the model Stages of Persecution, which stages and forms of Judenpolitik can be 
identified in Denmark during 1937-August 1943? 
 
1.7 Method 
The research questions will be answered by examining a host of primary historical sources. 
These are interpreted through a three-step historical method of 1) source criticism 2) 
triangulation, and 3) hermeneutics.185  This method will be briefly described below. 
As a consequence of the fact that historical sources are often preserved in a fragmentary or 
partly manner, source criticism is applied to establish validity by identifying the circumstances 
of their creation like e.g. author and date as well as contextual circumstances.186 This includes 
evaluating the author(s) of the sources for bias as well as credibility.187 Triangulation refers to 
an application of validation through data comparison within the social sciences. However, 
historians also apply triangulation by using several sources and secondary literature. This is done 
                                                     
185 Matthias Kipping, R. Daniel Wadhwani, and Marcelo Bucheli, “Analyzing and Interpreting Historical Sources: A Basic Methodology,” in 
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186 Ibid., 306. 
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in order to detect additional sources which contradict and confirm the findings. Generally, there 
is a high emphasis on sources written as close to events as possible in order to avoid 
“retrospective bias”.188 
The hermeneutic approach in history is to be understood as a contextual historical 
interpretation of meaning in texts.189 The primary source at hand is interpreted in relation to 
other sources in order to establish a contextual interpretational setting. Secondary sources are 
applied to provide and locate contexts which will assist interpretation, which builds on the 
triangulation principle.190 Meaning and thus research also depends on the reader’s contextual 
setting. The hermeneutic method acknowledges that interpretation is shaped by the 
researcher’s contemporary setting as well as a predisposed mindset.191 It has also been argued 
that a conscious recontextualization of sources allows for new insights into existing historical 
positions.192  
The hermeneutic circle is used to describe how the interpretation of sources is situated both 
with the researcher and previous research in a dialogue with the source. This dialogue is highly 
dependent on the research question(s) being pursued but is also an interchanging positioning 
between the part (the source), and the whole. Ideally, this allows for a source being used for 
answering other research questions as well as a continuous re-reading and understanding of the 
sources.193 
This three-step historical method is applied throughout the dissertation. It is combined with 
the analytical approaches presented in sections 1.2 to 1.5. It is a conscious choice to 
contextualize and interpret the primary sources by applying the notion of Judenpolitik and the 
model Stages of Persecution in order to connect events in Denmark to an international context 
within the overall framework of German anti-Jewish policy. Each chapter will relate to the 
research questions, while the identifiable steps in the model Stages of Persecution are pointed 
to. The categories of perpetrators, bystanders, and victims will be applied to serve as a point of 
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view as well as to trace possible bystander progression. The main perspectives remain that of 
the perpetrators and bystanders, but when possible, the victim perspective is included. 
1.8 Sources 
I use primary sources from the Bundesarchiv, Berlin, Lichterfelde, the Politisches Archiv (PA), 
Berlin, and the Danish National Archives. The Bundesarchiv holds the sources from the 
Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel (RfA) as well as the archive material of the German legation in 
Copenhagen related to trade. Sources from the legation that are not related to trade are located 
at the PA.  
The sources from the RfA has not previously been fully researched, and I have focused on two 
types of sources which serve as entry points into the organization.194 These are Handakten and 
Rundschreiben. Handakten contain selected files deemed important by the heads of the RfA and 
Rundschreiben detail and outline the procedures of the RfA. In addition, sources related to 
Denmark were as far as possible identified. In addition, sources from the (PA) have been used to 
trace the role of the NSDAP/AO in this policy area. The RfA still contains a host sources relating 
to its work on Aryanization, especially on how it was pursued in other countries. The sources 
examined thus represent a limited, but consciously chosen sample of available sources. The 
sample of sources is evaluated as large enough to make conclusions on the overall Aryanization 
polices of the RfA. Selected parts of the RfA’s archive which relate to Denmark are also used. 
However, it is possible that sources relating to Denmark are found in other archival categories 
of the RfA than the ones examined. 
The archival material from the trade section of the Gesandtschaft revealed 10,000 letters 
from the period of 1940-1944, which racially categorized companies in Denmark. It seems this 
type of letters is not preserved from before January 1940 or was transmitted in another manner. 
The correspondence appears to be missing for the following months: June and July (1940), April 
to September (1941), November and December (1942), January and February (1943), and lastly 
June to December (1944). 3,500 of the letters from the occupation period will serve as an 
analytical sample of the information exchange between the German Gesandtschaft in 
                                                     
194 The register of the RFA mentions the existence of a partial card registry containing the names of the companies examined and their racial 
status. However, the Bundesarchiv claim this is at the National Archives in Washington and Washington claims it is in Germany. 
Unfortunately, a continuous correspondence with both archives and individual research on my part has not located the remnants of this 
registry. 
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Copenhagen and the RfA. A sample has been selected due to the overwhelming and time-
consuming task of manual registration of all addresses, companies, and individual names, which 
would require at least six months of full-time registration. I acknowledge that a complete 
registration would allow for a more exhaustive result. However, the sample clearly reveals the 
existence of an elaborate information exchange regarding race, and that numerous Danish 
companies were examined according to race across the country.  Sources from the trade 
department of the AA, are also examined to trace the involvement of the legation in these 
matters, and this includes selected sources from the German Chamber of Commerce in Denmark 
found at the Danish National Archives. 
Sources used from the PA also focus on content relating to Jewish policies in Denmark. A 
majority of these were published in a commented source collection in 2008.195  A host of 
additional sources from the AA in relation to Denmark were published in 2015 in a large 10 
volume work which was limited to the period from November 1942 to May 1945.196 Relevant 
sources from both of these publications have been consulted to locate sources on Aryanization. 
In addition, files from the Danish Foreign Ministry’s group 140 contain examples of Danish-
Jewish companies that were Aryanized as well as the Danish government’s reaction to these. 
Several cases are used that show how German Aryanization took place and affected these 
companies. 
Selected postwar trial material is used to show how Danish anti-Semites became paid aids to 
the German legation to promote anti-Semitism, register Jews, and how members of the German 
police continuously registered Jews in Denmark. Postwar trial material, especially the 
interrogations always pose a risk of misinterpretation. I have applied the following rule of thumb 
to postwar defense strategy. It often seeks to assign responsibility further up the system in order 
to minimize one’s personal role and to suggest one’s actions had a moderating effect in an 
otherwise brutal system.197 
The Danish and German police cooperated on registration matters, and the 17,000 cases of 
the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs (SPSA), the AS-cases, have been examined for the 
Copenhagen area from April 1940 to October 1943. A number of cases reveal that the Danish 
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197 Richard J Overy, Forhør: det tredje riges elite taler ud (Kbh.: People’s Press, 2007), 178–82. 
 60 
police performed an unknown number of racial investigations on behalf of the German police. 
These sources reveal how registration measures proceeded.  
Granted, more postwar trials of the Danish and German staff at the legation would have 
allowed for a deeper examination of registration, and there exist similar cases of the SPSA from 
many other Danish cities. However, the files from Denmark's second largest city Aarhus only 
contain 1,664 cases, while larger provincial cities on average have between 350 to 800 cases, 
and smaller cities have around 89 to 300 cases. Copenhagen has been selected as most cases 
are from this city, and most Jews lived in Copenhagen. 
 In addition, sources from the Danish Foreign Ministry, especially group 120, contain relevant 
dealings of this ministry relating to Jews and Germany. The official, but often short, minutes of 
the meetings in the cabinet have also been used. The minutes are supplied with additional 
material from the recently published diary of the Minister of Public Works Gunnar Larsen, which 
had been largely inaccessible beforehand, and the published minutes of the meetings in the 
Nine-Man Committee. The Nine-Man Committee, officially the National Assembly’s 
Coordinating Committee, functioned as the connecting link between the political parties and the 
cabinet from July 1940 to October 1943. In October it was expanded to thirteen members 
despite the government not functioning as an executive. The private archive of the Minister for 
Industry, and Trade, Halfdan Hendriksen, is used to further supplement our knowledge on the 
content of the cabinet meetings. Other minister's archives have been consulted and these 
include Kristen Bording, Thune Jacobsen and Jørgen Jørgensen. These have not revealed 
material on the proceedings in cabinet meetings. 
There are known instances of trade organizations that have discussed Judenpolitik and 
especially Aryanization as well as other exclusive measures, however I have chosen to focus 
mostly on German archive material and Danish government files in order to establish the 
deliberate attempt to exclude Danish Jews from the economy. This choice focuses the 
dissertation and will provide the foundation for further research into how individual 
organizations reacted to pressures for the exclusion of Jews. These could include trade 
organizations, but also other organizations such as the Association of Danish Journalists or the 
Association of Doctors. 
 61 
On a more general level, most researchers agree that much of the material on the legation’s 
work in Copenhagen is still missing due to destruction of archives in April 1945.198 One example 
is the archives from the German consulates in Denmark, which are missing from both the PA and 
the Bundesarchiv.199 The reports on Danish German trade relations, written by Franz Ebner, head 
of economics and trade at the German Gesandtschaft in Copenhagen, were published in 2012, 
but do not reveal anything on anti-Jewish policies or Aryanization.200 
The Danish Ministry of Trade must have been involved in the Aryanization issues. However, 
extensive searches in the archival registries as well sampling of possible relevant files have not 
revealed any material on Aryanization or anti-Jewish measures in this ministry. This is also the 
case for trade negotiations in the Danish Foreign Ministry, which could contain sources related 
to Aryanization. Despite extensive searches in these sources the subject has not been identified. 
Previous research in this ministry does not mention the subject either.201 
1.8.1 Structure of dissertation  
Chapter two focuses on answering the first part of research question number one by focusing 
on the RfA and the policies developed to Aryanize the German foreign trade. Chapters three to 
nine all focus on Judenpolitik in Denmark. Research question number four will be answered by 
identifying the stages of persecution in each of these chapters. Chapter three to four will focus 
on answering the second part of research question one. These chapters partly answer research 
questions two and three on the subject of Aryanization. Chapter five focuses specifically on 
registration measures in Denmark, which to a lesser degree is touched upon in all chapters. In a 
sense chapter five functions as an overlap between the Aryanization theme, and other areas of 
Judenpolitik. As already noted registration serves as a necessary step to enforce and pursue 
discriminatory measures.  The German legation's assistance in formulating and executing 
Judenpolitik, as well as the Danish government’s reactions will be at the center of chapters six 
to eight. Chapter nine functions as an epilogue before chapter ten concludes. Chapter nine goes 
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beyond October 1943 to reveal how Judenpolitik continued as the German occupiers sought to 
partly erase the written memory of Jews in Denmark as well as promoting anti-Semitic 
arguments. 
2 Aryanizing the German Foreign Trade – The RFA 
This chapter explores and analyzes the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel (RfA) in order to 
answer the first section of research question number one “How was Germany’s ambition to 
Aryanize their foreign trade developed into concrete policies?” The RfA became the central 
organizational unit that pursued a Judenpolitik aiming at Aryanizing the German foreign trade all 
over the world.202 Sections 2.1 and 2.2 will show how the RfA was chosen for this task, and how 
it developed several policies to reach this goal. These processes are essential in order to 
understand the Aryanization measures pursued in Denmark both before and during the 
occupation. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 especially focuses on the registration processes of the RfA, 
which were set in motion in order to map Jewish businesses in the world. In many ways the RfA 
is a good example of how Judenpolitik was adopted into foreign trade policy while being fused 
with ideological and racially motivated goals. The main focus of the chapter remains the policies 
rather than the actors of the organization. However, we can conclude the upper-echelons of the 
organization appear well-educated with at least half of them holding a doctoral degree.203 
 In 1933, The Zentralstelle für den Außenhandel (ZfA) was renamed Reichsstelle für den 
Außenhandel. The organization was placed under both the German Foreign Ministry, 
Auswärtiges Amt (AA) and the Ministry of Economics, the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (RWM). 
In the AA, it was part of Office X which dealt with Trade Politics.  In RWM, it was Office V – simply 
called RfA. The RfA was headed by Oskar Wingen (AA) and Eugen Baumgartner (RWM).204 Oskar 
Wingen had a doctoral degree in Political Science and after four years in other positions he 
entered the AA in 1919.  He was head of the archives before becoming part of press matters 
(department P) in 1921. In the 1930s he had a briefer, but important position at the Propaganda 
Ministry (1933-1934), and until 1935 he was Saarbevollmächtigen des Reichskanzlers. He 
reentered the AA in 1935 and headed department X from October 1938 until he retired in 
                                                     
202 In the selection of sources I have examined, I have identified 35 different countries, which include most of Europe, but also countries such 
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203 “Geschäftsverteilungsplan (2),” February 1, 1941, BA, R9I, 3175. 
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November 1944.205 Eugen Baumgartner had a career in a private company before entering the 
RWM in 1934. He took over the leadership of the RfA in 1937, but our knowledge of his career 
is very limited.206  
The zenith of the RfA was in 1941, when it had five independent departments and 
approximately 50 offices of various sizes and areas of expertise.207 There were several underlying 
trade offices which reported to the RfA. Most important were the 22 Auβenhandelsstellen that 
were organized locally, but the various Prüfungsstellen for the individual trade sectors, e.g. 
leather, were also influential.208 The RfA can be viewed as an information center for all aspects 
of foreign trade. It published news on trade relations and was up-to-date on relevant foreign 
laws (e.g. tax laws) which could affect German trade.209 The Aryanization measures treated 
below were located in department III later IV, and are thus to be viewed as only a part of this 
organization’s many tasks which is illustrated by figure 1 and appendix 3. 
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Figure 1: The organization of the RfA 1941 – Appendix 3 contains all the office’s names.  
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Figure 2: Dept. IV. Containing the Racial registry of companies 1941. It was organized in Dept. III until 1940.  
2.1 Beginnings and Early Goals of the RfA 
A key component of excluding the Jewish trade partners was to register them. This seems 
to have taken place from as early as 1933 by both NSDAP/AO and RfA. In early 1937, the process 
was formalized, and the RfA was charged with charting and removing international Jewish 
representatives.210 The mission statement for RfA read "…that only through 1) a systematic 
registration of every German export company and 2) every representative for German 
companies abroad could the goal of a complete Entjudung be reached."211 This was a clear 
international and ideologically motivated goal of enormous dimensions. It was deeply rooted in 
the Nazi belief that Jewry was to be considered a world-wide threat aspiring to control the 
world's economy. It should be stressed that the policies of international Aryanization thus 
                                                     
210 The term representative is to be understood in a broad sense: any person affiliated with the German company abroad. Examples are: 
importers, agents or persons hired directly by the company abroad.  
211 ...dass nur auf dem Wege einer systematischen Erfassung 1.] sämtlicher deutscher Ausfuhrfimen und 2.) sämtlicher Vertreter deutscher 
Firmen im Auslande, das Ziel einer restlosen Entjudung erreicht werden konnte. ““RfA und die Entjudung der deutschen Firmen-Vertreter im 
Auslande.,” November 22, 1938, BA, R9I, 152. 
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commenced before the legal Aryanization process began in Germany in 1938.212 As such it was 
one of many policies directed at the Jews, which had begun in a legally informal manner and 
later became formalized. Yet, it should be noted that in the context of other countries this policy 
had to be carried out in an informal manner in the prewar period. 
The RWM, the AA and the NSDAP/AO were the organizations responsible for formalizing 
the process of Aryanizing the foreign trade and setting the long-term goals. By examining the 
letter exchanges, guideline proposals, and decrees which were circulated among these 
organizations we can locate how the RfA became the central organization in this area. The 
guidelines and decrees agreed upon forms the basis for the implementation of the bureaucratic 
work. The RfA was responsible for setting this in motion in order to remove Jewish influence 
from the German foreign trade.  
The initial description of what was envisioned was formulated in early 1937 by the 
Staatssekretär in RWM, Dr. Hans Ernst Posse, and commented by the AA and NSDAP/AO. It was 
expected that Germany would gain an economic profit by excluding Jews from foreign trade. 
There are several legitimizing arguments for this policy in Posse’s letter. Replacing Jewish 
representatives in German companies abroad would support and apply National Socialism’s 
fundamental view on Jews to international trade relations. Posse also acknowledges the 
existence of political and racial reasons, but he does not elaborate on these. The Jews were 
characterized as being both powerful and hostile to Germany. Their influence was estimated as 
being so strong that the excluding policies against them had to remain secret. Posse expressed 
his fears of the Jewish world press and this fits into the National Socialist perception that the 
Jews controlled the world’s media. For all these reasons Jews were to be excluded from the 
foreign trade. Posse feared that some German companies would be reluctant to fulfill the 
demands to remove their Jewish representatives due a risk of economic loss. Posse argued that 
the only feasible way to control the process without damaging foreign trade would be to use the 
state’s organizations. To Posse, the predominant problem in fulfilling these exclusive goals was 
finding suitable replacements for the Jewish representatives.213 
                                                     
212 I recognize that 'legal' Aryanization processes in Germany came after years of informal Aryanization attempts that were ideologically and 
sometimes financially backed by the dictatorship.  
213 “Posse zu Auswärtige Amt und NSDAP/AP,” February 8, 1937, PA, R27275. 
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Posse expected careful test-runs were needed in order to probe the possibilities of 
exchanging Jewish representatives with non-Jews. This precaution was deemed necessary in 
order to avoid suspicion and impairing foreign trade. This had to be achieved country by country, 
while remaining sensitive to the various national characteristics of each country. Posse 
estimated that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were the most suitable countries to initiate these policies 
in. Ideally, the Jews were to be replaced by Germans or members of the German people 
(Volksdeutsche). The Auβenhandelsstellen were to work from case to case while the legations 
of the AA would provide information on which German companies employed Jewish 
representatives. The AA would also have to assist in identifying and suggesting suitable 
replacements. The RfA was supposed to be the central organizer of these efforts, but Posse had 
already initiated the practical work as German companies claimed they were unable to find 
suitable replacements. Posse had been involved in these cases in order to replace the Jewish 
representatives and concluded there had been a traceable rise in their removal.214 The letter 
from Posse initiated a process to formalize the procedures to replace Jewish representatives. 
However, it turned out that several other informal initiatives had already been pursued in other 
branches of the National Socialist state and party organizations to reach the same objective. One 
such organization was the NSDAP/AO. 
 The former English citizen Ernst Wilhelm Bohle headed the NSDAP/AO. Having studied and 
married in Germany, he joined the party in 1931 and the SS two years later. He switched his 
British citizenship for a German one in 1937. The reasons were ideological, as he viewed Hitler 
as Europe’s savior from communism and the Jews. Carrying the high-ranking title of Gauleiter, 
Bohle was to organize all party activities outside of Germany. A main element of his work was to 
mobilize the almost 30 million Germans around the world to locally support National 
Socialism.215 The foreign trade branch (Außenhandelsamt) of the NSDAP/AO was headed by 
Alfred Heß, brother to the more famous Rudolph Heß, and Alfred Heß was placed just below 
Bohle in the NSDAP/AO.  
Heß and Bohle agreed on Posse’s draft decree, and it was distributed to all German legations 
who became part of these measures. The NSDAP/AO agreed the time seemed right to formalize 
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the process of Aryanizing the foreign trade as it would accommodate National Socialist thought 
and incorporate country-specific difficulties. Heß and Bohle explained that the draft was similar 
to the guidelines the NSDAP/AO had followed for years. The NSDAP/AO had used party members 
residing outside of Germany to determine who could be trusted in economic matters, and Jews 
were distrusted. Heß and Bohle had used party members for this task as they were believed to 
be more attuned to who were Jews or not. Formal supporters of the party were thus considered 
trustworthy partners in replacing Jewish representatives. Heß and Bohle characterized Jews as 
untrustworthy and unwanted. They envisioned the day when Germany’s foreign trade would be 
emancipated from Jewish influences. Yet, they wanted to expand these measures to also exclude 
emigrants from Germany and persons hostile to Germany, and these ideas were included in later 
decrees.216 With NSDAP/AO’s acceptance of Posse’s ideas the RWM charged the RfA with 
continuing the process of Aryanizing the foreign trade. 
In August 1937, the RfA had formulated an elaborate set of guidelines on how to replace 
Jewish representatives. The goal was explicitly described as being the complete exclusion of the 
Jews to be reached through perseverance and hard work. The guidelines were legitimized 
through characteristic anti-Semitic rhetoric combined with fear and concern. Using the anti-
Semitic perception of the Jews as being connected in a world-wide network they were regarded 
as an enormous threat to Germany, and their numbers alone was a sufficient reason to act 
against them. The Jews were seen as having the decisive advantage as they could collectively 
decide to terminate trade with Germany. At the same time Jews were labelled as untrustworthy 
and disloyal trade partners who based their choice of trade partner on economic parameters. 
The main concern expressed in the guidelines was that German foreign trade would risk being 
damaged by Jewish trade boycotts and Jewish attempts to turn the international political climate 
against Germany. It was argued that Jews had the means to change both the material setting 
and the overall attitude towards the German economy. The possible damage to the foreign trade 
and the German economy was the main concern in initiating a policy replacing the Jews. 
Replacements therefore had to be carried out carefully and trustworthy replacements should be 
identified before Jewish representatives could be excluded. Germany’s first priority was to 
obtain new and non-Jewish representatives. It was acknowledged that it would take years to 
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complete the replacement process.217 The guidelines thus seem to mark the beginning of the 
formal incorporation of Judenpolitik in foreign trade relations. 
The first guidelines were elaborate and extensive in laying out concrete procedures to reach 
the goal of Entjudung in the foreign trade, while assigning the necessary bureaucratic roles to 
the various organizations involved. The RfA also attempted to strengthen their position in this 
area through the phrasing in the guidelines, but let us begin with the content of the guidelines. 
They emphasized Jews could no longer be appointed as new representatives, commissioners, 
branch managers, or managers of subsidiaries in German companies in other countries. If at all 
possible, new appointees were to be chosen from German citizens in the country at hand. The 
most important goal was the replacement of the Jewish representatives with non-Jews.  As 
envisioned, this exchange had to be done carefully and without attracting attention. The 
guidelines thus became a very elaborate and formalized attempt to enforce Aryanization in 
other countries in an informal way.218 
German companies were responsible for finding suitable persons for new appointments, 
while the replacement of Jews was to be accomplished in coordination with the German trade 
organizations assisted by the RfA and its Außenhandelsstellen.  The RfA was to monitor and assist 
in the Aryanization of representatives. The RfA would cooperate with other branches of the 
economy, as well as party organizations. The Industry and Trade Chamber (Wirtschaftsgruppen 
oder Fachgruppen der Industrie oder des Handels) was one such group, while the RfA also 
coordinated efforts with, especially, NSDAP/AO and the leadership of the Gaue.219 
Replacing a Jewish person required proof of race. If the representative was Jewish, a review 
process of contracts, etc., would begin. The replacement had to be completed if possible, but 
problems in finding, e.g. a suitable new representative, were to a certain degree expected and 
accepted. However, the RfA stressed that continuous efforts to exchange the Jewish 
representative had to be carried out.220 Later editions to the guidelines allowed for one contract 
with a Jewish representative while pursuing new business opportunities, but from August 1939 
new permanent representatives could not be Jewish.221 
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The RfA reasoned that the first and most essential piece of information needed to 
successfully replace the Jews was their identities. The cornerstone for success was thus a 
continuous, confidential, and updated information flow on both Jewish and non-Jewish 
representatives for German companies. The information was transmitted by circulating letters, 
as well as through discreet oral messages. The replacement of Jews had to be completed with 
the acceptance of the company in question, but should problems arise, the RfA would step in as 
a mediator.222  
In October 1937, these guidelines were accepted by the AA, NSDAP/AO and the RWM. Only 
in October 1940 would major changes occur to these guidelines (see section 2.2). However, a 
decree to replace Jewish representatives had already been sent out in the summer of 1937. The 
decree originated from Minister of the RWM, Hjalmar Schacht, who thus appears to have been 
fully knowledgeable and supportive of the idea of Aryanizing the foreign trade. The decree 
caused confusion on how to implement it, and the RfA’s guidelines could no longer remain 
secret. In December 1937 the guidelines were distributed to the leading members of the various 
business organizations such as Reichsgruppen, Wirtschaftsgruppen, Wirtschaftskammern, 
Industrie- und Handelskammern, who would enact them in order to Aryanize foreign trade.223 
 
2.1.1 RfA and Domestic Aryanization Policies 
The RfA’s bureaucratic control over this policy area resulted in involvement in the domestic 
Aryanization policies as well. This occurred if international business relations were present in 
the company being Aryanized. The RfA thus supported the regime’s domestic Aryanization 
program by providing both mapping capabilities and knowledge. Several examples show this. In 
the summer of 1938, the 3rd addition to the Nuremberg Laws would eventually define Jewish 
companies. While the laws banned Jews from a number of industries, it was still not formally 
illegal to be a Jewish business owner. The RfA was charged with making two lists regarding 
German-Jewish export companies. The first list contained Jewish firms with export figures 
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exceeding 100,000 RM in the fiscal year of 1937, and a status on the progress of Aryanizing these 
firms. The second list was to provide an overview of all Jewish export firms that had been 
Aryanized in 1938 as well as the major firms Aryanized in 1937. These lists were used to evaluate 
the Aryanization prospect for Jewish companies exporting goods worth more than 100,000 RM. 
This entailed more detailed information on the individual company and the RfA would assist in 
supplying the main arguments for a company’s Aryanization.224 
Jewish victims of Aryanization who had fled Germany or Austria would from their new 
countries of residence attempt to secure valuables from their ‘old’ firms through legal claims 
and lawsuits. Their legal standing was much better, and this challenged the domestic 
Aryanization policies of Germany. The RfA would attempt to obstruct legal action by agitating 
for a faster domestic Aryanization process and provide concrete directions on how to proceed. 
The RfA advised that Aryanized companies in Germany under kommissarische Verwaltung were 
to transfer the companies and valuables to new owners as soon as possible. This would deter or 
cancel lawsuits and claims against the company being Aryanized. This would also deter legal 
claims from other companies who e.g. had outstanding claims against the company in 
Germany.225 
The RfA had experienced the greatest difficulties in winning such cases in the USA, Great 
Britain, and in some South American countries who lacked clearing agreements with Germany. 
The RfA placed some hope on an Albany, USA court ruling as it had gone against the Jewish 
refugee in question. The court argued it had inadequate jurisdiction to interfere in sovereign 
states, and concluded it was unauthorized to make legal judgements against Germany. Countries 
with clearing agreements made it easier for German companies to win cases or secure dues from 
business partners in those countries. As we know, such cases also occurred in Sweden.226   
This means that prewar Aryanization challenged the judicial system in other countries. The 
former owners judicially contested the Aryanization in courtrooms outside of Germany, and this 
forced other countries to take a position on this part of Judenpolitik. The matter is not further 
researched within the context of this dissertation, but it opens up for an avenue of further 
research initiatives into how several countries’ legal systems reacted to Germany’s anti-Jewish 
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policies. The approximately 340,000 prewar Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria means 
there is a potential to examine a number of court cases to establish how receiving countries 
legally positioned themselves in regards to Germany’s domestic Aryanization policies as well as 
their international implications. 
There are several examples of how Jews who had fled Germany were still subject to 
discrimination and the striking feature is the worldwide scope. A few examples should be 
sufficient to highlight this feature of international Aryanization. In the spring of 1939, William 
Anschel had fled to Australia from Cologne. In Cologne he had owned the company Wilhelm 
Anschel and partly owned the company S. Rosenthal & Co. He now tried to keep his German 
company alive by securing imports through a newly formed Australian company, but the RfA 
disallowed his representation for any German company - even his own.227 Another example is A. 
E. Khazam from Berlin, who in the summer of 1939 tried his luck as a refugee in Baghdad, but 
the RfA again stepped in and disallowed him as a representative for German companies.228 In 
this fashion the policies to Aryanize the foreign trade targeted Jewish refugees residing in other 
countries who potentially had already been subjected to Aryanization measures in Germany. 
2.1.2 The Role of the Devisenstellen 
The currency offices (Devisenstellen) were introduced into public German economic life in 
1934 in order to assist in putting controls on Germany’s foreign trade as it had suffered from a 
foreign currency deficit since 1931.229 The currency offices also became highly important in the 
expulsion and robbing of Jews, but the following will only focus on the collaboration between 
the currency offices and the RfA.230 
The date is unclear, but most likely in early 1938, the RWM had included the currency offices 
in the process of removing Jewish representatives abroad. The involvement of the currency 
offices caused several problems outside Germany, as the diplomatic representations were not 
informed of this step. The currency offices demanded that international payments were only 
received by Aryan representatives and proof of race was required. As a consequence, Jewish 
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representatives in other countries were not receiving payments from German companies. 
Jewish representatives began appealing to their national governments to interfere in order to 
receive payment. Nevertheless, the practice was continued, and only through the cooperation 
of the Außenhandelsstellen was it possible to transfer money to Jewish representatives abroad. 
In cases where there was a risk of financial loss or expensive lawsuits exceptions were allowed. 
In September 1938, a decree laid out the formal procedures, and misunderstandings were 
supposedly rooted out. Essentially, German companies would be unable to pay their Jewish 
representatives without the cooperation of government organizations. This rule would 
eventually end most business relationships with Jews outside of Germany.231 
From the vantage point of the RfA the cost of Aryanizing the foreign trade was considered 
too high. Jewish representatives who had been replaced received financial settlements e.g. 
because of breaches of contract fees. In the summer of 1938 these settlements were 
characterized as too high and unreasonable. Proof of expenditures was now demanded from 
German companies in order to be eligible for compensation in such settlements and further pre-
cautionary measures were taken in order to minimize expensive settlements.232  
It was advised to cancel contracts with Jewish companies if the cost was not too high, and 
compensation contracts were to be approved by the RfA.233 Contract obligations were to be kept 
if the option to cancel them without consequences was non-existent. The Außenhandelsstellen 
could demand that a German company cancelled their contracts, while the company could argue 
against this decision via a cumbersome application process. The application had to include the 
opinions of the local Devisenstelle, Industrie- und Handelskammer, and the Außenhandelsstelle 
on the case.234 
From the Danish-Jewish merchant Harald Michelsen and the Danish business owner Arthur 
Wittrock we have very concrete proof that the Devisenstellen were also involved in Aryanization 
abroad. Michelsen had secured a copy of a letter from the Oberfinanzpräsident in Leipzig 
informing German companies that from December 1938 payments from Germany to Jewish 
representatives, employees and managers abroad could not be made. Exceptions were only to 
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be made if the company could prove the contracts had been terminated.235 This was also the 
case with Arthur Wittrock. His business connection in Stuttgart, Bernhard Seidelmann, wrote 
that he was obliged to prove, through the Außenhandelsstelle, that Wittrock was Aryan in order 
to pay him.236 
2.1.3 Status Report November 1938 
Shortly after the Kristallnacht in November 1938 the RfA summarized their activities for the 
past year. Possibly, the report was part of the many new initiatives against the Jews that 
followed in the wake of the November pogroms. The report reflects the self-perception of the 
RfA and provide a status of their policies to Aryanize the foreign trade in late 1938. The 
guidelines mentioned in section 2.1 were characterized as providing the sense, tactic, and 
technique (Sinn, Taktik, und Technik) for pursuing the goal of Entjudung, and they had been 
distributed to all German legations.237 
The report also highlights some of the problems that had arisen between the RfA and 
NSDAP/AO. However, the argument of effectivity had superseded the organizational 
disagreements between the two, and the RfA were in charge of this policy area. The RfA thus 
took lead in the massive registration of Jewish representatives and in finding suitable 
replacements. The NSDAP/AO and local economic entities, Gauwirtschaftsberate, also played 
role. They were contacted when German companies would not concede to the RfA’s 
recommendations or were perceived as acting maliciously. The report shows that even the 
Gestapo was used against companies that were reluctant to replace their Jewish 
representatives. This had proved to be an extremely effective way of enforcing the Aryanization 
policies of the RfA. These enforcing measures emphasize that the policy was supported and 
implemented by several organizations within the National Socialist dictatorship to e.g. coerce 
German companies to fall in line.238 
The status of the RfA’s registration work in late 1938 was also summarized in the report and 
illustrates the enormous task being undertaken. It was estimated that 150,000 representatives 
still had to be registered abroad, and 150,000-200,000 German import/export companies were 
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connected to these representatives. The office on race matters in the RfA now employed 18 
people. 14 of whom were tasked with only writing registration cards. The number of registry 
cards had grown to around 400,000 and the average daily correspondence regarding race in the 
foreign trade numbered 400 letters. Possibly in a bid for more resources the RfA argued that 
adding more staff would expedite the task of registering both Aryan and Jewish 
representatives.239 
2.2 The Second World War – New Tasks for the RfA 
The beginning of the Second World War on September 1st 1939 was an escalating catalyst for 
the international Aryanization polices of the RfA as well as the Judenpolitik in general.240 The 
organization’s position on Entjudung was strongly enforced, combining their usual arguments 
with legitimizing war rhetoric. In addition, it was expected the war would soon end and make it 
illegal to trade with Jews. The escalating character is apparent in two reprimands from February 
and June 1940 to the leading cadres of the Außenhandelsstellen and the diplomatic legations. 
The aim was to enforce the replacement policy further by pressuring German companies to sever 
their contacts with Jewish firms abroad. The RfA stressed that the war should not pause 
Entjudung. Rather, the war was a reason to enforce it. The RfA was especially critical of 
companies who neglected their "Entjudungspflicht". In this manner the Aryanization policies 
were associated with a sense of patriotic duty.241 
War, race and politics were intertwined in the second reprimand that was issued in the middle 
of the German offensive against Belgium, the Netherlands and France (May 10th – June 25th, 
1940). It was based on information from the NSDAP/AO, which claimed Jewish representatives 
were not being replaced quickly and energetically enough. The RfA pointed out to the German 
companies that they had to ruthlessly exploit the war to exclude all Jews residing outside of 
Germany from the foreign trade. Companies were advised that as soon as the war ended it 
would become illegal to export to Jewish companies. The goal of illegality was in this manner 
used to legitimize the recommended and enforced exclusionary measures.242 
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In addition, the RfA issued an additional set of guidelines underlining that contracts with 
Jewish representatives had to be terminated as soon as possible in Europe and overseas. 
Companies were first to terminate existing contracts, and the RfA suggested using the argument 
that the war had caused turnovers to drop. Contracts in the making had to be denounced at all 
costs. This was especially important regarding overseas contracts, claimed the RfA. However, 
the technicalities for how to terminate contracts with Jewish representatives in enemy countries 
had not yet been worked out as very high compensation fines were being demanded from Jewish 
companies. Companies were reminded to only accept compensation claims if Jews (in their host 
countries) possessed a legal position that made it possible for them to bring cases before the 
courts.243 It was all underlined in the following statement: 
 
"In the meantime, it should become clear to every German company that this war is 
not only directed against the Western powers, but also against Judaism as their most 
willing and driving companions in all countries. Overtly or covertly recalcitrant 
companies are to be reported to the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel."244 
 
This racial war rhetoric foreshadowed later internal arguments used before and after entering 
into the war against the Soviet Union on June 22nd 1941. It is also evident that some German 
companies were still reluctant in accepting the policies against their Jewish trade partners. 
The responsibilities of the RfA were expanded in October 1940, while new and powerful 
organizations became users of the RfA’s expertise. A new set of guidelines for foreign trade had 
been accepted by RWM and AA, along with the Ministry for Domestic Affairs (Reichsministerium 
des Innern) and the Army High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht). Even Reichsführer 
SS Heinrich Himmler had accepted them. The new guidelines broadened the scope and could 
potentially damage a much broader range of Jewish companies and Jews. The regulations stated 
that new importers and recipients of German goods abroad, as well as companies importing 
goods into Germany, had to be Aryan and not hostile to Germany. The RfA was thus charged 
with registering a new category involved in trade: those who were politically unsuitable or seen 
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as a threat to German national security.245 This brought communist companies into the scope of 
the RfA along with companies that had or had had relations with Great Britain and later the USA 
or USSR. 
In the fall of 1941, the Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft agreed to let the 
RfA take the lead in registering Jewish and “enemy” companies and transfer such knowledge to 
the RfA. The minister was Walther Darré, the author of the influential Blut und Boden texts, and 
a great supporter of Nazism’s racial ideas.246 Apparently Darré’s ministry had also been 
registering Jewish companies outside of Germany. The RfA was thus charged with expanding this 
policy area, which also resulted in stricter, but still informal, rules against Jewish companies in 
other countries.  
The guidelines of October 1940 underscore that all import and export trade was now heavily 
influenced by the guidelines of the RfA and backed by powerful organizations. The RfA was 
responsible for almost all of the practical work. The guidelines provide insights into how these 
measures were to progress and how the anti-Semitic perception of Jews was used to legitimize 
this policy. The main principle behind the guidelines was to exclude Jews from being importers 
of German goods.247  
It was expected to become illegal to deliver goods to Jews in the near future and this was 
used to argue that German companies should proceed with exclusive measures immediately. It 
was a goal in itself to prevent Jews or others deemed unfriendly to Germany to earn money by 
trading with Germany. The argument was that Jewish trade would financially strengthen 
Germany’s enemies.248 The overall policies were not to harm the general economy of the Reich, 
but the main objective remained the purification (Säuberung) of Germany’s foreign business 
relations. At the same time, the new guidelines identified the RfA as the center for registration 
and information. Private messages from German companies on the racial composition of foreign 
companies were no longer to be accepted. Only information from the German legations across 
the world and German Chambers of Commerce would be considered valid.249  
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The practical way to proceed towards the goal of Entjudung varied according to the three 
groups targeted by the Aryanization policies. The three groups were 1) representatives 2) foreign 
importers of German goods and, 3) foreign companies exporting to Germany. Jewish 
representatives were to be replaced by Aryan ones as soon as possible. All new representatives 
had to be examined to ascertain their racial and political background. Exceptions could be made 
if the deal had to be sealed quickly, but afterwards the representative had to be categorized as 
non-Jewish otherwise the contract was to be terminated.250 Foreign companies with exclusive 
import rights were to be treated as representatives and were to be excluded if they were Jewish 
or deemed hostile to Germany. 
The procedures to exclude Jewish importers depended on the status of the country in which 
they resided. In militarily occupied countries, it was not illegal to sell goods to Jewish customers, 
as they still possessed a great deal of the market shares in some industries the RfA reasoned. It 
was argued that a general ban against trading with Jews would, at the moment, take too heavy 
a toll on foreign trade. It was advised that the occupied countries keep their domestic supplies 
at an acceptable level. However, the RfA instructed German companies to strive to replace 
Jewish customers with non-Jewish ones if possible. At the same time, the individual 
Prüfungsstellen could decide to issue a general ban on delivering goods to Jews. This had already 
been done in August 1940, as the Prüfungsstelle for leather had banned exports to Jews in the 
Netherlands.251 
Delivering goods to Jews or “deutsch-feindlicher Firmen” in other countries would at the 
moment be prohibited. It was expected that German companies would refrain from delivering 
goods to Jewish customers as long as the practice did not harm German exports. A distinction 
between new and old business relations was made to manage the process. New business 
relationships had to be investigated for their racial and political composition if it involved one of 
the following: 
 
1. Contracts which insured customers252 
2. Exclusive import rights 
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3. Long-term delivery contracts 
4. Contracts of a high value 253 
 
It was accepted that a German company might enter into one short-term contract without 
disclosing the racial or political composition of the importing company. Exempted from these 
rules was the area of the Generalgouvernement in Poland, where all companies were to be 
investigated. Older business relations were to be replaced if at all possible.254  
Imports were also part of these guidelines. The RfA turned it into a general rule that foreign 
export companies were only to be examined for their racial composition or political position if 
they were to enter into long-term contracts with German companies. The rule was based on a 
set of general instructions the RWM had issued on the 9th of April 1940 regarding foreign 
exporters and suppliers to Germany, stating that importing goods from Jews or enemies of 
Germany was to be avoided, as it would economically strengthen companies who were hostile 
to Germany. Instead, import policy had to be used to exclude Jews and hostiles, while at the 
same time strengthening German nationals or German-friendly companies abroad. Companies 
that had suffered losses as a consequence of their trade relations with Germany were to be given 
a high priority. However, this was only to be carried out if it did not damage the overall import 
relationship with other countries.255 Overall, these guidelines remained in place for the rest of 
the war, yet in the summer of 1941 Mischlinge (half-Jews) were also excluded from taking over 
contracts from Jews.256 Though it remained legal to trade with Jews, the new guidelines 
expanded the exclusive policy in all areas, as a rising number of companies outside of Germany 
could be affected by them. 
The tendency to expel Jewish companies from the foreign trade also caused some confusion 
as the Prüfungsstellen to a certain extent could craft their own policies. A letter exchange 
between the RfA and the German Chamber of Commerce in Copenhagen in late 1941 reflects 
this confusion and provides some insight into which bans were in place regarding Denmark. The 
RfA had to clarify that policies were changing on a daily basis, as Prüfungsstellen und 
Vorprüfungsstellen could decide to exclude the Jewish companies in an entire country from 
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receiving a specific type of goods.257 For example the Prüfungsstelle for leather industries 
banned delivery to Jewish importers in France, Belgium, Norway and Denmark on January 14th 
1941258, while the Prüfungsstelle für Textilindustrie already had a general ban on delivering to 
Jewish firms in almost all countries including Denmark.259 Evidently, Jewish companies in 
Denmark could not receive leather or products related to the textile industry. On the other hand, 
the Prüfungsstelle Metallindustrie prohibited delivering goods to Jewish and hostile companies 
in December 1941, however, repair companies in Denmark, Italy, Croatia, Sweden, Rumania, and 
Hungary were purposely omitted from these instructions.260 
It is important to note that it never became completely illegal to export goods to Jewish or 
hostile companies if it influenced negatively on the German armaments industry. However, this 
was only applicable to Jewish or hostile companies which had a track record of importing from 
Germany. Despite their status of 'old' importers, their racial category still had to be registered. 
As pointed out earlier all new importers had to be pre-approved as Aryan or non-hostile to 
Germany by the RfA before trade could commence. Generally speaking, it was expected that 
German exporters would refrain from delivering goods to Jewish companies. Even though there 
were some exceptions to the policy of excluding Jewish companies, they were registered as 
Jewish, and the ultimate goal was still to eliminate Jewish companies from the German economic 
sphere of influence.261 
2.3 The Practical Registration Work and Information Flow 
In order to fulfill the task of Aryanizing the foreign trade it is evident that its success rested 
heavily on the registration of Jewish companies and Jews. The RfA became the main information 
center in an elaborate network in which foreign companies and representatives were 
categorized according to German race laws. The country-specific investigations were most 
commonly carried out by the German diplomatic representations and local German Chambers 
of Commerce, but other organizations were involved or already engaged in similar activities 
aiming at the Aryanization or exclusion of Jews outside of Germany. The Deutsche Arbeitsfront 
(DAF) seems to be the largest entity involved, but they too were to be decoupled from the 
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process to avoid doubling work.262 Yet, other minor organizational entities were also involved in 
the Aryanization process.  
The following examples cannot be considered a complete overview, but they represent the 
contours of a complex and multitudinous effort to internationally exclude Jews in a host of areas. 
In August 1939, the German Chamber of Patent Lawyers (Patentanwaltskammer) was placed in 
charge of registering foreign patent lawyers who were Jewish. The RfA argued that the matter 
was of too little importance for them to handle. Thus, if German companies were looking for 
patent lawyers outside of Germany, the chamber was to be consulted on questions of race.263 A 
small note from 1940 also reveals that the RfA had inquired of the Reichsministerium für 
Volksaufklärung und Propaganda if they possessed a list of Aryan hotels in world capitals, and 
such a list could indeed be found, but at the Reichsverkehrsgruppe Hilfsgewerbe des Verkehrs.264  
Clearly, the RfA was not the only German organization that mapped Jewish enterprises abroad 
and attempted to exclude them. The exclusive character of the German Judenpolitik was 
international and seems to have been pursued by an unknown number of German government 
organizations. The RfA was predominant in this work, but many other entities of the dictatorship 
aimed at stopping Jewish companies and businesses in other countries from generating revenue 
from the German economy.  
Keeping track of registered companies was a main task of the RfA. Information on specific 
companies was copied and distributed to the relevant legations and German Chambers of 
Commerce abroad. The Außenhandelsstellen also received copies, and from 1941 the 
Prüfungsstellen were included in this information exchange. Several registries of Jewish 
companies must have existed, both domestically and at the German legations. The local 
registries were made to minimize the flow of letters to the RfA, who experienced a steep rise in 
incoming letters regarding race.265 The RfA was heavily burdened, as it received more than 
145,000 questions on matters of race and political threats in 1941 alone. As the chart shows the 
busiest years were from 1939-1942, and the decline might be attributed to the many 
Aryanizations in occupied countries.  
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Figure 3 Number of annual Incoming letters on racial matters.266 
 
In order to keep this type of correspondence a secret an elaborate code language was 
developed, which was used to pose and answer questions.267 Essentially, the code language 
underscores the diplomatic sensitivity needed in attempting to informally pursue Aryanization 
outside of Germany. In addition, it was not just a matter of cataloguing who was Jewish or Aryan, 
as companies were also defined as Jewish if the Jewish ownership was above 25%. The code 
language was developed to encompass all the different categories needed and derived from 
Greek and Roman mythology. The first set of codes was distributed in January 1938, but they 
were later expanded as the RfA was also charged with cataloguing if companies posed a political 
or security risk in 1940. The following is a complete list of these code words: 
 
Questions: 
Andromache  = Is [company name] Aryan? 
Ariadne  = Is [company name] non-Aryan? 
Cato  = Is there a political or security risk associated with [company name]?  
Cleopatra  = Does [company name] have Jewish employees? 
                                                     
266 Based on “RfA Statistiken 1937-1944,” 1937 1944, BA, R9I, 167. The numbers for December 1937 are missing and not included in the graph. 
267 Svend Nordlund appears to be the first to point to the two central codenames Achilles and Alchibiades in Nordlund, “Albikiades eller 
Akilles? Ariseringen i Sverige och reaktionerna på denna.,” 575–77, however he does not locate the question/answer possibilities or other 
codenames. 
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Melpomene  = Are there Jews in the leading bodies of [company name]? How large 
is the Jewish influence? 
Xantippe  = Is there Jewish capital in [company name]? How big is the capital? 
What share of the capital is Jewish?  
 
Answers: 
Achilles  = The [company name] is Aryan. 
Alcibiades  = The [company name] is Jewish. 
Archimedes  = The [company name] is Aryan, but it employs Jews. 
Diogenes  = There are non-Aryans in the [company name] leadership. 
Euripides  = The owner is Aryan. Parts of the company is owned by Jews. 
Hercules = The owner of [company name] has the nationality of the country. 
The company is not influenced by Jews.  
Juno = There are not political or security risks associated with trading with 
[company name].  
Leonidas = It has not been possible to confirm the racial composition of 
[company name]. It is not suspected of being non-Aryan. 
Nero = There is political or security risk in trading with [company name] 
Odysseus [Ulysses] = It has not been possible to confirm the racial composition of 
[company name], but it is suspected to be non-Aryan. 
Socrates = The [Company name] is influenced by Jewish capital. The share is 
about x/100th268 
   
The code language reflected the racial views of the Nazi regime. Without going into greater 
details of Greek and Roman mythological history, it will suffice to mention that Achilles, of 
course, is associated with positive connotations that the Nazis regarded as important. Alcibiades, 
on the other hand, was a character who befitted the negative stereotypes of Jews. In Greek 
mythology Alcibiades switched sides if it was to his benefit, and in the end, he was murdered for 
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his treachery. It is worth noting the Cleopatra/Archimedes constellation, because it shows 
companies were potentially registered for the mere employment of Jews. 
Changes in policy were also communicated using the code language as the following example 
will show. Leonidas and Hercules companies were equated with Achilles companies in late 1939. 
Companies suspected of being Jewish (Odysseus) could no longer be tolerated as trade partners. 
Existing Odysseus companies now had to be categorized as Jewish or not, and contracts were 
only allowed on a short-term basis. Jewish companies, companies where the leadership was 
Jewish (Diogenes) or those partly owned by Jews (Euripides) had to be replaced by Aryan 
companies. Companies that employed Jews (Archimedes) could be kept, but were to be 
pressured to replace an unknown percentage of their Jewish employees. Only a minor warning 
was issued for Socrates companies – beware of the Jewish capital.269 Just a month later, 
questions of race (Andromache/Ariadne) were to include information about whether the 
representative was already hired or in the process of being hired.270 
Interestingly, the code language was only to be used between the RfA and the 
Außenhandelsstellen, and it was directly advised that only a small number of the AA’s legations 
were to be informed. Possibly the RfA wanted to avoid dissemination to consulates.271 
Information on the racial category of a company was provided free of charge by the RfA in the 
summer of 1938. However, the AA was not ready for this step and kept charging fees, as 
companies could get the same information for free from the Außenhandelsstellen. In the end, it 
was decided that all correspondence related to Aryanization in which the legations had to be 
involved was to be carried out through the RfA.272 
2.4 Problems in Mapping and Excluding Jewish Businesses 1937-1944 
The many guidelines, rules and decrees draw a somewhat ideal image of how the Aryanization 
efforts of the RfA were intended to function, however the practical work of registering, replacing 
or excluding Jews did not proceed as smoothly as intended. This is indicated by the many memos 
sent to the organizations involved in the process. The memos reflect the practical problems the 
RfA and its affiliations faced, while also showing the limitations of the policies of the RfA. A 
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constant problem was keeping information secret, while at the same time making sure it was 
disseminated so Jews could be excluded. An additional concern was the question of correct 
information of e.g. street names, and dealing with nations who were critical of the anti-Jewish 
views of the RfA.273 The following examples illustrate this type of problems. 
The information on race was in many instances not treated confidentially by the various 
Außenhandelsstellen and some companies. One example from 1938 shows a telegram disclosing 
the racial category of a French company in plain language.274 In late 1938, the RfA also learned 
that some companies passed on the RfA’s racial categorization to their Jewish representatives, 
and this revealed the source. This caused problems for both the AA and the RfA. The RfA feared 
Jews would use this information to promote agitation against Germany, while Aryans would 
attempt to secure unqualified proof of their non-Jewishness. The issue caused severe 
embarrassment and administrative problems for the RfA. The RfA responded by threatening 
those who leaked such information with court sanctions and a general loss of trust by the 
German business community. The RfA also revised its stamp. All letters were from then on 
stamped with the words "confidential" and included the abovementioned threat.275 
The task of registering and answering questions about the racial composition of foreign 
companies was a continuous problem due the enormity of the task. In early 1938, the RfA had 
to ask companies to stop sending reminders regarding unanswered questions on race. The RfA 
bluntly reasoned that they lacked personnel while the foreign legations were having difficulties 
in answering questions on race. This was most likely because such investigations had to be 
pursued precautiously and were time consuming.276 
In late summer 1939, the RfA had to remind its users to recycle available information in order 
to avoid repeating the cataloging process.277 Companies were also conducting their own 
research into who was Jewish or Aryan. Continuous warnings were issued by the AA to stop such 
proceedings that were regarded as endangering foreign trade relations. Such questions were to 
be sent directly to the RfA. As a response, the RfA had to stress their leadership role. It seems 
                                                     
273 “Streng vertrauliche Behandlung amtlicher Auskünfte über Rassezugehörigkeit.,” December 13, 1938, BA, R91, 633. 
274 “IIIA 11/484 Feststellung der Rassezugehörigkeit von Vertretern im Auslande,” August 27, 1938, BA, R9I, 633. 
275 “Streng vertrauliche Behandlung amtlicher Auskünfte über Rassezugehörigkeit.” 
276 “IIIA11/376 Mahnungen in Vertreter - und Rassezugehörigkeitsfragen.,” February 25, 1938, BA, R9I, 633. 
277 “IIIb2 Handels-Auskünfte,” June 23, 1939, BA, R9I, 634. 
 86 
companies were to be continuously reminded of this and warned they could face legal 
charges.278 
A continuous concern was the status of foreign trade relations. In 1939, it seemed some 
German companies were trying to exclude buyers of German goods. This had caused the media 
in some countries to write about the incidents, while it had also reached parliamentary circles 
in a number of states.279 This caused concern, as it endangered not only foreign trade, but also 
the overall relationship with those states.280 
The position of the RfA was that German companies had to be “educated” and this could only 
be done if the information from the RfA was trustworthy.281 In the summer of 1939, the RfA had 
to emphasize that only Jewish representatives were to be replaced, not Jewish buyers of German 
goods. The misunderstanding had caused the work-load of the RfA to rise, but also underscores 
the fact that some of the German businesses involved in foreign trade had either misunderstood 
their obligations or expanded them.282 
In early 1941, it was decided to publish approved replacement companies or persons to make 
it easier for German companies to find replacements. However, the names of blocked companies 
and persons were not publicized.283 Still, some found their letters remaining unanswered for too 
long and turned to the local embassies. The RfA attempted to end this practice. In late December 
1941, it was becoming increasingly difficult to keep-up with the number of requests as they 
numbered 145.000 that year. At the same time the RfA argued that if the information was not 
monitored, cross-referenced and registered correct, it would lead to the same question being 
asked and answered multiple times. The RfA was busy, and many companies complied with the 
procedures, even though it seems the RfA in some instances became a bottleneck for trade.284 
On the 19th of December, the RfA sent out a plea to German diplomatic representations and 
consulates with trade responsibilities. The RfA asked to be the central information hub on racial 
matters. This would lighten both the burden of registration and of answering the same question 
more than once. In order to ease the information flow, it would suffice to write the category of 
a company on the received letter from the RfA and then return it. The leaders of the RfA further 
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indicated that questions on race were to originate from the RfA in order to be answered.285 As 
late as 1943, the RfA requested that inquiries be made only in writing to avoid 
misunderstandings which could arise over the phone. It was important to keep the information 
flow streamlined and correct.286 This indicates persistent problems in receiving and registering 
correct information. 
One example is from June 1942. Registering Jews and Jewish firms from Hungary correctly 
was problematic. The causes were usually due to misspellings of the local language e.g. the 
spelling of "(correct) Scsuska (false) Sesuka" led to misunderstandings both by those who 
inquired about the company and in the following registration of the company. The RfA strongly 
urged correspondents to secure correct information to avoid such misunderstandings.287 
Part of the exporting textile industry in Germany did not thoroughly comply with the 
exclusion of their old Jewish customers. German textile exporters simply asked the 
Prüfungsstelle for the racial composition of a given company, despite already knowing it to be 
Jewish. The importer was given the benefit of the doubt until further research had been done, 
thus allowing the deal to go through. Since textiles were often traded on a yearly basis, the 
exporter could then report that the deal had gone through and no further proof of the importer’s 
racial composition was needed.  
Textile exporters could easily find approved Aryan importers and were strongly encouraged 
to do so to avoid further paperwork. However, all new business connections had to be pre-
approved as Aryan before trade could commence. Old business connections also had to be 
approved when a business deal was about to be closed. This memo shows that the textile 
industry in particular kept supplying their Jewish business connections, despite the RfA. 
However, it is also evident that the RfA was an important organization in enforcing pressure on 
the export companies to terminate trade with Jewish importers. These kinds of omissions lead 
to a meeting between the Prüfungsstelle Textilindustrie and the RfA, resulting in a reprimand 
and new guidelines specifying the obligations of the textile industry.288 
Germany’s Italian ally did not share the visions of the RfA and instead worked to the opposite 
effect. The Italian state allowed former Jewish representatives of German companies in Italy to 
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import goods, but also allowed export to foreign Jewish companies. In the summer of 1942, the 
AA and RWM had been informed that Italian companies had an excessive fondness (Vorliebe) of 
exporting to foreign Jewish companies. This had been an issue since 1939, as Jews who had 
previously represented German companies instead became representatives for Italian firms. 
Clearly, Italy had a more relaxed position on a world economy without Jews. The issue had even 
been on the agenda of the German-Italian trade talks in the spring of 1942.289 Yet, it was still an 
issue in December 1942.  The RfA found that Jews who had been fired as direct representatives 
of German companies with some success imported goods from German companies. From the 
perspective of the RfA, this presented a problem, and a memo from December 1942 laid out 
new rules for the effective removal of Jewish importers in Italy. The memo shows that, even 
though the RfA tried to exclude Jews, there were loopholes. However, the memo also indicates 
the continuous attempt to reach the overall goal of excluding Jews from trading with 
Germany.290 
2.5 Consequences 
It seems only a few reports on the overall progress of Aryanizing the foreign trade have 
survived the war, but we do have some indicators besides the numerous letters on race. A 
suggestion to copy the British “Blacklists” was turned down in a meeting between RWM, RfA 
and the NSDAP/AO in the middle of 1941. The main argument was the extensive registry of 
60,000 companies at the RfA contained sufficient information, as 20,000 companies had been 
examined for their racial composition, and 7,000 of them were deemed Jewish.291 These 
numbers seem to have risen quickly. By spring 1942, the office had registered 26,000 Jewish 
companies and one-man businesses in the Netherlands, while the number of one-man Jewish 
companies in Romania was 40,000.292 The replacement process in Romania showed that by 
November 1942, a total of 1851 German companies had replaced their Jewish representatives 
without noticeable difficulties. There were some questions regarding the 30-40 Romanian anti-
Jewish laws affecting economic areas, as well as the definition of Jewishness. In Switzerland, 516 
German companies had replaced their Jewish representatives and removed 463 additional 
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representatives that were regarded as hostile to Germany (e.g. companies or persons deemed 
sympathetic to one of the Allied countries).293 Unfortunately, we only have a very fragmented 
overview of the numerical consequences of the work of the RfA. Further research is needed to 
gain a comprehensive understanding of the work of this large organization and its overall 
consequences for companies as well as individuals on a global scale. 
2.6 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that Germany’s ambition to Aryanize its foreign trade was formalized 
from 1937 and onwards. The RfA was charged by the RWM to formulate guidelines that aimed 
at the exclusion of Jewish representatives abroad. From 1940 onwards, these measures were 
expanded to include recipients of German goods abroad and importing companies. This had the 
potential to fulfill the intended goal of a complete Entjudung of the German foreign trade. It 
never became illegal to trade with Jewish companies. However, the exclusive policies seem to 
have been applied if they were not damaging to trade related to the war effort. Through an 
elaborate code language, a host of foreign companies and individuals were racially categorized 
and registered with the assistance of German legations and German Chambers of Commerce. 
The intentions of the RfA did not always proceed as anticipated and a host of memos reveal 
problems in the area of secrecy and legal claims in the prewar period. It has been identified that 
the Prüfungsstellen had the power to close off Jews from importing a specific type of goods in 
individual countries. 
Foreign trade was clearly used as a political instrument to reach racially motivated political 
goals. The policies were aimed at severing the international ties of most Jewish economic 
influences related to the German economy. On the basis of this, I would argue that we need to 
rephrase our understanding of Aryanization as a purely German phenomenon before the 
outbreak of war. Rather, it should be viewed as a global and continuous policy from 1937-1944. 
This opens the field for many new questions. How did other governments and Jewish companies 
react under the racial pressures before the war? How did German companies react in the 
international context of Aryanization? Did the early Aryanization attempts make it easier to 
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Aryanize the Jewish companies in e.g. France and the Netherlands after their occupation as many 
of them had already been registered?  
The next two chapters will show how the policies of the RfA were implemented in Denmark 
from 1937 to 1945. Though the RfA is not the main subject of this dissertation the following two 
chapters could be regarded as a focused case study into the implementation of RfA’s policies. As 
such Denmark serves as a rare case allowing us to follow RfA’s Aryanization policies over a longer 
period of time in a setting without a legal framework for the persecution of Jews. These results 
should be applicable to later international cross-case studies. We now move our focus from the 
RfA to explore how these goals and policies were pursued in Denmark. Through the assistance 
of the German legation these developed into one of the most successful areas of the German 
Judenpolitik in Denmark. 
 
3 Aryanization in Denmark 1937-1940  
The chronological scope of this chapter is the pre-occupation, and for this period it seeks to 
answer part two of research question one: How were the policies of the RfA implemented in 
Danish-German trade relations? This opens up for partly answering research question two and 
three on the role of the German legation in Copenhagen as well as the Danish government’s 
reactions to the Aryanization attempts. Section 3.1 is devoted to an overview of the relevant 
sections of the Auswärtiges Amt as well as selected staff at the German legation in Copenhagen. 
Section 3.2 follows the legation’s role in beginning to examine and register Danish-Jewish 
businesses as part of the RfA’s policies. Section 3.3 is the largest part of this chapter, and the 
main theme is the Danish government’s reaction to the German Aryanization measures. In sub-
sections I examine the reactions of the media, and the Danish-Jewish business minority that 
sought the assistance of the Danish Foreign Ministry in order to counter the German 
Aryanization measures. The ministry had to react to these concerns as well as consider how 
possible steps to protect Danish-Jewish citizens would be perceived by their German 
counterparts. The chapter thus provide the perspective of perpetrators, bystanders, and victims 
to these events. I will continuously relate events to actual cases, yet the main case of the chapter 
will be that of Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke import in section 3.3.4. It will in a detailed manner reveal 
how Aryanization took place in the Danish setting in this period. Related to the model Stages of 
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Persecution the chapter will show existence of informal measures against Jews in Denmark 
(stage one), registration (stage four), and exclusive measures against selected areas of the 
Danish-Jewish businesses (stage five). 
3.1 The Auswärtiges Amt 
Before beginning to examine how the RfA’s policies were implemented in Denmark we need 
to devote attention to the main German organizations involved in Denmark: the Auswärtiges 
Amt (AA), the German Foreign Ministry, and the Gesandtschaft, while focusing on the area of 
Judenpolitik. The AA has been the subject of several major studies. The most recent one, Das 
Amt294  confirmed the findings of earlier studies.295 It dissolved the narrative of the ministry as a 
stronghold against Nazism and revealed how the German diplomatic corps had remained 
surprisingly unchanged after the end of the war. The German Foreign Ministry promptly adapted 
to National Socialism, including its Judenpolitik.  The ministry became nazified at an increasing 
pace after 1937 as senior staff joined the party and the SS in growing numbers, while new 
employees were recruited from those organizations. The reasons for senior staff to join them 
has been suggested as an amalgamation of opportunism, career concerns, organizational 
pressure and ideological beliefs. The Foreign Ministry was likewise shown to have been active in 
planning and promoting the Final Solution. Additionally, it had promoted anti-Jewish measures 
in countries that were German allies or satellite states.296 
In the context of this dissertation we should take note of some of the central personalities 
residing in Berlin, who became involved in the Danish-German relationship, first of all the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1938 Joachim von Ribbentrop. Despite his meagre involvement 
in Danish affairs he was consulted on the most important issues. At same time most dealings 
between Denmark and Germany took place through their respective foreign ministries. Denmark 
was in this way the occupied area on which Ribbentrop could exert the most influence. In regards 
to Denmark Ernst von Weizsäcker was also quite involved in Danish affairs. He had served at the 
German legation in Copenhagen (1924-1927) as Gesandtschaftsrat. From 1938-1943 he held the 
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position of Staatssekretär, Undersecretary of State, the highest civil service position in the AA 
and ranked just below Ribbentrop.297 The head of AA’s department for Scandinavia was Werner 
von Grundherr. He entered the AA in 1918 and was German envoy to Finland from 1925 to 1934. 
From 1934 and onwards he was the AA’s head of department for Scandinavia and the Baltic 
countries.298 
The key department of the AA on Jewish matters was Abteilung Deutschland which was 
recreated in 1933 and placed under the present Undersecretary of State, Bernhard Wilhelm von 
Bülow. In 1933 his nephew Vicco von Bülow-Schwante became the leader of department 
Deutschland. He was an anti-republican who had been politically engaged from 1928 as a 
member of the German National People’s Party, Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP). He was 
responsible for justifying the National Socialists’ racial policies by providing statistical material 
intended to substantiate the perceived negative Jewish influences. This type of reports could be 
regarded as spin doctor manuals as they provided an arsenal of positive arguments for German 
domestic policies that could be applied by the German legations as counter arguments.299 Emil 
Schumburg was the first Judenreferent, expert on Jewish affairs, of the AA from 1936-1940. He 
was briefly leader of Dept. Deutschland in the AA in 1939, for which he had been working since 
1933, and he was behind drafting some of the reports, mentioned above, that Bülow-Schwante 
would transmit to German legations. In 1936, Himmler personally enlisted Emil Schumburg into 
the SS.300 
The more well-known Martin Luther headed Abteilung Deutschland from 1940 and handled 
Jewish questions as well as race issues. He worked closely with Adolf Eichmann’s department to 
diplomatically prepare and secure the deportations of Jews. He was promoted to 
Unterstaatssekretär in the AA in 1941 and represented the ministry at the Wannsee conference 
in 1942. His career ended as he attempted to remove Ribbentrop in early 1943. This caused his 
imprisonment in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp from February 1943. Under Luther the 
department extended its role as an information hub in the AA as it secured, and transferred 
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information from the many German legations on Jewish matters. Furthermore, the department 
coordinated efforts against Jews with the RSHA as well as office D III.301 (See below). 
Office D III was the main office for Jewish Matters in Dept. Deutschland.  Office D III was 
headed by Franz Rademacher in 1940, but he was removed when Luther was imprisoned. 
Rademacher was the second Judenreferent and worked closely with Luther. Rademacher was 
deeply involved in writing several of the key documents of the so-called Madagascar plan. The 
plan envisioned the deportation of the German Jews to the, at the time, French Island, and this 
is regarded as the first territorial final solution. Rademacher was generally involved in arranging 
deportations from all over Europe, but after Luther’s removal Rademacher served in the navy 
for the duration of the war. He served two postwar prison sentences, became advisor to the 
Syrian government and spied for West Germany before dying in 1973.302 
I have already touched on the leadership of the German legation in Copenhagen, but to briefly 
summarize: Cecil von Renthe-Fink headed the legation from 1936 to September 1942 and 
Werner Best succeeded him for the duration of the war. Ernst Krüger was Consul General and 
Trade Attaché. Krüger came to Denmark in 1915 and received the title of consul and trade 
attaché in 1919. In 1937 he was promoted to Consul General. Krüger is important because he 
handled the extensive correspondence between the German legation in Copenhagen and the 
RfA. As I will show later, he was directly involved in the Aryanization processes in Denmark and 
reported on the racial composition of Danish companies to the RfA.303 Higher-ranking Danish 
civil servants gave Krüger the best of recommendations after the war, and he was allowed to 
stay in Denmark as a special gesture. They described him as being against Nazism and helping 
Danish-Jewish businessmen who were being targeted by the German Chamber of Commerce or 
people in Berlin.304 Contrary to this perception, I will show he was actually involved in 
Aryanization measures. 
Gustav Meissner was also involved in anti-Jewish measures in Denmark. He was the Presse 
Attaché of the German legation in Copenhagen 1940-1943, and managed department IV on 
                                                     
301 Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz, “Martin Luther,” Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz, accessed March 12, 2017, 
http://www.ghwk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf-wannsee/teilnehmer/luther.pdf. 
302 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 184,254; USA and National 
Archives and Records Administration, Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War (Washington, D.C., 2014), 29; 
Richard Breitman, ed., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 161–62; Ernst Klee, “Franz 
Rademacher,” Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945 (Nikol Verlag, 2016), 476–77. 
303 “Letter correspondence between the RfA and German legation - Multiple letters 1940-1944,” 1940, BA, R9I, 324, 325, 358, 1856-1867. 
304 Kirchhoff, Den gode tysker: Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz: de danske jøders redningsmand, 69. 
 94 
culture, press and radio. Meissner was an early member of the Nazi party, having been employed 
at Dienststelle Ribbentrop in 1937 with Nordschleswig as his area of expertise as he was fluent 
in both languages. He was associated with Martin Luther, the leader of Abteilung Deutschland 
from 1940. This connection was to Meissner’s benefit during his years in Denmark. He became 
part of the German legation from the 9th of April 1940. Werner Best did not side with Meissner’s 
ambitions. Meissner joined the front soldiers at his own wish a couple of months after Luther 
was removed in February 1943.305 Another import personage is Paul Kanstein who rose to the 
rank of SS-Brigadeführer in 1942. He had made a career for himself in the German police. From 
1937 he was the leader of the Stapoleitstelle Berlin and in 1939 Vice President for the police in 
Berlin. He was sent to Denmark in April 1940, where he headed the police department at the 
German legation, and was responsible for the security of the German troops. Kanstein viewed 
the collapse of the cooperation as a personal defeat and requested for transfer, which was 
granted in October 1943.306 
Lastly, we should mention Paul Barandon. He was the Gesandter, envoy, and deputy manager 
of the German legation from January 1942. He headed the legation in the interim between Cecil 
von Renthe-Fink and Werner Best. Barandon had been in the AA since the beginning of his career 
and had been a party member since 1937.307 He was recalled to Berlin in January 1945. According 
to postwar interrogations Ribbentrop moved Barandon to a position as AA’s representative at 
the German Military high-command (OKH) until March 1945. According to Barandon, Ribbentrop 
wanted to be informed of the work of the OKH.308 Within the context of Judenpolitik Barandon 
was not a novice as he had investigated staff members in the AA in order to locate possible 
Jewish ancestry.309 
3.2 The German Legation and Aryanization  
Aryanization in Denmark in the prewar years rested on the partnership between the RfA and 
the German legation in Copenhagen. The RfA relied heavily on information from Denmark to 
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fulfill their task of Aryanizing the foreign trade between the two countries. The most important 
aid for the RfA in Denmark was the German Gesandtschaft, and the German Chamber of 
Commerce in Denmark (GCC) performed investigative tasks for the legation. Trade Attaché and 
Consul General Ernst Krüger was charged with reporting, and answering questions on the racial 
composition of Danish companies. He would correspond extensively with the RfA on these 
matters. 
The GCC’s role mainly consisted in registering and investigating who was Jewish, while also 
overseeing the Aryanization process. This work began in Denmark in 1937. The German Chamber 
of Commerce was founded in November 1936, but the formation was a dual project between 
the establishment (AA) and the NSDAP's representatives in Denmark. The idea for a chamber of 
commerce in Copenhagen was voiced from several sides as early as 1934.  The embassy showed 
great interest in the matter, as Ernst Krüger unsuccessfully attempted to control the formation 
process on behalf of the Gesandtschaft. In 1936, the NSDAP's Landeskreisleiter in Denmark, 
Rittmeister Haupt, informed the AA he would found the GCC in collaboration with other German 
businessmen in Denmark. The chamber did not initially have support from all parts of the 
established National Socialist bureaucracy, and the RfA did not officially recognize the GCC until 
late October 1937.310 
Haupt lost his position as Landeskreisleiter to Ernst Schäfer in 1939. The year before, Haupt 
had already been replaced as Hauptgeschäftsführer in the GCC by Kurt D. Buck.311 Buck was re-
drafted into the army in 1943 and was replaced by Arnold Brauer. The leader of the GCC was its 
president, Herbert Danielsen. He maintained continuity in the organization, as he held the 
presidency from 1936 until the end of the war. Danielsen was also the financial secretary of the 
Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) in Denmark. Clearly, the GCC had strong ties to the party in 
Germany. It should probably be regarded as a German organization, because it mainly worked 
for the NSDAP’s financial interests in Denmark. The evident political orientation towards 
Germany was also reflected in the composition of the executive committee, since the majority 
were required to be German nationals. However, on the surface, the GCC attempted to appear 
as a legitimate and neutral organization working to improve trade relations between the two 
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countries. The GCC reached a membership zenith in May 1943, when almost 2/3 of its 1845 
members were Danish.312 
The GCC had a clear racial profile being hostile towards Jews and Jewish companies from its 
foundation. This is revealed in a membership exclusion in the summer of 1942. Count C. 
Ahlefeldt-Laurvig was a member of the executive committee of the GCC and a lawyer. In a 
description of the case, he briefly summed up the GCC's position on Jews: "From its foundation 
the Chamber of Commerce has not wished to admit non-Aryan members or firms where the 
Jewish element is present."313 The Judenpolitik was a part of the GCC’s identity and the 
organization participated in enforcing it. 
In the summer of 1941, the Danish Nazi Party tried to establish an organization called the 
Danish-German Commercial Advisory Board (Dansk-tysk Erhvervsråd.) It resembled the GCC so 
much that the Reichsgruppe Industrie warned the RfA and others not to cooperate with the 
organization. In the fall the Danish Nazis had reduced the scope of their organization to just 
registering party members and planned to function as a volunteer advisory organization. The 
party was probably not influential in the Aryanization attempts in Denmark, but it seems 
probable it might have assisted in pointing to Jewish influences.314 This unsuccessful attempt to 
establish a trade organization fits the overall perception of a Danish Nazi Party that never 
successfully became a part of the German occupiers’ plans.315 
As already noted the German Gesandtschaft was by far the most important collaborating 
organization for the RfA. The German legation had been charged by the RfA with providing 
information on the racial composition of Danish companies. The correspondence between 
Krüger and the RfA is mainly missing for this period, and quite fragmented. Yet, the remaining 
correspondence does show the personal involvement of Ernst Krüger and Cecil von Renthe-Fink. 
In the following, I will closely analyze the known incidents. 
In 1936 Renthe-Fink and DAF had disagreed on policies in Denmark. In 1936, DAF had publicly 
announced its intentions to replace Danish representatives of German firms with Germans. This 
had been criticized in the magazine for Danish company agents, and Renthe-Fink advised 
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caution. He argued that Germany should not aggressively push this “healthy goal” as it would 
turn the Danes towards England. In the end, Renthe-Fink suffered a small reprimand.316 In 
essence, Renthe-Fink had agreed with the intentions, but not the method.  
Krüger became involved in a case in May 1938 in which the currency office of Bremen had 
asked a German company to prove that its payments were being made to an Aryan company. 
This links into the argument made earlier that the currency offices played a role in the RfA’s 
Aryanization efforts. Krüger argued that such measures would cause strong public reactions in 
Denmark, but as we shall see later, this was not the case. Despite his warnings Krüger answered 
the request and the company in question was categorized as non-Jewish. Krüger did attempt to 
affect the policies of the RfA by advising that the currency office should not pursue the matter 
further. However, Krüger was informed that wherever possible, contracts with Jewish firms were 
to be terminated.317 It appears unlikely, but as far as we know, this was the first direct order 
coming from Berlin to initiate Aryanization initiatives in Denmark. The legation began to follow 
the new policy in its own way. 
Possibly in order to save face locally, the Gesandtschaft had officially argued that the currency 
office’s claims for proof of being Aryan had been raised due to a mistake. However, the cases 
and complaints from Danish companies escalated. Renthe-Fink did not argue against the 
practice, but he raised awareness of specific Danish laws that secured compensations for firms 
who did not receive due payments. His advice was to pay the firms regularly in order to avoid 
the larger compensation fees.318 
Renthe-Fink was fully involved in the racial categorization of the company Aram Nichan in 
Copenhagen. Seven days after the request had been received, Renthe-Fink wrote “Further 
research has shown that Aram Nichan, Kopenhagen K, Hauserplads 18, apparently is to be 
considered Jewish. He can therefore not be recommended as a representative for German 
firms.”319 There were also recommendations of Danish lawyers who suited the racial policies. In 
1938, the race of Danish lawyer Svend Harms was categorized as Aryan, and then recommended 
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for his successful work for German firms in debt collection cases. Later that year the RfA also 
approved lawyer Kjeld Rørdam as a legal representative for German firms in Denmark.320 
Renthe-Fink and Ernst Krüger were directly communicating with the RfA in Aryanization issues 
and proposing adjustments to suit local circumstances. They had formally disguised existing 
attempts at Aryanization and supported the introduction of the informal racial division in Danish 
German business relations. Renthe-Fink in this way supported the policies of the RfA. He was 
also personally involved in specific cases in which Danish representatives were racially 
categorized. The result of these would mean either the acceptance or exclusion as 
representative for German companies in Denmark. Other German organizations also sought the 
expertise of the legation in racial matters. 
The Reichspressekammer was a subsection of Goebbels’ Reichskulturkammer that organized 
the press according to the party’s interests. It was headed by SS leader Max Amann, one of 
Hitler’s earliest followers. In the middle of 1937, the chamber requested a list of Danish 
companies available for selling German papers and periodicals in Denmark. The only demand 
was that the companies were Aryan. If only Jewish companies were available, the 
Reichspressekammer wanted to know to what degree they were Jewish. The German legation 
in Denmark replied that A/S Bladkompagniet had the broadest distribution network, but it was 
owned by newspapers known to have Jews among their stockholders. It did suggest the Aryan 
company A/S Bladhandlerforbundet, but characterized their distribution network as more 
limited. Though we do not know the outcome of this request, it seems very likely that German 
government organizations were avoiding Jewish companies, thus pursuing the exclusion of Jews 
in their foreign relations as well.321 However, we know little of the border-crossing Entjudung 
measures pursued by other organizations in National-Socialist Germany before the war 
commenced. 
This was also the case when Goebbels’ propaganda ministry began asking a host of questions 
on Danish suppliers of press photos. Seven companies were to be examined from April 1939 to 
June 1939; all but one passed the test of not being led by “Jews or German emigrants”. Signed 
by Renthe-Fink, a letter declared the photo service Paul Martin Meyer was Jewish. This basically 
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ended their potential business with German customers.322 Renthe-Fink had been personally 
involved in examining the racial composition of Danish companies and excluding the Jewish one. 
Renthe-Fink is thus to be considered part of the informal Aryanization policies being pursued in 
Denmark on a very detailed level. 
3.3 Reactions to Aryanization in Denmark 
The Danish Foreign Ministry’s knowledge of the German Aryanization procedures must have 
begun in late 1937 and possibly sooner. In early February 1938, the ministry tried to determine 
how to react in cases of Jews being excluded from German firms in Denmark. The ministry was 
also aware of cases in which Danish-Jewish business owners, representatives or employees in 
Germany were being targeted for discrimination when they negotiated import contracts.323 In 
order to gain knowledge on how other countries proceeded in the matter the Netherlands were 
contacted. They seemed to have reached an agreement with Germany on the issue, but the 
Dutch denied this was the case.324 Instead, they wrote that racial matters were being dealt with 
in the context of informal negotiations between German and Dutch government trade 
representatives. We are unaware of the strategies or agreements the Netherlands were 
pursuing or getting in these trade talks.325 However, Aryanization at this early stage was 
apparently an issue in the Dutch-German trade relationship as well. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, in the early stages of international Aryanization the processes set 
in motion by the RfA were not kept confidential. This was probably why a Danish-Jewish 
merchant could pass on detailed knowledge of the Aryanization attempts set in motion by the 
RfA. The letter was passed through the Grosserer-Societetet, the Danish Merchants Association, 
and forwarded to the Danish Foreign Ministry in anonymized form. Through a colleague, the 
Danish merchant had access to a circular letter from the German Velvet and Silk Weavers’ 
Association. It stated that Jewish representatives abroad were to be fired without damaging the 
overall foreign trade or the Four-Year Plan.326 The letter also revealed that information was being 
gathered on the racial composition of Danish firms by using information bureaus. The Danish-
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Jewish merchant in question claimed 80% of his turnovers could be attributed to his agency for 
several German companies. The application of German race laws in Denmark would force him 
to close down, he argued. He attempted to counter the exclusive processes by stating that the 
German policy had to be contested, as “Danish Merchants quite undeservedly were being 
financially destroyed by a foreign power…”327 Clearly, foreign trade was being used to achieve 
racial political goals by using formal demands in Germany and to impose informal Aryanization 
policies outside of Germany. 
The Danish Foreign Ministry received further confirmation of the German policies from the 
consulate in Hamburg in the summer of 1938. The consul, Marinus Yde, wrote that the German 
government was behind charging exporters not to hire Jewish agents and to sever their ties to 
old connections. It had caused some concern in the German business community, showing there 
was some reluctance to follow suit.328 The consul’s message was hastily passed on to the Danish 
Ministry for Trade, Industry and Shipping, but more followed. The business environment in 
Germany was also turning sour for German Jews as well as Danish Jews who were company 
owners or employed by Danish companies. Marinus Yde, met with representatives for Danish-
Jewish interests in Hamburg. The meeting mainly concerned the registration demands for Jewish 
assets329, but Jews, including non-German Jews, were also forbidden to visit the Hamburg stock 
exchange. The consul foresaw the closure of several foreign businesses in Germany, as access to 
the stock-exchange was necessary to trade and survive. Sales of foreign Jewish businesses were 
completed without consideration for the businesses’ goodwill and essentially meant a great loss 
for foreign Jewish businesses in Germany.330 
On the matter of Jewish representatives, the consulate in Hamburg reported on several cases 
in the summer of 1938 in which Danes were attempting to push out Jewish Danes as 
representatives for German firms. Although there are few details, it is evident that Danish Jews 
were not only being targeted by German firms, but also by an unknown number of fellow Danish 
business men who were ready to take over their positions as representatives. In this manner 
these Danes actively participated in the success of the German Aryanization attempts and 
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exploited them for personal gain. The consulate also provided an example of the German-Jewish 
Iwan Levy331, who for several years had represented Roulunds Fabrikker in Odense, Denmark. 
He was experiencing many difficulties, because he was Jewish, and “he had to let his business 
Aryanize”. He promised to open a small factory in Denmark, if he could emigrate, but was 
discouraged from doing so by the consul, who referred to the strict immigration laws in 
Denmark.332 
The Danish Foreign Ministry files do not provide us with much information on how Danish 
companies located in Germany adjusted to the anti-Jewish rules in Germany. We only know of 
four cases. One seed company whose owner was Jewish closed and moved to Denmark. E. 
Fjeldsøe, the Danish agent for several poultry firms in Denmark, had been asked if he was Aryan 
and if the companies he represented were Aryan or led by Aryans. The Danish company Fisker 
& Nielsen transferred their Jewish manager from Germany to the Netherlands.333 The Danish 
contracting company Christiani & Nielsen relocated two Jewish engineers to Copenhagen.334 The 
ministry does not seem to have been involved on behalf of the targeted Jewish owners to secure 
assets or values. 
The reports from the consul and the Danish foreign ministry’s knowledge raises the question: 
how did foreign companies located in Germany react to Aryanization demands from 1933-1939? 
The issue of German companies’ reaction to Aryanization is considered a must in most German 
historiography on this theme, while the largest American companies have also seen their fair 
share of investigations.335 This area could deserve, at least, further research into Danish 
companies as a host of questions come to mind: Did they fire their Jewish employees or not? 
Did they buy Aryanized German companies to gain market shares, or did they remain 
uninterested? Danish research is silent on the issue, which makes it difficult to confirm the 
reports. However, such procedures against foreign companies in Germany do contain the 
                                                     
331 I have been unable to locate further information on Iwan Levy.  
332 “Jødiske repræsentanter i Tyskland for danske firmaer,” June 29, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b. 
333 “De tyske ariseringsforanstaltningers virkninger for danske firmaer og forretningsmænd.,” January 11, 1939, RA, UM 140.N.33b; Bjerre, 
Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945, 158.  
334 Andersen, De gjorde Danmark større: De multinationale danske entreprenørfirmaer i krise og krig 1919-1947, 128. 
335 E.g. Edwin Black, IBM and the Holocaust. The Strategic Alliance between Nazi Germany and America’s Most Powerful Corporation 
(Washington, DC: Dialog Press, 2001); More recently AP admitted to having fired or removed Jews from their German branch Ofer Aderet, 
“Associated Press Admits It Fired or Transferred 6 Jewish Employees at Behest of Nazi Regime in 1935,” Haaretz, May 10, 2017, 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/ap-admits-it-fired-6-jewish-employees-at-behest-of-nazi-regime-in-1935-1.5470709 AP’s investigation 
was caused by this historical article ; Harriet Scharnburg, “Das A und P der Propaganda. Associated Press und die nationalsozialistische 
Bildpublizistik,” Zeithistorische Forschungen 1–2016 (2016): 11–37. 
 102 
elements of diplomatic problems, which larger nations such as the USA, the United Kingdom and 
France possibly felt obliged to comment and react on. 
3.3.1 Negotiating Aryanization 
In the summer of 1938, the issue of Aryanization had also reached the Danish Minister of 
Trade, Industry, and Maritime Affairs, Johannes Kjærbøl, who forwarded a message from Alfred 
Raffel A/S, a Danish steel importer, to the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter Munch. 
Several German companies had withdrawn their contracts from Raffel.336 The names of several 
other companies being subjected to Aryanization were supplied to the Foreign Ministry by 
Ludvig Elsass, the director of Danish steel company Sophus Berendsen. These cases included: 
Harald Michelsen’s Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import, James Polack’s removal from AGFA in 
Denmark and C.B. Henriques’ removal as chairman of Siemens in Denmark. We will follow both 
Harald Michelsen’s and James Pollack’s companies later in the chapter, but first we turn to the 
Aryanization of the famous perfume 4711 in Denmark.337 
In 1902, Moritz R. Henriques took over as exclusive representative for the popular perfume 
4711 from Cologne – the Echt Kölnisch Wasser, the eau de Cologne. In 1932 he established a 
factory to produce the perfume in Denmark, managed by his son Kai Henriques. They were 
required to buy the needed raw materials to produce the perfume from the German company 
and to refrain from selling other brands. In 1938, the turnover was 900,000 DKR (30 mill./2017), 
and a fixed percentage of the turnover was paid to the main company in Germany. In March 
1938, a visit to Cologne had dire consequences for the positions of the two Danish managers. 
They were notified that new “Aryan regulations” meant the discontinuation of the contract. The 
managers of 4711 had attempted to keep the Danes on board by creating a new company in 
which the wife of Kai Henriques, who was most likely not Jewish, was to own 25% of the stock, 
but this attempt failed. Moritz’s contract would expire on January 1st 1939, and six months later 
Kai’s contract as factory manager was to expire. Apparently, all avenues of finding a solution had 
failed, and Moritz R. Henriques praised the management of 4711 for these attempts. The appeal 
to address this “injustice”, as Moritz termed it, was made to the Danish Merchants’ Association 
and the Danish Foreign Ministry.338  
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These cases prompted discussions in government and the top-level of the Danish Foreign 
Ministry on how to diplomatically address the issue in a more formal manner. German 
Aryanization policies in Denmark were discussed at a cabinet meeting in the summer of 1938. 
The Foreign Minister was to participate in a meeting of the so-called Oslo states,339  and the 
“...question of the dismissal of Jewish agents in businesses as such demands are being raised 
from the German side.” The issue of Aryanization was thus to be discussed among a wider group 
of smaller European states. This underscores that the informal Aryanization policies set in 
motion by the RfA were having an effect on these states.340 
The Danish government proceeded to raise the question of Aryanization in the Danish-
German Trade Committee (det Dansk-tyske handelsudvalg) during the summer of 1938. The 
main aim of the committee, headed by higher-ranking civil servants, was to solve trade issues 
between the two countries. Denmark was represented by a senior civil servant in the Danish 
Foreign Ministry, Nils Svenningsen, while the Germans were represented by Alex Walter. Walter 
had negotiated trade agreements with Denmark since 1936 and was well connected in Berlin.341 
The minutes of the meeting emphasize the clash of the small, independent democracy and the 
rising National Socialist state enforcing its Judenpolitik. Denmark's position was diplomatic and 
pragmatic. Svenningsen believed the problem consisted of two separate issues 1) Jewish agents 
for Danish companies in Germany and 2) Jews, living in Denmark, who were agents for German 
companies. The strategy was to forfeit the case for Jews working in Germany and carefully argue 
against German Aryanization policies in Denmark. Svenningsen claimed Denmark had no 
intention interfering in the domestic policies of Aryanization. However, he diplomatically 
stressed that Jews working for Danish companies in Germany should not be fired too hastily as 
it could damage Danish-German trade relations. He thereby forfeited protecting Danish-Jewish 
citizens working in Germany. This might be viewed as diplomatically sound, and in line with the 
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strategy to not provoke Germany. However, it stands in contrast to the Foreign Ministry’s usual 
code of conduct which is to secure and protect Danish citizens. To Svenningsen, the issue of 
Jewish representatives for German firms in Denmark was a more serious matter, as several 
agents had complained to the ministry. Svenningsen advanced cautiously on Denmark’s behalf. 
He claimed that Denmark knew it could not interfere in these cases, but felt obliged to raise the 
matter. The main argument was that trade relations risked being damaged due to possible 
boycotts and loss of goodwill towards Germany. In addition, Svenningsen noted that the lay-offs 
of Jews were pursued by German firms without the support of the German government. 
Svenningsen also stressed that a difference between Aryan and Jewish did not exist in Denmark. 
The arguments appear weak and were contrary to the knowledge of the ministry. He might have 
thought he could gain goodwill by acting very restrained.342 Svenningsen thus tried to challenge 
Germany’s racial views, but this was refused by his German counterpart. 
Walter basically discarded all arguments from the Danes by providing unmistakable National 
Socialist rhetoric. He stated that the position of the Jews in public as well as in business life had 
been changed – and continued: 
  
“National Socialism views unregulated participation from Jews as incompatible with 
the will of the German people, and it was its intention, the will of the movement to 
limit Jewish activities in Germany. This was not just the wishes of one party or a 
specific social class, but the collected perception of the German people. Germany 
was conscious of the grave difficulties that would arise by pursuing this 
perception.”343 
 
Walter claimed that the German government was prevented from interfering in individual 
companies’ pursuit of the will of the people, and the current challenges this created were 
regarded as temporary. The Jews were seen as acting against German interests everywhere and 
viewed as a world-wide threat. Walter then moved on to blame the Jews for several incidents 
including anti-German boycotts. He claimed that Jewish representatives for German companies 
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had acted disloyally by promoting non-German companies in order to damage Germany. 
Walter’s arguments were consistent with National Socialism’s ideas, and the policies of the RfA. 
Walter would transmit the Danish concerns to his superiors, while arguing that he could not 
interfere in the matter. At the very end of the meeting, Svenningsen repeated his main 
argument: that the issue of Aryanization had the potential to damage trade relations between 
the two countries. He thus tried to re-frame the argument away from the racial and anti-Jewish 
points employed by Walter, but was unsuccessful.344 
The Danish Foreign Ministry only mildly contested Aryanization, but there were limits to 
Aryanization in Denmark. These are found in internal discussions and correspondence to other 
ministries. The Danish government defined their limits in a legal sense as it argued it had no 
cause to interfere if contract agreements were not violated. This meant that if agents and 
representatives were fired within the framework of legality it was considered futile to raise the 
issue, despite the evident racial and anti-Jewish reasons behind the lay-offs. This stance was 
explained to the Danish Ministry of Justice in August 1938: 
 
“Should the attempts from Germany later be directed at businessmen of Jewish 
descent living in this country who are not (agents, exclusive importers, 
representatives etc.) in a special judicial agreement with a specific German company, 
the Foreign Ministry believes that it should be considered to contact the German 
government”.345 
 
This stance had several options built into it, and was clearly not a bulletproof defense of the 
Danish-Jewish business minority. The case for representatives was forfeited, while it was only 
“to be considered” to raise the matter on behalf of other categories of Jewish businesses if 
problems were to arise. 
 The Danish Foreign Ministry did intervene in a few cases in which Danish companies were 
not being paid because they were considered Jewish.346 In November 1938, the Danish 
Merchants Association asked the Danish Foreign Ministry to confirm whether the German 
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dictatorship was pursuing a deliberate policy of exclusion, meaning a policy demanding Danish-
Jewish representatives to be either laid off or their contracts terminated upon renewal. The 
Danish Foreign Ministry answered it had passed on the question to their legation in Berlin and 
in doing so evidently deferred the matter, despite their knowledge.347 
In early 1939, the Danish Ministries also learned of the GCC’s attempt to categorize 
companies according to the racial definitions of Germany. The Ministry of Justice obtained 
several documents showing that a Danish merchant had been investigated and asked to disclose 
his race according to the Nuremberg laws. This was an obvious informal use of the German race 
laws. It was news to the Foreign Ministry who had been unaware of the GCC’s activities. In late 
August 1939, it even seems the GCC tightened its measures, as it attempted to pressure their 
members to fire Jewish employees. This was, for example, demanded of the Danish merchant 
Karl Kiefer. The GCC wanted the Jewish employee replaced. However, the Foreign Ministry 
interfered, but the outcome remains undisclosed. The case illustrates how a pressure was 
applied on Danish companies to let their Jewish employees go in order to become members of 
the GCC. The extent is unknown, but it opens up for the potential discrimination against Jews 
who were merely employed by companies trading with Germany.348  
3.3.2 Media Reactions to Aryanization 
In an article headlined “Unheard of Nazi-German Attacks on Danish Business Life”, the Danish 
Communist newspaper Arbejderbladet was one of the first to publicly report on the German 
Aryanization attempts in Denmark in May 1938. The article argued that Germany had attempted 
to control who was in charge of the companies trading with Germany. The paper had supposedly 
learned that the GCC had requested the Danish Merchants’ Association to inform their members 
that companies without Jews would be preferred as German trade partners. At the same time, 
the article referenced the general tendency that German firms were firing their Jewish 
representatives abroad.349 
  In the summer, the newspaper Aftenbladet ran a smaller piece with the headline “Germany 
Demands Aryan Proof from Foreign Companies”. Remarkably, the article focused on the British 
reactions to the German politics. The correspondent described how British firms were being 
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asked to prove they were not owned by Jews or persons of Jewish origin. Proof would only be 
accepted if it was confirmed by the German Embassy in London or the British Chamber of 
Commerce. The British Minister of Trade, the conservative Oliver Stanley, would reject the 
attempted interference in British trade relations. This was possibly one of the first public 
statements made by another country against the policies pursued by the RfA.350 This shows not 
only the international scope of the RfA’s policies, but also that they were being challenged in 
other countries. 
In the autumn of 1938 the Danish newspaper Ekstrabladet confirmed the existence of an 
official German policy aimed at replacing Jewish business representatives based on information 
from a “large Danish company”. Their German business relation had openly stated that the 
German authorities demanded proof that representatives of German companies were of Aryan 
descent. There were other examples of companies being split up according to race, while others 
denounced the German demands.351 The articles show that German Aryanization attempts had 
become a public issue, and that the introduction of Judenpolitik’s Aryanization aspects were 
being dealt with in various ways within the Danish business community. 
3.3.3 Denying Aryanization 
Swedish Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler had spoken on Aryanization at the students’ 
association of Göteborg in early December 1938. The speech caused public debate in Sweden, 
but Swedish historian Sven Nordlund has pointed to the speech having very little effect on the 
Aryanization attempts.352 The Danish diplomats in Sweden confirmed that Sandler had given an 
unmistakable warning against Germany’s attempt to Aryanize Swedish business life. In addition, 
they verified the content of the Swedish newspaper articles on the speech. The Swedish papers 
mostly focused on the warning given to Germany, but Sandler had also cautioned Swedish 
businesses who were to refrain from answering questions on race. He had stressed that the 
Aryanization attempts must be terminated in order to preserve the positive trade relations 
between Germany and Sweden.353 Sandler undeniably spoke against the German policies and 
directly challenged international Aryanization.  
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The articles in Swedish newspapers revealed that the following different categories of 
Aryanization were being pursued in Sweden: 
 
1. German companies had dismissed Swedish-Jewish representatives 
2. Germany has demanded termination of contracts for Swedish Jews who were 
representatives of Swedish companies selling German goods 
3. Companies in Sweden with subsidiaries in Germany had been asked to provide 
information for both entities:  
a. If the white-collar workers were Aryan 
b. If the capital in the company was Aryan354 
 
Sandler’s speech had a marked effect on Danish affairs. The Danish Foreign Ministry had to 
publicly comment on the matter, and as we shall see it would officially deny the existence of 
Aryanization in the Denmark. 
The Danish newspaper Politiken reported on Sandler’s speech and underscored Swedish 
newspapers’ support for Sandler. Several statements from the Swedish newspapers revealed 
the policies of the RfA and were cited by Politiken. The main concern was not Jews being let go 
from German companies in Sweden, but the fact that Aryanization was supposed to be enforced 
outside of Germany. The Director of the Swedish Chamber of Trade in Stockholm had stated that 
it “…had received numerous complaints over German companies which had cancelled their 
contracts with Swedish firms that were owned by Jews or employed Jews…”. The article briefly 
described the Danes as having decided to “suffer and be quiet”.355 This basically meant that 
Aryanization in the Danish public was perceived as unchallenged by the government, which was 
not far from being correct.  
The Swedish statements forced the Danish Foreign Minister since 1929, Peter Munch, to 
comment on Sandler’s speech and Aryanization in Denmark. Only a day after the article, an 
interview with Munch was on the front page of Politiken under the headline “No ‘Aryanization’ 
of Danish Business Life”. The minister stated that there had been rumors of Aryanization in 
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Denmark, which seemed similar to the Swedish experiences. However, the known examples had 
been researched and Munch claimed they were false. Munch’s statement clearly did not 
correspond with the ministry’s knowledge.356  The public statements of both Sandler and Munch 
were picked up by the press service in the German Foreign Ministry, and Renthe-Fink also wrote 
a brief summary of Munch’s statement, but without commenting on it.357 
Munch’s statements caused a brief and short-lived public reporting on Aryanization, which 
was followed in the ministry. The articles demonstrate that the scope and policies of the RfA in 
Northern Europe were known to the business environments. The Jewish weekly, Jødisk Ugeblad, 
perceived Sandler’s speech very positively, as it was interpreted as a defense of liberty against 
Nazism. The article described how demands for proof of race from German companies were a 
well-known occurrence in the Danish-Jewish business minority. The Danish Foreign Minister was 
criticized for being excessively diplomatic in denying the existence of the phenomenon in 
Denmark. The weekly’s article was picked up by Arbejderbladet a few days later.358 
The Aryanization attempts also became part of an international public debate. The issue was 
raised during a questioning session in the British House of Commons in late December. A Labour 
member enquired of the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, if the government was aware of the 
dismissals of Jewish employees and what the government intended to do to prevent it. Hoare 
replied the matter would be investigated, while stressing that decent British companies should 
refrain from being part of such conduct.359 Deutsche Zeitung, a paper in German printed in 
Moscow, wrote a piece on the German Aryanization attempts in Scandinavia. The article has 
several examples of Aryanization explaining “…the Fascists’ furious anti-Semitic campaign and 
overall demand for the Aryanization of trade companies”. Examples from Denmark were AGFA 
and the publisher Høst, which I will comment on below. Deutsche Zeitung also provided 
examples from Norway, where stores apparently had used posters to signify they racial status.360 
It seems the sources were communist papers and parties from other countries, most likely within 
Scandinavia. Quite surprisingly, the British working-class newspaper The Daily Herald in 
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December 1938 had a small article with the headline “Nazis ‘Purging’ Danish Firms”. According 
to the article, the Danish publisher Høsts Forlag had a large bookstore, which had been visited 
by a seemingly normal German customer. However, the visit resulted in a letter giving the 
business this warning: stop selling anti-German books or lose your privilege to sell German 
textbooks.361 
The Norwegians also had a round of public debate regarding Aryanization attempts in Norway 
in January 1939. It spanned various newspapers, which reported different opinions on the 
matter. The Communist newspaper Arbeiderbladet were hardliners against the practice, while 
others such as Morgenbladet and the trade paper Norges Handels- og Sjøfartstidende 
downplayed events and reported the issue was marginal.  They only knew of a few companies 
that had been asked about their racial composition. However, Norway’s trade organization 
spoke of several incidents of Norwegian merchants being asked about their race and families.362 
Returning to Foreign Minister Munch’s denial that ended up backfiring. This was partly due 
the media exposure, and partly because more business owners contacted the ministry with 
examples of Aryanization. One was the A/S Dansk Patent Kontor, Danish Patent Office Inc., which 
apparently, as a result of German pressure, had restructured as the Jewish person in the 
leadership had stepped down. As a consequence, the Danish Foreign Ministry produced an 
overview of the Danish patent business, which seemed to be dominated by Jewish leadership or 
personnel. Many had lost their German clients, who had transferred their business to Aryan 
offices. The Ministry decided not to raise the case with the Germans based on the estimation 
that it would be futile. Evidently, the ministry rejected to challenge Aryanization despite its 
obvious effects in this business area.363 A lawyer provided clear evidence that his client, the 
company Jul. Zacharias, had been asked in plain language in the following manner: 
 
“…as you are our representative we kindly ask you to inform us if your company is 
Jewish or under Jewish influence.”364  
 
The lawyer had replied that the company’s owner was 100% Aryan.365  
                                                     
361 “Nazis ‘Purging’ Danish Firms.,” The Daily Herald, December 29, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b. 
362 “Handelsforholdet Norge-Tyskland,” January 20, 1939, RA, UM 140.N.33b. 
363 “Note om dansk-jødiske patent bureauer,” March 15, 1939, RA, UM 140.N.33b". 
364 “Den danske legation i Berlin til Udenrigsministeriet,” December 12, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b. 
365 Ibid. 
 111 
3.3.4 Attempted Aryanization - Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import 
In the following we will look at the of case of the textile company Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke 
Import. The case provides an in-depth perspective from the viewpoints of victim, perpetrators, 
and bystanders on Aryanization in Denmark. The case reveals many details of the company’s 
problems, and the detailed knowledge the Foreign Ministry was gaining. The case also reflects 
the effects of RfA’s Aryanization policies on the Danish-Jewish business community. It begins 
with a discussion between the German company Fr. Küttner A.G. from Saxony and the Danish 
Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import. In 1938, they had been business partners for the past 15 years, 
but the partnership was now characterized by distrust. Harald Michelsen, the owner of 
Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import, wanted a Danish lawyer to oversee negotiations on how to 
proceed, because the “…word of the Israelites would, according to German law, never be 
respected by the law against a German Aryan’s.”366 Apparently, Michelsen had been fired by 
Küttner. However, Küttner’s largest customer in Denmark would only accept Michelsen as their 
representative. Küttner had sent Dr. Treischke to handle affairs in Denmark. Dr. Treischke had 
been very satisfied with Michelsen’s work over the past 15 years, but the German government 
had forced Küttner to fire Michelsen, Dr. Treischke explained. The president of Küttner was also 
Wirtschaftsminister of Saxony, and he disallowed Jews in his company, including Jews not 
residing in Germany. The lawyer suggested the formation of a purely Aryan company, with 
Michelsen in charge of sales, but both parties rejected this strategy. The lawyer also touched on 
the subject of economic losses for Germany, but according to Treischke:  
 
“The present German government was indifferent to the subject of economic loss of 
a business, when the state’s political interests and the state’s idea were to be 
implemented, as the state now has the greatest authority over individual or 
economic interests”.367 
 
It is evident that this company mainly complied with RfA’s policies – and Germany’s, for that 
matter. It also underscores the view that these policies to a certain extent ignored the possible 
economic losses which arose from pursuing racial goals within the foreign trade.  
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Küttner instead suggested appointing a new agent, while keeping Michelsen on as a dealer 
without mentioning his exclusive rights. A “gentlemen agreement” (sic) would secure Michelsen 
a customer base defined by Küttner. This would protect him from being ousted by the newly 
appointed agent, Küttner argued. Küttner was seemingly attempting to find a creative solution, 
but they still needed an official acceptance of the agreement from Berlin. Küttner’s motive was 
not to help Michelsen, but to secure their largest Danish buyer. 
Two months later, the case remained unresolved, and Michelsen continued to be excluded 
by other German companies. The German company Kötitzer Ledertauch- u. Wachstuch-Werke 
had also given their notice of termination to Harald Michelsen. According to Michelsen, Kötitzer 
had secured the acceptance of a change of agent from its Danish customers before terminating 
the contract. Michelsen was also indirectly obstructed from doing business with the main 
German producer of Vigogne Yarn, a mixture of wool and cotton, Vigognespinnerei, in Saxony. 
Michelsen’s requests for price lists were left unanswered, and by ignoring him, the company 
indirectly excluded him from their business network.368 
Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import began a struggle to keep its imports from Germany by 
directly contacting the management of the German companies and the Danish foreign ministry, 
thus challenging the German Judenpolitik in both countries. Several arguments were employed 
towards the German businesses. The business-related ones focused not only on long-term 
business relations and rising sales, but also on the risk of damaging sales by excluding Michelsen. 
He used a national argument, stressing that the proceedings against Jewish business partners 
would damage Germany’s image. Moral arguments and family history were also employed. 
Contract terminations were viewed as unfair and Michelsen argued that his mother’s family 
belonged to the German Jews who had opened the Hamburg/America route.369 In this way he 
applied his personal contacts and personal life to underscore positive examples, while pointing 
to several possible negative consequences.  
Towards the Danish authorities, Michelsen challenged the German policies by emphasizing 
economic losses and Germany’s problematic interference in Danish domestic affairs. He pointed 
to a 75% loss in turnovers due to Aryanization, and that the German mixture of politics and 
business would eventually lead to unforeseen consequences. He stressed that the contracts 
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were terminated for one reason only: he was Jewish. Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import asked for 
the protection of Danish Jewish citizens, clearly stressing the national argument. The 
repercussions were also felt by the staff of the company, some of whom would have to be 
dismissed due to the dramatic decline in turnovers. This argument could be expected to find 
fertile soil due to the high unemployment rates in Denmark.370 The company suggested it could 
open new avenues of income by being allowed to import yarn and silk from other countries.371 
In November 1938, the predicaments of the Danish company escalated further. The spinner 
factory Gustav Vogel in Saxony announced that it would become illegal for them to wire 
payments to foreign representatives who were Jewish. After this date, exceptions could only be 
made if Vogel proved the relationship with the representative had been terminated. Michelsen 
alerted the Danish Merchants’ Association, which asked for confirmation of the German policies 
later that month.372 Michelsen also tried to argue his case directly with the Danish foreign 
ministry using legal, national, economic and personal arguments: 
 
“If we cannot get the needed support from the Danish state, it will mean that our 
existence as merchants and humans are threatened, this means we cannot keep our 
staff or our home… we are aware that we must look at this as members of a society 
as a whole. If it is the case that the Foreign Ministry believes it cannot secure our 
interests as Danish citizens against the German state, we hope that through you or 
other Danish authorities, we will be given the chance to rebuild our business through 
other countries that are not against trading with Danish citizens of Jewish faith.”373  
 
Michelsen moved on to suggest that increased imports from England would solve his 
problems. This was a clear challenge to both the German Aryanization policies and the vague 
stance of the Danish government.374  
Munch’s public refusal of the existence of Aryanization in Denmark prompted Michelsen to 
write again. Under the heading “Aryanization of Danish business life”, Michelsen contested the 
                                                     
370 Christensen et al., Danmark besat: krig og hverdag 1940-45, 42. 
371 “Skandinavisk Kunstsilke Import - multiple docs. [Aug. 1938].” 
372 “Grosserer-Societetets Komite til Udenrigsministeriet.” 
373 “Skandinavisk Kunstsilke Import til udenrigsministeriet,” November 11, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b“...hvis vi ikke kan få den nødvendige støtte 
fra den danske stats side, vil dette betyde, at vor eksistens som købmænd og menneske[r] trues, d.v.s. [vi] kan ikke holde vort personale eller 
vort hjem...er vi klare over, at vi må se på dette som et medlem af hele samfundet. I tilfælde af at udenrigsministeriet ikke formener at kunne 
varetage vore interesser som danske statsborgere over for den tyske stat - håber vi, at der gennem dem eller andre danske myndigheder vil 
blive givet os en chance for at opbygge en forretning med andre lande, som intet har imod at handle med danske statsborgere af jødisk tro.” 
374 Ibid. 
 114 
Judenpolitik of National Socialist Germany. He provided evidence that Danish Jews were being 
subjected to strong economic pressure because of their race, and he argued that this was 
interference in domestic affairs. He understood that Denmark’s relationship to Germany was 
sensitive and issues had to be handled quietly, but he pointed to the ministry’s obligation to 
protect the interests of Danish citizens.375 He continued:  
 
“It begins with the Jews, but the Germans might someday also deny paying or 
working with Danish subjects of the Catholic faith or Danish subjects that are Social 
Democrats, Social Liberals, Conservative etc. because this does not fit Germany…”376  
 
It seems the Foreign Ministry did not engage in the case to assist Michelsen, but the 
knowledge was now extensive, and the examples so numerous, that the ministry had to react in 
the form of issuing a set of internal guidelines on the matter in early 1939. 
The letter titled “The German Aryanization Measures and their Consequences for Danish 
Companies and Businessmen” was transmitted to most Danish legations in Europe, which clearly 
emphasizes the ministry’s extensive knowledge of the matter. The letter ended:  
 
“The incidents mentioned are only examples of the consequences of the possible 
general rule that German companies must dismiss their Jewish agents, 
representatives and directors in foreign countries and presumably free themselves 
of connections with Jews where this can happen without damaging the German 
export interests.”377 
 
The Danish Foreign Ministry’s knowledge was extensive and precise. In these sentences the 
ministry specifically summarized the policies of the RfA. However, the ministry did not challenge 
the German position or defend the Danish-Jewish businessmen. The ministry was in the dark on 
the issue of importers who were not agents or representatives. However, the ministry was not 
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interested in contacting the German government to clarify the matter. This basically means they 
feared to raise the issue at all.378 
The ministry summarized some of the known cases including James Polack.379 Polack had 
been the exclusive Danish-Jewish representative of the German AGFA in Denmark since 1927.380 
Polack’s success led to the creation of an independent AGFA branch with Polack as both its 
director and chairman of the board. In what seems to be one of the first Aryanizations in 
Denmark he was in December 1937 informed that his contract would not be renewed. He would 
have to leave the company upon expiry of his contract in December 1938. Yet, in the summer of 
1938 he was asked to cease coming to the company premises.381 Financially, Polack was grossly 
denied the value of his stocks and had a sum of money blocked in Germany. The stock was sold 
at a rate of 100, but the buyer, the Danish Bank director Eigtved, estimated to I.G. Farben the 
value as being more than 500. Polack also had RM 4905 in a pension fund in Germany which was 
blocked and could not be transferred to Denmark via the Danish-German clearing account.382 
His attempt to construct a new company based on imports from other countries was 
unsuccessful due the unwillingness of the Danish government to lift the general trade 
restrictions.383 
The ministry’s summary of known cases contained new additions, which have not been 
preserved on the main file. The company Anton Petersen & Henius A/S, which imported book 
printing machines from Germany, had been re-structured according to German demands. It had 
changed its composition of the management and sold its stocks to Aryan family members.384 The 
merchant Jørgen I. Meyer had been fired as exclusive agent of Johann Maria Farina and 
Schwarzkopf Perfumes. Two advertising companies were also targeted and had lost their 
German customers. The chairman of the Jewish congregation, C.B. Henriques, had been 
removed from the board of directors of Siemens in Denmark. Apparently, he had refused to step 
down voluntarily, prompting a change in the number of board members from eight to seven. As 
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the majority of the board were Germans, they voted Henriques out.385 This Aryanized the 
Siemens branch in Denmark.  
Denmark seems to have been the only Scandinavian country to refrain from issuing a formal 
diplomatic protest against the German Aryanization attempts in Denmark. The Norwegian 
Government had raised the issue directly with the German Foreign Ministry in early January 
1939. It claimed that German procedures were damaging trade relations and that Norway 
considered these actions as an interference in its domestic affairs. The Germans replied that the 
government was not involved, and as Alex Walter had argued in Denmark, it was the choice of 
the German companies to freely choose their trading partners. If they terminated contracts with 
Jews, they acted according “…to the current German mindset…” However, German companies 
were not to enquire directly if a company was Jewish, and the German Foreign Ministry would 
assist on a case to case basis. In this manner, the German government denied being involved, 
while at the same time condoning the practices of the German companies. It is evident that the 
Germans tried to avoid acknowledging any government involvement in the matter.386 It is hardly 
possible to make an exhaustive comparison between the reactions of the three countries as we 
remain uninformed on how Norway proceeded in the matter. As we have seen Sweden’s Foreign 
Minister Rickard Sandler openly contested the Aryanization policies, and that Sweden quickly 
returned to a “business as usual” policy.387 However, it is remarkable that Denmark was the most 
cautious of the three, and this might be related to the border issue. 
Denmark’s only known protest remains the one voiced at the meeting between Svenningsen 
and Walter in the summer of 1938, which was not made public. The reasons behind the lack of 
a more formal reaction are probably to be found in the Danish government’s perceptions of its 
geo-political situation. It was the dominant position of the Foreign Ministry that events in 
Germany, at any given time, would directly influence Denmark. This view affected most policy 
areas. The tendency was to be very cautious and avoid provoking Germany. As the 1930’ies 
progressed this predisposition was enforced by key factors: such as the rising military power of 
Germany and its’ wishes to reset the Versailles treaty by reclaiming German minorities and 
territories. In addition, Denmark was militarily isolated. In regards to Judenpolitik we know of a 
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similar Danish reaction in January 1939. The AA demanded of foreign powers that they 
discontinued employing Jews as consuls in Germany. Denmark complied quietly, while Sweden 
and Norway considered formal reactions.388  The case and reaction has been labelled a 
“comprised narrative about Denmark’s relationship to Germany in the 1930’ies”.389 Denmark 
thus seems to have been more cautious than its Scandinavian counter-parts. The most 
outspoken difference between Denmark’s and Sweden’s reactions in relation to Aryanization in 
the prewar period appear to be a public stance against Aryanization. However, the rights of the 
Jewish businesses appear to have been abandoned by both countries in order to prevent 
damaging the over-all trade relations with Germany. 
3.3.5 The Union of Representatives for Foreign Companies 
As explained in the introduction an overall examination of the organizations related to foreign 
trade it not included in the scope of this dissertation. However, historian Sofie Lene Bak has 
shown the matter of Aryanization was discussed within the Union of Representatives for Foreign 
Companies (Foreningen af repræsentanter for udenlandske firmaer). There were concerns 
within the organization on letting a Jewish representative negotiate with the GCC. Despite the 
fact that the attempts to maintain trade used to be an unpolitical area this was no longer 
achievable by 1938. The union harbored several examples of representation for German 
companies being awarded based on race. The annual assembly in February 1939 revealed that 
racial discrimination was prevalent. The chairman, Christian Hjelm Bang, stated at the meeting 
that the union could not intervene when contracts between Jewish representatives and German 
companies were terminated within the framework of the law. However, official commentaries 
at the meeting reflected that an unknown number of non-Jewish members had sought to secure 
the representation of German companies, and take advantage of the situation.390  
This was also the case during the Occupation. At a meeting of the Union of Representatives 
for Foreign Companies in February 1942 it was discussed if the Arbitration Committee should be 
headed by the Jewish member Michael Cohn. The minutes do not seem to completely reflect 
the discussions at hand, but Cohn was reelected with fifty-three votes, though forty-two 
members had voted against him. The vote on his position probably reflect it was a disadvantage 
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the he was Jewish as every other position up for election saw unanimous votes. The Danish 
Chamber of Merchants’ annual assembly in 1942 reflected some of the same concerns. It was 
proposed to terminate the tradition of forced membership in order to exclude the Jews from 
the organization. The proposal was voted down, but a group of members, possibly in association 
with the anti-Semite Aage H. Andersen, wrote to the minister of trade to raise the same issue.391 
These examples sketch a dispute within the Danish business environment on how to respond 
to a political landscape effected by racial ideologies. The examples also point to a willingness 
within the Danish business community to replace Jews. The full scope remains undisclosed and 
reveal a research gap in need of a closer investigation into the replacement of representatives 
on company level as well as the organization’s knowledge and reactions in the matter. 
3.4 Chapter conclusion. 
This chapter has shown how the RfA’s policies were implemented in the Danish-German trade 
relations, and how it was assisted by the German legation even involving the envoy Cecil von 
Renthe-Fink. Despite a fragmentary set of sources several cases of Aryanization show how the 
policies of the RfA directly affected the Danish-Jewish business community. As a bystander to 
the German Aryanization measures the Danish government remained passive in its response to 
protect the Danish-Jewish business minority. The government, represented by the Danish 
Foreign Ministry, displayed an extreme sensitivity towards Germany in this issue. It refrained 
from assisting Danish-Jews employed in Germany. In Denmark the ministry would only interfere 
if there were a breach of laws. This was in spite of the obvious hardships especially Danish-Jewish 
representatives of German companies were facing.  
In regards to the stages of persecution we find that several German or German friendly 
organizations were involved in informally pursuing Aryanization measures in Denmark. Stage 
one is thus characterized by high degree of structure and organization. It also specifically 
targeted Jews, which means the definition of Jews (stage three) must have been employed. It is 
also quite obvious throughout the chapter that the stages of identification, registration, and 
exclusion (stage four and five) are found in the prewar period. The exclusive measures within 
Aryanization (stage five) were targeted at Jewish representatives. They were removed by 
discontinuing contracts or through demanding changes in company management. 
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This chapter has also pointed to other possible areas of exclusion. The GCC’s pressure on 
Danish companies to let go of their Jewish employees in order to achieve membership points to 
the possible existence of a much broader discrimination. This is also the case regarding Danish-
Jews employed in Germany who seems to have experienced being removed from German 
companies. The research from Sweden reveals Swedish companies with subsidiaries in Germany 
were asked to provide information on both their employees and the capital of the company. It 
remains an open question if Danish companies of the same sort were subject to the same 
questions, and if so how did they react? Similarly, what was the reaction of Danish companies 
located in Germany during the rise of the dictatorship. How did they react to the racial policies? 
Did they fire their Jewish employees or did they attempt gain market shares through the 
Aryanization policies in Germany?  
The Danish sources also reveal several countries were discussing international Aryanization. 
The meeting of the Oslo states of Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway 
and Sweden brought it to the international agenda. However, Danish sources also point to 
discussions on the issue in Britain. Only further research will allow us to compare the reactions 
of various governments on a transnational level, but it was clearly an issue most countries had 
to address in some way. 
 
 
4 Aryanization in Denmark 1940-1943  
This chapter follows the continued implementation of the RfA’s Aryanization initiatives in 
Denmark during the occupation. Throughout the chapter we will follow how the legation 
assisted in and continued to enforce Aryanization. It will show how the goals of the RfA were 
almost completed by September 1942 as most Danish-Jewish representatives and importers had 
been Aryanized through exclusion. Also, most Danish-Jewish companies who were dependent 
on direct imports of raw materials or other imports from Germany were Aryanized according to 
Cecil von Renthe-Fink. The chapter will close by revealing Renthe-Fink’s last push for further 
Aryanization measures. A part of this was to suggest to informally introduce the third addition 
to the Nuremberg Laws in Denmark. The third addition to the Nuremberg Laws came in 1938 
and among other things added a definition of Jewish companies to the laws which originated 
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from 1935. These ideas were picked up and followed through by Renthe-Fink’s successor Werner 
Best. The above themes partly answer research questions one and two, and are covered in 
sections 4.1 to 4.6. The exception is section 4.4. which deals with research question three: the 
reaction of the Danish government. That section will show that by late 1940 the Danish 
government would no longer raise concerns regarding Aryanization measures with German 
representative. Instead, the government would only attempt to diminish effects in single cases. 
The preceding years had seen a great pressure being asserted on Danish-Jewish companies. 
This will be evident in the Aryanization cases of the steel company Sophus Berendsen (section 
4.3) and the medical company Lundbeck (section 4.5.1).  These will also focus on how the 
company owners were removed but continued to assert influence on their companies. In a 
couple of minor cases it will be specifically shown how the Danish domestic market was also 
affected by Aryanization. 
This chapter will show the following stages of persecution can be identified. The informal 
measures against Jews in Denmark (stage one), registration (stage four), and exclusive measures 
against Danish-Jewish businesses who traded with Germany or sold German goods (stage five). 
The chapter will open by introducing two German reports on Danish Industry and Trade. They 
show that the goals to Aryanize several sectors in Denmark were a consequence of German 
domination and the continued registration of Jewish companies. 
4.1 Aryanization Prospects in Danish Industry and Trade 
Two reports from 1940 show how the information gathered by the RfA with the aid of the 
German legation and the GCC was put to use in order to locate, analyze and recommend the 
removal of Jews in selected Danish business sectors. The main purpose of these reports was to 
chart Danish business areas, but the following paragraphs will focus on the reports’ advice on 
Aryanization. The reports originated from the industrial and trade groups of the RWM, 
Reichsgruppe Industrie and Reichsgruppe Handel.  As most other government entities these 
Reichsgruppen were affected by the belief in victory in the summer 1940, which lead to 
numerous ideas on how to restructure Europe including enforced Aryanization.392 Both Reports 
show overwhelmingly detailed information on the overall industries and were preoccupied with 
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disclosing the racial configuration of companies and industries. In addition, there are several 
concrete suggestions for further market gains to be made by removing Jews. 
Under the heading "Entjudung der dänischen Wirtschaft", the report from the industrial 
group of the RWM, from August 1940, shows the intention to Aryanize the industrial sector in 
Denmark as well as the usage of the RfA’s registration efforts. The report mentions hundreds of 
companies and fourteen had been racially categorized as Jewish. The report recommended that 
German style Aryanization measures should be implemented immediately in the sectors of iron, 
steel and sheet metal, in spite of the Jewish influence being characterized as small. The first step 
to be taken was installing German trustees (Treuhänder), in Jewish firms in Denmark. 
Afterwards, negotiations for takeovers should be initiated, and German companies could be 
brought in as replacements in the long run. If objections occurred they would be dampened by 
excluding the companies from receiving "raw materials, machines and so on”. In this manner, a 
company would be forced to discontinue production. It was even estimated that Aryanization 
would not cause any loss of market shares for the companies in question.393 
The report shows that Judenpolitik could be applied to gain market shares, and it seems to be 
an implicit understanding that Jews were to be removed. The suggestion to insert trustees does 
not seem to have been successful, but as the case of the steel company Sophus Berendsen will 
illustrate the company was none the less Aryanized. The Danish historian Joachim Lund has aptly 
characterized the overall report as a modest wish list of the German industrial areas, with the 
exception of the passages of Aryanization, which are labelled as “controversial” and 
immoderate.394 
A similar report was published by the Reichsgruppe Handel in November 1940. The Danish 
trade sector was appraised in detail to identify possible areas for German companies to influence 
or take over in a postwar setting. In addition, it suggested how to proceed in Germanization and 
Aryanization. In the fall of 1940 it was not necessary to initiate an extensive replacement 
campaign for the benefit of German companies. Rather, Denmark should remain untouched 
during the war while preserving the most important industry: farming and livestock. The goal 
was to replace Danish companies with German ones after the war, though the report did suggest 
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the removal of Jewish and “enemy” influences from Danish companies. The reasons were 
described as political and economic, while employing arguments that accentuated, the highly 
stereotypical, presumed negative effects of Jews in businesses. For example, it was argued that 
the absence of Jewish influence in Danish trade had allegedly secured a stable market. This was 
because (non-Jewish) market leaders had refrained from taking advantage of dominant 
positions and thus avoided capital flight. The Jewish companies that existed would eventually be 
minimized due to a decrease in living standards, the authors believed. At the same time the 
report provided concrete suggestions on how to proceed in specific areas.395 
Østasiatisk Kompagni, ØK, (East Asiatic Company) was rightly evaluated as one of the biggest 
trading companies in Denmark. That is why its takeover was deemed immediately necessary. 
The report contained suggestions for ØK’s Aryanization and take-over. ØK’s valuable assets 
included trading companies, industrial plants, and an important shipyard. In addition, the 
company owned plantations which were controlled through subsidiaries and 
Interessengesellschaften (partnerships). The Germans were still examining the capital flows of 
the company, but had traced connections to "English-Jewish high finance": Hambro's Bank in 
London. It was advised to strive for taking over the company by forcing Jewish and British capital 
out of the company. However, it had to be pursued carefully in order to prevent the losing the 
overseas positions in East Asia. Interestingly, the report also focused on maintaining the 
company's goodwill in East Asia and Africa. The suggested first step was to prevent the company 
from selling its subsidiaries or overseas holdings.396 
The report included a comprehensive analysis of Jewish influence in several other industries 
in the Scandinavian market, but focused mainly on Denmark. The jewelry trade was surveyed as 
consisting of 20-25 wholesale businesses in Scandinavia and a multitude of small retail stores. 
There was a slight Jewish influence in wholesale, whereas retail was categorized as 
overwhelmingly Jewish. It was reasoned that the Jews had secured the retail market as a result 
of their “enormous capital power”. It was predicted that the removal of the Jews would secure 
a satisfactory opportunity for German businesses to conquer the jewelry retail businesses in 
Scandinavia.397 
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Several other industries were noted for their Jewish presence. The import and distribution of 
coffee products was largely concentrated on Jewish hands. The most important and substantial 
company in this field in Denmark was De danske Cichoriefabriker A/S. The company produced 
coffee surrogate products, and the company value was calculated to 20 million DKK. (519 mill. 
/2017 DKK). The other companies owned by Cichoriefabriker A/S were C.F. Rich & Sønner, De 
danske Chicorietørrerier, and De Forenede Kaffesurrogat- & Cichoriefabriker". Other importers 
of coffee and coffee substitutes were labelled as influenced by Jewish capital. It was 
recommended that German companies would attempt to gain influence over these companies. 
Nine metal retailers were known and one was categorized as Jewish. In addition, the tobacco 
and fur industries counted twenty large companies including one Jewish company. In five 
companies, the racial composition had not yet been established. Six large department stores 
were under investigation in order to determine their racial status, as the report claimed they 
had a collected turnover of 100 million DKK – amounting to 2.5 billion DKK in 2017 prices. The 
production of porcelain was perceived as being under considerable Jewish influence.398 
Clearly, the intentions to remove the Danish-Jews in specific companies and business sectors 
are present in these reports. Although the effects on most of the companies in these reports 
have not been investigated, they are telling in their intent to remove Jews. Moreover, they 
reflect several instrumental arguments as Jews, almost as a matter of fact, are to be removed in 
order to gain market shares and create opportunities for German companies. The reports also 
underline that the registration work of Jewish companies undertaken in Denmark was by no 
means innocent, but was used and applied in order to plan and attempt to remove Jews.  
The registration and data collection of Jewish businesses in Denmark was not limited to larger 
companies and even included one-man businesses in Copenhagen. At least one of the invading 
German troop units carried with them a written order instructing them to avoid Jewish stores. 
The order also specified that they could not ask if a store was Jewish.399 Around the turn of the 
year 1940 the offices of Erich Lüdke, supreme commander of the German troops in Denmark 
(April 1940 - September 1942), had issued a list of small Jewish stores in Copenhagen. It seems 
this index specified, which businesses were to be avoided by German soldiers. The list includes 
businesses in the textile industry, such as tailors and other types of clothes-related businesses, 
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as well as food retail stores. The list comes across as incomplete, but there are 214 individual 
businesses and their owners on the list. Given that there were only about 7,000 Jews in 
Denmark, this list alone provides the names of 3.05 % of the Danish Jews. We are thus able to 
conclude that the registration process went beyond the categories of importers and exporters, 
but also included the smallest units of local Jewish businesses.400 At the same time it suggests 
that small Jewish stores were supposed to be boycotted by German soldiers. 
4.2 The Correspondence Between Ernst Krüger and the RfA 
The correspondence between the RfA and the German legation on the racial composition of 
Danish companies was maintained by Ernst Krüger. As pointed out in the introduction it consists 
of 10.000 letters from the period of 1940-1944. It seems this type of letters is not preserved 
from before January 1940 or was transmitted in another manner. However, some of letters sent 
after January 1940 refer to earlier letters on the same company going back to as early as 1937.401 
It is worth noting this type of correspondence continued until May 1944 in Denmark. In order to 
gain an overview, I have examined 3.500 of the letters from the occupation period. They will 
serve as an analytical sample of the information exchange between the German Gesandtschaft 
in Copenhagen and the RfA. 
Generally, they show a continuous correspondence on Danish companies of all sizes and 
places ranging from a clothes store in Lemvig to the filet factory in the city of Rønne on the Island 
of Bornholm.402 In the sample 150 different Danish cities have been identified, and most 
correspondence centers on the larger cities of Denmark. If Jews or Jewish capital was involved 
the correspondence would often be of a longer character. One example is the company 
Oversøisk Kurve- og Bambus Industri, which in January 1940 had been categorized as a 
“Diogenes” company meaning there were Jews in the leadership. This had been repeated in 
August, but in January 1941 the RfA inquired if the “Alcibiades Nathan” had been removed.403 
Most of the correspondence originating from the legation on non-Jewish companies appears  
as in the picture below. It employs the code language specifying the company as Leonidas/Juno 
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– Leonidas meaning it has not been possible to confirm the racial composition, but it is not 
suspected of being non-Aryan. Juno meaning there are not political or security risks associated 
with trading with the company.  In the example below the address is not provided, but most 
letters were supplied with an address. 
 
 
Figure 4: The source is BA, R9I, 1864. In the sample analyzed there are fire company's originating from Lemvig 
 
Based on this sample, as well as Renthe-Fink’s status reports (in section 4.6) it seems most 
Danish companies trading with Germany were categorized according to the Nuremberg race 
laws.  
4.3 Aryanizing Sophus Berendsen A/S 1938-1941 
The Aryanization of Sophus Berendsen is a revealing case as it shows the actions and reactions 
of perpetrators, bystanders and victims. It involves German actors and organizations from both 
Berlin and Copenhagen, while underscoring the rather passive bystander role of the Danish 
government. Tellingly, it is also an example of how one company reacted when being targeted 
for Aryanization. In the period at hand, Sophus Berendsen was among the largest steel 
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companies in Denmark and was headed by its owner, Ludvig Elsass. The German Aryanization 
policies had affected the company as early as 1938 and along with other companies Elsass 
contacted the Danish Foreign Ministry to raise their concerns over termination of contracts as 
well as the lay-offs of Jewish agents for German firms.404 In November 1938 Elsass had an 
exchange of opinion with Nils Svenningsen. Svenningsen pointed out the Danish Government 
could not assist in matters which existed between two companies as the German dictatorship 
was not involved. This was similar to the arguments Alex Walter had used.405 (See chapter three). 
Elsass had quite the opposite experience. He had personally dealt with several German 
companies. The persistent and continuous pressure from German authorities was the reason 
behind the termination of contracts. Elsass’ experience was that German companies were 
fighting to maintain their old and better qualified representatives. Elsass thus challenged the 
official explanations and argued that the matter had to be raised in meetings between the 
dictatorship and Denmark.406 As we know this was to no avail. (See chapter three). 
The occupation enforced the Aryanization attempts against the company. The Danish 
government appears to not have been involved in the negotiations between Sophus Berendsen 
and Germany companies as things progressed negatively. The German company Differdingen 
Stahlwerke A.G. was represented in Denmark, Norway and Sweden by Sophus Berendsen A/S. 
Differdingen was about to enter yet another contract with Berendsen in May 1941. Clearly, 
Differdingen was not in compliance with the guidelines from the RfA. This resulted in a visit from 
Stahlunion-Export GmbH's executive Adolph Schmitt to the German legation in Denmark, and 
this changed the course of events.407 With the cooperation of the NSDAP-AO, Differdingen was 
persuaded to change their representative. Instead, the Danish steel company Lemvigh-Müller 
A/S became their new representative.408 
In the fall of 1941, Sophus Berendsen A/S was Aryanized. Elsass, the steel company’s CEO, 
was forced out, and the Supervisory Board was purged of its Jewish director C.B. Henriques, 
lawyer to the Supreme Court and director of the Danish-Jewish Congregation. The reason was 
not made public, but major Danish newspapers reported the change. It only took little insight to 
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know that both Elsass and Henriques were Jews.409 According to Elsass’ own account of the 
events, he was forced out by the Germans and had to sell his stock, his house and summerhouse 
on a pro forma basis.410 Elsass instead had an office at an insurance company with a direct line 
to his former company. He directed his former company from that office until October 1943, 
when he fled to Sweden as the German’s attempted to arrest  and deport the Jews. Only in 
November 1945 could he formally re-enter the company, along with his son Adam Elsass.411 
The case shows that a constant pressure was being applied on the company and there seems 
to have been a direct German involvement in restructuring the company along racial lines. In 
essence, the identification of the company as Jewish led to its Aryanization in the duration of 
three years. Impressively, Elsass appears to have maintained some control despite having lost 
all formal involvement in the company. We can only guess as to why the process of regaining 
formal control of the company seems a prolonged affair. In this case the government reacted 
passively in the prewar years, and possibly attempting to not to provoke Germany, while almost 
quietly accepting these policies in spite of the hardships the Danish-Jewish business minority 
experienced. (See chapter 3). I recognize the difficulties of the government to interfere directly 
in such cases during the war years, but as I will show below this was not a coincidence as the 
government largely forfeited to involve themselves in this area by late 1940. 
4.4 The Danish Government and Aryanization 
As we recall, the RfA sent out new demands in October 1940 to make sure importers and 
exporters as well as recipients of German goods were not Jewish. These demands quickly 
affected Danish trade. In late 1940 the Danish Association of Merchants sent several examples 
of letters from German companies, which seems to be directly related to the new guidelines of 
the RfA. In these letters, Danish companies were asked to stop visiting and selling to Jewish 
companies. The letters also asked companies to prove the recipients of German goods were 
                                                     
409 “Ny direktion og bestyrelse i Sophus Berendsen A/S,” Nationaltidende, September 16, 1941; “Ændringer i ledelsen af akts. Sophus 
Berendsen,” Politiken, September 16, 1941; “Den nye ledelse i aktieselskabet Sophus Berendsen,” Politiken, September 17, 1941 A third 
person, Director V. Hassing also left the board, but I have unable to disclose who that is. 
410 The official records of real estate sales do not contain evidence to support these claims. Tingbog, Hovedstaden, Frederiksberg 2, 
Frederiksberg 10051 70, 1927, https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/da/billedviser?bsid=41649#41649,6613828; Tingbog, Nordjylland Fjerritslev 
74 Slettegård, Hjortdal, Hjortdal 680354 16, 1927, https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/da/billedviser?bsid=49939#49939,10679802. The 
summerhouse Sanden Bjerregaard was used by the Germans and eighteen bunkers were built on the large property. According to Jens 
Andersen head of Hanstholm Bunker Museum Elsass did receive postwar compensations. Private e-email correspondence Jens Andersen, 
“Sanden Bjerregård,” January 18, 2016. 
411 Based on “Ludvig Elsass levnedsbeskrivelse til ordenskapitlet,” 1956, Kindly provided by his grandchild Nick Elsass; “Sophus Berendsens 
øverste ledelse,” Berlingske, November 6, 1945. 
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Aryan. In addition, a number of German companies requested lists of known Jewish 
companies.412 This knowledge prompted a discussion in the Danish Foreign Ministry which 
included Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius, and the decision was the following: 
 
“It is hardly useful to raise these issues as regular cases…we have to wait until single 
cases arise, which we might smooth out confidentially”.413   
 
This meant that the attempt to defend Danish-Jewish business life had largely been forfeited 
by the Danish government. As bystanders with the ability to at least raise concerns on behalf of 
the Danish-Jewish business life they generally choose to remain silent. This opened for further 
Aryanization measures being pursued without being challenged by the Danish government. It 
would appear as if Judenpolitik in the area of Aryanization had few limits for prevailing in 
Denmark. 
 
4.5 Continued Aryanization 
The Aryanization attempts of the RfA directly interfered with the Danish domestic market and 
in troublesome cases the RfA had a decisive role on how to proceed. In the following paragraphs 
I will examine a few cases that show how the RfA, Prüfungsstellen, the German legation, and 
Danish companies were involved in Aryanization of the Danish domestic market, which 
depended on German imports. One such case is between the Bavarian company A.G. für 
Bleicherei, Färberei, Apparatur und Druckerei Augsburg and their Danish representative 
company Boas & Gautier. The Danes were ordered to cease entering into contracts with Jews 
and terminate existing contracts with Jewish companies. This order would affect the Danish-
Jewish firm Engelhardt & Lohse in Copenhagen. However, the German legation in Denmark 
warned that a breach of contract would lead to recourse claims, as it violated Danish law. In the 
case at hand, the arguments of the legation were accepted, but the RfA and the Prüfungsstelle 
Textilindustrie disallowed future contracts with Jews.414 This meant that upon renewal of the 
contract Engelhardt & Lohse would be excluded. In this way, Danish laws regarding contract 
                                                     
412 “Grosserer-societetet til Udenrigsministeriet,” December 13, 1940, RA, UM 140.N.33b. 
413 Ibid. Handwritten by Scavenius on the letter from the Merchant’s Association “Det kan næppe nytte, at ville rejse disse spørgsmål som en 
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414 “Correspondence RFA, P.st. Textil, Außenhandelsstelle Südbayern,” June 1941, BA, R9I, 616. 
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breaches were accepted, but mainly because of the possible economic losses. The main 
component of the order remained in place. In the long run Engelhardt & Lohse, would be 
excluded from buying goods imported from Germany even though this interfered directly with 
the Danish domestic market. 
A different approach came from a German cosmetics company.415 It demanded of their 
representative, the Danish company Georg Tranberg, Copenhagen, to sign a declaration stating 
it would not sell goods from the Germany company to Jewish customers. The responsibility for 
securing that German goods did not reach Jewish customers was thus placed with Georg 
Tranberg. The RfA and the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemische Industrie became involved, as the 
Danish company was a member of the GCC. In this industry, it was not a general rule to 
discontinue delivering to Jewish companies. However, German companies could of their own 
accord demand that their goods would not be supplied to Jewish companies.416 This shows how 
there were various policies at play, but the overall tendency was clear: even the Danish domestic 
market was to be conformed along racial lines if goods were imported from Germany. Danish 
companies thus became involved in the Aryanization process although the scope of their 
involvement needs further examination. 
One case illustrates a direct and international involvement in the exclusion of the Swedish-
Jewish company A. B. Varukontor.  It was a combined effort by the Danish company Duelund 
Nielsen, the German company Röhm & Haas G.m.b.H and the RfA. The flow of goods was as 
follows: Röhm & Haas supplied the raw materials for Duelund Nielsen’s production of plexiglass 
for watches. The finished product was exported to the Swedish-Jewish company A. B. 
Varukontor in Stockholm. The company held the exclusive import rights from the products of 
Duelund Nielsen - even from wholesalers.417  
A rather creative idea was used in order to bypass and exclude the Swedish company while 
avoiding legal complications. The German and Danish companies were assisted in their endeavor 
by the Außenhandelsstelle für das Rhein-Maingebiet.  The plan was for Röhm & Haas to redirect 
their raw materials to a larger wholesale company in Denmark who would hire Duelund Nielsen 
as producer of watch glasses. Yet, the contract would specify that the raw materials would only 
                                                     
415 The name is not disclosed. 
416 “Correspondence GCC, RFA, Wirtschaftsgruppe Chem. Ind. Oct-Nov.,” 1941, BA, R91, 617. 
417 “Lieferung von Plexiglas nach Dänemark,” March 1942, BA, R9I, 608. 
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be provided if the wholesaler took over the export rights of Duelund Nielsen’s products to 
Sweden. The RfA agreed to the plan in March 1942.418 
The plan was not bullet proof as Duelund Nielsen risked losing its exports to Sweden. Yet, it 
would be a convincing counter-argument to underline the fact that the company’s production 
would come to a standstill without the needed raw materials. From a German perspective the 
Swedish-Jewish company would be excluded from receiving products made from German raw 
materials. The maneuver had the potential to open the Swedish market for Duelund Nielsen’s 
products, while Röhm & Haas G.m.b.H avoided indirectly supplying a Jewish company with 
German goods. The example illustrates how Danish exports to countries within the German 
sphere of influence were subject to, or involved in, measures to exclude Jews in other countries. 
There are probably similar cases, but is seems more likely such matters would be settled without 
involving the RfA. 
4.5.1 Aryanizing Lundbeck 
The Aryanization of today’s medical giant Lundbeck reveals how companies attempted to 
avoid the demands of the RfA. In addition, it underscores how information on race travelled 
through an elaborate and international information network. Lundbeck had humble beginnings, 
but the partnership between the founder Hans Lundbeck and Eduard Goldschmidt drove the 
company in the direction of the chemical and medical industry. Born in Czechoslovakia, the 
Jewish Goldschmidt had been living most of his life in Hamburg. At age 23 he joined Hans 
Lundbeck in Denmark and their co-operation was sealed with a partnership in 1924. 
Goldschmidt’s German connections secured Lundbeck sole production and sales of substances 
like painkillers in Denmark. After his long period in Denmark, Goldschmidt became a Danish 
citizen in mid-March 1939.419 
Only a few months later, the RfA sent out a warning. Lundbeck & Co. was suspected of having 
camouflaged its Jewish ownership by constructing a new company named Hans Lundbeck. In 
January 1940, Goldschmidt left the company Hans Lundbeck. This resolved the matter from the 
perspective of the RfA and the company was now considered Aryanized. As a consequence of 
this change, Germany companies were advised to transfer their business from Lundbeck & Co. 
                                                     
418 Ibid. 
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to Hans Lundbeck. In the spring of 1940 the RfA had definite proof that Goldschmidt was Jewish, 
because his birth certificate had been recovered from the Jewish congregation in Prague.420 
Information on Jews was thus assembled from a variety of sources and applied locally as well as 
internationally. This could indicate that there was a central organization in charge of maintaining 
a registry over Jews from Europe as a whole - perhaps even in countries outside of Europe as 
well. The RfA certainly did so in regards to businesses, but other organizations involved could be 
the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, which headed the persecution and murder of the European 
Jews. 
Goldschmidt formally removed himself from Lundbeck & Co in late 1940, but informally 
continued to work for the company. His decision probably Aryanized the company, and saved it 
from closing as it was highly dependent on trade with Germany. Lundbeck produced a new 
medical product in 1941 that cured some, but not all, bacterial infections. The production of the 
medicine relied heavily on raw materials from Germany. In 1942 a patent dispute evolved 
between German companies and Lundbeck. This led to negotiations with German 
representatives from several medical industrial companies, as well as Lundbeck & Co. It was 
attempted to solve the patent issue in Malmö, Sweden, as Goldschmidt met with 
representatives from the German company in question. Hans Lundbeck was bedridden in 
Denmark, and the patent issue could not be formally solved because Goldschmidt was Jewish. 
However, the agreement was formally sealed after the war. It is surprising that Goldschmidt 
participated in these meetings showing his informal role was strong, and that it was respected 
by his German counterparts. Goldschmidt fled with his wife to Sweden in October 1943, but he 
remained continuously informed about company matters. He even maintained an active role in 
the company despite his exile, and after the war he reentered the company without 
difficulties.421 
The Lundbeck case shows that companies would go to some lengths in order to maintain key 
business interests. This is seen in many other countries as well, but in Denmark it probably 
worked more smoothly, as formal laws against the Jews were not introduced. The overwhelming 
majority of the Jews later successfully fled to Sweden. This allowed for, in this case, continuous 
contact between key persons and the company. The German companies’ willingness to solve 
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patent disputes despite Goldschmidt being Jewish appears extraordinary compared to the other 
cases presented in this dissertation. We should note that the second meeting took place in 
neutral Sweden and not in Denmark, indicating that a meeting in Denmark was deemed too 
difficult or dangerous. It remains unknown how the Danish government reacted in this case or 
if it became involved at all. There were probably many business relationships which were solved, 
one way or the other, without the involvement of government organizations. 
4.6 Aryanization in Denmark 1942-September 1943. 
In January 1942, Renthe-Fink could conclude that Aryanization measures in Denmark had 
resulted in the Entjudung of representatives, and that Danish-Jewish firms who imported from 
Germany were being “eliminated”. Renthe-Fink wrote so in an introductory letter to a large 
report on the composition of the Jews in Denmark. In the letter, which will be analyzed in greater 
detail in chapter seven, he described the German Judenpolitik in Denmark in general. He also 
presented the following status of Aryanization in Denmark: 
 
“Not mentioned422 is the purification process that the legation has done in 
association with the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel for years. The Jewish 
representatives for German firms have been removed if we with certainty have been 
able to determine their Jewish characteristic.“423  
  
The Aryanization process to exclude Jewish representatives had begun in 1937. Five years 
later it was estimated as almost complete in Denmark. Cleary, the legation had played their 
important part in the Aryanization process in Denmark. As we saw, this corresponds to the first 
goal of the RfA: to remove Jewish representatives. The second was to exclude Jewish companies 
from the German-Foreign trade. Renthe-Fink reviewed this process as being well under way 
considering that several of the Prüfungsstellen were prohibiting the delivery of German goods 
to Jewish firms. Renthe-Fink argued that, as Germany was practically the only import option for 
Denmark, “a strong elimination process of Jewry in these firms has begun”.424 However, the 
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many intermarriages of Jews and the Danish upper-class slowed down the progress as this 
complicated identifying who were Jewish. 
It seems to be the case that most Danish-Jewish companies who were dependent on imports 
from Germany had been Aryanized by the summer of 1942. The cases of four textile companies 
that were being denied raw materials from German companies will illustrate this.425 Silkeborg 
Tekstilfabrik was regarded as particularly important by the Danish authorities as it was to 
produce roughly half of Denmark’s standard underwear in 1942. In December 1941 the company 
had received letters from German exporters blatantly stating they could not deliver goods to a 
company with two “non-Aryan” board-members.426 Krüger regarded it as highly unlikely that 
Silkeborg Tekstilfabrik would receive goods from Germany, because it was “not pure Aryan”.427 
The discussions on imports to the four companies were handled by the Danish-German trade 
committee, and Alex Walter was almost clinical in his response. Two companies, including 
Silkeborg Tekstilfabrik were producing standard goods, and if the Jewish board members were 
not removed the companies could expect deliveries to be discontinued by June 1942. Dansk 
Kunstsilke Industri and Dansk Garn Industri had already received goods under the condition that 
the Jewish board members were removed. In order to receive raw materials from Germany again 
they had to be replaced. In addition, Jewish stock-owners were to be removed. Walter 
confidentially let on he would attempt to exempt Danish-Jewish companies who were approved 
for imports by the Danish currency office. The Danish Government wanted to know if the two 
companies should postpone replacing the Jews and the Jewish capital. Walter’s reply was “I 
recommend that the companies…are purified as suggested by the German side”.428 There was 
not any hope for the other two companies either. This was in spite of Danish attempts to 
repeatedly raise the case with Walter and in late April the companies were informed by German 
authorities that deliveries for the second quarter would be otherwise disposed of. The board 
member in question left his position and stated that “the problem is solved.”429 
It seems highly likely that the number of Danish-Jewish companies dependent on German 
imports was dwindling fast as even the company designated to produce half the country’s 
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underwear was Aryanized. The German representatives Krüger and Walter were not in doubt: 
Aryanization would be the end result. This is a further indication that the Aryanization policies 
of the RfA were pursued in Denmark with the assistance and knowledge of representatives from 
the legation. The case never went to higher levels of the Danish government, but was handled 
by high-ranking civil servants. The attempts to save the Danish-Jewish board members and stock 
owners was practically non-existent. The strategy seems to have been to protract time before 
Aryanization became inevitable if the company was to survive. The arguments from 1938, that 
the division between Aryan and Jewish in Denmark did not exist, were nowhere to be found in 
1942. Tellingly, the last piece of archival material from the foreign ministry’s main case on the 
issue of Aryanization is from May 1942. 
In September 1942 Renthe-Fink concluded that the last Jewish agents and representatives 
had been removed. In addition, Jewish importers in Denmark had been ausgesmerzt 
(eradicated). The first goals of the RfA had been completed in Denmark and most Danish-Jewish 
companies were now considered Aryanized. There were still Danish-Jewish companies left who 
depended on Germany in some way: those who produced for the German war industry and 
those who were not directly dependent on German imports. Renthe-Fink was ready to move 
against the latter group and wanted to expand Aryanization further by proposing the following 
policy: 
 
“…the question remains, if the elimination or at least the limitation of the Jewish 
influence in Danish businesses that are not directly dependent on German imports 
are to be attacked. An effective means of pressure would be to introduce terms for 
the delivery of fuels from Germany…”430   
 
Renthe-Fink’s analysis of the import structure for fuels revealed that it was controlled by only 
eight Danish companies. He suggested to change the terms of delivery in such a manner that 
German coal would only reach Aryan companies. Fuel deliveries were controlled by the Danish 
government, but Renthe-Fink creatively suggested to bypass these control points. He highlighted 
that such measures were not to be formally approved by the Danes and could easily be enforced. 
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Renthe-Fink believed similar measures had been applied in Hungary, thus displaying a 
knowledge of anti-Jewish policies elsewhere.431 
He further wanted to expand the Judenpolitik in Denmark by informally applying the third 
addition to the Nuremberg laws of 1935. The third addition came in 1938 and defined Jewish 
companies. He wanted to apply the legal term “analogy”. This is used to assign a legal 
consequence if a law does not exist, by using an existing law as inspiration.432 In this way Renthe-
Fink tied it directly to the anti-Jewish laws in Germany. It is worth noting the law of 1938 also 
includes the definition of Jews according to the Nuremberg race laws of 1935.433 One could argue 
it had the potential to de-facto introduce the Nuremberg race laws in Denmark as well as the 
third addition from 1938. Werner Best followed through on this suggestion in January 1943. (See 
below).  
The law of 1938 also stipulated a registration of Jewish companies. Renthe-Fink expected it 
would be difficult, but by no means impossible to compose a list of Danish-Jewish companies. 
Essentially, a lot of the mapping had already been done in the legation’s work for the RfA. The 
largest Danish-Jewish companies were breweries and banks, which should be targeted first. 
Renthe-Fink expected the Jews to attempt to rally the population against the Germans. Renthe-
Fink also believed the Danish government would view such a policy as an attack on Danish 
independence. Despite these concerns, Renthe-Fink recommended proceeding, but with some 
flexibility. The German war economy was not to suffer from these measures, and this was similar 
to RfA’s overall guidelines. An extended deadline was to be given to make room for Danish firms 
to begin a Freiwilligen (voluntary) exclusion of Jewish influence.434 This was an elaborate 
proposal, which was approved by Berlin in October with the promise of further guidelines being 
provided soon.435 Unfortunately, these guidelines are missing. It seems the so-called Telegram 
Crisis (see chapter eight) stopped further development of Renthe-Fink’s proposal, but his 
replacement, Werner Best, followed up on the matter in January 1943. 
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Werner Best took over from Renthe-Fink in November 1942  (see chapter eight ). Best wrote 
two large reports on the Jews in Denmark in January 1943 and April 1943, which are elaborated 
on in chapter eight. These reports also contained the subject of Aryanization. Best had been in 
Berlin in early January 1943 receiving new orders on Aryanization measures in Denmark. The 
orders to Rüstungsstab Dänemark  were to cut- off Jewish industrial firms in Denmark from the 
production chain. Rüstungsstab Dänemark had already reduced the number of Danish-Jewish 
companies on contract from 12 to six since September 1942. This process could have been the 
work of the RfA or it could have resulted from Renthe-Fink’s proposal from September to cut-
off German supplies to Danish-Jewish firms. The remaining six firms were to excluded from 
future contracts, but only if this would not have a damaging effect on production related to the 
war effort. Danish-Jewish firms who were on contract Rüstungsstab were now to be evaluated 
for exclusion. In addition, they were to be informed that they would not be eligible for additional 
contracts: “Because of new orders from the Reich, Jewish firms were not to be engaged.”436 
 Standard Elektric was considered Jewish, but it was agreed that its Jewish manager Gunnar 
Meyer-Gelberg would be allowed to remain in the company until an agreement between the 
Danish branch and European Standard Elektric was finalized. Yet, he apparently stayed on until 
1946.437 Best agreed to let Meyer-Gelberg stay in the company due to its importance for the war 
economy, which trumped Aryanization measures. However, Best did stress that Jewish influence 
was to be excluded if at all possible.438 The case illustrates the level of political acceptance 
needed for a Jewish company to maintain a trade relation with Germany at this point. However, 
it also raises the question of how many Danish-Jewish industries had been working for the 
German war effort in order to remain in business.  
The January orders also contained the application of the third addition of the Nuremberg laws 
to Denmark. Danish-Jewish firms were from now on to be categorized and registered according 
to these as suggested by Renthe-Fink in September 1942. As we know, this had been done since 
1938 by the RfA, but this order was directly aimed at Denmark. In Best’s second report on the 
Jewish question in April 1943 Best estimated that there were 345 independent Jewish firms left 
in the Danish economy. The overwhelming majority were the 313 wholesale dealers, whose 
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influence had diminished significantly. There were twenty-two factory owners and only four 
companies engaged in the stock exchange, while six were in banking. Such a detailed report 
indicates that a full overview of the Danish-Jewish companies now existed. Best estimated the 
economy as being almost uninfluenced by Jews. Since his meeting with Rüstungsstab Dänemark 
in January, three of the six Jewish companies had been excluded. One company had been 
Aryanized by changing the composition of its supervisory board, while the contracts of two 
companies had not been renewed. Best could conclude that out of 700 Danish companies 
producing for the German war effort, only three were Jewish.439 
4.7 Chapter Conclusion 
In September, 1942 Renthe-Fink reported that the Aryanization process regarding Danish-
Jewish representatives and import companies was complete. This answers the last part of 
research question one as we are able conclude that the policies set in motion by the RfA in 1937, 
with few exceptions, appear to have been successfully implemented in Danish-German trade 
relations. Yet, it should be underscored that some cases reveal that Danish-Jewish business 
owners maintained some control of their companies. It should also be noted that Jewish 
companies still existed before events in October 1943. However, despite the lack of official laws 
against the Jews in Denmark the companies targeted for Aryanization, and the individuals 
associated with these, were formally removed from being business owners, CEOs, board 
members or owners of more than 25% of the stocks in companies. These findings indicate that 
Aryanization was probably the most successful part of the Judenpolitik pursued in Denmark. 
Further, they challenge our understanding of the Jews in Denmark as being largely untouched 
by the German occupation. 
The results on Aryanization was due to the efforts of the RfA, the local involvement of the 
German legation, and to some extent German companies. We can conclude on research 
question two that the German legation’s role for these policies to succeed appear fundamental 
through providing local racial investigations. Renthe-Fink actively assisted in the suggestion for 
further measures of Aryanization by attempting to prevent fuel supplies from reaching Jewish 
companies, as well as to propose to use the definition Jewish companies as it was formulated in 
the Nuremburg laws. Renthe-Fink would do so by applying the legal term “analogy”, which in 
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the absence of one law uses an existing law as inspiration. His successor Werner Best would 
implement this in January 1943, and at the same time limit the Jewish companies producing for 
the German war effort. It could be discussed whether this could be labelled as a formal law 
against the Jews in Denmark. It was probably perceived as such by the Germans, but it appears 
never to have been announced or otherwise publicized.  
In answering research question three, the Danish government’s response appears meagre, 
and largely failed to protect several civil rights of the Jewish minority such as trade rights, and 
formal ownership rights in companies. As a bystander the government in this area appears to 
have remained largely passive.  
We lack an in-depth perspective from the victims’ point of view on the possible personal and 
financial consequences of the Aryanization policies. Questions such as how being removed from 
a company affected their identities as members of the business community, and being part of 
Danish society at large? How many were informally deprived of company ownership and how 
many were forced to sell their stocks? And what personal and financial consequences did this 
result in? These unanswered questions, combined with the removal of Jews from companies,  
and the few known forced stock sales (James Polack (chapter three), Dansk kunstsilke industri, 
and Silkeborg tekstil fabrik in this chapter) do raise an interesting issue of the removal of wealth 
from Jews, which is directly tied to the Aryanization process in Denmark. 
Lastly, the use of Danish-Jewish companies in the German war effort is an area that could 
deserve a comprehensive analysis in order to locate the scope and reasons behind this. Possibly, 
the answer might be that the survival of the business was deemed most important given the 
circumstances. However, several moral questions will probably surface if this is investigated.  
In regards to the stages of persecution we find that Aryanization measures in Denmark 
continued to be applied informally through an extremely high degree of structure and 
organization (stage one). The introduction of the formal application of the Nuremberg Laws in 
defining Jewish companies at least raises the discussion if this is to be regarded as part of stage 
two – Formal laws. However, they were never publicized or, as far as we know, passed on to the 
Danes. From a German perspective these were applied. They were used to Aryanize and exclude 
Danish-Jewish companies producing for the German war effort (stage five). 
Clearly, the definition of Jews was informally applied (stage three). Again, we can locate the 
stages of identification, registration, and exclusion (stages four and five). The exclusive measures 
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within Aryanization (stage five) targeted Jewish representatives and Danish-Jewish import 
companies. Aryanization understood as the exclusion of Jews from the economy appears 
complete for these two groups. Lastly, the chapter opens up for the possibility of the presence 
of stage six as forced stock sales appear to have occurred, but as the sales are not disclosed we 
cannot decisively conclude that stage six was present. 
5 Mapping and Registering the Jews in Denmark 1937-1943 
In the previous chapters we have touched on how registration of Jewish companies took 
place, and that this knowledge was applied in order to exclude Jews from the trade relations 
between Denmark and Germany. The registration of Jews is thus a fundamental prerequisite for 
any anti-Jewish measure. This chapter follows the registration process of Jewish individuals in 
Denmark by exploring the cooperation between Danish and German police. In doing so the 
chapter partly answers research questions two and three on the theme of registration. Sections 
5.1 and 5.2 provides an overview of Danish-German police cooperation in the period from 1933 
to 1945. It also focuses on the presence of key Gestapo members who were responsible for 
registering Jews in Denmark.  
The last third of the chapter, sections 5.3 to 5.5, shows how the registries of Danish Jews were 
created. It partly builds on previous research which has concluded that a registry of at least 2,000 
entries had been created since the middle of 1941. It has been strongly suggested that the 
Gestapo possessed other sources of information, and not only relied on stealing the membership 
protocols from the Jewish congregation to draft the lists of arrests used in October 1943.440 
Postwar court case material will be used to further expand our knowledge on these registries. 
This will allow us to conclude that an extensive registration process was being undertaken by 
German police  from early on. In addition, new sources will be presented revealing that Danish 
police assisted in investigating the racial background of refugees as well as an unknown number 
of Danish citizens. 
5.1 Danish-German Police cooperation 
As early as May 1933 the German legation in Copenhagen was instructed to begin registration 
of refugees, including Jews, who had emigrated to Denmark. The order originated from the 
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Geheime Staatspolizeiamt, later called the Gestapo, and the legation from then on performed 
registration and surveillance tasks for one of the dictatorship’s most oppressive organizations. 
These tasks were to be carried out for the sake of state security as all refugees were presumed 
enemies of Germany. Communists, pacifists, Social Democrats and Jewish intelligentsia had to 
be registered, even if they were not engaged in political activities. The Gestapo intended to 
create a registry of all these groups, including information on their whereabouts, travels and 
networks. The AA charged all diplomatic entities to adhere to the demands of the Gestapo. As a 
result, all German emigrants in Denmark and elsewhere were to be registered by the German 
diplomatic corps.441 In this manner the AA supported the persecution of political and racial 
enemies outside of Germany. At the same time the Gestapo would form partnerships with the 
Danish police and share information on refugees as well as communists. 
 
5.1.1 Prewar Police Cooperation  
The prewar cooperation between German and Danish police focused on communists and 
refugees including Jews. Three branches of Danish police were working on foreigners and radical 
political groups. These branches were organizationally placed under the Criminal Police in 
Copenhagen. The first branch was the Section on Foreigners and Visas, formed in 1919.442 The 
second branch, Section D, had been established in 1931 and functioned as the national 
information hub on security matters related to politically radical individuals and organizations.443 
The third branch was the Security Police, founded in 1939 under the Federal Police to control 
and combat the illegal work of radical political parties and groups.444 
Gestapo’s registration of Jews, and communists was revealed through a publicly debated 
asylum case from 1938 which exposed Danish police suffered from security breaches as well as 
infiltration. In the high-profile libel case between the Minister of Justice, Karl Kristian Steincke 
and Frits Clausen, leader of the DNSAP, stolen material from the police’s refugee files was 
presented as evidence. This resulted in house searches and internal investigations of the police. 
These showed police section D’s specialist on Nazism, Kaj Yttesen, had been a double-agent and 
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it was estimated he had been working 51% for Germany and 49% for Denmark. More than 1,000 
pieces of information, primarily on German immigrants and Jews, had reached the hands of the 
Gestapo.445 The consequences for Yttesen were minor as he was demoted to regular police, but 
it forced retirement upon Yttesen’s superior Andreas Hansen. The investigation into Andreas 
Hansen showed that in 1934 he had covered-up police informant and Nazi member, Carlis 
Hansen’s abduction of a German communist in Denmark.446 Another consequence of these 
investigations was the imprisonment of Fremmedpolitiet’s police officer Max Pelving who was 
exposed as an informant.447 It has been emphasized that the police leadership appears oblivious 
to the possible consequences these leaks and infiltrations could have for refugees.448 The 
Gestapo possessed detailed knowledge of these individuals including addresses and political 
opinions. This allowed for a close monitoring of communists and several emigrant 
organizations.449 
It has recently been documented that this information exchange also existed on a higher and 
more formalized level. The Gestapo and Danish police both regarded the communists as 
dangerous enemies and this resulted in the formation of cooperative information networks 
before the war. It has lately been argued that the twenty German police officers who came to 
Denmark on April 9th 1940 were in fact well-known peers.450 The formal and detailed information 
exchanges between the two police forces began in 1935 and continued into the occupation 
period.451 The Rigspolitichef, National Police Commissioner, and later Minister of Justice, Thune 
Jacobsen, had excellent connections with German and Austrian police. In 1939, Jacobsen 
informed the German Gesandtschaft that he had increased surveillance of immigrants and asked 
for assistance against the communists.452 The prewar connections laid a solid foundation for the 
cooperation of the German and Danish police during the occupation. 
5.1.2 Police Cooperation During the Occupation 
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The police cooperation during the occupation was formalized on the 14th of April 1940, but 
for several days the German military security police, the Abwehr, and the Geheime Feldpolizei 
used the information obtained in the prewar years to make a series of arrests. These included 
several Danes, even a member of Danish Parliament, German immigrants, British and French 
nationals, maybe even Polish citizens. However, most were later released due to the Danish-
German agreement on police jurisdiction. The Gestapo and SD were not established as official 
organizations until August 1943. The German occupation plans specified the idea that law and 
order was to remain with the Danish police and courts. This proposal was accepted by the 
government. The Danish police took over investigations, interrogations and arrests. The Danish 
government used the agreement to prevent the introduction of martial law and until August 
1943 largely succeeded in securing that most Danes were judged according to Danish laws. More 
importantly, the death sentence was avoided until August 1943.453 
The overall responsibility for the success of this arrangement resided with the Danish Minister 
of Justice. The first, Svend Unmack Larsen, had been minister since September 1939, but proved 
too tempered for the delicate negotiations with Germany and was replaced by Harald Petersen 
in July 1940. Petersen had been a State Prosecutor in Copenhagen since 1932, and he was 
considered a tough negotiator. This apparently, resulted in his removal in June 1941 when Thune 
Jacobsen replaced him as one of the non-affiliated ministers. Jacobsen was an ambitious police 
lawyer who is remembered as the creator of the modern Danish police. He had an international 
outlook which was mostly directed towards Germany and he was the first Rigspolitichef 
(National Commissioner of the Danish Police). Jacobsen is somewhat of a puzzle. Despite his 
major and important political position, as well as being the head of a police force responsible for 
hunting communists and resistance fighters, we lack a contemporary analysis of him and his 
deeds during the war.  He was unpopular during the war and highly criticized after the 
liberation.454 
Most of the cooperation regarding police matters was handled in meetings between Thune 
Jacobsen and Paul Kanstein who were personal friends even using the informal “du” to one 
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another. Kanstein’s career track is quite remarkable. He was educated as a lawyer and began a 
successful career in the Gestapo in 1934 reaching the position of police Vice President in Berlin 
before being ordered to Denmark. From April 1940 until October 1943 Kanstein managed the 
German Legation’s section for inner affairs being responsible for the security of the German 
troops and the police department. He was a member of the SS reaching the rank of SS-
Brigadeführer in 1942 and left Denmark in October 1943. Recent research has revealed him as 
extremely tactical while being in line with the party policies e.g. against the Jews. His cooperative 
partners in the Danish government held him in high esteem. They gave him positive letters of 
confidence during his postwar trials and denazification hearings which helped secure him a life 
in peace from 1948.455 
On a more practical level the Statsadvokaten for Særlige Anliggender (State Prosecutor for 
Special Affairs, SPSA), was set up to handle police matters between Denmark and Germany. The 
office was to collaborate with the German military security police in matters of spying, sabotage 
and disruptive measures. The SPSA was to investigate and make arrests in cases involving Danes 
and Germans. The German army only agreed conditionally and were affirmed in their right to 
protect themselves by using martial law if necessary. It was a fragile agreement. It was 
repeatedly used by the Germans to threaten the Danes to comply or see the formal arrival of 
the Gestapo. During the first years of the occupation this cooperation went smoothly, but as the 
illegal press gained momentum Danish police was increasingly labelled as German henchmen. 
The beginning of armed resistance in 1942-1943 saw the Germans utilizing military courts, but 
sentences remained limited to imprisonment until the end of August 1943, when the death 
sentence was introduced and applied.456 
There were four different leaders of the SPSA during the occupation. The first one, Harald 
Petersen, was in office for two months until his appointment as Minister of Justice. Eivind Larsen 
was then head of the SPSA until the 21st of June 1941, when he was promoted to head of 
department in the Ministry of Justice. His successor, Poul Kjalke, was removed after a 
disagreement with the Ministry of Justice and the Germans. The loyal Troels Hoff took over in 
February 1942 and remained in this position for the duration of the occupation. The SPSA resided 
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at the HQ of the Police in Copenhagen and the many day-to-day cases were handled by SPSA’s 
police called the AS. This force was headed by Jens Peter Odmar. He was an ambitious police 
commissioner who came from Section D. In January 1942, he fused Section D into the AS and 
became very powerful. He was in charge of the many known and unknown registries of Section 
D. In the spring of 1941, the AS consisted of 13 officers with German language skills, but as the 
case load grew so did the office. A year later, 24 officers and three lawyers were employed, and 
in 1943 the number of officers had risen to 40.457 
5.1.3 Gestapo in Denmark 1940-1943 
Henrik Lundtofte’s book on the Gestapo was a first. He analyzed the organization’s role in 
Denmark as it gained executive powers with its official establishment in September 1943. His 
research is intentionally brief on the period from 1940 to September 1943. However, many of 
the men who became part of the Gestapo in Denmark from 1943 had been staff at the German 
legation in the preceding period. We can therefore point to a continuity in personnel, indicating 
that they performed other police tasks. One of these was intelligence gathering on known 
enemies of National Socialism including the Jews. Without applying the name Gestapo, the 
organization was incorporated as part of the legation’s staff. In 1940, more than twenty 
members of the Gestapo were in Denmark, a number that had risen to 62 by the summer of 
1943. The first addition of eleven men came in late 1940 and represented a 35% increase in staff, 
while subsequent additions came in January and July 1943. Werner Best would also secure a 
separate police battalion of 500 men in May 1943. The formal Gestapo office for Jewish Affairs, 
IV-4-B, was only established in September 1943. This was headed by Kriminalrat Erich Bunke, yet 
by February 1944 only one person worked in the office as most Jews had fled or been 
deported.458 
As we know Kanstein headed inner affairs and just below him was Regierungsrat Anton Fest 
who headed the police department at the legation. Fest was educated in law in 1930 and joined 
the NSDAP in 1933. He became part of the SS in 1934 and a year later he joined the Gestapo as 
well as being recruited for the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA). In April 1940 he was attached 
to the German Legation in Copenhagen with the SS-rank of Sturmbannführer. He was basically 
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the Gestapo leader in Denmark, and was disguised by the diplomatic title Police Attaché, which 
was used for police leaders in neutral and German allied countries.459 There were seven main 
offices under Fest, four of which were headed by Hans Hermannsen (more on him below). These 
offices were: Counterintelligence, Central registry, Border Surveillance and Gegnerbekämpfung 
– combatting enemies. These enemies were the ideological enemies of Germany: communists, 
emigrants, Jews and freemasons. Hans Hermannsen came to Denmark as a local Gestapo expert 
with experience in combatting communists in Flensborg. 
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5.1.4 Gestapo’s Hans Hermannsen and His Associates 
There has been little attention in Danish research to Hans Hermannsen’s role in regards to 
Jews, while his participation in combatting communists is well-described. This is surprising, as 
he was presented as the expert on Jewish affairs to Eichmann’s deputy Rolf Günther who came 
to Denmark in September 1943. Günther was in Denmark to oversee the attempt to arrest and 
deport the Danish Jews. As Hermannsen was head of four of the police offices including the 
registries we need to take a closer look at him.460 Hermannsen, nicknamed “uncle Hans”, was in 
Denmark for the duration of the occupation and carried the ranks Kriminalrat and SS-
Hauptsturmführer.  His career in Flensburg police saw him gaining infiltrating and registration 
skills, while in 1935 taking over the leadership of the city’s Gestapo office.461 He was responsible 
for placing many Flensburg communists in prisons or concentration camps. However, 
testimonies after the war also reveal him as behaving nonviolently and sometimes warning both 
Social Democrats and Jews in the local area.462 A case used to underscore this trait is the Jewish 
Alexander Wolff’s revisit to Flensburg in 1966 as Wolff described Hermannsen in positive terms. 
Contrary to this, Danish research has shown how a battered Wolff was literally thrown over the 
Danish-German border in 1938 while his farm was vandalized and taken over by the city of 
Flensburg. Wolff’s mother and wife were relocated to Berlin, but were later murdered during 
the Holocaust.463 
Hermannsen became a specialist in building information networks during the 1930s. He 
recruited informers north and south of the border, while also infiltrating the German refugee 
milieu in Denmark. In 1936 Hermannsen even went undercover as a businessman and travelled 
to Copenhagen to gain an overview of the refugee milieu in Denmark.  He met with informants, 
who provided addresses of German communists in Denmark and disclosed the courier lines 
between the two countries. Hermannsen’s cooperation with Danish police was thus well 
established as he relocated to the Danish capital in 1940.464 
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Hermannsen reached Copenhagen on the 20th of April 1940 and like all German police 
officers, he was officially tied to the German legation. Gestapo’s official establishment in August 
1943 saw Hermannsen named head of office IV-1-A which combatted communists. His career in 
Denmark before August 1943 was varied. He began building registries of communists and Jews, 
while  postwar testimony confirms his close cooperation with Danish security police and its 
manager Jens Peter Odmar. Hermannsen described how Danish police performed observations 
and conducted questioning of communists on his request. He was afterwards provided with the 
information the Danish police had collected.465 
Hermannsen was involved in a host of controversial and violent events during the occupation. 
In June 1941, the Danish police arrested a row of communists on German demand and 
Hermannsen made sure that German communist refugees were also apprehended. Many of 
whom later perished or were killed in Germany. Hermannsen took part in the deportation of 150 
Danish communists in October 1943. After August 1943, he planned and executed 10 raids on 
so-called anti-social Danes. Many of which were deported. Hermannsen also combatted the 
Danish resistance movement. However, Hermannsen helped some Danish Social Democrats and 
resistance fighters during the occupation. So much so that Danish obituaries in 1952 praised his 
deeds except for the communist newspaper Land og Folk. Lundtofte concludes that Hermannsen 
could be viewed as the personification of the cooperation between German and Danish police.466 
Hermannsen is in many ways a controversial and contradictory figure and maybe his label as 
a “prototypical opportunist” is the most adequate. He was neither a stereotypical Gestapo man 
nor a clear-cut rescuer. Evidently, he knew how to protect himself and get involved with the 
right people, but as his German biographer states: “Undeniably, Hermannsen was employed in 
the Gestapo for more than 12 years in one of the most profoundly criminal and central 
institutions of radical measures in the NS-State and was responsible for several communists’ 
deaths.”467 In some instances, previous research seem to neglect that he was not only an 
employee, but had extensive leadership responsibilities during most of his career. It has been 
argued that his positive deeds in Denmark were the reason he escaped justice after the war, but 
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he functioned as a counterintelligence officer for the British and then for the Americans until he 
died in 1952.468 
Fritz Renner was one of Hans Hermannsen’s closest associates and member of the Gestapo 
in Saarbrücken before coming to Denmark on November 23rd, 1940. His main task seems to have 
been registering the Jews in Denmark.469 Previous research has presented us with one elaborate 
example of Renner’s work as Heinrich Himmler had ordered the arrest of the presumed Danish-
Jewish professor Walter Thalbitzer. Thalbitzer, an expert on Inuit culture, was to work in the 
concentration camp Dachau on the horrible medical freezing experiments.470 Kanstein was to 
concoct the appropriate reasons for Thalbitzer’s arrest and Fritz Renner was to examine 
Thalbitzer’s heritage via published genealogical works. In a four-page report Renner unraveled 
Thalbitzer’s family history only to conclude he was not Jewish.471 As the question came directly 
from Himmler, his superiors must have trusted Renner’s skills, and he clearly knew his sources. 
Fritz Renner was one of the few persons who would be assigned work in the official Gestapo 
office for Jewish affairs IV-4-B as it was established in September 1943.472 He is also known for 
his attempts to catch fleeing Jews during October 1943. He did so along with Paul Hennig (see 
section 5.3.1) and during a shoot-out in Tårbæk Renner or Hennig  killed Claus Christian Heilesen 
who assisted in helping Jews escape.473  
One of Renner’s associates in gathering intelligence on Jews was Gustav Oehlerking, of whom 
we know very little. He came to Denmark in January 1943 as one of the fifteen new German 
police officers who were instated at the German Legation. He was 53 years old when he arrived 
in Denmark from Hannover with the title of Kriminalobersekretär – a middle rank.474  
5.2 Police Cooperation on the Enemies of Nazism 
5.2.1 The Communists and the Resistance Movement 
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During the war Danish and German Police cooperated their actions concerning  communists, 
the resistance movement, refugees and Jews. Let us first look at the cooperation on Communists 
and the resistance movement in order to establish the nature of cooperation against groups 
considered enemies of Germany. The German attack on the Soviet Union enforced Danish-
German cooperation further. Danish police were in charge of arresting Soviet citizens along with 
Danish communist leaders and Danish police overzealously executed the task. The Germans had 
demanded at least 70 arrests, but the Danes arrested 168 including 20 non-members of the 
communist party. Two of the three communist members of the Danish Parliament were also 
arrested, and several other waves of arrests were carried out by Danish police until August 1943. 
250 communists were interned in the Horserød camp and most were deported along with the 
Danish Jews in October 1943. The Danish government also made the communist party illegal in 
August 1941 in order to prevent damaging the politics of cooperation with Germany. This was a 
violation of the constitution, yet all the remaining parties voted for the law. The Danish 
government framed the law and internments of the communists as being Danish initiatives by 
arguing the law would eventually have to be instituted. Still, the arrests were made on German 
demand. The government could argue that jurisdiction was still in Danish control, but it was a 
jurisdiction that violated the constitution.475  
Cooperation also took place in regards to the resistance movement. Resistance became a 
rising concern for the Germans as 1942 progressed. The German police presence was increased, 
even though Danish police still performed many of the investigative tasks and made the arrests. 
Prime Minister Buhl’s speech in September 1942, asking the population to report resistance 
members, and the King’s public denouncement of sabotage in May 1943 were attempts to keep 
some control over jurisdiction at the expense of the resistance movement.476 In essence, there 
was a well-established cooperation between Danish and German police, which was supported 
at the highest levels of government even against the resistance movement. 
5.2.2 Police Cooperation on Refugees  
German refugees in Denmark were generally considered as enemies of the dictatorship, and 
were of special interest to German police units such as the German Military Intelligence unit 
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(Abwehr) and The Secret German Military Police (Geheime Feldpolizei). These units were also 
central to the German police and intelligence activities in Denmark in the period before 1943.477 
We know little of their activities in Denmark, but have some information on the cooperative 
nature between them and the Danish Police through some well documented cases. 
On the 16th of April 1940 the Germans requested a full census of all foreigners in Denmark 
and shortly afterwards the Danish Ministry of Justice announced The Act of Obligation to be 
Registered for Foreigners.478 This act made it was mandatory for all foreigners older than 16 to 
register in person at the local police station during May 1940. The rules also applied to 
Scandinavians and stateless persons who were most likely Jewish individuals. 28.632 persons 
were registered during the month of May, and the information was passed on to the Germans. 
For the Copenhagen area alone, the tally was 14.400 persons. The main registry of these people 
was at the SPSA, with a copy located at section D of the Copenhagen police.479 A month later, 
the Abwehr demanded an overview of all the formalities regarding the registration process of 
foreigners. This included questions such as what kind of stamps were used? Which forms and 
IDs were used? The Danish police replied quickly and self-flatteringly concluded: “…here in 
Denmark there is widespread control of the foreigners and a thorough control over the 
individual foreigner”.480 
Several arrests of refugees were made and the most current estimate shows that 155 
refugees were handed over to German police. This included 20 Jews, 18 of whom, were later 
murdered in the camp system.481 The authors of the four-volume examination of the Danish 
refugee policies from 1933-1945 describe these arrests in detail482, but the cases from the SPSA 
reveal an additional request for the arrest of 55 German emigrants on the 28th of August 1940.483 
There also exists a further request to arrest 32 Dutch citizens in the summer of 1940.484 These 
were carried out, but are not included in previous research and additional requests possibly 
exist. The actual number of arrests thus appears to be higher than previously acknowledged and 
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it seems to be impossible to give a satisfactory numerical result. However, it can be concluded 
that there was a high degree of cooperation in this area. 
German police continued to focus on refugees, and in late 1940,  Anton Fest demanded that 
Danish police raided the Danish refugee committees. The weak pretext had been a suspicion of 
propaganda. Danish police searched the premises of the three main refugee organizations in 
Denmark: 1) The Matteotti Committee, which had mostly helped Social Democrats fleeing from 
Germany 2) The Committee of the 4th of May 1933, which had assisted Jewish refugees 3) the 
Åndsarbejderkomiteen, which had mostly assisted intellectuals of all kinds. The Danish police 
confiscated all material, including registry cards, correspondence etc. and it was all handed over 
to the Germans. This secured further intelligence on many of the German refugees.485   
In December, Fest specifically requested more information on refugees and stateless persons 
from Germany, Austria, the Czech lands and Poland. In addition, Fest wanted a complete copy 
of all Danish refugee cards, with an indication of who were Jewish. This clearly underlines the 
extensive intelligence gathering, and the continued German interest in registering Jews. Fest’s 
request caused internal discussions between the Danish Ministry of Justice and the Foreign 
Ministry, but also revealed that the Danes had already labelled all registry cards involving Jews 
with a “J”. The police possessed a complete overview of Jewish refugees on two sets of registry 
cards:  one set with basic information and a set with extensive information. The Ministry of 
Justice suggested agreeing to the German request by supplying them with a copy of the cards 
with basic information as the German’s already possessed a copy of the census on refugees. As 
a consequence of this it would only be a matter of time before German police had determined 
who were Jewish. The Foreign Ministry disagreed and the request was denied. The Germans 
countered this decision by requesting access to the registry in order to take notes. Kanstein 
revealed that many of those who were of interest were Jewish refugees. This request was 
accepted and the end result was potentially the same: critical personal information ended up in 
German hands.486 
The case developed further in December 1941, as Fest now requested a copy of all former 
German citizens including information on race. It was apparently the German consulate in 
Copenhagen that required this information, and they quickly followed up on Fest’s request. In 
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February 1942 the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Justice gave in. Fest received a copy of 
989 registry cards on Jews which contained information on 1414 persons including their 
addresses. All Jewish refugees were thus registered less than two years after the occupation 
with the aid of the Danish government and police.  Historians Hans Kirchhoff and Lone Rünitz 
conclude: “In this manner they were well-prepared for the day the ‘Jewish question’ in Demark 
would also find its ‘final solution’. Now, the only thing missing was similar information about the 
Danish Jews.”487 The cooperation on Jewish refugees must be labelled as almost unlimited 
assistance to German police. These actions amounted to cooperation and assistance in 
Judenpolitik, as well as potentially putting these people at risk. The interest in the foreign Jews 
shows that Judenpolitik’s racial categorization, and registration was applied in Denmark.  
 
5.3 German Registries of Danish Jews 
Paul Hennig and Lorenz Christensen are the most important Danish aids in creating registries 
of Jews. I will provide a short biographical account of them with a focus on their involvement in 
this area. These will build on the knowledge we already possess of them from historian Sofie 
Lene Bak’s research. Bak was the first to research the main anti-Semites Lorenz Christensen and 
Paul Hennig and connect them to the German Legation.488 
5.3.1 Paul Hennig 
Paul Hennig (1902-?) had a German mother and had attended the German school in 
Copenhagen. From 1928-1932 he was an assistant to Otto Brenner at the company 
Personalhistorisk Institut. The company performed genealogical research and provided 
discounts for members of the DNSAP and the National Socialistisk Arbejderparti (NSAP). Hennig 
was a member of NSAP, and in 1933 he began his independent genealogical business, 
Arierregisteret (the Register of Aryans). Evidently, it was focused on providing proof of race in 
accordance with the Nuremberg Laws. In April 1941 he was also the CEO of the Race Political 
Office under DNSAP. He wrote numerous articles for the anti-Semitic weekly Kamptegnet, but 
after a dispute with the editors Aage H. Andersen and Olga Eggers, he was fired. During this 
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period, he had also been paid by the GCC to perform racial investigations into Danish businesses. 
In the spring of 1942, he became part of the SS. He was located in both Berlin and Copenhagen, 
but the circumstances appear cloudy. He came back to Copenhagen in January 1943 to assist in 
translation and genealogical work.489 Under Ersatzkommando Dänemark he was to certify that 
young SS volunteers were Aryan including their fiancées if they happened to be engaged. 
Afterwards, the paperwork would be sent for approval at the Rasse- und Sieldungs Hauptamt 
(RuSHA) of the SS.490 Paul Hennig’s role in the anti-Semitic paper Kamptegnet will be analyzed 
in chapter six. 
5.3.2 Dr. Lorenz Christensen 
Dr. Lorenz Christensen is one of the most central Danes491 in regards to Judenpolitik in 
Denmark. Previous research has labelled him as the German’s de facto Judenreferent from 
February 1943 to 1945, but documents from his postwar trial reveal he was an official one only 
from the spring of 1944.492 (See chapter nine). Postwar he managed to present himself as an 
independent business man from 1933-1940 in Deutsche Wirtschaftsberatungsstelle. From 1941-
1943 he was presented as a researcher on the Jewish question. Closer inspection into these 
claims show he was much more.493 Previous research has already shown he became increasingly 
anti-Semitic in the 1930s and a supporter of National Socialism.494 His “business” was to secure 
loans and promote trade with Germany, yet from 1935 it was financed by Volksdeutscher 
Mittelstelle (VoMi).495 
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Lorenz Christensen had since his younger years been interested in genealogy. As the category 
of the Volksdeutsche was defined in March 1939 his skills were needed on a professional level. 
The Volksdeutsche were ranked just below citizens of the Reich, but were considered members 
of the German people.496  People who felt or wished to be part of the German people had to 
prove their descent and race. In the late 1930’s Christensen began to issue certificates of 
ancestry (Ahnenbriefe) to prove Aryan descend. He would obtain the necessary proofs of births, 
baptisms, marriages and deaths from many Danish parishes.497 
In early 1940 Lorenz Christensen returned to Kiel University after a dispute with Jens Møller. 
Christensen had received his doctoral degree there and returned to continue working on the 
university project Handwörterbuch des Grenz und Auslandsdeutschtum, which was used to 
legitimize border revisions. The Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel (CAU) was headed by Otto 
Scheel from 1933-1945 and he was from the town of Tønder which had been German before the 
referendum in 1920. Scheel headed the Instituts für Volks- und Landesforschung which had been 
formed in January 1938 by Hinrich Lohse. Scheel was head of the institute which researched the 
history of the peoples, political history and race in the border area.498 In the fall of 1940 
Christensen again became part of this institute.499 
The occupation of Denmark saw Christensen being recruited to the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). He 
would pass on knowledge of trade in the area and suggest companies suitable for the German 
war industry as well as point to possible informers. He informed the SD of boycotts against 
German businesses in the region and would send evaluations of the Danish National Socialist 
leadership.500 In October 1940 he became head of the Sippenkanzlei Nordschleswig, which was 
funded by VoMi, but part of National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei - Nordschleswig 
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(NSDAP-N).501 Contrary to Christensen’s postwar testimony he is described as sometimes 
wearing an SS uniform with SD insignia, indicating that he might in fact be a member of the SS.502 
Lorenz Christensen was hired by the head of press affairs at the German legation, Gustav 
Meissner, to assist in composing a report on the Jews in Denmark. (See chapter six). Renthe-Fink 
prolonged Christensen’s employment and it lasted until the end of the war.503 As part of his 
official work for the legation he created a registry containing information on at least 2.000 
Danish Jews for the report, but it probably also served as research for his book, Det Tredje Ting 
(The Third Power), the principal anti-Semitic piece in Danish and published in the fall of 1943.504 
5.3.3 German Registries 
In order to prepare the postwar court cases against Paul Hennig and Lorenz Christensen, the 
Danish police conducted many pre-trial interviews with former employees at the German 
legation. Danish police would in their questioning focus mostly on establishing if the material 
gathered on Jews was used for preparing the action against the Danish Jews in October 1943. 
However, these interviews throw light on the cooperation between the German police and the 
Danish anti-Semites by revealing how the registration offices functioned at the legation. This 
included details on Gestapo’s work. 
Apparently, the genealogical office at Dagmarhus (the administration offices of the legation) 
contained large posters of family trees and registries of Jews. Yet, most registries had been 
burned just before the war ended.505 In this office the registries over Jews were kept and Paul 
Hennig would explain that Fritz Renner had three separate registries on: 1) Danish Jews 2) Jewish 
Companies 3) Foreign Jews. Paul Hennig evaluated the registries as follows: “…probably all Jews 
were in it along with a number of persons who were erroneously assumed to be Jews...”.506 
Lorenz Christensen would state that the registries contained information on people who were 
not pure Jews and relatives, which underscores the extensiveness of these registries.507 
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Christensen probably intended to diminish the value of the registries, but as we have already 
seen exclusive measures were also pursued against people who were related to Jews or 
regarded as “Mischlinge”. Paul Hennig also disclosed that Fritz Renner had been charged with 
creating a registry of the Danish Jews. As Renner came in late 1940, it indicates that registration 
probably began that year. The office of registries also held catalogue cards of priests and doctors 
as well as overviews of lodges and sects in Denmark.508  
Postwar, Hermannsen would continuously argue that the raid against the Jewish 
congregation in September 1943 had formed the basis for the action in October, but several 
times he disclosed that as Renner’s superior he was fully aware of Renner’s work.509 As we recall 
Hans Hermannsen headed these offices until the middle of 1943, and must have been 
monitoring the registration process. In addition, he would personally make requests to the SPSA 
to investigate on the race of Danish citizens (see the following sections). This implies a more 
direct involvement in the registration process. 
There seems to have been a close working relationship between Renner, Hennig and 
Christensen. A former Gestapo officer would explain that Renner worked almost exclusively on 
Jews, while Hennig would assist him on daily basis. Christensen functioned as Renner’s local 
expert and advisor on Jewish Affairs in Denmark. Interestingly, it is also disclosed that Anton Fest 
would be consulted on all important questions relating to the Danish Jews.510  
Eberhard von Löw was part of the SS from 1935 and worked on security issues in Schleswig-
Holstein. In April 1940 he was relocated to the headquarters of the RSHA’s dept. VI, later dept. 
III. He was to build an office responsible for occupied Germanic countries and his specific area 
of expertise was on Denmark. Löw requested Christensen to create an overview of the Danish 
Jews in the beginning of the war, but  postwar Löw stated the RSHA never received it. Given the 
fact that registration work was made, it seems unlikely the information was not passed on to the 
RSHA, but this remains to be confirmed. 
 Löw’s request, fulfilled or not, shows the RSHA’s early interest in this area in Denmark. 
Christensen’s selection as author indicates that his expertise on Jews was valued even by the 
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RSHA.511 There is no doubt that extensive registration measures took place almost from the 
beginning of the occupation. Previous research has not focused on Danish police’s cooperation 
in this area. This is the focus of the remaining part of this chapter. 
5.4 Danish Police and Racial Investigations 
The phone rang at the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs on the 29th of April 1943. It was the 
German assistant detective Fritz Renner. Renner’s call was related to N.A., a former social-
democratic member of parliament and supposedly Jewish. Renner wanted Danish police to 
investigate her race and they acted swiftly finishing the report in one day. N.A. was no longer a 
member of parliament, but had been so for seven years. She had been registered by the police 
for belonging to the leadership of the Social Democratic Information and Propaganda 
Department which combatted Communism and National Socialism. Police in her birth town of 
Horsens could report her parents were now living in the town of Virum, not so far from 
Copenhagen, and they were now questioned.512 
The police knocked on her parents’ door at two o’clock in the afternoon on the 29th N.A.’s 
mother answered the door and confirmed her identity. The two officers then began questioning 
her about the couple’s race. Were they Aryan? Were they sure they did not have any Jewish 
blood in their family?513 The couple denied by giving extensive details on their family history. 
The local policemen could conclude they were probably not Jewish, and “Neither of the two 
questioned persons carries the slightest look of being of Jewish descent”.514 This was Danish 
police carrying out racial investigations on behalf of German police. The local police chief reacted 
strongly against this kind of work, but to no avail.515 
N.A.’s parents became curious as to who the policemen were. The husband was a former 
member of the Danish Social Democratic Party and contacted Alsing Andersen. Alsing Andersen 
was a Social Democrat, member of parliament since 1929 as well as a former Minister of Defense 
and Finance. In April 1943 he was the General Secretary (forretningsfører) of the party. Alsing 
Andersen contacted the Ministry of Justice and raised a host of questions. Had the Minister of 
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Justice given orders to perform the interrogation? Could the Germans ask a local precinct to 
perform such interrogations? With what right had the interrogation taken place? Was it a 
common practice or a single case? We do not know if Alsing Andersen received answers to these 
important questions, but the internal discussion that followed between the Danish Foreign 
Ministry and the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs supplies us with the answers.516 
The State Prosecutor for Special Affairs at the time, Troels Hoff, wrote a report to the Foreign 
Ministry. It is well attested that the SPSA’s office was involved in investigations the Germans 
requested as this was part of keeping the Danish police and the judicial system in Danish hands. 
However, Hoff’s answer shows that the SPSA also provided sensitive information on Danes based 
solely on German requests. Hoff stated:  
 
“From the present German authorities, the department receives a large number of 
requests regarding Danish citizens. The information wanted is: if individuals are 
sentenced or known by the police, and sometimes their family relations, if they are 
politically known and in addition if they are Aryans or of Jewish descent. The requests 
are increasing.”517 
 
Evidently, this practice had existed for some time. Hoff explained the German reasons for 
asking such questions were to prove if the following categories of Danes were Aryan:  
 
 Women who were to marry Germans 
 Danish citizens who sought employment in German organizations in Denmark or 
Germany 
 People who wanted to travel to Sweden or Germany 
 Owners of Danish companies who wanted to trade with Germany 
 
Hoff argued it was in the general interest of Danish citizens, “especially the many non-Jewish 
ones” to provide the Germans with information on race. However, he did not express 
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consideration  for the possible negative consequences for Danish Jews. The SPSA would utilize 
numerous sources to answer these requests such as: police registers, the registry of commune 
residents518 (Folkeregisteret), and the Ministerialregisteret or church protocols.519 If the police 
had failed to ascertain answers from these sources they would attempt to conduct a voluntary 
interview of the person of interest. Hoff added, “In singular cases, where the police have wanted 
to avoid asking the individual directly, and where they were expected to not being able to 
provide the answers themselves, others have been questioned”.520 Basically, the Danish police 
used all available sources to perform uncritical racial registration on the basis of the German 
racial laws and definitions. Hoff made sure future requests would be made in writing.  A phone 
call had been sufficient for Danish police to investigate and answer questions regarding Danish 
citizen's judicial, political, or racial status, but Hoff now made sure future requests were made 
in writing. This is confirmed by the cases, which from approximately that date is supplied with a 
written note, while previous cases often refer to a phone call.521 
The family, mentioned above, had been one of those cases where a personal inquiry had to 
be conducted in relation to their daughter. Hoff’s explanation of this specific case shows how 
the police had generally proceeded in such matters. A phone call from Fritz Renner at the 
German legation had been sufficient to set off an investigation into the racial composition of the 
family. The request was based on the suspicion of the possible Jewish maiden name of N.A.’s 
mother. The police had, with the aid of local authorities, used the Folkeregister and the church 
protocols in order to answer the question. It is also worth noting that this case clearly falls 
outside of the categories mentioned by Hoff.522 
The Danish Foreign Ministry became involved and the minister, Scavenius, was informed of 
the matter. The ministry reasoned the best-case scenario was to refrain from answering this 
type of questions, but as the practice had existed for “a long time”, it would be too difficult to 
discontinue it without risking political problems. A main argument employed by Nils Svenningsen 
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was the risk of raising an issue that potentially brought the Jewish question on the agenda. “For 
the sake of both the Jews and all of society’s interest, we have to accept some smaller 
unpleasantness.”523 
One important item rests in the investigative file on N.A. , which apparently did not become 
an issue between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Justice. It is an empty application form 
required to be filled out when applying for return travels from Denmark. Two of the fields stand 
out as travelers from Denmark were required to put down their religion and race on the form. It 
is uncertain when the questionnaire was issued, but it originated from the office of the 
Rigspolitichefen. It shows that race, despite its informality, was being enforced in such a way 
that it appeared on formal travel questionnaires issued by Danish police.524 
5.5 The Cases of the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs 
The SPSA performed thousands of investigations at the request of the Abwehr and the 
German legation. These requests mostly regarded Danish citizens. In addition, inquiries 
regarding immigrants, and sometimes their arrest, were also made to the SPSA who followed 
through on them. The answers to all requests usually contained information on a citizen’s former 
breaches of law, political standpoint and sometimes family relations. This kind of personal 
information was forwarded without the consent of those involved and it usually originated from 
Section D’s registries on e.g. communists and members of the Danish Nazi party.525 The overall 
number of requests and answers to the Germans have not been fully accounted for, but a sample 
from April 1943 shows that Danish police provided information on 412 Danish citizens that 
month.526 Questions on race were rare527, and they mostly originated from the police section of 
the legation. Most questions on race were asked by Hans Hermannsen, Fritz Renner or Gustav 
Oehlerking. As we saw earlier, these were the policemen working on registering Jews. 
My examination of the roughly 17.000 case files for the Copenhagen area shows that the 
majority of these can be grouped into the following categories: 
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 Answering questions from Abwehr or the Reichbevollmächtiges office regarding: 
o Information on thousands of Danes’ political and criminal records, 
sometimes also family relations and economic issues 
o Questions on refugees: their addresses, marital status and so forth 
o Requests to perform investigations of places, addresses and interrogations 
of persons on behalf of the Abwehr 
o A few cases on communists, the rest are in a separate archive 
o Few questions on race 
o Questions on foreigners who were not refugees 
 Incidents between Germans and Danes:  
o Incidents involving shooting and stabbing with bayonets 
o Rape, sexual abuse and the spreading of venereal diseases 
o Violent incidents such as fights and brawls 
o Smaller incidents like spitting, showing, and yelling 
o Minor acts of vandalism on German signs, cars, and telephone cables  
o Showing support for the allies by wearing red, white and blue insignia 
o Disgracing German graves 
o Debts in Germany 
 
The approximately 240 cases that revolve around race often include examination of relatives 
as well. This means that each case often contains information on the race of parents, siblings, 
and grandparents. Cases of examined companies also contain genealogical information on all 
board members. The number of people examined is thus higher than 240, and closer to 1.000. 
Hoff’s categories of racial questions (women who were to marry Germans etc. (see above)) 
seems to have been a routine matter, yet the preserved cases involving race reveal that they 
revolve around three general groups: 1) Refugees 2) Danes 3) Companies. It appears that race-
related questions for these groups were forwarded to the Danish police if the German police 
was experiencing difficulties in determining if a person was Jewish. Other organizations such as 
the German Chamber of Commerce, private information bureaus, genealogists and party 
members had probably already been asked the same questions. The methodologies in order to 
ascertain if people were Jewish involved both interviews and using local records. As we have 
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already learned from the case on N.A., relatives or friends were questioned by police to ascertain 
the race of the person in question. These interviews were carried out by local police precincts 
on the behalf of the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs. Other public organizations involved 
were the records of the local municipalities, known as the Folkeregister, as well as local parish 
records. In some cases, tax records were also used in order to determine if a person paid 
Kirkeskat, a tax collected and paid to the Lutheran Church (Folkekirke) by the central authorities 
in Denmark.528 This was a tax Jews usually did not pay. Overall, the preserved cases on race show 
that a considerable work effort was made to answer the German requests.  
However, there are several indications that the number of racial investigations was probably 
higher. Two cases illustrate this. The first one is on professor and medical doctor Paul Møller 
who in March 1941 was asked if he was Jewish by Danish Police. The request originated from 
the German legation, because Møller was about to travel to Germany to give a series of lectures. 
Møller had asked detective constable Olesen about his workload on such questions and Olesen 
had replied “It is not so bad”, because he only had two more places to visit that day. It seems 
Olesen was no stranger to performing this kind of work. Compared to other cases, the 
investigation on Møller was not extensive. He was simply asked if he was Jewish and answered 
no, while offering to produce his birth certificate to prove it.529 This incident corresponds to 
Hoff’s categories (see above), but shows it had been a routine matter for several years. Persons 
going to work for German organizations were also examined, such as groups of Danish women 
going to work for the German Red Cross.530 However, this brings into question if the 
approximately 100,000 Danes who went to work in Germany were most likely questioned or 
examined regarding their race as well.531 
5.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter intended to answer research questions two and three on the theme of 
identification and registering Jews. It thus focused on stage four in the model Stages of 
Persecution. In most occupied countries Jews were required to register by law. This chapter has 
shown that in Denmark it proceeded informally, and this is stage two in the Stages of Persecution 
                                                     
528 The Lutheran Church and the State are not separated in Denmark. 
529 “3242. Forespørgsel på Poul Møller og Svend Petri,” March 1941, RA, AS-Sager Kbh. 
530 “15523. Forespørgsel på fem personer,” July 3, 1943, RA, AS-Sager Kbh. 
531 Christensen et al., Danmark besat: krig og hverdag 1940-45. 
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model. The basis of all identifications and registrations appear to be based on the German 
definition of Jews, which is stage three in the model Stages of Persecution. Despite the lack of 
registration laws in Denmark the Jews were systematically registered by German police. The 
examination of the German registration efforts has revealed they took on a formalized structure 
from late 1940 an onwards. However, a preliminary registry probably existed as part of the 
Aryanization efforts which began in 1937 (see chapter three).  
 
Hans Hermannsen headed the registries of Jews while most day-to-day work was performed 
by Fritz Renner. Both were members of the Gestapo, but part of the German legation’s staff. 
They were assisted by Danish anti-Semites Paul Hennig and Lorenz Christensen. Christensen was 
viewed as an expert on the matter, which gained him the title of Judenreferent in 1944. The 
German legation had three registries on 1) Danish Jews 2) Jewish Companies 3) Foreign Jews.  
This chapter has revealed an extensive cooperation between the German and Danish police 
on these matters. The Danish-German police cooperation had a prewar context which secured 
a host of personal ties which remained in place during the occupation. The cooperation was 
extensive, and the Germans were provided with all the Danish information on foreign Jews. 
Danish police and the SPSA would answer an unknown number of German requests regarding 
the race of Danish citizens. According to Troels Hoff, head of the SPSA, this involved the following 
categories: Women who were to marry Germans, Danish citizens to be employed in German 
organizations in Denmark or Germany, individuals travelling to Sweden or Germany, and owners 
of Danish companies who wanted to trade with Germany. But there appears to be several other 
cases revolving around race in which Danish police supplied information to German police. 
The role of the Danish government has not been fully disclosed. The Danish government was 
only involved as a copy of all the catalogue cards with basic information on Jewish refugees were 
handed over to the German police in February 1942. Only in the middle of 1943 it seems at least 
Scavenius was made aware that the SPSA was performing racial investigations on behalf of the 
German police, but this type of information exchange continued. 
In the area of registration, the cooperation seems to have been largely unlimited, and viewing 
this within the context of bystander analysis this work does have the character of supporting the 
perpetrator’s registration efforts. Clearly, it was a cooperation which sought to maintain the 
judicial and executive powers on Danish hands. However, we can hardly ignore the evident 
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consequences this work had in relation to excluding Jews, while also thinking ahead to October 
1943. These registries must have formed the basis for the list of arrests being made in 
preparation for the action against the Jews in Denmark. 
6 Probing the Limits of Cooperation 
The dissertation now turns to exploring and analyzing how other areas of Judenpolitik were 
pursued in Denmark. The chapter revolves around answering research questions two and three. 
Section 6.1 begins the chapter by briefly tracing how the legation began reporting on the Jewish 
question in Denmark. It also shows how the racial laws of Germany began influencing parts of 
the Danish society in 1937-1940 through the usage of proof of race (Ariernachweis). Danish 
citizens sought to prove their Aryan race in order to qualify for trading with Germany, and 
Germans with ancestral ties to Denmark had to prove they were Aryan to avoid persecution in 
Germany. These endeavors involved Danish parishes and archives. Section 6.2 focuses on 
research question two by following the legation’s attempts to promote Judenpolitik in various 
forms in Denmark from the beginning of the occupation until January 1942. Several initiatives 
were set in motion in this period such as an official race office to support the use of National 
Socialism’s race categories, and initiatives to promote anti-Semitism. At the same time a security 
area was setup in the northern and western part of Jutland, which disallowed the presence of 
Jews, German refugees, and Gypsies in this area. 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 are the largest parts of the chapter. They center on both research 
question two and three during the crisis in the Danish-German relationship surrounding the 
signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in late 1941. This resulted in a combined German pressure 
on the Danish government to introduce formal laws against the Jews. This part of the chapter 
will also introduce the previously unknown request from Cecil Renthe-Fink to introduce anti-
Jewish laws in December 1941. This pressure led to several discussions within the Danish 
government and they reveal that a minority would accept formal laws against the Jews. 
6.1 Judenfrage Dänemark 1933-1940 
One of the reports on Jews written by Bülow-Schwante of the AA’s Abteilung D, the section 
working on Jews, (see chapter two) reached the German legation in Copenhagen in May 1933. 
The report was to document and provide political arguments for Germany’s new anti-Semitic 
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course.532 In Denmark it was also distributed to the larger German consulates.533 The report 
documents how adamantly and quickly the AA supported and expanded on the dictatorship’s 
policies against Jews. Since it was written in-house, it is also a testament to the AA’s use of racial 
arguments to justify Germany’s Judenpolitik. The first line stated that foreign countries had 
misunderstood Germany’s anti-Jewish policies, and the next twenty pages gave a wide-range of 
legitimizing arguments for Germany’s policies. The basic argument was that the influence of 
Jews had become enormous in practically all areas of German society. Sixteen themes were 
highlighted, including subjects such as Jewish domination in culture and certain business sectors. 
A host of statistics were used to legitimize the claim of an overwhelmingly high number of Jews 
in positions such as doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. Culturally, Jews were seen as too 
dominant compared to their numbers, while they were politically associated with Social 
Democrats and Communists.534 From this early stage on, the German diplomats in Denmark 
were thus charged with supporting and promoting the underlying ideas of German Judenpolitik. 
From 1930 to 1936 the German envoy in Denmark was Herbert Freiherr von Richthofen. He 
was 51 years old in 1930 and had a long diplomatic career behind him, but also ahead of him, as 
he continued to serve until 1944.535 On his own accord Gesandter von Richthofen followed and 
reported on the so-called Jewish question in Denmark right after the National Socialist takeover. 
One of the first cases reported on was twenty German-Jewish students who had fled Germany 
and requested enrollment in Danish universities to complete their degree. However, there were 
several obstacles. First of all, they had to obtain permits of residence, which was a cumbersome 
process. Secondly, several university regulations made it difficult to follow the needed courses 
to qualify for graduation. In addition, lectures were in Danish only and many courses were 
overbooked. As Danes superseded foreigners on the waiting lists the German-Jewish medical 
students were not able to complete their studies. Likewise, only Danish citizens could serve as 
civil servants and lawyers. The twenty students were permitted to continue their studies under 
these normal, but rather harsh terms.536 
                                                     
532 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 46–47 Several other reports 
like this were sent to the legations, but this is the only one I have been able to locate in the archives of the German Legation in Copenhagen. 
However, there are also printed speeches from Goebbels and Hitler which were to be disseminated. 
533 These were Aarhus, Aalborg, Randers, Esbjerg, Fredericia, Kolding, Odense and Svendborg 
534 “Ref. D. 913 Judenfrage Deutschland,” April 30, 1933, PA, Kopenhagen 76. 
535 Maria Keipert et al., eds., “Richthofen, Herbert Freiherr von,” Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen Auswärtigen Dienstes, 1871-1945 
(Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2008). 
536 “Jüdische Studenten aus Deutschland und die Kopenhagener Universität 153A,” May 29, 1933, PA, Kopenhagen 76. 
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In late 1933, Richthofen sent a second report to Berlin entitled The Jewish Question in 
Denmark. The report is a further indication of how the German diplomatic representatives in 
Denmark followed the issue from very early on. It contained the perception of a public meeting 
at which Danish and foreign Jews had been discussed. The meeting was held at the society of 
Socialvirke, a society that discussed current political and social issues. There were three main 
speakers: the Danish Social Democrat Dr. Albert Olsen, Dr. Davidson, and Arthur Henriques. Dr. 
Davidson was a communist and had withdrawn his membership of the Jewish congregation, 
which he accused of consisting of capitalists.  Arthur Henriques was a member of the board of 
the Jewish congregation. The meeting had in general recognized the Jewish contributions to 
Danish society and was uncontroversial. However, German surveillance of the meeting was used 
to identify enemies of the National Socialist cause. For example, Albert Olsen was described as 
a person who in writing and speeches had proved to be “an enemy of the new Germany”. The 
report also stated that there were around 6,500 Jews in Denmark. This was possibly the first 
numerical estimate of the number of Jews in Denmark reported from the German legation.537 
A few other reports on public meetings were passed on the following year. They showed 
political support for the Jews in Denmark, while Danish politicians argued that German anti-
Semitism was undemocratic and incompatible with Danish ideas.538 Only one reported attempt 
at boycotting German companies has been located. The Danish company Oskar Wagner had sent 
out a leaflet arguing for a boycott of German companies. The German Gesandtschaft identified 
Wagner as a Jewish communist by using local sources and passed on the details to the RfA.539  
We do not possess many details on these early registrations. The involvement of the RfA 
indicates the organization was registering Jews suggesting boycotts. The RfA would later 
dominate the area of registering foreign Jewish companies (see chapter two). 
In early 1936, the German Foreign Ministry sent out a general order to most legations and 
consulates to report on the development of the Jewish question. Evidently, Richthofen had on 
his own initiative recognized the importance of Judenpolitik in National Socialism and reported 
on the issue before it became a formal task.540 The order was tied to the dictatorship's view of 
the Jews as a worldwide threat. The intention was to gain a complete overview of the Judenfrage 
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in the world (Gesamtes Ausland). This type of reports was to include information on the 
following issues: anti-Jewish laws similar to the ones in Germany, and Jewish attempts to 
counter Germany. The recipients of these reports were Rudolf Hess, at that point deputy 
(Stellvertreter) for Hitler, Goebbels’ propaganda ministry, the Gestapo, and Heinrich Himmler.541 
This underscores the growing importance placed on Judenpolitik in various areas of German 
foreign policy. 
 Judenpolitik as a policy area was expanding and the view of Jews as a political problem was 
increasing. This was expressed in the continuous sensitivity and added incentive to monitor the 
issue in Denmark. Positive and negative statements regarding Jews in Denmark as well as the 
perception of the anti-Semitic policies in Germany were followed closely. In January 1936, 
Richthofen could report that prominent Danish theologians were very critical of a leaflet 
entitled: The Christian Church in the Nordic Perception.542 The anti-Semite Aage H. Andersen 
was the author of the leaflet. Andersen had been expelled from the Danish Nazi party because 
of his hostile attitude towards Jews (sic).543 Andersen had based his work on the well-known 
anti-Semitic work The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Richthofen noted that most Danish clergy 
were unsupportive of anti-Semitism. The denouncement made it to NSDAP’s newspaper 
Völkische Beobachter, which claimed that the Jewish question had been raised in Denmark.544 
(See section 6.2.1 for more on A. H. Andersen). 
Richthofen would in 1936 argue that the Danish public was becoming more sympathetic 
towards Germany’s anti-Jewish measures. According to Richthofen, the slight change of heart 
lay in Danish exposure to Jewish refugees who were described as “importunate and obtrusive”. 
Richthofen employed an underlying assumption in anti-Semitism in which meeting Jews would 
reveal their (assumed) basic negative characteristics. In turn, this would generate sympathy for 
Germany’s domestic policies, he argued. To substantiate his claim, he cited the regional 
newspaper of Frederiksborg Amtstidende. The paper’s small article focused on the 50-60 Jewish 
refugees living in the larger city of Hillerød who had neglected to report e.g. address changes 
causing extra bureaucratic work.545 Clearly, it is an exaggeration to interrelate the article to a 
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general change in the Danish attitude towards Jews. Nonetheless, Richthofen used it to present 
himself as an effective promoter of Judenpolitik in Denmark. 
In 1936, Cecil von Renthe-Fink replaced Richthofen as envoy which followed regular 
diplomatic protocol. It appears we are missing similar reports on the Jewish question from 
Renthe-Fink, but it seems unlikely he could have avoided reporting on the subject. As noted 
earlier, such reports were specifically requested and expected by the AA as well as being 
forwarded to high-ranking men and organizations. In addition, we should recall Renthe-Fink’s 
work in Aryanization, which showed his involvement in Judenpolitik. Our knowledge of the 
contents of these reports is thus highly fragmented. Yet, they show Denmark was part of the 
surveillance of Jewish refugees initiated by both the Gestapo (see chapter five) and the AA. We 
will now turn to how proof of race was used in Denmark in the prewar years. 
6.1.1 Hjalmar Schacht’s Aryan Certificate  
In the spring of 1937, the President of the German Reichsbank and Minister of Economics 
Hjalmar Schacht contacted the small, Danish parish of Tinglev. Schacht had been born in the 
parish by his Danish mother, and the priest was requested to issue proof that the prominent 
German minister was Aryan. According to the priest, he daily issued this type of documents to 
Germans with Danish family ties.546 Proof of being Aryan had become vital for Germans to avoid 
being targeted by the anti-Jewish laws and/or to become party members. According to the 
German consulate in the Danish town of Skive, with 10,000 inhabitants, the consulate had 
assisted in 1,000 cases by the autumn of 1937. This process had involved both Danish priests 
and archives in the northern part of Denmark.547 However, this was not a new task for Danish 
archives and parishes. As early as 1934, a newspaper article had shown how Danish archives 
were involved in providing certified proof of German citizen’s Danish ancestry.548 
The German race laws also influenced the marriage laws in Denmark. In October 1937, the 
Danish Ministry of Justice practically enforced the Nuremburg race laws in Denmark. The 
ministry issued a circular which made it illegal for foreigners and non-resident couples to get 
married in Denmark. If a marriage was illegal in another country it should be considered illegal 
in Denmark. The Ministry of Justice attempted to spin the public reception of the law by 
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providing two examples from British marriage laws. The British law stated that brother “A” could 
not marry brother “B”’s wife before brother “A” was deceased. Evidently, the circular did not 
aim at stopping a swarm of British siblings trying to marry their brothers’ wives, but instead to 
prohibit marriages between German Jews and non-Jews in Denmark. The circular even outlined 
the German racial laws and explained how to determine who was Jewish (!). This was done in 
order to instruct the Danish organizations who had legal power to wed couples.549 Probably, this 
would mostly have affected German citizens, but in this manner, Denmark maintained the 
Nuremburg race laws on marriages regarding foreigners and travelers. 
In 1938 Aryan proof also became an increasing issue for Danes. Thomas Hauch-Fausbøll was 
one of the Danish pioneers of genealogical research, and the Director of the Danish Genealogical 
Institute. In an interview in late 1938, he revealed that he spent most of his time at the archives 
“finding material for Aryan proofs for persons who want to be married or make business 
connections in Germany. The number of orders is enormous...”550  
These kinds of questions were also posed to the Danish Foreign Ministry. The Danish-Jewish 
company Arthur Wittrock contacted the ministry to obtain an Aryan proof, but over the phone 
the ministry denied issuing such documents. Wittrock claimed he was not Jewish and believed 
he could solve the problem himself.551 The brief letter exchange shows that the Danish Foreign 
Ministry drew a line at issuing official statements of race. However, in the spring of 1939, the 
question of Aryan certificates surfaced again. Danes who lived in countries with anti-Jewish laws 
such as Germany, Italy, and Hungary faced increasing demands to prove they were Aryan. The 
ministry denied it could issue such certificates but unofficially it referred to private genealogical 
companies.552 Thus, providing legal advice on how to adhere to the racial laws, which seems to 
have been most helpful for those who were considered Aryan. 
The various newspaper articles show that the German race laws had a border-crossing effect. 
It involved Danish authorities and archives, as well as being a smaller public issue. It increasingly 
became apparent that proof of being Aryan was a requirement in order to trade with Germany, 
and ads for genealogical research appeared in some newspapers.553 Parts of the Danish 
                                                     
549 “Arier-attest for tyskere, der vil vies i Danmark.,” Politiken, October 17, 1937, Politikens Online Arkiv. 
550 “Slægternes flittige forsker fylder 60,” Berlingske Aftenavis, December 29, 1938, Mediastream“...at finde stof til arierattester for personer, 
som vil giftes eller knytte forretningsforbindelser i Tyskland. Bestillingernes antal er enormt...” 
551 “Arthur Wittrock til Udenrigsministeriet.” 
552 “Jødespørgsmålet: Arierattester,” June 3, 1939, RA, UM 120.D.28. 
553 See e.g. “Reklame,” Nationaltidende, April 21, 1939, Mediastream; “Reklame,” Fædrelandet, February 7, 1940, Mediastream. 
 171 
administration became involved in supplying the needed documents to Germans who needed 
proof of their family lines. Combined with the arrival of refugees, the use of official Danish 
documents for proof of race is an example of how the exclusive policies of National Socialist 
Germany affected Denmark. 
Despite the lack of sources from the German legation on the issue of Jews in the prewar years, 
it seems safe to conclude that the issue was far from absent on the agenda. Taken together with 
the prewar Aryanization policies and registration of refugees we can conclude that Judenpolitik 
was a policy area which from 1933 became part of the legation’s work. We now turn to the 
occupation period to further examine the promotion of race and anti-Semitism. 
6.2 Promoting Anti-Semitism and Race  
This section deals with two areas of German Judenpolitik in Denmark: the attempts at 
promoting the anti-Semitic cause and to establish an official race office issuing proofs of race. 
The majority of the following sub-sections deal with anti-Semitic propaganda. Aage H. Andersen 
is central to these efforts which is why he will be our first center of attention.  
6.2.1 Anti-Semitic Propaganda 
Aage H. Andersen (1892-1968) has been called the most anti-Semitic person in Denmark, so 
much so that it cost him his first marriage.554 He was also excluded from the Danish Nazi Party 
(DNSAP) in 1935 due to his anti-Semitism. Instead, he formed his own Nazi party: National 
Socialistisk Arbejderparti (National Socialist Worker’s Party (NSAP)). Yet, in December 1941 the 
two parties merged. The 500-1,000 party members of NSAP were militarized, ritualized, and 
formed a small unit for active anti-Semitic raids called Storm Garden (the Storm Guard). The 
Party members and their spouses had to prove their Aryan descent. In 1935, The NSAP began 
publishing the anti-Semitic “classics”: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Henry Ford’s The 
International Jew, and the protestant reformer Martin Luther’s anti-Semitic book On the Jews 
and Their Lies from 1543.555 
Aage H. Andersen is known for issuing the anti-Semitic publication Kamptegnet, which was 
created in 1939, and formatted along the lines of the German Der Stürmer. Andersen was also 
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behind creating and chairing Dansk Anti-Jødisk Liga (Danish Anti-Jewish League) in 1941. The 
league was a sub-division of Anti-Jewish World league (Antijüdische Weltliga). Both of these 
were tied to the work of NSAP, and later DNSAP.556 Both Kamptegnet and Anti-Jewish league 
will be dealt with more extensively below, but first we should note that Andersen’s work in these 
organizations secured him a powerful ally in Paul Wurm. 
In 1940 Paul Wurm was head of the Anti-Jewish World League, and the international 
department of Der Stürmer. He ensured that foreign news stories that depicted Jews negatively 
were published in the paper. Because of this position, he became head of an international 
network of anti-Semites, who held annual meetings during the 1930s. Wurm’s Antijüdische 
Weltliga had 25 translators who monitored foreign news on Jews, and media companies 
perceived as being controlled by Jews. Wurm was considered part of the “old” generation of 
anti-Semites within the National Socialist movement, and he had powerful friends. He held 
meetings and exchanged letters with Franz Rademacher, and Wurm’s information resources on 
international Jewry connected him to Adolf Eichmann as well as the SD.557  
Aage H. Andersen’s Anti-Jewish League was to assist in promoting National Socialism’s racial 
ideas in Denmark, and it is recognized as an extreme organization. In addition to previous 
research, I would like to draw attention to surveillance reports from Danish police that have not 
been previously applied in the research of the league. The league held a series of public meetings 
during the occupation, and the police reports indicate these meetings drew larger crowds than 
formerly recognized.558 According to the reports, an average of roughly 270 people attended the 
eight surveilled meetings. In February 1942, the highest number of attendees was recorded as 
600 participated. The lowest number recorded was in January 1943 as only 90 people were 
present. However, the meeting in January was hampered by an air raid alarm. In comparison the 
meeting in February 1943 was attended by 150 people. The content of these meetings was highly 
anti-Semitic and similar to the most extreme propaganda claims known from Germany. This 
included rhetoric of being at war with the Jews, who had to be destroyed. Police also recorded 
the audience yelling “death to the Jews” on several occasions. There would often be praise for 
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the Danish volunteers in the Frikorps Danmark – the battalion of Danish volunteers in the 
Waffen-SS. Some meetings were also attended by Frikorps’ members and on occasion members 
of the German military or the Waffen-SS. The Danish government would be highly criticized, and 
prominent Danish-Jewish civil servants or business owners were mentioned by name. Aage H. 
Andersen spoke at all the surveilled meetings.559 
Anti-Semitic propaganda efforts became part of the German Judenpolitik in Denmark in the 
spring of 1941. Aage H. Andersen was facing charges from the Ministry of Justice in the summer 
of 1940 for publishing several anti-Semitic books and leaflets. This was the second time he was 
facing the courts. In 1938 he had been sentenced to 80 days in prison after losing a libel case to 
the Jewish congregation.560 In 1941 Andersen activated his German connection, Paul Wurm. 
Wurm involved himself in order to intervene on Aage H. Andersen’s behalf by reaching out to 
the AA for assistance. The letter reveals that Andersen had received legal assistance from 
Germany during his trial in 1938. This points to direct German involvement in promoting anti-
Semitism and legally assisting anti-Semites in Denmark even before the occupation. Towards the 
AA, Wurm argued that the German occupation of Denmark should improve the possibilities of 
providing legal assistance to Aage H. Andersen. Wurm stressed that Danish Jews should not be 
permitted to legally challenge Andersen’s publications or to frame him negatively.561  Renthe-
Fink had to explain that Andersen had violated Danish press law and stood accused of attacking 
the Danish government in his writings. Despite these concerns Renthe-Fink secured Andersen’s 
stock of anti-Semitic literature from being confiscated.562 It seems that the German assistance 
in this matter was limited to ensuing that Andersen would not suffer material losses. 
Nine months later, Renthe-Fink suggested subsidizing and promoting Aage H. Andersen’s 
anti-Semitic paper Kamptegnet. Renthe-Fink estimated that Andersen had made an 
“outstanding” contribution to the promotion of anti-Semitic literature in Denmark. There were 
“keine Bedenken” (no concerns) in reinvigorating Kamptegnet by providing it with heavy 
subsidies. Instead, it was to be welcomed as a way of re-introducing anti-Semitic propaganda in 
Denmark as the paper had “through its treatment of the Jewish question in Denmark had a good 
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influence”.563 Andersen and his paper were to be paid 3,000 DKK (67,957 DKK/2017) a month, a 
considerable sum. Renthe-Fink recommended purchasing all of Andersen’s anti-Semitic 
literature, which was illegal to distribute, at a price of 15,000 DKK (339,787 DKK/2017). Renthe-
Fink viewed the literature as a propaganda source for National Socialism and would make it 
available to Danes free of charge. Gustav Meissner travelled to Germany to discuss the matter 
further, and the initiative was approved.564 
The case of Andersen highlights the various border-crossing connections between advocates 
and supporters of Judenpolitik. Andersen’s activation of his international anti-Semitic associates 
thus triggered interference in his court case. The case ran its course, but Andersen’s material 
losses were minimized, as his illegal literature was not confiscated. Instead, his publications 
became available for potential illegal distribution. Renthe-Fink evidently went on the offensive 
with a local initiative to re-open Kamptegnet, support Aage H. Andersen financially, and make 
Danish anti-Semitic literature available for free. Renthe-Fink thereby initiated propaganda 
measures which promoted anti-Semitism and were to legitimize Judenpolitik. He framed his 
initiative positively by pointing to the benefits of reintroducing anti-Semitic propaganda in the 
Danish sphere. The German legation had consciously decided to challenge Danish law by 
becoming distributers of anti-Semitic publications. 
The weekly Kamptegnet has seen its fair share of historiographic attention and recently it was 
comprehensively researched.565 The Stürmer like lay-out and content was highly anti-Semitic. 
The articles were often hateful and vulgar as crimes related to sexual violations or violence were 
preferred. The articles often relied on informants or readers who sympathized with Nazism or 
wanted to inflict reputational damage on e.g. family members or business owners. Often the 
information was validated by the genealogical business Personal Historisk Institut that also 
issued proof of race. Pictures came from German bureaus, while Aage H. Andersen supplied local 
pictures of Jewish stores or residences. The anti-Semitic caricatures of the Stürmer were 
reprinted in the paper, in addition to Danish produced ones, and it would seem the connection 
to Wurm secured German propaganda material.566 Kamptegnet was frowned upon. It 
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experienced several letters and counter articles against it in other papers and magazines. It 
remained a minor weekly with estimated sales of 2,000 per issue, but it was probably read by 
more due to its tabloid character.567 
We know little of the consequences of Kamptegnet’s propaganda, but court-case material 
from the postwar trial against Paul Hennig do provide new insights. The more than 100 articles 
authored by Paul Hennig were individually researched by Danish police. The police managed to 
interview at least 139 people who had their names published in Hennig’s articles. The police 
aimed at disclosing the possible consequences of these articles. Some of the interviewees 
claimed to be unaware of the articles, and the police would read it aloud on the phone. In most 
of these cases, the person stated that the article had not been damaging for them. It is of course 
unknown if they later remembered incidents during the war. A segment of the interviewees 
claimed not to be Jewish and felt unharmed by the articles. Others would state the article had 
not been damaging but were discomforted at being publicized. Nine people were not interested 
in pressing charges if Hennig had been sentenced for other transgressions during the war. This 
seems to indicate the articles had been harmful, but in this manner, it was avoided to revisit the 
issue.568 One case should suffice to illustrate the difficulty in evaluating whether the 
interviewees experienced discomfort after being publicly labelled as Jews. A Jewish owner of a 
small patisserie stated the he was not bothered by the article about him. However, after the 
publication he had experienced the words ”Jew” etc. being painted on the sidewalk of his private 
villa.569 This suggests that the consequence of the article was that he fell victim to anti-Semitism. 
For some, the anti-Semitism sponsored by the German legation had more apparent 
consequences. Although it remains difficult to directly relate anti-Semitic incidents to the articles 
in Kamptegnet, 31 persons indicated that this was in fact the case. In an article from December 
1941, the Jewish singer Raquel Rastenni had been labelled as Jewish. Questioned after the war, 
she argued she had lost jobs because of the article, including the cancellation of her usual 
summer job at Marienlyst with the Kaj Evans’ orchestra. This cancellation was “caused by 
Marienlyst wanting to avoid trouble as it had been publicized she was Jewish”.570 One family in 
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Copenhagen had, after an article in Kamptegnet in late 1941, experienced posters being put up 
on their restaurant bearing the word “Jew”. On their private villa’s fence, posters were put up 
reading “Jew Villa”, and a window had been smashed. A star on the house that looked like the 
Star of David had been removed by the owners “to not provoke the young Nazis”. The wife, who 
was not Jewish, was arrested in October 1943, but was able to secure a release after two hours, 
as she could prove she was not Jewish.571 Incorrect information could also be damaging. An audit 
company was wrongfully labelled as Jewish, and despite a complaint to Kamptegnet, who 
corrected the article, the company lost customers. The article had been anonymously circulated 
among the company’s clients, and used by agents of other companies to convince them to 
change their audit company. The company ended up losing many contracts in the fishing 
industry, which exported heavily to Germany.572 
During the occupation Kamptegnet caused continuous concerns at the highest levels of the 
Danish government. The following will show that Kamptegnet’s editors were prosecuted with 
the acceptance of Berlin, while illustrating the extreme caution the Danish government 
exercised in this matter. In December 1941 the government had a renewed discussion regarding 
a possible police action against Kamptegnet. However, the fear of raising “the complete Jewish 
question…which was to be avoided as long as possible” caused concern.573 The anti-Semitic 
campaign distressed the Danish government and while being somewhat passive the preliminary 
legal proceedings were set in motion in January 1942.574 Kamptegnet was also discussed in 
several cabinet meetings in February 1942. The Minister of Justice, Thune Jacobsen, believed it 
might be possible to use the laws against pornography to incriminate Kamptegnet. However, the 
government wanted Kanstein to approve this step before pursuing the issue further.575 It is 
unclear if Kanstein was consulted, but Weizsäcker was. 
Gunnar Larsen visited Berlin in March and he took the issue to Weizsäcker.576 Larsen 
discussed both the Jewish question on a general level and Kamptegnet with Weizsäcker. Larsen 
had gotten the impression that the Jewish question would not be raised in Denmark if the Danes 
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behaved wisely. However, and without providing details, Weizsäcker’s remarks on this area were 
“not absolutely positive”.577 The Danes had been warned and provided with a rather negative 
outlook for the future regarding the Jews. On the specific issue of Kamptegnet, Larsen stressed 
to Weizsäcker that the Danes acknowledged that the anti-Semitic nature of Kamptegnet was 
tied to the German policy. However, the government was concerned, as the paper had turned 
in a pornographic direction. The Danish envoy, Mohr, raised the same concerns two weeks later. 
Weizsäcker argued that it was up to the Danes to deal with pornography issues.578 The Danes 
had thus cautiously secured support for a legal action against Kamptegnet. Evidently, the Danes 
very hesitantly challenged an obvious and vulgar proponent of anti-Semitism. A concerned 
Weizsäcker contacted Renthe-Fink, who managed to dampen the paper’s writings somewhat.579 
There seems to have been a slight discrepancy between Berlin and the legation in this matter. 
The legal action which followed against Kamptegnet is often used to underscore Danish 
independence in judicial matters. However, it seems the Danish government only pursued the 
weekly after receiving approval from Berlin. 
6.2.2 Jud-Süss 
Earlier in 1941, Renthe-Fink had succeeded in getting the well-known anti-Semitic German 
movie Jud-Süss shown in Danish movie theaters. The movie combines Christian anti-Semitic 
sentiments and National Socialist race propaganda. At the dramatic peak of the film, the Jewish 
character Süss rapes a young, obviously Aryan woman who drowns herself in shame, while Süss 
is expelled from the city. This had caused German audiences to yell out in the theatres, 
demanding banishment of the Jews.580 Renthe-Fink had initial difficulties in persuading Danish 
theater owners to show the film as they feared boycotts. Renthe-Fink reported that negotiations 
were planned, while mentioning the possibility of the movie opening in early 1941, slightly more 
than four months after it had launched in Germany.581 We lack the sources to shed light on how 
Renthe-Fink convinced Danish theaters to show the film. Yet, they did and their initial fears 
proved unwarranted. Recent research considers the movie a European success, as it sold 20 
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million tickets. In Denmark, it was one of the most successful German movies shown during the 
occupation, as it played in theaters in the Copenhagen area for several months. According to 
Danish film historian Lars Martin-Sørensen, the appeal to the Danish audience was not its anti-
Semitic content, but rather that the movie contains the usual elements of a blockbuster 
drama.582 The reviews were mixed. The bourgeois paper Berlingske-Tidende saw the character 
Süss as a contaminator of society, describing him as a plague, while the Aryans in the movie were 
labelled as protectors against such dangers. The reviewer, Svend Borberg, clearly accepted the 
propagandistic intentions in the movie. The leftist paper Social-Demokraten, on the other hand, 
labelled the movie as very biased.583 
We are unable to trace the actual effects of the movie on Danish audiences, but it is still 
considered a central propaganda piece of National Socialism, just like its much less successful 
predecessor Der ewige Jude, which was a more blatant piece of anti-Semitic propaganda. Both 
movies were shown prior to deportation campaigns in the Netherlands and France, but they 
were also used for morale boosts and shown to SS personnel in concentration camps and at the 
front lines. In Denmark, Der ewige Jude did not reach theatres, yet it was shown at meetings of 
the Danish Anti-Jewish League. This was also the case for the movie Jud Süss, which became an 
integral part of the education at the sergeant level (Unteroffiziere) for the Schalburgkorpset.584 
The German legation and Renthe-Fink had clearly played a decisive part in promoting anti-
Semitism and secured a key propaganda piece was shown in Denmark. The propagandistic 
movies continued to be used and to be shown in private settings, which only underscores their 
position as important anti-Semitic propaganda pieces. 
6.2.3 Promoting Race 
Proof of race was brought on the official agenda in the spring of 1941 by the Danish Nazi party 
(DNSAP). The party wanted to issue Aryan certificates, which would be legally acknowledged in 
Germany. The Danish office was to be called Rassepolitischen Zentralbüro. Paul Hennig, 
genealogist, and party member headed it, in cooperation with Aage H. Andersen. As mentioned 
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earlier (see chapter five and above) they were central personalities in race matters in Denmark 
and tied to several German organizations including the legation. 
The leader of DNSAP, Frits Clausen, had successfully convinced Renthe-Fink to secure Berlin’s 
approval for a Danish office to issue Aryan certificates. Renthe-Fink believed it would be 
beneficial to achieve a formal approval of the office’s certificates as he labelled other issuers of 
proof of race as unofficial profiteers. An official office would probably remove the competition 
in this curious industry, and Renthe-Fink would have secured a monopoly for the DNSAP.585 Less 
than a month later the initiative was approved and the SS Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt 
(RuSHA) would in the future recognize Aryan certificates issued by the office in Denmark. Paul 
Hennig was to make an observation tour to Germany to learn the trade. The RuSHA looked 
forward to Hennig’s visit and would provide further assistance to the office in Copenhagen if 
needed. It turned out Dr. Charles Hindborg, also a member of DNSAP, headed the Amt für 
Rassenforschung, which also issued Aryan certificates.586 In the end, the new office was called 
Head office for Racial Policies and led by Aage H. Andersen.587 
The Head office for Racial Policies, operating under the name Arier og 
Slægtsforskningskontoret (Aryan and Genealogical Research Office), began investigations on its 
own. A complaint from the company E. Geday to the Danish police revealed that the office had 
called one of E. Geday’s business connections, Københavns Tæppelager (Copenhagen Carpet 
Storage) in order to ask if E. Geday had an Aryan certificate. The caller had identified herself as 
a member of the Danish police, and this was probably to the gravest concern for the police. The 
police visited the premises of Arier og Slægtsforskningskontoret, which was on the same floor 
as Kamptegnet and Dansk Antijødisk Liga. This tied all three offices to Aage H. Andersen. The 
police got the impression that the business provided Aryan certificates and did genealogical 
research, but also that it apparently used drastic methods to obtain racial information.588 This 
proves the previous indications that Andersen was systematically collecting information on the 
Jews and kept registries of his findings.589 
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Renthe-Fink had supported the wishes of the Danish Nazi Party and this had resulted in a 
Danish office which could issue official Aryan certificates. Berlin had accepted the proposition 
and made their expertise on the issue available. This is to be considered a vital step in the 
promotion of race in Denmark as a formal organization could officially determine the race of 
Danes. Despite its voluntary nature it formally introduced the use of Nazism’s racial definitions 
in a country without racial laws defining Jews. It remains unknown how many Danes applied for 
official proof of being Aryan. Most likely, those who needed such proof had already obtained it 
in some form in the 1930s. It is undisclosed how the Danish government reacted to the creation 
of this office. 
6.2.4 Jews Excluded from Being in Parts of Denmark. 
In October 1940, Reinhard Heydrich ordered the security police to register and interrogate 
German emigrants in occupied countries. The goal was to relocate persons who were wanted by 
the German police or viewed as enemies of Das Reich. The order included a section on the Jews, 
who were to be interned in camps near large traffic hubs such as ports or main railway lines. The 
geographic range of the order was Northern and Western Europe, but Denmark was not 
included.  Kanstein was informed of Heydrich’s order, and at the same time the Oberkommando 
des Heeres demanded security areas (Sicherungsgebiete). These had to be cleared of Jews, 
political refugees from Germany, and Gypsies who were all considered enemies of Germany. 
This order was applicable to Denmark in the area of Northern and Western Jutland. The German 
military e.g. requested a list of Jews in the town of Varde, but Danish police claimed they were 
unable to answer.590 In November 1940, the Germans successfully demanded that a group of 
German Jews were removed from the area of Thy in Northern Jutland.591 The Judenpolitik was 
thus formally and geographically enforced in Denmark, and there was a specific area of Denmark 
that Jews could not visit or live in. 
6.3 German Pressure for Anti-Jewish Laws and the Signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact 
In September 1940 King Christian X would enter into a discussion with Prime Minister 
Thorvald Stauning on the possible German demand to deport Jews in Denmark. The King would 
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deny any such demands and the Prime Minister expressed the same views. Hjalmar Schacht was 
paraphrased during the discussion as having stated there was not a Jewish problem in Denmark. 
It is unclear what sparked this exchange of views.592 A strong pressure for anti-Jewish laws would 
soon stress test this position.  
A forceful pressure for anti-Jewish laws began in the last two months of 1941 and January 
1942. These months would become dramatic, and this was related to the signing of the Anti-
Comintern pact in November 1941. There would be high tensions in the Danish-German 
relationship and a crisis within the Danish Government.  In order to examine these events 
further, a few contextual passages are needed on the signing of the Anti-Comintern pact and the 
Wannsee Conference. As both events appear to have had an enforcing effect on the 
development of Judenpolitik in Denmark. I will then move to the German correspondence 
between Copenhagen and Berlin related to the Judenpolitik in Denmark in early January 1942. 
This will set the scene for the examination of the German pressure for anti-Jewish laws in 
Denmark as well as the reactions and discussions within the Danish government. Let us now turn 
to the contextual part of this section.  
Denmark, along with allies and satellites of the Third Reich, signed the renewal of the Anti-
Comintern pact on the 25th of November 1941.593 The pact was originally formed in 1936 
between Germany and Japan against Soviet Russia. It was mostly perceived as a show-case to 
promote the collaboration of the two countries. It was expanded when Italy and Spain became 
co-signatories in 1938 and 1939 respectively. The renewal of the pact in 1941 was not only used 
for propaganda purposes, but also to formally tie other nations closer to Germany. Denmark’s 
government would hesitate in signing the pact, recognizing its legitimizing value for Germany, 
while also acknowledging that Denmark would be perceived as tightening its association with 
Germany. Yet, the German demand for a Danish signature proved non-negotiable. Renthe-Fink 
threatened to terminate the cooperation agreement between Germany and Denmark from 
1940. The German pressure was intensified as the German troops in Denmark went into a state 
of alert. This happened two days before the signing was to take place in Berlin. After a series of 
discussions in the cabinet the Danish Foreign Minister left for Berlin. In Berlin, demands were 
sharpened upon his arrival. In the end, Denmark secured a small diplomatic victory. It was 
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confirmed that Denmark was not be obliged to initiate new policies after signing the pact. The 
signing sparked rumors and demonstrations in Copenhagen against the Danish-German 
cooperation.594  
On the 20th of January 1942, the Wannsee Conference took place.595 The Wannsee 
Conference is generally considered as a coordinating meeting between SS officers, state 
secretaries and senior civil servants who were to organize the further persecution and genocide 
of the European Jews.596 It was supposed to have taken place on the 9th of December, but the 
Japanese attacked the USA on the 7th, and Germany declared war against the USA on the 11th. 
Due to these events the conference was rescheduled to the 20th of January 1942. 
The subject heading for the postponed meeting was changed to “issues related to the final 
solution of the Jewish question.”597 The participants would discuss how to proceed against the 
Jews in most European areas. As one of the only regions the Nordic countries were to be 
exempted from a “tiefgehender Behandlung” (an extensive treatment), probably meaning 
deportation and murder, as this would cause difficulties. As a consequence, Luther suggested 
the less than 20,000 Jews in the Nordic countries were to initially be spared. This was accepted 
due to the low number of Jews in Denmark and Norway.598 
If we remain in the period surrounding the Wannsee conference two notes from Rademacher 
and Luther are revealing of AA’s perception of Denmark in regards to European Judenpolitik. 
Prior to Wannsee’s scheduled meeting on the 9th of December, Rademacher outlined the AA’s 
“ideas and wishes” on the matter in eight points. They all concerned the development of the 
Jewish question in various states and as the points progressed, the measures suggested became 
less radical. The first four points regarded deportation measures especially in the German Reich. 
Points five to six were focused on introducing anti-Jewish laws in e.g. Rumania and Bulgaria. 
Denmark was affected by point seven “Influence the remaining governments of Europe to 
introduce anti-Jewish laws”. Point eight stressed AA’s wish for a continued positive cooperation 
with the Gestapo.599 
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Close to New-Year’s Eve 1941, and after the postponement of the Wannsee conference, 
Luther reflected on the issue. Under the impression of an Entschluss des Führers (a decision by 
Hitler) that all Jews were to be removed from Europe before the end of the war, he suggested 
that all signatories of the Anti-Comintern Pact, if possible, should be moved to adopt some form 
of anti-Jewish laws. He presumed difficulties would arise in signatory countries Italy and Spain 
due to clerical obstruction, but also in Hungary. Interestingly, he included non-signatories 
Sweden and Switzerland labeling those countries as potentially difficult to move in that 
direction. He evidently did not expect problems to arise in countries like Rumania, Bulgaria, 
Finland or Denmark. This suggests that the AA was satisfied with the current progress on the 
matter in these countries.600 It is important to note that Luther’s ideas and thoughts serve as an 
important pretext for the discussions on these matters in Denmark. 
Following the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact rumors of Anti-Jewish laws in Denmark 
initiated an internal German correspondence between Copenhagen and Berlin. This is 
enlightening in understanding both German reactions as well as the development of Judenpolitik 
in Denmark. Ribbentrop wanted to know who had started the discussion of the Jewish question 
in Denmark.601 Martin Luther explained how the German legation had not been instructed to 
initiate the Jewish question in Denmark. However, Rademacher had “orally” instructed Renthe-
Fink to raise the question when the opportunity presented itself. Renthe-Fink was to refer to the 
fact that:  
 
“…according to the words of the Führer the Jewish question in Europe would be 
finally solved and it would be wise if Denmark duly would adjust itself 
accordingly.”602  
  
Renthe-Fink was also to argue that solving the Jewish question would be “technically easier” 
if Denmark would introduce German-type laws against the Jews. In addition, Werner von 
Grundherr had also instructed Renthe-Fink to do so. Ribbentrop’s order was to “Nicht insisteren” 
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- do not insist, since it might work to opposite effect in the Danish government.603 In this manner 
it seems to be Ribbentrop who had lightened the pressure for anti-Jewish laws in Denmark. 
It would seem that the German Judenpolitik in Denmark between the period from November 
1941 and January 1942 was to apply a diplomatic and political pressure in order to achieve the 
adoption of some form of anti-Jewish laws in Denmark. If Denmark did not comply, the 
consequences seem to be minimal as Ribbentrop had ordered his diplomats not to insist on such 
laws. In this light, any gains made in regards to Judenpolitik in Denmark would probably be 
regarded as a success. 
6.3.1 The Policy of Exclusion 
Letters from Renthe-Fink in early January 1942 shows he had attempted to follow the orders 
from the leading cadres of the AA. They also shed light on the progress of general anti-Jewish 
policies being applied in Denmark. The German Reichsbevollmächtigten had continuously and 
forcefully stressed this stance in earlier meetings with Scavenius.604 Unfortunately, we lack the 
minutes of these talks, but according to Renthe-Fink he had pointed out that: 
 
“It would be wise if Denmark in due time would attune itself to the fact that a 
European-wide regulation of the Jewish question would be introduced at the latest 
by the end of the war”.605 
 
At the same time Renthe-Fink confirmed the official, yet subversive, racially motivated anti-
Jewish policy in Denmark:  
 
“…we will continue our former policy. Our previous practice, whenever an 
opportunity presents itself to push back the influence of the Jews, or rather to 
completely eliminate the Jewish influence, will be continued. Also, we shall continue 
to work towards a greater understanding of the Jewish question here.”606 
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Judenfrage erfolgt.” 
606 “23. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt”“die bisherige Linie weiterverfolgen. Unsere bisherige Praxis, den Einfluss der Juden, wo 
immer sich eine Gelegenheit dazu bietet, zurückzudrängen bezw. die Juden ganz zu eliminieren, wird fortgesetzt. Ebenso wird weiter darauf 
hingewirkt werden, hier größeres Verständnis für die Judenfrage zu wecken.” 
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This is the clearest expression of the presence of an active German Judenpolitik in Denmark. 
To some extent it builds on the reasons behind the Aryanization policies. These served a twofold 
purpose of 1) carrying out the Entjudung of the German foreign trade, and 2) were an important 
component of the overall Judenpolitik in Denmark. At the same time the statement underscores 
the fact that subsidizing Kamptegnet and promoting Jud-Süss were both part of a continuous 
effort to create Anti-Semitic awareness. In a sense the statement also concluded that the 
pressure on the Danish Government to adopt anti-Jewish laws had been unsuccessful, but that 
other informal gains had been made.  As we step back into events in November and December 
1941 it will become evident that the Danish rejection was by no means an outcome set in stone. 
On the contrary, the Danish government’s rejections of formal laws opened up for informal 
discrimination. 
6.3.2 Renthe-Fink Proposes Anti-Jewish Laws 
At several meetings in December 1941 and January 1942, Renthe-Fink strove to influence 
specific members of the Danish government and its administration to adopt anti-Jewish laws. 
The discussions underscore that Renthe-Fink followed his instructions from Berlin, and despite 
being unsuccessful in his endeavor to persuade the Danish government to adopt formal anti-
Jewish laws, he made other gains in this area. The Danish reactions to the German pressure are 
also reflected in these discussions. I will first account for the content of the meetings and then 
analyze them. 
Franz Rademacher visited Denmark on the 11th of December, just a few days after the original 
date for the Wannsee Conference. Rademacher’s visit to Denmark was thus completed under 
the impression that most Jews in Europe faced deportation and death in some horrible form. 
Rademacher stayed in Copenhagen for six days, and it is highly likely that he held meetings with 
Renthe-Fink, but we do not know for certain. Yet, Rademacher was a high-ranking official in the 
AA and had continuously corresponded with Renthe-Fink on the issue. Following Luther’s ideas 
for the Wannsee Conference, Denmark was to be pushed to adopt laws against the Jews. Only 
the day after Rademacher’s departure, Renthe-Fink began following through on these new 
orders. 
Renthe-Fink applied pressure on Knud Sthyr, a senior civil servant in the Foreign Ministry, at 
an informal meeting. The minutes is an unused source in Danish history. They reveal how 
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Renthe-Fink was aligned with the wishes of the AA and did not have second thoughts in 
attempting to raise the Jewish question in Denmark. According to the minutes, he demanded 
that laws against the Jews were to be introduced in Denmark by stating: 
 
“It was even more necessary now, as Göring had said plain and clear to Scavenius 
that Denmark also had to assist in solving this National Socialist ideological 
question”.607 
 
Renthe-Fink went on to declare that Denmark needed some form of laws against the Jews. 
The Danes disagreed. The issue could not be compared to Germany, they said, stating that: 
“There is not a Jewish question in Denmark”. They also warned Renthe-Fink that the Danish 
government would resign if Jewish liberties were diminished. While this was a noble argument, 
it stood in contrast to the arrests of the communists by Danish police in the summer of 1941608 
and the Aryanization attempts. Moreover, the Danes argued that “The influence of the Jews in 
this country has been strongly diminished, and at the moment they were remaining very 
quiet.”609 Renthe-Fink accepted these arguments. However, he countered them by suggesting 
the following administrative actions: 
 
A. The government should not hire or promote Jews in the civil service, and 
it should influence larger Danish companies to avoid promoting Jews to 
the leadership 
B. The government should prevent Jews from appearing on Danish Radio 
C. The government should make sure that all Jewish elements were removed 
from the Danish press.610 
 
In combination with the Aryanization policies these three suggestions were Renthe-Fink’s 
goals in the area of Judenpolitik, and he would work to achieve them for the duration of his 
period in Denmark. 
                                                     
607 “Referat af møde mellem Cecil von Renthe-Fink, H.H. (Hugo Hergel?) og Knud Sthyr.,” December 18, 1941, RA, UM 120.d28a"Det var så 
meget mere nødvendigt, som Göring jo klart og tydeligt til Scavenius havde sagt, at dette nationalsocialistiske ideologiske spørgsmål måtte 
Danmark også være med til at løse.” Göring had stated this to Scavenius during a meeting in Berlin, which was held during the signing of the 
Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941. I will account for this meeting in the sections below. 
608 Christensen et al., Danmark besat: krig og hverdag 1940-45, 252–55. 
609 “Referat af møde mellem Cecil von Renthe-Fink, H.H. (Hugo Hergel?) og Knud Sthyr.” “Jødernes indflydelse her i landet var gået stærkt 
tilbage, i øjeblikket holder de sig så stærkt i ro.” 
610 Ibid. 
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Renthe-Fink’s suggestions to not promote Jews and remove them from the radio seemed 
practically feasible to Sthyr who would take the matter to the government. However, it was 
impossible to accept an official agreement, because “the Danish government would rightly fear 
that an agreement between Denmark and Germany of some side-branch of the Jewish question, 
would sooner or later give rise to Germany demanding further questions solved.”611 Renthe-Fink 
had mentioned that the newspapers Politiken and Berlingske Tidende were considered 
controlled or influenced by Jews. Politiken had Jewish stock-owners and Berlingske had C.B. 
Henriques as a board-member. The Danes stressed that they could not remove stock ownership 
and argued that Henriques’ presence was not a valid argument for categorizing Berlingske 
Tidende as influenced by Jews. Instead, they focused on the (racial) fact that it was primarily 
owned by an Aryan family. Moreover, they argued it would be very difficult for the Danish 
government to remove Henriques.612 
Renthe-Fink was questioned on his motives.  Had he been instructed to promote questions 
on the Jews in Denmark? He denied this despite his instructions from Rademacher and Werner 
von Grundherr. Therefore, his suggestions below have to be viewed as very tactical as he on the 
one hand promoted anti-Jewish initiatives while on the other hand used his superiors in Berlin 
as a threat towards the Danish government. His denial of his instructions shows a Renthe-Fink 
who wanted to present himself as ready to promote strong anti-Jewish measures in Denmark. 
Postwar Renthe-Fink would argue that he wanted to lie low in this policy area and not promote 
Jewish laws in Denmark.613 However, Renthe-Fink’s answer was: 
 
“He denied it but declared that after the statements that periodically had been made 
in Germany, and after the Jewish question’s development in the occupied countries, 
he had to assume that he sooner or later would be instructed [to act].”614 
 
                                                     
611 Ibid. “...den danske regering med rette ville være bange for, at en aftale om en eller anden sidegren af jødespørgsmålet mellem Danmark og 
Tyskland ville føre til, at man fra tysk side før eller senere forlangte yderligere spørgsmål løst.” 
612 Ibid. 
613 see e.g. Yahil, Et Demokrati på prøve, 76. 
614 Referat af møde mellem Cecil von Renthe-Fink, H.H. (Hugo Hergel?) og Knud Sthyr.” ”Dette benægtede han, men erklærede af efter de 
udtalelser, der faldet periodevis i Tyskland, og efter jødespørgsmålets udvikling i de besatte lande, måtte han gå ud fra, at han før eller senere 
fik instrukser.” 
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The Danish tactic was to underline that anti-Jewish initiatives would be contrary to the wishes 
of the German government who valued quiet and order in Denmark. Renthe-Fink would breach 
the overall German policy by moving against the Jews, the Danes argued.615  
The discussion seemingly continued in early January 1942 in a second meeting between 
Renthe-Fink and Sthyr. Renthe-Fink found it difficult to accept the rejection of an official 
agreement to prevent the promotion of Jewish civil servants. The Danish answer remained the 
same. The Danish government feared it would be met with new demands once it had accepted 
the first ones. However, the government would possibly be able to “de facto” stop promoting 
Jews.616 
In the period between the two meetings with Sthyr, Renthe-Fink had also attempted to raise 
the issue with Gunnar Larsen on the 23rd of December 1941. According to Larsen, Renthe-Fink 
came across as cautious, but he basically proposed the same initiatives to be taken against the 
Jews as he did in his meetings with Sthyr. Renthe-Fink probed Gunnar Larsen’s attitude towards 
introducing Jewish laws, but Larsen agreed with his colleagues: demands for anti-Jewish laws 
would cause the resignation of the Danish government. Renthe-Fink replied with the view that 
“one could never know when the case would be raised by Berlin”. Larsen suggested that one 
should make sure Berlin would not raise the issue. Renthe-Fink tactically proceeded by stating 
that he would have to prevent the issue from being raised in Berlin, but the Danish government 
had to play a part in securing this outcome. Renthe-Fink repeated the government had to 
discontinue hiring or promoting Jews in the civil service and prevent Jews from appearing on 
Danish Radio. This was identical to Renthe-Fink’s suggestions to Sthyr.617 
Renthe-Fink then used Berlin and the Danish anti-Semites to pressure Gunnar Larsen. Renthe-
Fink claimed Berlin was well-informed on these issues from the legation and the anti-Semite 
Aage H. Andersen. The proponents of anti-Semitism would inform party organizations, which in 
turn would ask the AA for reports on the subject. Renthe-Fink emphasized that a substantial case 
on the Jewish question in Denmark was being assembled in Berlin.  
Renthe-Fink went on to suggest that the Danish Jews would welcome a formal understanding 
on the matter. In Larsen’s words it went as follows:  
                                                     
615 Ibid. 
616 Ibid. 
617 “Referat af møde mellem Gunnar Larsen og Cecil von Renthe-Fink,” December 23, 1941, RA, UM 120.d.28a 1946-1972; Also printed in 
Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1:515–16. 
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“…the Danish Jews, whom he [Renthe-Fink] recognized were not aggressive or 
excessively represented, except in university circles, themselves should have an 
interest in a Danish-formulated simple understanding of the matter; hereafter one 
could argue to Berlin that the case had now been brought to order and thus avoid 
Berlin demanding the case being raised, which would have more dangerous 
consequences for the Jews at a later point in time.” 618 
 
Gunnar Larsen dismissed Renthe-Fink’s arguments, because the suggestion of a formal 
resolution was considered political and would probably cause the present government to step 
down. 
 In conclusion, Renthe-Fink argued that the Danish government could avoid provoking the 
question by not promoting Jews in the civil service and to prevent them from speaking on the 
radio. Gunnar Larsen agreed to work for avoiding “provocations”. At the following cabinet 
meeting, Larsen said he had rejected Renthe-Fink’s proposal. Scavenius revealed that Renthe-
Fink had approached him on the same issue as well, but he too had rejected Renthe-Fink’s 
demands.619 Renthe-Fink had clearly pressured several persons of the Danish government and 
administration in an attempt to make them accept anti-Jewish measures.  
Cecil von Renthe-Fink had thus followed orders and attempted to expand the Judenpolitik in 
Denmark by applying a political pressure on members of the Danish government. The Danish 
rejection was followed up by Renthe-Fink in a well-structured counterproposal to institute 
informal measures against the Danish Jews (the proposals labelled A, B and C above). Renthe-
Fink might have suspected a Danish refusal of a formal agreement, as he seems to have a specific 
“Plan B” drawn up. The Danish members of the administration and government negated formal 
laws but accepted Germany’s wish to see progress in the area of Judenpolitik. The refusal to 
acknowledge that a Jewish problem existed in Denmark was an attempt to undermine the 
premise of Judenpolitik. If a problem does not exist, it cannot be addressed. Semantically, this is 
a very creative challenge to the fundamental and negative views of Jews. However, the Danes 
                                                     
618 “Referat af møde mellem Gunnar Larsen og Cecil von Renthe-Fink”“…de danske jøder, som han erkendte ikke var aggressive og ikke var 
overmægtigt repræsenteret, undtagen lige i universitetskredse, selv måtte have en interesse i, at man fra dansk side indførte en eller anden 
simpel ordning, hvorefter man overfor Berlin kunne erklære, at sagen nu var i orden og derved undgå, at man fra Berlin krævede sagen taget 
op med langt farligere konsekvenser for jøderne selv på et senere tidspunkt….” 
619 “Ministermøde,” January 6, 1942, RA, Ministermøder 29.1.1940 - 28.8.1943; Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar 
Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:9. 
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somewhat undermined this position by arguing that Jewish influence in Denmark had 
diminished. This was obviously an attempt to tone down the importance of Danish Jews in order 
to avoid discriminatory measures. The Danish acceptance of the de facto implementation of at 
least suggestion A + B shows that the Danish government representatives were ready to accept 
informal initiatives against specific groups of Jews. It remains unclear if Renthe-Fink succeeded 
in removing Jewish stock owners from Politiken. However, C.B. Henriques was removed from 
Berlingske Tidende, but the exact date is unknown.620 
Renthe-Fink deployed different legitimization strategies in his meetings with Sthyr and 
Gunnar Larsen. In the first discussion, he used Göring’s words to substantiate his claim, while 
also stressing an expectation that the Jewish question would be raised in Denmark. Interestingly, 
the Danes used Berlin as a counter argument, claiming that Renthe-Fink was going directly 
against the dictatorship’s policy of political stability in Denmark. The Danes expected that a 
formal German demand for anti-Jewish legislation would result in the withdrawal of the Danish 
government, and several of Renthe-Fink’s suggestions for formal laws were taken off the table. 
However, this seems to be a tactical move by Renthe-Fink who instead proposed informal 
demands in order to gain advancements on the issue. 
In the meeting with Gunnar Larsen, Renthe-Fink seems more careful. Renthe-Fink legitimized 
his arguments by using Berlin as a threat, and he continuously stressed that Berlin was following 
events in Denmark through various channels.  He specifically mentioned Aage H. Andersen as 
one of these informants. As we know, Renthe-Fink was behind assisting Andersen in gaining the 
position as the primary anti-Semitic agitator in Denmark. Due to this support, Renthe-Fink could 
hardly view him as a threat. Andersen was rather a key individual in Renthe-Fink’s attempt to 
raise anti-Semitic awareness in Denmark. Renthe-Fink also use the Jews as an argument by 
claiming that a formal agreement would calm them. Incidentally, his characterization of the 
Danish Jewish influence reveals that Renthe-Fink possessed information on the composition and 
positions of Danish Jews. 
                                                     
620 T. Vogel-Jørgensen, Berlingske Tidende gennem to hundrede aar 1749-1949, vol. 2. Under Grundloven 1849-1949 (Berlingskes Forlag, 1949), 
531 ”Han holdt ud på sine poster i Berlingske Tidende så længe, han mente at det ikke kunne skade bladet, at han sad der. Først da han blev 
klar over, at hans person kunne være uheldig for bladet i dets forhold over for tyskerne, meddelte han, at han ville trække sig tilbage. 
Højesteretssagføreren bevarede dog både i egenskab af juridisk rådgiver og på anden måde nær tilknytning til det Berlingske hus” // ”He kept 
his positions in Berlingske Tidende as long as he felt it would not damage the paper if he stayed on. Not until he realized his character could 
be unfortunate for the paper’s relationship to the Germans, he announced his withdrawal. The supreme court justice did keep his role as legal 
advisor and in others ways his association with the company”. 
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Overall, we must acknowledge the clear Danish refusal of introducing formal laws against 
the Jews, while not ignoring the evident approval of informal initiatives towards the Jews. It 
seems evident that developments in the overall German Judenpolitik also had an enforcing effect 
on promoting the Jewish question in Denmark. Unfortunately, we do not have Renthe-Fink’s 
reports on these meetings, and we are left with a very one-sided and Danish perspective. 
6.4 The Danish Government’s Discussions on Measures Against the Jews 
We now turn to the discussions within the Danish government related to the signing of the 
Anti-Comintern Pact and Renthe-Fink’s pressure for Jewish laws. These will show that although 
the cabinet ministers ended up rejecting Renthe-Fink, a minority in the Danish government 
seriously considered accommodating the Germans in some way.  
In late November 1941, Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius would travel to Berlin to sign the pact, 
and during his stay he had conversations with Adolf Hitler, Joachim von Ribbentrop and 
Hermann Göring. Hitler had impressed Scavenius on the 27th of November, and Scavenius is to 
have stated “Besides what is in the minutes from Scavenius it should be noted that he had the 
very best impression of Hitler as a dynamic character who completely controlled everything and 
everyone”.621 This is also reflected in the minutes from the Nine-Man Committee, where 
Scavenius’ characterized Hitler as: “He was a force. There was a colossal confidence in 
victory”.622 Otto Carl Mohr, Danish envoy of the Danish legation in Berlin, felt Hitler gave a less 
impressive performance compared to his meeting with him in September. Mohr even detected 
a marked difference in Hitler’s mood. Hitler did not mention the Jewish question, but stressed 
Germany’s role as Europe’s defender against Bolshevism.623 After Meeting Hitler, Scavenius met 
with Ribbentrop, who would not mention Judenpolitik, but he did comment on the 
demonstrations in Copenhagen against the signing of the pact.624 
The day before, the 26th, Göring had extended an invitation for tea to the Danes and other 
diplomats. Göring had been in Denmark several times, including as a show pilot after the First 
World War. He shared anecdotes from that time and described it as one of the best periods of 
                                                     
621 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1:461. 
622 Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget, vol. IV Regering og Rigsdag under besættelsen. Aktstykker. Stenografiske referater (København: J. M. 
Schultz A/S, 1948), 627 141th. meeting 03.12.1941 “...han var en kraft. Der var en kolossal sejrssikkerhed.” 
623 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1:471 Mohr’s minutes are reprinted in 
the diary and must have been circulated. The meeting took place on the 27-11-1941. 
624 Ibid., 1:469 The minutes were written by Frantz Hvass from the Danish Foreign Ministry. They are printed and must have been circulated. 
The meeting took place on the 27-11-1941. 
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his life. He spoke of National Socialism, which he regarded as unsuitable for export, and he then 
turned to the Jews, reckoning: “there was no way around a European solution to the Jewish 
question considering – in his opinion – their close connection to Bolshevism.”625 
 
Scavenius returned home by car on the 29th of November to a group of eagerly awaiting 
colleagues, whom he quickly calmed. He stated that Hitler and Ribbentrop had not raised the 
Jewish question, the question of Southern Denmark or the use of the Danish military. The 
cabinet had expected these three issues would have been raised. Scavenius did refer to his 
conversation with Göring and stated:  
 
“Hermann Göring had during a conversation touched upon the Jewish question 
especially concerning the full-Jews…The individual states could solve their affairs as 
they wanted. But international Jewry also had to be combatted, because otherwise 
the struggle against Bolshevism could not be accomplished. There was no rush, but 
at some point, the issue had to be solved.”626 
 
Scavenius also gave an oral report of this visit to the Nine-Man Committee. Alsing Andersen 
specifically asked if the issue of the Jews had been raised. Here Scavenius omits any mention of 
Göring, but states that “other people” had commented on the Jewish question calling for a 
common Judenpolitik. The need was legitimized in the belief that Jews were behind communism 
and the enemies of Europe.627 This fact sparked a government debate on the issue. On behalf of 
the Social-Democratic group in parliament Andersen continued to argue they could not accept 
moves against the Jews. The conservative Ole Bjørn Kraft seconded this. Scavenius calmed his 
colleagues by replying he had told his German counterparts there was not a ‘Jewish Question’ 
in Denmark and Scavenius gave the same answer to the Swedes.628 Yet, this important denial is 
not cited in the Danish minutes of the meeting in Berlin.629  
                                                     
625 Ibid., 1:470 The meeting took place on the 26-11-1941 and the minutes are written by Hvass. They are reprinted in the diary which means it 
must have been circulated, thus a number of people must have been aware of Göring’s statement. 
626 “Halfdan Hendriksen spredte erindringer 1939-1944. Manuskript B,” December 1944, RA,  Halfdan Hendriksen 1939-1944 The minutes from 
the meetings were read out during the meeting, but there is not recorded any remarkable reactions by the King to these; “Statsrådsprotokol,” 
December 1, 1941, RA, Statsrådet. 
627 Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget, IV Regering og Rigsdag under besættelsen. Aktstykker. Stenografiske referater:627 Meeting on the 
3.12.1941. 
628 Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 111 Kirchhoff uses Swedish diplomatic reports as his source. 
629 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1:470. 
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Scavenius also gave other details. The Germans had been surprised by certain appointments 
and while details were not provided they seem to concern the appointment of Jews within the 
civil service. Scavenius then turned to Göring’s words: the German method was not necessarily 
the path to be taken everywhere.630 This could indicate that he at least thought of a Danish way 
to deal with this question and at the same time appease the Germans. 
The Danish government could no longer doubt the long-term goals of Judenpolitik in 
Denmark:  the issue had to be handled. The Danes were probably unaware of Göring’s role in 
anti-Jewish policy, but recent research suggests Göring’s role was substantial. Previous research 
has rightly emphasized Göring’s letter to Heydrich in the summer of 1941, in which Heydrich was 
placed in charge of planning the final solution of the Jewish question (Endlösung der 
Judenfrage.)631 However, the relationship between Göring and Heydrich was not a novelty. The 
attempt to seize Jewish assets began as Göring was placed in charge of the four-year plan in 
1936 and became Commissioner for Raw Materials and Currency. Göring placed Heydrich as 
head of the Currency Investigation Office, in charge of monitoring the regulations against Jewish 
wealth, with the instruction to report to Göring personally. On Göring’s orders Heydrich also 
became head of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration in January 1939. Göring was at an early 
stage involved in anti-Jewish policy making and the Göring/Heydrich connection went back to 
1936.632 Göring’s statement to Scavenius was thus made by one of the central personalities in 
this policy area. 
As we shall see in the following, Scavenius had been affected by Göring’s words. The tough 
discussions among the ministers on whether to sign the Anti-Comintern pact or not had 
dissatisfied Scavenius. Upon his return, he argued this could not happen again, as “…it was 
necessary the government realized it could be required, if developments led to it, that Denmark 
would have to join the Axis Alliance…”633 This statement was made during a discussion of the 
possible amalgamation of the Axis alliance and the Anti-Comintern pact, which could occur if 
Spain joined the war on the Axis side.634 This formed the basis of a longer discussion among the 
                                                     
630 Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget, IV Regering og Rigsdag under besættelsen. Aktstykker. Stenografiske referater:627–28 Meeting on the 3-
12-1941. 
631 “Ermächtigung Hermann Göring an Heydrich,” Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz, July 31, 1941, 
http://www.ghwk.de/ghwk/deut/Dokumente/Goering.pdf. 
632 Longerich, Holocaust, 62–64. 
633 “Ministermøde,” November 29, 1941, RA, Ministermøder 29.1.1940 - 28.8.1943 “Det var nødvendigt, at regeringen gjorde sig det klart, at 
det kunne blive nødvendigt, hvis udviklingen førte dertil, at Danmark måtte tilslutte sig aksepagten.” 
634 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1:461. 
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ministers on what the Danish position should be if such a demand was raised. The possibility of 
joining the Axis became a splitting issue in the government. 
6.4.1 The Limits of Cooperation 
The other ministers felt they had to make a stand against Scavenius on this issue. In late 1944 
the trade minister described these discussions, using them as an example of Scavenius’ refusal 
to follow the cabinet’s instructions. Scavenius’ statement caused much dispute among the 
government and the political ministers who requested that Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning 
personally raised the issue with Scavenius. The attempt was unsuccessful. Scavenius instead 
suggested changes to the government, as he thought certain ministers had not comprehended 
the position of the country. This resulted in three rounds of meetings between Stauning and the 
political ministers on how to proceed. Scavenius, Thune Jacobsen and Gunnar Larsen were not 
invited, as none of them belonged to a political party. 
The idea of joining the Axis was decisively turned down by the political ministers in a meeting 
on December 22nd 
 
“The Prime Minister accounted for the negotiations that had taken place because of 
the Foreign Minister statements at the cabinet meeting on the 29th of November, 
and after a meeting with the 8 political ministers the Prime Minister announced 
there would for example be opposition against introducing Jewish laws, against 
joining the three-power pact [the Axis], and against allowing for the disposal of the 
military outside of Denmark’s borders”.635 
 
Scavenius’ statements on the 29th of November were evidently more comprehensive than the 
minutes of the ministers’ meetings reveal. It seems clear that joining the Axis meant the possible 
introduction of anti-Jewish laws in Denmark, as well as deploying the Danish military outside of 
                                                     
635 “Ministermøde,” December 22, 1941, RA, Ministermøder 29.1.1940 - 28.8.1943 ”Statsministeren redegjorde for de forhandlinger der var 
ført I anledning af Udenrigsministerens udtalelser på ministermødet den 29. November, og efter konference med de 8 politiske ministre 
meddelte statsministern at der eksempelvis ville være modstand imod at gennemføre en jødelovgivning, at tiltræde tremagtspagten samt at 
stille militær til rådighed udenfor Danmarks grænser.”; The statement is not mentioned in Larsen’s diary, which seems quite remarkable, it is 
mentioned in ; “Halfdan Hendriksen spredte erindringer 1939-1944. Manuskript B” Almost the exact same words are applied. Hendriksen also 
refers to a cabinet meeting on the 6th of December 1941. However, the information seems to contain the minutes of several meetings. E.g. 
he writes on the discussions of the weekly anti-Semitic Kamptegnet, which the government wants to dampen the effects of. However 
according to Gunnar Larsen’s diary and the protocols from the cabinet meetings these do not take place until 2. of Feb. 1942. See e.g. Larsen 
Vol 2. p. 74.  Hendriksen writes at the end of this amalgamation of meetings that Scavenius said that we have to say no to all demands 
regarding Jewish laws. However, I would argue the minutes from the protocols of the Meeting of the Ministers on the 22.nd of December 
1941  were written the same day and only record decisions and rarely discussions. Therefore they seem more trustworthy. 
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Denmark. Scavenius was voted down, but his readiness and willingness to accommodate 
German demands in order for Denmark to maintain some independence appear extensive. The 
other ministers kept him at bay; however, as I will show below, Scavenius was not alone, as Knud 
Kristensen supported him. Given the fact that Thune Jacobsen and Gunnar Larsen often 
supported Scavenius, these non-affiliated ministers might have agreed as well, but they were 
not part of these discussions. In addition, Renthe-Fink had begun pushing for anti-Jewish laws 
the day before the political ministers’ conversation with Scavenius. (See above). 
The three meetings among the political ministers took place from the 29th of November to 
the 22nd of December and ended in the formal statement to Scavenius mentioned above. The 
political ministers refer to the affair as a conflict, and the meetings reveal a crisis between the 
political ministers and Scavenius. The meetings also reflect the political ministers’ skepticism 
towards Scavenius, but also towards Gunnar Larsen. The first meeting illustrates a group of 
political ministers who largely opposed Scavenius’ wishes and his work methods. The harshest 
comment came from the Minister of the Interior, Knud Kristensen, who said “…the policy of the 
Foreign Minister was, in the end, to make us bow to all German demands…”.636  Yet, he, as the 
only minister, also argued “the Jewish question is not nearly as dangerous for us if it is solved in 
a reasonable way”.637  At least one of the political ministers would thus accept some form of 
measures against the Jews in Denmark, but we do not know what reasonable means. In the end 
the Prime Minister went to Scavenius to inform him that: 
 
“…the ministers already now wanted to specify that they would not accept a host of 
the demands, one could expect the German side to make over time; such as Jewish 
laws, joining the Axis pact or sending troops to foreign countries.”638  
 
The statement shows that the ministers expected the Germans to raise the Jewish question 
at some point. The government should not, they agreed, accept any measures against the Danish 
Jews and they apparently expected Scavenius would give in to such demands. The majority of 
the political ministers were not satisfied. They wanted a more formal statement to be presented 
                                                     
636 “Halfdan Hendriksen spredte erindringer 1939-1944. Manuskript B,” 142–43 “udenrigsministerens politik gik ud på, at vi til syvende og sidst 
skulle bøje os for alle tyske krav”. 
637 Ibid. “Jødespørgsmålet er ikke nær så farligt for os, hvis det løses på en skikkelig måde…”. 
638 Ministrene ønskede at præcisere allerede nu, at de ikke ville gå med til en række af de krav, man kunne påregne, efterhånden ville 
fremkomme fra tysk side, såsom jødespørgsmålet, tilslutning til Aksepagten eller udsendelse af tropper til udlandet.” Ibid., 144 paraphrased 
by Hendriksen on the meeting on the 15th. 
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to Scavenius at a cabinet meeting. After another meeting between the political ministers on the 
19th of December, it was decided to formally make the above-cited statement to Scavenius on 
the 22nd. 639  Scavenius’ thoughts on the government’s stance remain undisclosed. Yet, he 
explained to the Swedish diplomatic envoy, Gustav von Dardel, in January 1942 that a move 
against the Jews would be misunderstood by the Danish population.640 This might indicate that 
the demonstrations and other public support for the Jews had influenced the government’s 
stance on the issue. (See section 6.4.2) 
During the discussions among the political ministers Gunnar Larsen and Scavenius showed a 
willingness to accommodate German demands by suggesting that the Danish Jews should 
request laws against themselves. This is revealed in a meeting on the 13th of December 1941 
between Larsen and his brother-in-law Niels Peter Arnstedt, who was also employed as envoy 
in the Foreign Ministry. Larsen expected the government to resign in a couple of months due to 
expected German demands for laws against the Jews. Arnstedt thought this would be a disaster 
and argued that the Jewish question should somehow be solved by the Danes. However, he 
perceived this to be an impossibility as the public was certain to oppose it - just as Scavenius 
would later tell the Swedes. Instead, Arnstedt suggested that the Jews should propose that laws 
were made against themselves and Larsen, having thought of the same idea, believed it would 
show both initiative and protract time.641  
This highly controversial suggestion was viewed as a method to secure the continued 
existence of the government. A Jewish acceptance of laws against them would ensure that the 
public would refrain from demonstrations, and the Germans would have to recognize that the 
Danish Government had taken initiative in the matter.642 Larsen was concerned that it could 
create a foundation for harsher demands, and he decided to bring the proposal to Scavenius. 
Scavenius accepted the suggestion without sharing Larsen’s concerns. However, Scavenius could 
not accept Arnstedt as a messenger to the Jewish congregation, because he was part of 
Scavenius’ staff in the ministry. According to Gunnar Larsen’s minutes, Scavenius argued it might 
be enough if the Jews accepted to refrain from being employed in public positions. This was 
similar to the German concerns which had been voiced to him in Berlin in November 1941. 
                                                     
639 Ibid., 144–45. 
640 Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 111. 
641 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1:500–501. 
642 Ibid. 
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Scavenius expected the Jews to reject this proposition, but he believed the Germans would view 
it as a sign of Danish goodwill if it was accepted.643 It is unknown if the proposal was brought to 
the Jewish leadership. 
The suggestion is an evident example of the cooperation which intended to gain political 
goodwill by, in some form, accepting German demands. It also contained the usual motive of 
keeping the government in power. It is a suggestion which has not been described in the 
historiography of the period. Clearly, there was a wish to accommodate the German Judenpolitik 
in some manner. At the same time, we must recognize that the suggestion included a possible 
Jewish response. This is quite important as the proposal seems not to have been made in spite 
of the Jewish community. Rather, it was intended to be made in cooperation with the Jewish 
leadership. In addition, the statement made by the political ministers on the 22nd of December 
might have ended the possibility of advancing the proposal. On the other hand, both the 
proposal and the discussions among the cabinet ministers do show a previously unrecognized 
willingness by at least three ministers in the Danish government to accept more formal anti-
Jewish measures in Denmark.  
6.4.2 Rumors and Public Refusal of Judenpolitik 
The public reacted as well. They were unaware of the Danish exception from the formal 
obligations of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and well-founded rumors quickly began to flourish. They 
were sparked by a press release from the AA which stated that all signatories of the Pact had to 
handle the Jewish problem, and this was repeated in segments of the Danish press.644 Two of 
the most persistent rumors were that Danes were to be conscripted into the German army and 
that anti-Jewish laws would be introduced. The rumors sparked the first demonstrations against 
the Danish government’s cooperation with Germany.645 The Swedish diplomatic reports 
described there were anti-Semitic incidents, such as the arson attempt on the synagogue in 
Copenhagen, but also counter-demonstrations.646 
The rumors affected the inner circles of the government.  Minister Gunnar Larsen was 
approached by a family member who requested assistance in obtaining travel permits to Sweden 
                                                     
643 Ibid. 
644 Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 378–84. 
645 Claus Bundgård Christensen et al., Danmark besat: krig og hverdag, 1940 - 45 (København: Informations Forlag, 2009), 266–68. 
646 Kirchhoff, “Endlösung over Danmark,” 1993, 60; Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 111. 
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on behalf of a niece who was considered half-Jewish. Larsen committed himself to helping, as he 
already had experience in such matters. F.L Smidth’s machine factory in Lübeck seems to have 
been Aryanized in the 1930s, as Larsen had helped Dr. Benda, an employee of the factory, to 
reach Sweden.647 The example illustrates both that Danish companies were affected by the anti-
Jewish measures in Germany and the profound anxiety the rumors caused in Denmark. On this 
occasion, Larsen also elaborated on his thoughts on the Jews in general. He was seemingly 
surprised that the Jewish question had not yet been raised by the Germans, but he was sure it 
would be raised. 
The many rumors of anti-Jewish laws being introduced in Denmark led to protest writings 
from the theological faculty at the University of Copenhagen. The theologians’ statement 
informed the Danish government that they refused to accept that Jews were not to be regarded 
as equals. The main argument was the Jews belonged to the Danish people according to the 
constitution. Furthermore, it would go against Christian values to initiate laws against them. 
According to the Ministry of Education, all faculty was prepared to accept the ultimate 
consequences of the statement.648 The rector and his board (Konsistorium) at the university 
followed up on the letter from the theological faculty. They too regarded discriminatory 
measures against “their fellow Jewish citizens” as being against justice and the Danish 
mentality.649 Both letters also mention that they will not accept discriminatory measures against 
Jews, even informal ones.650 This was a clear public stance from leading members of society 
against the possible introduction of the formal parts of Judenpolitik. Keeping Scavenius’ message 
to Dardel in mind it seems these statements might have affected the government. 
The German press release, the rumors of anti-Jewish laws, and the open discussions on the 
Jews in Denmark led to the first contact between unknown Danes and the Swedish legation in 
order to let the 200 Hechaluz in Denmark immigrate to Sweden. The 200 Hechaluz had been 
invited to Denmark to learn farming in order to migrate to Palestine, but the war had left them 
stranded in Denmark. The Swedish Jewish community and social services deemed it advisable to 
                                                     
647 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1:154, 461–62. 
648 “Det Teologiske Fakultet til Undervisningsministeriet,” December 23, 1941, RA, UM 120.d.28a 1946-1972. 
649 “Rektor ved Københavns Universitet,” January 7, 1942, RA, UM 120.d.28a 1946-1972. 
650 Not mentioned in Schjørring, Jens Holger, “Dansk teologi og nazismen.,” in Nazismen, universiteterne og videnskaben i Danmark. 
(København: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 2015). 
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only receive 20 to 30 people. The initiative was never followed through, but it does reveal very 
early flight initiatives and underscores the Swedish restrictive refugee policy at this point.651 
Renthe-Fink blamed an article in the Chicago Daily News, which had stated that the Danish 
King would abdicate if such laws were introduced, and similar stories were presented in the 
Swedish press.652 In addition, Renthe-Fink wrote a longer report on the press reactions to the 
rumors. He especially focused on a piece by the prominent theologian Hal Koch. Koch had argued 
that Denmark could not continue its policy of the 9th of April if Jewish laws were to be introduced. 
Renthe-Fink argued that Koch’s article had brought about a public discussion of the Jewish 
question in Denmark which had never been seen before. It had reached wider audiences than 
e.g. Kamptegnet’s articles, and Renthe-Fink viewed it as a victory for the cause. He decided to 
not interfere in the Danish discussion.653 
6.5 Chapter Conclusion 
Section 6.1 of this chapter has shown how German race laws influenced Danish society by 
prompting citizens to informally secure proof of race if they had official dealings with Germany. 
We can even trace the formal application of the German race laws in Danish marriage laws, 
which were made to prevent, or exclude, foreign Jews from marrying non-Jews in Denmark. We 
can thus identify the following stages of persecution: one, two, three, and five in this section 
alone. This raises the question of how many “ordinary” Danes secured proof of race, but also to 
what extent Danish companies began to prove they were Aryan. 
 In answering research question number two this chapter has shown the German legation 
was very active in promoting Judenpolitik in Denmark in several areas. Anti-Semites and anti-
Semitic propaganda was strongly supported by the legation. While this is not part of the Stages 
of Persecution model, we should recognize the stigmatizing (stage seven) effects of Kamptegnet 
and the movie Jud Süss. The creation of an office that had the power to issue official Aryan 
certificates must be recognized as formalized step that officially applied the racial definitions of 
the dictatorship (stages two and three). 
                                                     
651 Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 111. 
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653 “23. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt.” 
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In addition to these measures Renthe-Fink described the informal Judenpolitik being pursued 
in Denmark as a continuous pressure to exclude Jews. The orders from the AA was to pressure 
the Danish government to adopt anti-Jewish laws, and these were loyally followed by Renthe-
Fink. He initiated a steady pressure on several members of the Danish administration and 
government. While not being successful in this endeavor he secured guarantees from the Danish 
government that they would agree to informal, but de facto measures against Jews. While still 
being within the informal stage of the model, the pressure must be characterized as highly 
organized and intentional. This builds on the chapters of Aryanization and the legation appears 
very active in other areas of Judenpolitik as well.  
This brings us to the reaction of the Danish government which partly answers research 
question number three. The Danish government’s decision to oppose and reject formal laws 
against the Jews has been a large component of the somewhat positive evaluation of the 
cooperation policy. However, the discussions surrounding the events of from November 1941 
to January 1942 show that a minority in the government would accept some form of laws against 
the Jews. This gives rise to at least a re-evaluation of the Danish position in this policy area 
around the turn of 1941. Current historiography gives the impression of a firm government 
stance towards the Germans on this issue, but we should recognize the fact that the German 
Judenpolitik caused some heated government discussions. These reveal a previously 
unrecognized political maneuverability in regards to the Jews in Denmark. The government 
decisions resulted in the acceptance of informal initiatives which were intended to avoid formal 
ones. This was in spite of the fact that informal measures also contained possible discriminatory 
measures against the Jews. These discussions also bring to light that the German pressure was 
having an effect on the following members of the Danish government: Erik Scavenius, Gunnar 
Larsen and Knud Kristensen. If we look at the Danish government in light of progressive 
bystander research we can thus detect a movement towards accepting demands originating 
from the perpetrators within the informal stages of persecution. 
In the next chapter we will explore the manner in which Renthe-Fink’s policies were followed 
through and how the Danish government slowly continued to accept informal policies against 
the Jews. 
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7 Enforcing the Policy of Exclusion 
This chapter spans over the months from January to September 1942, and ends just before 
the Telegram Crisis sets in. It mainly focuses on answering research questions two and three. 
Stages of persecution will be pointed to especially on the area exclusive measures directed at 
preventing Jews from being promoted, speaking on the radio, as well as removing Jewish 
individuals in high-level positions in the media. Thematically the chapter begins by exploring and 
analyzing Cecil von Renthe-Fink’s anti-Semitism as it is presented in his cover letter to Lorenz 
Christensen’s report on the Danish Jews. This serves to identify Renthe-Fink’s endorsements for 
National Socialism’s racial ideas, while acknowledging that he was not one of the party’s radical 
supporters. At the same time the chapter will present the Judenpolitik Renthe-Fink followed in 
Denmark. It draws on his orders from December 1941 (see chapter six) to pressure the Danish 
government to exclude Jews. This is shown in section 7.2 which also traces the Danish 
government’s reactions to these attempts. The highest level of the Danish government is 
involved in these Entjudung cases. We will trace the rising adherence and acceptance of the 
informal measures against the Jews in prominent positions in order to prevent formal laws.  
Section 7.3 follows the visit from the central personalities from the AA in the summer of 1942 
who promotes harsher informal measures against the Danish Jews. This has an enforcing effect 
on Renthe-Fink who increases the pressure on the Danish government to let go of Jewish civil 
servants. The chapter ends with a proposition to re-evaluate Renthe-Fink’s role in the 
Judenpolitik in Denmark viewing him as a promoter of anti-Jewish policy rather than the 
opposite. 
 
7.1 Renthe-Fink’s anti-Semitism 
Until New Year’s 1941 to 1942 Cecil von Renthe-Fink had only mentioned the subject of the 
Jewish question in Denmark once in his bi-weekly reports. However, in January 1942 he 
presented an elaborate analysis of the issue in his cover letter to a report on the Jewish influence 
in Denmark.654 The contents of the report will be dealt with below. For now, our attention will 
remain on Renthe-Fink. In the summer of 1940, Franz Rademacher had requested an update on 
                                                     
654 “26. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt,” January 7, 1942, DK MAG He reported on the first public debates on the “Jewish 
Question” in Denmark. 
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the numbers and influence of the Danish Jews. The report was part of the AA’s attempt to gain 
a world-wide overview of the number of Jews as well as their influence in trade, industries, and 
their share of capital. Rademacher’s current information on Denmark originated from the book 
Die Verbreitung der Juden in der Welt (The Distribution of Jews in the World) from 1937. The 
book reported that Denmark’s  6,000 Jews lived mainly in the greater Copenhagen area. The lack 
of statistics and publications delayed the report, but Renthe-Fink completed Rademacher’s 
request on the 20th of January 1942 after several reminders.655 The report was written by Lorenz 
Christensen and submitted on the same day as the Wannsee Conference.656 
Renthe-Fink’s lengthy cover letter to the report shows it was an important issue he was 
describing. He analyzed the role of the Danish Jews as well as the Danes’ perception of Jews. In 
addition, he ended his letter by pointing to some doubtful passages and conclusions in the 
report.  In order for Renthe-Fink to criticize aspects of the report, he must have been quite 
knowledgeable on the subject matter in Denmark.657 Renthe-Fink expected that the Jews in 
Denmark would be subject to formal persecution in the future as few politicians in Denmark had 
realized 
 
“…that in the coming new Europe the Jewish question, for all partners and also 
Denmark, will be solved along certain general uniform rules, which means it will be 
solved consistently.”658 
 
Renthe-Fink began by contextualizing the Jewish question in Denmark, because most Germans 
would be incomprehensive to the underdeveloped attitude towards the Jews in Danish society.  
He wrote that even public figures claimed a Jewish question was non-existent in Denmark. 
According to Renthe-Fink only the Danish Nazi Party and a few politicians had comprehended 
Judenpolitik’s importance to the German dictatorship.659 
                                                     
655 “9. Franz Rademacher an Cecil von Renthe-Fink,” January 27, 1941, DK MAG; “10. Das Auswärtige Amt an die Deutsche Gesandtschaft [DK-
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10th. of December. It seems plausible Renthe-Fink held on the report and sent it at an opportune moment. The letter from NSDAP/AO 
Denmark sent to Berlin is from 10-12-1941 and passed on to AA by Renthe-Fink on 21-01-1942 “29. Cecil von Renthe-Fink and das Auswärtige 
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657 “28. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt.” 
658 Ibid.“daß in dem kommenden neuen Europa die Judenfrage für alle Partner und somit auch für Dänemark nach gewissen allgemeinen 
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659 Ibid. 
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Renthe-Fink provided four historical and blatant anti-Semitic reasons for the Danish 
“ignorance” towards Jews. He applied the underlying argument that hostility towards Jews was 
tied to the experience of physically meeting Jews. Renthe-Fink would explain that the Danes 
were only exposed to Jews in the ratio of 1:500, while in Germany it was 1:100. The second 
reason was the emancipation of the Danish Jews in 1814 which had secured citizens’ rights for 
Jews born in Denmark. The emancipation had allowed intermarriages, and Renthe-Fink 
explained how Jews through “clever” intermarriage strategies had assimilated into important 
Danish families. This argument presented Jews as conspiratorial, and Renthe-Fink now described 
how “more Danes than one would expect have Jewish blood in their ancestry”.660 The third 
reason was the Danes’ liberal and individualistic attitudes, while the fourth was a return to the 
racial and anti-Semitic arguments: the Danes were without the “bitter experiences with Jews 
that we have”.661 In contrast to German Jews, Danish Jews had, according to Renthe-Fink, 
cleverly managed to cloak themselves, yet their influence was not as prominent as in 
Germany.662 By describing the Jews in Denmark in this manner, they were presented as if they 
by some master plan had succeeded in infiltrating Danish society. 
He went on to stress that despite their minor influence, the Jews in Denmark were still a 
matter of concern, since a powerful group of Jews held prominent positions in universities, 
cultural areas, the press, and the economy. He attributed Jewish influence to the many 
Mischlinge who dominated intellectual circles, as well as the long liberal and Jewish influence on 
the Danish spirit (Geist).  This could be traced back to the radical and liberal Danish-Jewish 
thinker Georg Brandes.663 The Jews, but especially the Mischlinge, were criticized for working 
against the efforts to draw Denmark closer to Germany,  and making it difficult to pursue 
exclusive processes such as Aryanization.664 
In the final passages of the letter Renthe-Fink accounts for the current subversive German 
Judenpolitik being pursued in Denmark: 
 
                                                     
660 Ibid.“Weit mehr Dänen als man ahnt, haben Judenblut in ihren Adern.” 
661 Ibid.“...die bitteren Erfahrungen mit den Juden zu machen wie wir.” 
662 Ibid. 
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“As long as it is for the benefit of our [Germany’s] warfare and our collected political 
interests to not disturb the quiet development in Denmark it will not be an option to 
fundamentally pursue the Jewish question in Denmark. Our practice is for the time 
being mostly limited to prompting the Danish government to eliminate Jewish 
personalities wherever these can exercise a damaging influence. The Danish 
government is said to have decided to, in the future, not to place Jews in prominent 
positions in the civil service…”665 
 
According to Renthe-Fink the Danish government had also agreed to stop providing 
citizenship to Jewish emigrants, while the legation raised the importance of the Jewish question 
at any given moment towards representatives of the Danish Government.666 The report was well 
received by Rademacher who labelled it as ausgezeichnet (excellent).667  
Renthe-Fink knew his anti-Semitism and was applying it to his arguments tying them into the 
racial ideology of Nazism to the satisfaction of his superiors. His use of terms like ‘elimination’ 
(Eliminierung) and ‘purification’ (Reinigungsprozeß) to describe the removal of the Jews, as well 
as his use of racial terms like ‘Jewish blood’ and Mischlinge, substantiate this. It is evident that 
Renthe-Fink was following the approved instructions of Luther, Grundherr and Ribbentrop (see 
chapter 6), while stressing the special circumstances he was working under in Denmark. There 
seems to be little doubt that Renthe-Fink was pursuing an approved German Judenpolitik in 
Denmark. 
Renthe-Fink’s letter and its explicit reservations about an action against the Danish Jews have 
traditionally been interpreted as proof of an alleged wish to avoid raising the Jewish question to 
the Danish government.668 While his arguments could indeed be regarded as a statement 
defending the cooperation policy, the view of a Reich Plenipotentiary who was reluctant to move 
against the Danish Jews seems difficult to align with his simultaneous initiatives in Judenpolitik 
such as promoting anti-Semitic propaganda, racially categorizing companies, and pressing for 
anti-Jewish legislation. 
                                                     
665 Ibid.“Solange es vom Standpunkt unserer Kriegführung und unserer gesamtpolitischen Interessen vordringlich ist, daß die ruhige 
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We now move to the contents of the extensive report on the Danish Jews written by Lorenz 
Christensen. It had been compiled from his own registry cards (see chapter five) as well as a host 
of publicly accessible sources among which he surprisingly mentions the membership list of the 
Jewish congregation.669 It also includes the censuses (Folketællinger) on the complete Danish 
population from 1921 which included a section on people’s religious faith. From these, 
Christensen had identified 5,924 Jews in the year 1921. An additional source was an article from 
1934 in which the author had constructed a complete registry of Jews based on tax lists from 
the Jewish congregation, Jews who had been financially supported by the congregation, lists of 
Jewish children in Jewish schools, and Copenhagen public schools. Lastly, the author had had 
access to the protocol of former members of the congregation and concluded that in 1931 there 
were 5,635 Jews in the Copenhagen area.670 Christensen calls it a methodological problem that 
he is not able to identify “Rassejuden” from the sources at hand, but he will examine these in 
separate report.671 
Lorenz Christensen focused on Jews in several sectors of the economy and trade, where 74 
companies were identified as Jewish or having Jewish employees. The former being the most 
prevalent. The companies mentioned are major Danish ones who had probably not been 
Aryanized by January 1942, while some state organizations were included as well e.g. the 
University of Copenhagen. Christensen had also focused on identifying Jews in culture and 
media. A large segment of the report was devoted to identifying prominent members of society 
who had Jewish mothers, Jewish ancestry, or who were married to Jews. Altogether 200 
individuals were racially categorized in the report. In addition, Christensen had registered people 
who had publicly supported or assisted Jews.672 
The report was passed on to NSDAP/AO in Denmark before it was sent to the AA, and by 
March 1942 it had been circulated in Berlin. Head of the NSDAP/AO branch in Denmark, Ernst 
Schäfer,  evaluated the Jewish influence in Denmark similar to Renthe-Fink,  but Schäfer applied 
a harsher anti-Semitic and National Socialist rhetoric. Schäfer pointed to some minor mistakes 
in the report, but overall, he characterized it as a precise, and important evaluation of the overall 
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composition of the Danish Jews. He especially emphasized that the report would explain to 
outsiders why Jews were not so prevalent in Denmark compared to other countries. He stressed 
that “Danish Jewry, and the Mischlinge, who play a particular role in Denmark, are all opponents 
of every single German and enemies of the relationship between Germany and Denmark.”673 
The Mischlinge were described very negatively and as having a powerful position in Denmark.  
They were accused of greatly obstructing the process of removing Jews from the businesses and 
political positions. According to Schäfer, the Mischlinge did so in collaboration with Freemasons, 
the church, and friends of England.674 Only recently has the  NSDAP/AO in Denmark been 
examined showing their involvement in Judenpolitik.675 
The report from Lorenz Christensen was evaluated by the NSDAP affiliated Reichsinstitut für 
Geschichte des Neuen Deutschlands (The Reich Institute for the History of the New Germany). 
The institute had since 1935 been charged with historically legitimizing National Socialism, and 
it focused intensely on the Judenfrage.  It had close connections to the AA and examined the 
Jewish question in other countries e.g. Great Britain and Italy. Genealogical work was also carried 
out for these countries, as well as cataloging mixed marriages. The institute actively pursued 
policies in this area as they educated diplomats in the Jewish question from 1938 onwards.676 
The AA used the knowledge gathered by Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des Neuen 
Deutschlands to ask country-specific questions on e.g. Jewish organizations. In turn the AA 
supplied information on the influence of Jews and anti-Jewish laws from their diplomatic 
entities. The forwarding of the report on the Danish Jews thus fits into the overall information 
flow on foreign Jews that occurred on a large geographical scale between National Socialist 
Organizations.677 The Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des Neuen Deutschlands’ evaluation of the 
report was very thorough. The institute in Munich had either been charting the Danish Jews 
themselves, or possibly been forwarded a copy of Hans Hermannsen’s registries. The 
Reichsinstitut agreed with most of the report’s findings: there was a very high number of 
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assimilated Jews (Assimilationsjuden) and mixed marriages in the upper class. They corrected 
some of the report’s historical passages on the immigration of Sephardic Jews in the 17th and 
18th centuries and pointed to Ashkenazi Jews as having immigrated as well. This only 
underscores the institute’s elaborate knowledge of Danish Jews. There seems to be no doubt 
that besides the RfA, other German organizations had an international approach to the Jewish 
question and continuously gathered information on Jews. 
 
7.2 Continued Exclusions 
7.2.1 Excluding Jews from Being Promoted 
We now turn to the Danish government and its discussions on the subject of Jews. The various 
minutes of the cabinet meetings are an invaluable source for following the continuous presence 
of the Jewish question in the Danish Government. The minutes mainly portray the group of 
ministers as being largely opposed Foreign Minister Scavenius’ suggestions on the matter, but 
as we have already seen, in chapter six, a minority within the cabinet were ready to accept some 
form of anti-Jewish laws. Yet, the majority prevailed. The position presented to the Germans 
was that Denmark would not accept formal anti-Jewish laws. However, during the discussions 
on how to proceed, one can observe an incipient acceptance of informal measures against the 
Jews. These discussions reveal the subject’s sensitivity as well as its importance to the 
government. Overall, it seems Scavenius and the Minister of Public Works Gunnar Larsen appear 
more accepting of informal measures against the Jews compared to their colleagues. Yet, we 
should acknowledge that, in several instances, the cabinet ended up agreeing on how to 
proceed. This is also the case in regards to the discussions in the cabinet in the period from 
September 1942 to August 1943 covered in chapter eight. 
Following the events of December 1941 and early January 1942 the issue of not promoting 
Jews became a point of discussion among the ministers on the 6th of January 1942. According to 
Larsen’s minutes, they all agreed to “…not provoke by making Jewish appointments that would 
stand out…” in public organizations.678 The ministers believed this could be achieved without 
difficulties except at the universities. However, Minister of Education Jørgen Jørgensen felt he 
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could convince the rector of Copenhagen University, Carl Edvard Bloch, to agree with the 
government.679 It would seem the Danish government had decided to adopt and enforce an 
informal rule not to appoint Jews to the civil service. On top of this the Minister of Ecclesiastical 
Affairs Vilhelm Fibiger asked the Jewish leadership through the chief rabbi, Max Friediger, to 
keep calm and “show restraint”. According to Larsen’s minutes, Friediger had agreed, but it is 
unclear to what extent the leadership of the Jewish congregation had agreed to this 
suggestion.680 
Eight days later, Minister of Justice Thune Jacobsen paraphrased a meeting he had had with 
Renthe-Fink. Surprisingly, Jacobsen had brought up the subject of the Jews and had explained 
to Renthe-Fink that Jews would not be promoted in the civil service, but the government would 
resign if formal laws were introduced.681 This confirms that at least some ministers of the Danish 
government enforced the decision to unofficially block the promotion of Jews. The government 
had shown some acceptance in the matter, and we can trace this in Renthe-Fink’s cover letter 
from January 20th, 1942. “The Danish government is said to have decided to, in the future, not 
to place Jews in prominent positions in the civil service…”682 Renthe-Fink actually had several 
ministers’ words to back up this statement, and he had good reason to believe he had achieved 
suggestion “A” from the 18th of December 1941 (see chapter six). 
In February 1942, the issue of the Jews was discussed at two cabinet meetings. This time it 
revolved around several themes such as: Jewish doctors, Jews in the press, celebrating 
prominent Jews and kosher sausages. The Minister of Justice raised his concern that the 
newspaper Politiken had over-emphasized the birthday of Dr. Erik Warburg, who was considered 
Jewish. Warburg was apparently “one of those Jews the Germans were keen to get at”, and 
Larsen criticized Warburg for behaving unwisely.683 
It was not the first time Warburg had surfaced in the discussions among the ministers. In late 
December 1941, Professor and Head Surgeon at the Copenhagen County Hospital in Gentofte, 
Tyge C. Geerts, who happened to be married to Gunnar Larsen’s niece, had passed on several 
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negative messages regarding the Jews at the Faculty of Medicine. Allegedly, the students were 
extremely affected by “the pretty big Jewish element at the faculty”.684 Dr. Erik Warburg and Dr. 
S.E. Kjærgaard had supposedly neglected to read aloud Rector Bloch’s statement. The statement 
had been issued in an attempt to halt the demonstrations against the signing of the Anti-
Comintern Pact the previous month. Apparently, a young doctor, a “Russian Jew that had 
obtained Danish citizenship” had also openly supported sabotage. Larsen regarded these acts as 
extremely dangerous, and it was discussed within the government four days later.685 Larsen 
emphasized that such behavior by Jewish professors could cause the Germans to raise the Jewish 
question. The Minister of Education agreed and expressed his concern as well. Yet, it remains 
unknown if these discussions resulted in actual consequences for these individuals.686 
The discussion on Warburg in early 1942 led to a general debate among the ministers who 
agreed to show extreme caution regarding issues relating to Jews. This prompted the Minister 
of Trade to inform the government that he had denied a request from the Danish Jews for the 
production of kosher sausages as standard sausages had been introduced for everyone. The 
minister’s decision was supported and legitimized by arguing that kosher sausages would 
provoke the Germans. The kosher sausage case is a typical example of how introducing informal 
restrictions against the Jews was legitimized by the fears of formal rules as part of the logic of 
cooperation. The Minister of Education, Jørgen Jørgensen, also raised an issue. The Germans 
had complained of a planned radio show on Georg Brandes, marking what would have been his 
100th birthday. Gunnar Larsen scolded Jørgensen for being incautious, as Renthe-Fink in 
December 1941 and January 1942 had mentioned that such radio shows were regarded as 
provocative. Larsen even argued that the program should never have been produced.687 This 
discussion reveals both the German pressure, and the various levels of concern in the Danish 
government as well as its readiness to impose informal restrictions. 
Brandes was also an issue at the next cabinet meeting. The former Communist students’ 
union, (Studentersamfundet), wanted to celebrate what would have been Georg Brandes’ 100th 
birthday. This caused grave concern among the ministers, but the meeting was held 
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nonetheless.688 The number of celebration parties for Brandes appears to have been high, as the 
Germans had negotiated on the matter with the Minister of Justice, Thune Jacobsen. The 
contents are undisclosed, but it underscores the continued German attempt to control the 
subject of Jews in the public sphere in any form; even the celebration of famous, but deceased 
Jews.689 
7.2.2 Excluding the Jews From Nationaltidende 
Two years of consistent and increasing pressure to remove Jews from the press eventually 
resulted in the successful removal of Jews and those presumed Jewish from the leadership of 
the Danish newspaper Nationaltidende. In January 1941, Gustav Meissner had labelled the 
Editor-in-Chief Aage Schoch, CEO Holger Cohen and journalist Bertel Bing as Jewish.690 The first 
pressure was applied to remove Schoch, who was not Jewish, and Bertel Bing. The Germans had 
demanded Schoch’s dismissal for a lengthy period of time due to his negative stance towards 
Germany, and his critical articles against Germany written before the war. Meissner blamed the 
paper’s unsympathetic attitude towards Germany on Jewish influence. He demanded that 
Schoch step down as editor-in-chief while Bing was to be dismissed. Over several months, 
negotiations took place between Meissner and the Danish government, yet Schoch remained 
while Bing was excluded from writing radio reviews.691 This was only the first step as new 
demands surfaced in December 1941. These may be related to the German pressure applied 
around the signing of the Anti-Comintern pact. 
This time it was Cecil von Renthe-Fink who demanded that Schoch and CEO Holger Cohen be 
fired after a series of allegedly insulting articles. During a cabinet meeting in late February 1942 
it was decided to accept the German demands, and Schoch was removed.692 Only a week later, 
Cohen was targeted.693 The Germans argued that he controlled administrative affairs, interfered 
in the editorial process, and was the “evil spirit” of the paper. The Danish Foreign Ministry denied 
that they could interfere in this case, but the Germans repeatedly requested Scavenius to 
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remove him. In the summer of 1942 the German patience ended as Nationaltidende refused to 
run C.F. Schalburg’s obituary. C. F. Schalburg was a Russian-born Dane who reached the rank of 
major in the Waffen-SS. He had been killed on the Eastern Front while commanding a battalion 
of Danish SS-volunteers in the Frikorps.694  
Cohen was attacked in the National Socialist papers Fædrelandet, Kamptegnet and 
Nordschleswigsche Zeitung, which all emphasized that Cohen was Jewish. On the 20th of June 
Director of the Foreign Ministry Nils Svenningsen received a telephone call at his private 
residence and was requested to meet with Legationsrat Hugo Hensel in an hour. Only four days 
prior to this Renthe-Fink had again requested Scavenius to remove Cohen. Hensel presented the 
following message: “We have the intention to remove Coh[e]n to Germany and confine him as 
Hetzer”. The question of Cohen became high-level politics. At 13:30, a meeting was held at the 
Prime Minister’s Office (Statsministeriet).  Several ministers of the government were present 
including Prime Minister Buhl and Erik Scavenius as well as members of Nationaltidende’s board 
of directors. Faced with the “choice” of being deported to Germany or stepping down Cohen 
chose the latter.695 
Cohen’s own account of the meeting has never been presented before, and it is revealing in 
several ways as it highlights the reactions of the Danish government, the German Judenpolitik, 
and Cohen’s personal perspective. At the meeting Cohen related how he had been very cautious 
of his actions since the 9th of April 1940. He had avoided interfering in the editorial work of the 
paper and was cautious on the phone, while also being careful not to draw attention to his 
person. He seemed largely disappointed in the government’s reaction, but appears to have 
found support from Vilhelm Buhl and Thune Jacobsen who offered to assist him or answer any 
questions he might have. Cohen was supported more fiercely by Halfdan Hendriksen and 
members of the board of directors of Nationaltidende, who were considering closing the paper 
as a consequence of his removal.696 A few days after the meeting the board of directors sent a 
letter to the Prime Minister expressing their great surprise in the government’s acceptance of 
the German demand. They argued to no avail that Cohen should be reinstated.697  
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The ministers reacted in various ways to the German demands. Scavenius straight-forwardly 
said nothing could be done while the Prime-Minister was much more apologetic in his approach, 
arguing that the German demand was a major breach of law without any evidence. The 
participants agreed Cohen had been singled out, because he was Jewish. Yet, they refrained 
from attempting to argue the case further, and denied Cohen any forms of financial 
compensation. Minister of Justice Thune Jacobsen also revealed the Germans had requested 
Cohen was put under surveillance, yet the minister seemed satisfied with Cohen’s assurance 
that he would remain in Denmark. Scavenius could account for the German modus operandi in 
such cases. They would begin with minor complaints escalating to threats and repeated 
complaints ending in an ultimatum to remove a person.698  
This seems to indicate that an unknown number of similar cases had crossed his desk since 
the beginning of the occupation. Was this the method Renthe-Fink applied to slowly remove 
Jews from their positions? In this case Judenpolitik proceeded just as Renthe-Fink had described 
it: to prompt the Danish government to eliminate Jewish personalities. However, it is surprising 
to find a direct threat of deporting Cohen to Germany. Clearly, the delicate balance of the 
cooperation was not considered in jeopardy by demanding Cohen’s removal. Rather, it displayed 
a German willingness to enforce their demands in spite of the possible effects it might have on 
the cooperation. The Danish government, on the other hand, decided to give in under duress. 
By accepting these demands, they expanded the informal measures against Jews. The events of 
this case open up for a possible renewed focus on the individual circumstances surrounding Jews 
who left managing positions in the first three and half years of the occupation. They appear far 
from random, but rather as part of the conscious and continuous Judenpolitik aimed at slowly 
excluding the Jews. 
7.2.3 Excluding Jewish Publishers and Publications 
In June 1942 press attaché Gustav Meissner could conclude his analysis on the publishing 
industry and bookstores in Denmark. In addition, he presented his results in excluding 
publications deemed hostile to Germany from Danish public libraries. These included communist 
and pacifist literature, but also works written by immigrants. He had also succeeded in 
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preventing public libraries from carrying well-known works authored by Jews.699 Meissner’s 
analysis of the Danish publishing business and book stores was thorough. His overview contains 
477 official book stores and 200 other types of book traders. Meissner characterized the 
publishing house Gyldendal as the most influential.  In addition to book store sales all publishers 
sold books via agents in schools and offices, but also in local shops. The companies Branner and 
Haase were categorized as enemies of Germany and Gyldendal deemed unfriendly. The scientific 
publisher Munksgaard was identified as untrustworthy due to the Jewish influence in its board 
of directors. Meissner also repeated an earlier warning about David Grünbaum, who controlled 
the influx of English-language literature into Denmark. According to Meissner, he did so in 
collaboration with Swedish distributors who were connected to the British embassy in 
Stockholm. For these reasons Grünbaum, was to be put under surveillance by Kanstein’s 
office.700 
The analysis of this industry found only one Jewish company and a Jewish individual who 
imported English language books, but in order to identify them a complete industry must have 
been thoroughly examined. The immense amount of resources which must have been used to 
complete this investigation only underscores the legation had placed a high priority on 
identifying Jews in order to follow through on their Entjudung policies. In addition, the 
surveillance measures applied to Grünbaum shows that the German police force was possibly 
performing active police work. It is unfortunately unknown how many Jews were placed under 
surveillance by the German authorities, but if it was deemed necessary, it seems manpower was 
provided.  
7.2.4 Excluding Jews From the Radio 
The Danish Broadcasting Company, Danmarks Radio701, aired a presentation by the Jewish 
Permanent Secretary in the Statistical Department Georg Cohn in early July 1942. The Danish 
government had not followed through on their promises to Renthe-Fink to prevent Jews from 
appearing on the Radio. Renthe-Fink quickly reacted. Gunnar Larsen was the first to be exposed 
to Renthe-Fink’s complaints. Renthe-Fink stressed he had continuously warned against letting 
Jews speak on the Radio and promoting them. Renthe-Fink repeated his arguments from his 
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meeting with Gunnar Larsen in December 1941, and again used Berlin as a threat, while giving 
the impression he was trying to keep the Jewish question out of Denmark. Renthe-Fink moved 
on to blame the Jews for not being “as quiet as mice” (musestille)  to avoid raising the issue 
further, while he expressed astonishment over the fact that the Danish Jews had not 
disappeared from the country when they had the chance.702 It is unclear which chance he is 
referring to, but through Larsen he exerted a pressure on the minority to become even less 
visible under the threat of further possible measures. 
Cohn’s radio appearance was a central discussion point at the cabinet meeting four days later. 
Larsen stressed it would be for the benefit of the Danes, and the Jews, to avoid radio 
appearances by Jews, while referring to a former agreement to reach this end. This could 
indicate the discussions which followed Renthe-Fink’s demands for anti-Jewish laws in 
December 1941 and January 1942 had been successful. It is unclear whether this was a fact, but 
it was certainly Larsen’s perception that such an agreement existed.703 Renthe-Fink had said 
“henceforth it was to be prevented that the radio be placed at the disposal of Jews.” In mid-July 
1942 all ministers agreed, and the Minister of Education was made responsible for ensuring that 
this would not happen again.704 
Nevertheless, Cohn was invited to give an interview on the news of the radio at 18:35 on 
Friday the 7th of August, 1942. It may thus appear as if the Danes were not adhering to their own 
decisions. However, at the time the news on the radio was an independent unit edited by the 
newspapers who supplied the contents of the program. Cohn was to be interviewed on the price 
index, but at 16:30 Barandon ordered Meissner to demand that Cohn was prevented from being 
interviewed. The case went all the way up to Vilhem Buhl.705 The Prime Minister’s statement on 
the issue shows how the Danish government participated in the informal exclusion of Jewish civil 
servants’ public statements. Vilhelm Buhl explained how the ministers in the government had 
decided not to allow Jewish civil servants to appear on the radio, but the independent news desk 
had not been instructed on the matter. The Prime Minister seemed to regret he had not taken 
the matter up directly with Cohn. Vilhelm Buhl would not prevent him from appearing on the 
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radio an hour and half before the news was to air. At the same time, it would have been too 
obvious that Cohn’s appearance had been cancelled because he was Jewish. According to Buhl, 
this had the potential to raise debate on the Jewish question.706 The radio news was informed 
of the decisions made by the Prime Minister, telling the organizers to omit Cohn’s name.  Cohn 
had “turned pale as a sheet” as he agreed that his name was not mentioned.707 
As a consequence, Nils Svenningsen was instructed to inform the Germans of the following: 
 
“….The Prime Minister authorized me [Svenningsen]… to declare to the German 
Gesandtschaft that he was prepared to see to it that in the future Jewish civil 
servants would not appear on Danish Radio”.708 
 
This decision was passed on and well received by Barandon and Meissner, who refrained from 
cancelling Cohn’s radio appearance. Instead, they expressed gratitude for the promise of a 
“radio lock-out for Jewish civil servants”. Meissner continued to argue it was in the Jews’ own 
interests to limit their appearance on the radio. He legitimized this argument by pointing to the 
strong anti-Semitic movement, which could use such appearances to argue for official laws 
against the Jews.709 Of course Meissner was part of this movement, but applied it as a threat just 
as Renthe-Fink had done. 
The Danish Nazi newspaper Fædrelandet had apparently monitored the radio and had noticed 
that Cohn had not been mentioned by name. This was celebrated as a victory in a blatantly anti-
Semitic article claiming the omission of Cohn’s name was due to “the purer atmosphere which 
is sweeping over the country at the moment”. This was used to questioning why Jews held such 
high positions in Denmark, as Danes could easily take over these positions.710 
If we look more closely at Renthe-Fink’s swift reaction we should recall his letter from the 
20th of January 1942, where he informed his superiors in Berlin that he was putting pressure on 
the Danish government to prevent Jewish influences. Cohn‘s radio appearances made it seem 
as if Renthe-Fink was not delivering on his promises. One of Renthe-Fink’s key threats towards 
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the Danish government was the issue of the Jews being raised by Berlin. This threat could also 
be viewed as an expression of Renthe-Fink’s own concerns. If the issue was raised by Berlin, it 
also meant Renthe-Fink had been unsuccessful in reaching the promised goals for the anti-
Jewish policies in Denmark. This may explain why he reacted so strongly in the Cohn case. 
Meissner employed the same tactic, playing on the Danish government’s fear of official demands 
in this area. Meissner and Renthe-Fink thus reached progress in the informal restrictions against 
Jewish civil servants by obtaining an assurance from the Prime Minister that Jewish civil servants 
were banned from appearing on the radio. 
Prime Minister Buhl’s statement in August added to the informal measures as he announced 
that public speeches by Jewish civil servants were to be prevented. Buhl legitimized his and the 
government’s actions as a method for preventing formal laws against Jews. In October 1942 this 
restriction was enforced on E. Seligmann Director of the Prices Board (Prisdirektoratet), who had 
been identified as Jewish and was to hold a lecture, not on the radio, but at the Trade and Offices 
Association (Handel og Kontor). The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Trade Hakon 
Jespersen requested Seligmann to document his ancestry. The Foreign Ministry acted as the 
genealogical race experts concluding that Seligmann was not Jewish according the Nuremberg 
laws.711 In the case of Seligmann,  the Danes used the formal racial definitions in order to adhere 
to their promises to informally exclude Jewish civil servants from speaking in public. The case  
indicates that the exclusive measures had been expanded to encompass all forms of public 
speeches.   
 
7.3 Visit to Denmark – Summer 1942 
Danish-German relations had reached a critical moment in the summer of 1942. The death of 
Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning in May and his successor Vilhelm Buhl had a negative effect 
on the Danish-German relationship, but more importantly sabotage was on the rise. In the late 
summer of 1942, Werner von Grundherr, Wilhelm Stuckart and Otto Ohlendorf were all in 
Copenhagen. Ohlendorf was head of Sicherheitsdienst Inland in the RSHA, which included 
Denmark, and he was later to head the committee for foreign trade in the RWM. Two months 
before his visit he had commanded the dreaded Einsatzgruppe D, which had killed 90,000 Jews. 
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The visit to Denmark had several reasons. There was to be an inspection of the German defenses 
built to prevent a possible Allied invasion in Denmark. On the administrative level the 
bureaucracy was to be minimized, while it was to be examined if Denmark could be tied closer 
to Germany in several areas.712 
 This was a visit by individuals who on a regular basis were involved in making decisions 
regarding the overall direction of German policy in Denmark. Given their personal involvement 
in the organizational and practical tasks of both excluding and murdering the Jews, they were 
also in Denmark to evaluate the status of the Judenpolitik. At the same time, the deportations 
of Jews from all over occupied Europe were in motion and the pressure for increased measures 
against the Jews in Denmark rose. The visit was used by Frits Clausen and Gustav Meissner to 
promote Judenpolitik further. Clausen wrote directly to Grundherr during his stay in Denmark to 
raise several issues including further measures against Jews.  
 Clausen’s overall aim was to gain more political power for his party. He legitimized his 
suggestions by pointing to several peculiarities of the influence of Jews in Denmark, which from 
the viewpoint of Nazism seemed remarkable. Clausen’s party was surprised by the fact that the 
Supply Office, Varedirektoratet, was controlled by “two Jews and one half-Jew”, while the 
Permanent Secretary for the Statistical Department, Cohn, was also Jewish. German 
organizations were also trading with Jewish companies. Clausen recognized that action was 
being taken in the area of trade, but he thought it was progressing too slowly. He argued that 
the theaters and press were under Jewish influence, while the Jews controlled half the banking 
industry and dominated the stock-exchange. Clausen’s main argument was to frame these issues 
as essential problems for the German state, because the Jews were using their power against 
Germany. Clausen suggested restructuring the Danish government to counter these 
developments. In the near future Jews who were politically opposed to Germany had to be 
removed from their positions. However, Clausen did not suggest the introduction of any legal or 
formal laws against the Jews.713 He clearly wanted stronger measures than the ones promoted 
by Renthe-Fink, but still in an informal manner.   
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Three days later, Meissner wrote a note describing Stuckart’s and Ohlendorf’s impressions of 
the progress of the Judenpolitik in Denmark. Meissner might have over-interpreted the 
impressions somewhat, as Stuckart’s own thoughts on the visit do not contain passages on the 
position of the Jews in Denmark.714 Meissner mostly focused on Ohlendorf’s negative comments 
on Jewish influence. This could indicate that Ohlendorf was the most critical of the three visitors, 
which is backed by his promise to Clausen that things would change. Ohlendorf was also to have 
promised to report to Himmler that the SS should be tied more strongly to the political 
developments in Denmark. One cannot help thinking of Best’s arrival in the fall, but we lack 
evidence to tie these events together.715 It appears to be the first-time representatives from 
Berlin voiced a dissatisfaction towards the progress of Judenpolitik in Denmark, and the visit had 
a marked effect on Renthe-Fink. 
 Only a few days after the visit from Berlin, Renthe-Fink again attempted to pressure 
Scavenius into firing specific Jews in the public administration. Generally, he held that it was 
unwise to have Jews in prominent positions and pointed to firing Cohn, while also underscoring 
that it would be prudent to replace the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Justice, Aage 
Svendsen, who was considered half-Jewish. Scavenius advised against it. It would cause a great 
disruption in the government and only a direct German order could make this happen. Renthe-
Fink’s suggestions were thus rejected by Scavenius who did mention what was needed for this 
to succeed. Renthe-Fink backed down, and instead stressed that it would be wise if the Danes 
on their own would absorb the well-known German stance against the Jews.716 We should of 
course take note of Scavenius’ principal stance, which probably reflected the position of the 
majority of the ministers. In the summer of 1942 this was where the government drew a line in 
the sand, but as we shall see in the following chapter this was a line Scavenius would be ready 
to cross only weeks later. 
The visit also had further consequences as Anton Fest, maybe on Kanstein’s orders, would 
instruct Lorenz Christensen to compile a list of the most important Jewish persons in Denmark. 
On the 24th of August 1942, the list of fifteen people was sent to Fest. First on the list was the 
head of the Jewish congregation, C.B. Henriques. Christensen characterized him as “without a 
                                                     
714 Introduction to “41. Gustav Meissner: Notiz für Herrn Minister,” August 22, 1942, DK MAG. 
715 Ibid. 
716 “42. Cecil von Renthe-Fink Aufzeichnung,” August 24, 1942, DK MAG. 
 219 
doubt the leading person in Danish-Jewish orthodox circles.” Henriques was also a lawyer at the 
Supreme Court, on the board of directors of the paper Berlingske Tidende, and a representative 
of several other companies. The two rabbis Max Friediger and Marcus Melchior were also on the 
list, as well as two persons who were also characterized as communists.717 
After arriving in Berlin, von Grundherr visited Rademacher. Grundherr brought Clausen’s 
letter, but also gave the impression that his visit had had a Schockwirkung (a shock effect). 
Rademacher agreed, because Kanstein, during a recent visit to Berlin, had felt the need to justify 
his policies in Denmark. According to Rademacher, Kanstein did not agree with Grundherr’s 
apparently negative report on matters in Denmark. Grundherr had expressed his views to 
Scavenius in Copenhagen while Renthe-Fink had been given a pep talk. We know this from 
Rademacher’s suggestion to Luther to change the policy against the Jews in Denmark. It would 
seem that Grundherr, like Ohlendorf, had been critical of the way the Jewish question was 
addressed in Denmark. Rademacher suggested to Luther that stronger measures were to be 
introduced in Denmark. He copied many arguments from earlier reports to prove the continued 
influence of the Jews. Rademacher argued that the previous policy of ungestörten Entwicklung 
(undisturbed development) had now reached its limits.718 
Rademacher’s suggestions for developing the Judenpolitik further were not radical. He 
proposed to enact measures against the Jews, which were to avoid the introduction of harsher 
measures in the future. He believed that a constant pressure should be applied on the Danish 
government to secure some progress. In order to launch the process, the Danish government 
was to be forced to introduce some unspecified measures right away. It would seem that the 
removal of Jewish civil servants could be one such step, but formal laws were not suggested. 
Von Grundherr believed the time was not ripe for pressuring the Danish government in that 
direction, and Ribbentrop never became involved.719 Here we could point to a slightly more 
aggressive stance by Rademacher and Luther in regards to Judenpolitik in Denmark, and while 
these suggestions were not applied, they would become part of the pressure on the Danish 
government during the Telegram Crisis (see chapter eight). Yet, it is worth noting that these 
were still informal.  
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Scavenius presented the German dissatisfaction with matters in Denmark at a cabinet 
meeting. Scavenius had been informed during the visit, possibly from Grundherr, that the 
attitude against Germany was too strong, and the demand for the introduction of the death 
penalty for acts of sabotage had been raised. Scavenius had apparently fended off these 
demands, but he now called for enforced restriction against the “officers, priests and teachers” 
who were stirring anti-German sentiment. Halfdan Hendriksen’s impression was that this was a 
German suggestion, and not one to be followed by the government. The fact that these 
significant social groups were to be restrained might indicate that the government was losing 
support for its cooperation among the upper levels of society. The issue of Jewish civil servants 
was also raised by the Germans who had specifically requested the dismissal of Einar Cohn, 
Seligmann and Lindgren (who was married to a Jewish woman).720 It would seem that as most 
Jews by this point had been removed from Danish companies, the next step was to move against 
the civil servants.  
Despite the slow progress compared to the rest of Europe, where much harsher measures 
had been introduced at much earlier stages, the pattern of exclusion came in a different order 
compared to the Judenpolitik in Germany. In Denmark Jewish company owners were excluded 
before the civil servants. Still, the attempt to exclude these groups in an informal way carries 
recognizable traits of the formal exclusions in Germany in the 1930’s. 
7.4 A Re-Evaluation of Cecil von Renthe-Fink  
This chapter is the last to explore and analyze Cecil von Renthe-Fink’s role in the German 
Judenpolitik in Denmark, as he was recalled in September 1942 due to the Telegram Crisis that 
will be dealt with in chapter eight. His wife remained in Copenhagen until the 1st of November. 
Mrs. Renthe-Fink was sent off at a small fare-well dinner with the participation of prominent 
members of government, and high-level civil servants.721  Most notably was the presence of 
Minister Gunnar Larsen and head of the Department of the Foreign Ministry Nils Svenningsen. 
Mrs. Renthe-Fink was described as bitter, and blamed the politicians for being unwilling to make 
the necessary changes, which had caused Renthe-Fink to be recalled to Berlin, despite his good 
intentions. She specifically mentioned the issue of Jews on the radio as one of the areas in which 
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the politicians should have been more responsive. Renthe-Fink had not been degraded. Instead, 
he became a special envoy, (diplomatischen Sonderbeauftragten), in Vichy France in December 
1943. A Jewish family was removed from an apartment in Berlin to make room for the Renthe-
Finks, and as so many others, they personally benefited from being servants of the 
dictatorship.722 Upon arriving in Berlin Renthe-Fink reported the Italian envoy was not a close 
associate to Germany, because the envoy’s wife was of Jewish Descent.723 Lastly, Ribbentrop 
requested Renthe-Fink and Werner von Grundherr to write a recommendation on how to 
proceed in Denmark, and it was suggested that the new Danish government should approach 
the German Judenpolitik further.724 Renthe-Fink’s continued use and promotion of the regime’s 
racial ideas serves as a further reason to re-evaluate our perception of his role in Denmark in 
regards to Judenpolitik. 
Taken together the chapters three to seven reveal Renthe-Fink as a continuous supporter, 
promoter, and developer of Judenpolitik in Denmark in accordance with orders from Berlin. Let 
us briefly recapture the many ways, he had enforced Judenpolitik. Renthe-Fink was personally 
involved in registering Jews as part of the prewar Aryanization measures in Denmark. During the 
occupation he and his staff would continuously work in collaboration with the RfA to Aryanize 
the Danish-German trade relationship. In January 1942, Renthe-Fink reported that he had 
succeeded in removing all Jewish representatives for German firms in Denmark, and in 
September all Danish-Jewish importers had also been excluded. Renthe-Fink suggested further 
measures against Danish-Jewish companies who received German goods from Danish importers, 
and through a legal technicality he suggested the application of the Nuremberg Laws to define 
Jewish companies in Denmark. Likewise, he was a continuous promoter of anti-Semitism in 
Denmark through the support of Kamptegnet, and the success of getting Jud Süss on Danish bill 
boards. He hired Lorenz Christensen to perform registration tasks for the legation in cooperation 
with Hans Hermannsen and his staff. It has not previously been recognized that Renthe-Fink 
suggested formal laws against the Jews in December 1941. The suggestion was quickly turned 
into a continued pressure on the Danish government to exclude Jews from prominent positions. 
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This was closely tied to orders from Berlin to pressure the Danish government on the issue while 
not damaging the overall cooperation. 
Cecil von Renthe-Fink has been high-lighted as a career diplomat who succeeded in keeping 
the Jewish Question at bay in Denmark. However, his direct involvement in Aryanization and 
many other exclusive measures against Jews shows that he was rather another example of a 
higher-level member of the AA who worked to achieve the dictatorship’s ideological goals. 
Without being a radical or fanatic follower of National Socialism, he acted as most German 
diplomats did in this period.725 He did not prevent Judenpolitik in Denmark, rather he was one 
of its promoters. Given the continued importance in keeping Denmark as a cooperative partner 
to Germany he acted within the informal realm and in accordance with the wishes of Berlin. 
From this perspective Renthe-Fink succeeded in several areas. Besides Aryanization he was 
successful in reaching Danish assurances of excluding the Jews from the radio, while he in an 
unknown number of cases saw to it that Jews were removed from their position, just as Cohen 
was removed from Nationaltidende and C.B. Henriques from Berlingske Tidende. 
7.5 Chapter conclusion 
Chapter seven has shown the German legation continued to assist in the Entjudung measures 
against Danish Jews in the media as well as continuously pressuring the Danish government to 
prevent Jewish civil servants from speaking on the radio. During the summer of 1942 we detect 
dissatisfaction with the progress of Judenpolitik in Denmark from Rademacher and Luther. 
However, the suggestions for enforced measures were still to be achieved by pressuring the 
Danish government, and without introducing formal laws. After being visited from Berlin 
Renthe-Fink exerted an even stronger pressure on the Danish government to dismiss specific 
Danish Jewish civil servants. The legation can thus be characterized as fully assisting in both 
formulating and executing Judenpolitik in Denmark.  
The response of the Danish government to the exclusive elements of the German Judenpolitik 
in this period varied. It reluctantly accepted the removal of Jews from some newspapers, and 
while failing to completely ensure that Jews were not to appear on the radio in one instance, 
the government ended by promising to exclude the Jews from appearing on the radio from 
August 1942. This seems to be the reason behind examining the race of one civil servant to make 
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sure he was not Jewish. Scavenius denied the government could dismiss Jewish civil servants 
without a direct German order. This appear as the limit to what the government would accept 
by the summer of 1942. We can thus detect a bystander government that progressively accepted 
more German demands, but also had a limit. At the same time, we should recall from chapter 
four that is also seems the government gave-up its minimal resistance to Aryanization measures 
close to this point in time as the main file ended in May 1942. 
We detect several stages of persecution. Stages two and five are the most notable: the 
informal exclusion of Jews in prominent positions, from appearing on the radio, and being part 
of the leadership of some Danish newspapers. The use of the definition of Jews (stage three) 
functions as a stepping stones for the identification (stage four) of who to exclude. In addition, 
we can identify that the Danish administration applied the definition of Jews in order to ascertain 
if a member of the administration is Jewish. This was done to approve his public lecture in the 
Trade and Offices Association. 
The chapter’s last section was a reevaluation of Renthe-Fink’s role in the Judenpolitik in 
Denmark. I argued Renthe-Fink was a continuous supporter, promoter, and developer of 
Judenpolitik without being a radical follower of National Socialism. This fits with the perception 
of most higher-level members of the AA in this period. However, the chapter has also pointed 
to other proponents of Judenpolitik employed at the legation. It has e.g. identified Gustav 
Meissner. This does give rise to question how other members of the legation’ staff assisted in 
achieving progress in Judenpolitik. We have already located the German police’s registration 
efforts, but they probably supported in other ways as well, which the surveillance of Grünbaum 
shows. This chapter high-lights that Judenpolitik was actively pursued by the leadership at the 
legation. If we relate this to the AA’s overall role in Judenpolitik this is not surprising. However, 
it has not previous been clearly identified in the Danish context. 
 
8 The Telegram Crisis and Administrative Discrimination 
Chapter eight shows the continued efforts of the legation to promote Judenpolitik from 
September 1942 through to August 1943. Section 8.1 briefly describes the Telegram Crisis. In 
section 8.2 the chapter returns to the period just before the Telegram Crisis as Himmler 
approved to deport the Danish Jews. However, we will follow how this grave proposal was left 
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in order to continue an informal Judenpolitik in Denmark. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 is devoted to the 
interim period from the 29th of September to November 4th, 1942. This is the period from Cecil 
von Renthe-Fink’s dismissal to the arrival of Werner Best. In this period the German policies 
against Denmark are explored following the discussions on these in Berlin. At the same time 
Barandon and Kanstein from the German legation would take over Renthe-Fink’s role, and begin 
to exert an enormous pressure on the Danish government to, among other things, adopt formal 
laws against the Jews. Section 8.4 focuses on the Danish government’s reactions in this period, 
and it shows that a minority within the government would accept formal anti-Jewish laws. 
In section 8.5 we take a step back from high-level politics in order follow the Danish 
volunteers from the Frikorps who were on leave in Denmark. This provides an important victim 
perspective, despite it being recorded in Danish Police reports, it reveals several anti-Semitic 
events took place in Copenhagen in the fall of 1942.  
Sections 8.6 and 8.7 zooms in on Werner Best’s two reports on the Judenpolitik from January 
and April 1943. These reports are often viewed as a defense for the cooperation policy. However, 
by examining the reports’ measures set-in motion to prepare for Best’s stated goal of the 
complete removal of the Danish Jews, we arrive at a more nuanced perspective on these reports. 
Section 8.8 follows the Danish government’s reactions to Werner Best’s arrival. It will show how 
the government began to administratively discriminate against the Danish Jews in order to make 
sure they were not hired in mostly higher-level positions in the civil service. Let us first take a 
closer look at the Telegram Crisis. 
The Telegram Crisis was sparked by Hitler’s anger towards King Christian X who in late 
September 1942 had only briefly thanked Hitler for his greetings on the King’s birthday. As a 
result, Renthe-Fink was recalled on the 29th of September, and Werner Best arrived on the 4th of 
November. In the interim Paul Barandon would act as a temporary plenipotentiary.726 The 
Danish government had to endure a waiting game for almost a month, and discussed several 
scenarios on how to proceed. At the same time, the government experienced a strong pressure 
from German officials in Denmark to initiate steps which would show political goodwill towards 
Germany. The introduction of formal laws against the Jews was pointed to as one such step, and 
this is reflected in the government’s discussions in October.   
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During this dire crisis, the Danish King had a serious horseback riding accident on the 19th of 
October 1942, and there was widespread fear he would not survive his injuries. The Crown 
Prince, the later Frederik IX, even took over the regency until Christian X was reinstated in May 
1943.727 The fall led to several discussions on how the government would proceed in case of the 
King’s death. The acting German Reich Plenipotentiary, Paul Barandon, knew about the King’s 
illness in surprising detail, and he could report on the King’s pulse, fever and general condition. 
The next three days Barandon reported on how the King slept as well as his statement that if he 
died, the problem of the Telegram Crisis would no longer exist. The fear of the King dying abated 
as he slowly began to recover in late September.728 
8.1 Himmler’s Approval to Arrest The Danish Jews 
On the 24th of September, shortly before the Telegram Crisis took off, Ribbentrop had called 
Luther to suggest the deportation of Jews from Denmark, Bulgaria, and Hungary.729 While it is 
well-established that nothing came of this, it is worthwhile examining the circumstances more 
closely than previous research has done. These events are telling of Berlin’s ideas on 
Judenpolitik, and provide an indication of Denmark’s position within a German dominated 
Europe. The idea to deport Jews from the three countries was most likely inspired by a meeting 
in the German leadership earlier that day. During the meeting Jews were in general held 
responsible for sabotage against Germany. In addition, deportations were discussed. They were 
considered to be progressing in all occupied areas, as well as in Croatia, Slovakia, and Romania. 
Ribbentrop’s proposal was to supplement these deportations by reaching out to the Bulgarian, 
Hungarian and Danish governments in order to have them deport Jews residing in these 
countries. The Italians would receive the same invitation, but this would originate directly from 
Ribbentrop or the Führer.730 Italy could thus be viewed as part of this suggestion. 
Bulgaria and Hungary were part of the axis alliance, while Denmark was not. However, all 
three countries communicated through diplomatic channels. In this context Ribbentrop’s 
suggestion seems as an attempt to bolster the AA’s role in the overall process of Judenpolitik.731 
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As we know Ribbentrop’s suggestion never materialized. This shows that despite the power 
relationship being in German favor, these countries still enjoyed a high degree of independence. 
So much so that a consultation was warranted before deportations could proceed. It is worth 
noting that deportations from these countries did not ensue until local governments were 
replaced by more German friendly ones or had seen a complete German takeover.732 The 
exception being Bulgaria which did not deport Jews from the country or were invaded by 
Germany. 
Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo in the RSHA, had attended the same meeting as 
Ribbentrop. Müller had similar suggestions.  On the very same day he advanced the idea to 
introduce registration measures against the Danish Jews in order to arrest them.733 It is 
undisclosed if these efforts were coordinated or not, but Müller’s proposals were harsher than 
Ribbentrop’s, as Himmler answered:  
 
“I agree with the arrest of the religious Jews (Glaubensjuden) as well as the 
Communist and Marxist functionaries. These measures are to be coordinated with 
the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry must be informed that I find the 
implementation of these measures necessary.”734 
 
This acceptance meant the creation of a Festnahmekartei (a registry for arrests), and the 
suggested move against the communist leaders was performed only weeks later.735 This 
underscores that Müller’s suggestions and Himmler’s approval were consequential. The 
proposal of these drastic measures seems to be the first time, the RSHA and Himmler took a 
direct initiative to arrest the Jews in Denmark. It underscores that the deportation of the Jews 
in Denmark was thought of by the main architects of the Holocaust even before Best arrived.736 
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It is unclear why the Jews in Denmark were not arrested at this point. Müller’s suggestions 
also needed approval from the AA, and it seems plausible that the AA convinced Himmler to 
postpone the arrests. It has been convincingly argued that the appointment of Werner Best as 
Reich Plenipotentiary halted the initiative. Werner Best, needed to deal with a friendly, rather 
than a hostile Danish government or no Danish government at all. If the Jews were arrested the 
projected reshuffling of the Danish government might also become an impossibility.737 (See 
section 8.2). It seems plausible that the consideration for Best’s future political maneuverability 
played a major role as he still enjoyed Himmler’s support. 
On the 8th of October, it seems an analysis of the Jewish influence on Communism in Denmark 
was ordered, thus tying the ideological and racial enemies of Nazism together in the Danish 
context.738 On November 4th  the report on Jewish influence in the Danish Communist Party was 
forwarded to the AA. It was composed by Heinrich Müller in collaboration with Gustav Meissner, 
and the fairly speedy reply points to the possibility that most of the case material was readily 
available due to earlier registration efforts. The report is not convincing in tying the two groups 
together, and the authors forced its conclusions to fit the racial ideas of amalgamating Jews and 
communists. Several of the Danish communists,  mentioned in the report are only connected to 
Jews by marriage. The report in many cases linked communist thoughts to the Danish Social 
Democrats, who were labelled as potential enemies although they were neither communist nor 
Jewish.739 
8.2 German Ideas for Denmark During the Telegram Crisis.  
In the middle of October,  Barandon would describe the Danish government as nervous and 
awaiting German demands for a restructuring of the cabinet. Barandon opposed the idea of 
adopting Danish Nazis into the government. Instead, he viewed the crisis as an opportune 
moment for Germany to achieve a more accommodating Danish government. One that would 
initiate measures against the press, the Danish resistance, and the Jews.740 Paul Kanstein agreed 
with Barandon. They both regarded the coming government as the last before a German take-
over of power, and this prognostication later proved to be precise. Kanstein passed his views on 
                                                     
737 As suggested by John T. Lauridsen in his introduction to “49. Heinrich Himmler an Heinrich Müller.” 
738 “50. Martin Luther an die Deutsche Gesandtschaft Kopenhagen.” 
739 “131. Heinrich Müller an das Auswärtige Amt,” November 4, 1942, WBK Vol. 1. 
740 “48. Paul Barandon an das Auswärtige Amt [DK MAG],” October 5, 1942, DK MAG. 
 228 
to Gottlob Berger, head of the SS-Hauptamt, while also supporting Werner Best as the most 
suited candidate for the position as Reich Plenipotentiary. Best was also Himmler’s favorite 
candidate, and it fell on fertile soil when Kanstein argued the SS would gain a stronghold in 
Denmark by appointing Best.741  
This development was further supported by two notes from Renthe-Fink to Ribbentrop on 
Danish matters. Renthe-Fink’s first note was a status on the situation in Denmark, and the 
second was an elaborate proposal on how to proceed. The second one was written in 
collaboration with von Grundherr (AA). Renthe-Fink’s first report did not mention the subject of 
the Jews. Generally, the Danish government was commended for adhering to German demands, 
but it was also criticized for not wholeheartedly supporting National Socialist Germany. On the 
other hand, the Danish people were generally described as negative towards Germany. Renthe-
Fink’s last words were “The weakening of the democracy’s powerful position has therefore been 
my most purposeful goal”.742  This was Renthe-Fink’s self-perception of his period in Denmark, 
and this goal was carried into the second note, which contained an elaborate suggestion on how 
to proceed in Denmark. 
Renthe-Fink and Grundherr’s ideas were more developed compared to Barandon’s and 
Kanstein’s suggestions. Renthe-Fink and Grundherr proposed to untie the Danish government 
from parliamentary bindings, and orienting the media towards Germany. At the same time an 
active campaign against the resistance movement was to be initiated and the leading Danish 
politicians were to be directed towards initiating German-style laws against the Jews. As a way 
of separating the Danish government and the monarchy, the new plenipotentiary was to ignore 
the King and only cooperate with the government. The authors expected that the future Danish 
government would probably oppose these demands, but this was to be used as an advantage to 
continuously restructure the government in a more National Socialist direction. Scavenius, 
Gunnar Larsen and Johannes Kjærbøl were regarded as examples of ministers who could remain 
in the coming government.743 There were thus clear intentions to destroy the remnants of 
Danish democracy by purposely provoking government reshufflings to accommodate German 
demands, and within this strategy a pressure for laws against the Jews was to be applied.  
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In late October, Hitler, Ribbentrop, Best, and Walter Hewel, Ribbentrop’s permanent officer 
at Hitler’s chancellery, held a preparatory meeting stipulating the tasks for the newly appointed 
Reich Plenipotentiary. Many of Renthe-Fink’s and Grundherr’s suggestions were discussed at 
this meeting. Hitler’s main concern was keeping Denmark as a militarily strategic bridge in order 
to maintain military control over Norway. The new Reich Plenipotentiary was to break the 
interior power of the country with the aid of the Danish Nazis, but as warned by Barandon and 
Kanstein, they were not necessarily to be part of the government. The importance was placed 
on forming a legal government with German-friendly personalities or people who would 
conform to German demands. As suggested, Best was only to work with the Danish government 
in order to secure a coordinating role in the formation of Danish laws and the administration of 
the country. The government was to have little political support in the population in order to 
make it feel completely dependent on “die deutsche Macht” (the German power). There were 
no demands for actions or policies against the Jews as far as we know. There were only two 
important and limiting elements to these ideas: they could not damage Germany’s overall 
foreign policy or Germany’s war economy. In November, Scavenius was invited to Berlin, and 
demands were made directly to him.744 
8.3 The Danish Government Before Best’s Arrival  
The Germans had made their final decisions in late October, but the preceding weeks had 
been used to continuously pressure the Danish government to make the wanted changes: 
reshuffle the government, introduce anti-Jewish laws and enact the death penalty for acts of 
sabotage. This pressure had been applied on Scavenius and Nils Svenningsen by several German 
representatives, but the only ones identified by name are Barandon and Kanstein. They all 
suggested to Scavenius that he could gain good-will by accommodating the Germans, but 
Scavenius acted as a coolheaded tactician and rejected them. His rejection was not founded on 
the contents of the German proposals. Rather, he required assurances of political stability in the 
Danish-German relationship in order to consent to them.745 Tellingly, Barandon’s and Kanstein’s 
                                                     
744 “109. Cecil von Renthe Fink: Niederschrift,” October 27, 1942, WBK Vol. 1 The introduction to source 109 contains a discussion on the 
possible author of the minutes. ; “110. Cecil von Renthe-Fink/Werner Best Niederschrift,” October 27, 1942, WBK Vol. 1. 
745 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:403, 408, 390 It concerns the dates 
of 12-10-1942, 24-10-1942, and 27-10-1942,. 
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impressions from these conversations were positive. They considered it likely a new government 
would accept these German demands.746 
According to a secret report from the German Military Secret Service, the Abwehr, the King 
had been asked about his position on the hypothetical question of German demands for laws 
against the Jews and the introduction of the death penalty. The King is cited as saying, “I would 
rather abdicate than voluntarily agree to, what I believe, would befoul the name of Denmark”.747 
While we lack Danish sources on this meeting it appears that representatives of the Danish 
government were probing the possibilities for accepting German demands. At this point it would 
seem as if Scavenius and others were contemplating accepting German demands for formal laws 
against the Jews in order to gain stability within the Danish-German relationship.  
Ribbentrop invited Scavenius to Berlin at the beginning of November to discuss German 
demands. The invitation resulted in a brief period of intense meetings between the ministers 
and the so-called Nine-Man Committee, as well as with Crown Prince Frederik who had taken 
over due to his father’s accident.748 The discussions during these meetings reveal the boundaries 
and limits on the introduction of formal measures against the Jews. Scavenius kicked off 
discussions at a Statsråd749 by pointing to seven issues on which Scavenius expected the 
Germans would make new demands.750 
 
1. The difficulties of the cooperation between a democracy and a totalitarian state 
                                                     
746 “72. Paul Barandon an das Auswärtige Amt,” October 15, 1942, WBK Vol. 1; “75. Paul Kanstein an Gottlob Berger,” October 16, 1942, WBK 
Vol. 1. 
747 Abwehr, “Bericht vom 5.10.1942,” October 5, 1942, PA, R261128 Politische Lage Dänemark“...ich abdiziere eher, als dass ich freiwillig in ein 
Abkommen einwillige, von dem ich der Meinung bin, dass es den Namen Dänemark beschmutzt.” It is uncertain who wrote the report for 
Abwehr, but it is highly detailed and corresponds to the known reactions of the Danish government durin the Telegram Crisis. See eg. ; 
Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:377 The report is possibly on the 
discussion between the King, the Crown Prince, Prime Minister Buhl and Scavenius, which took place on the 29th. of September, but Danish 
minutes of the meeting do not seem to exist. The Abwehr report seems credible as similar reports are rich in detail and some parts are 
certifiable through other sources. The Abwehr’s report from the 2.11.1942 contains extreme details on how power was transferred from the 
King due to the Crown Prince due the King’s horse-back riding accident on the 19.10.1942. Even that the queen had given Prime Minister Buhl 
comforting words if the King was to die. It also contains many details on the following cabinet meeting and there is a clear consistency 
between Gunnar Larsen’s minutes of the meeting on the 27.10.1942 on the government’s discussion on how to proceed in case of the King’s 
death. A further argument for the credibility of these reports is the status on the King’s illness, which on the 2.11.1942 is described as having 
taken the decisive turn for the better. Vilhelm Buhl and Alsing Andersen are mentioned as sources. It could be Georg F. Duckwitz who is the 
“ich” in the reports as he had an elaborate network among the Danish Social Democrats. Though his ties to Abwehr are blurred and they have 
not been decisively refuted ; Kirchhoff, Den gode tysker: Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz: de danske jøders redningsmand, 52–53, 107–10. 
748 It should be recalled the King had a horsback riding accident on the 19.10.1942 and the Crown prince took over regency until 15.5.1943 
Jespersen, Rytterkongen, 473, 477–78, 481. 
749 Meeting between the Regent and the cabinet on government issues 
750 “Statsrådsprotokol,” October 31, 1942, RA, Statsrådet The official minutes to do not reflect this discussion. Apparently, the protocols in 
which the minutes are normally recorded had not reached the meeting. The meeting’s minutes were instead based on notes from the 
Minister of Justice. He had only registered one point of seven - the possible demand for a change in the government. The following is based 
on Larsen’s minutes see below. 
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2. The Jewish question 
3. The Communists 
4. Instigators (Kaj Munk, Arne Sørensen, Hal Koch, and Vilhelm La Cour) 
5. Sabotage 
6. The attitude of the press 
7. Demands that Denmark send more workers to Germany 
 
The list is prioritized, and the two first bullet-points were considered the most important and 
politically difficult. The first point regarded the possible demands for a restructuring of the 
government in a direction which made it more independent from the political parties, and:  
 
“No. 2. was the Jewish question. The Foreign Minister paraphrased Göring’s 
statement to him in Berlin approximately a year ago, when Göring had stated that 
the question of National Socialism played a minor role; if there was just some form 
of cooperation between the countries it would not be of decisive importance if the 
system of government was based on National Socialist guidelines or not, even 
though the prerequisite, of course, had to be the achievement of good and 
confidential cooperation. On the contrary, one could not avoid the Jewish question, 
as it sooner or later would become a matter for all of Europe, but on the other hand 
the question did not have to be solved in the same way everywhere, as the Jewish 
question expressed itself in highly different ways in various countries. The Foreign 
Minister expected that it would be possible to get by with a very mild form of Jewish 
laws, namely the dismissals of Jewish civil servants in higher positions or something 
similar. The Foreign Minister was aware of the extreme difficulty of this question, 
and it could cause great difficulties even if it was toned down to something less.”751 
 
Based on his meeting with Göring the Foreign Minister evidently expected that the Germans 
would demand anti-Jewish laws, while Kanstein’s and Barandon’s recent pressure only added to 
                                                     
751 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:422–33 ”No. 2. Var jødespørgsmålet. 
Udenrigsministeren refererede Görings udtalelse til ham i Berlin for ca. 1 år siden, idet Göring her havde udtalt, at spørgsmålet om 
nationalsocialismen spillede en underordnet rolle; når blot man kunne få et samarbejde i stand mellem landene, ville det ikke være af 
afgørende betydning, om regeringssystemet var efter nationalsocialistiske retningslinjer eller ej, selvom om forudsætningen selvfølgelig 
måtte være, at man kunne opnå et godt og fortroligt samarbejde. Derimod kunne man ikke komme uden om Jødespørgsmålet, da det dog før 
eller senere blev en europæisk sag, men på den anden side behøvede spørgsmålet ikke løses ensartet hele vejen, da jødespørgsmålet jo gav 
sig højst forskelligt udtryk i de forskellige lande. Udenrigsministeren kunne derfor tænke sig, at man måske kunne komme igennem med en 
meget mild form for jødelovgivning, nemlig afskedigelse af jødiske embedsmænd i højere stillinger eller lignende. Udenrigsministeren var dog 
klar over, det var et yderst vanskeligt spørgsmål, og at det kunne volde store vanskeligheder, selvom det blev dæmpet ned til noget 
underordnet.”. 
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this expectation.752 Scavenius was thus ready to accept formal laws against Jewish civil servants 
to accommodate German demands and secure the cooperation. 
During the meeting, Prime Minister Buhl denied that the government could be changed, anti-
Jewish laws introduced, and the death penalty reinstated. The remaining questions were up for 
negotiation. Most other ministers agreed, but two ministers were ready to accept some form of 
discriminatory measures against the Jews. Minister for the interior Knud Kristensen was flexible 
on the Jewish question. The most important issue for him was the form and extent of the laws. 
Minister for Education Jørgen Jørgensen could not support formal laws, but he was ready to 
accept minor informal measures against the Jews. The Jews were to be removed from prominent 
positions, “which they themselves should be strongly interested in”753, he argued, while the 
Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs Vilhelm Fibiger opposed any form of anti-Jewish laws.754 We do 
not know the positions of the remaining ministers Alsing Andersen, Gunnar Larsen, Kristen 
Bording, Halfdan Hendriksen and Johannes Kjærbøl. We should expect that Scavenius’ usual 
allies, Larsen and Jacobsen, were probably ready to accept formal anti-Jewish laws, but this 
cannot be substantiated by the sources at hand. Yet, we can conclude that at least three of the 
government’s ministers agreed to some form of discriminatory measures against the Jews, while 
two spoke against it.755 Clearly, the position of some of the cabinet members had changed 
significantly since December 1941, making this a telling example of how the logic of cooperation 
functioned to continuously, but piecemeal to give in to German demands. At the same time the 
bystander role had progressed towards accommodating German demands. In the summer of 
1942 Scavenius had demanded a direct German order to dismiss Jewish civil servants, but this 
stance seems to have evaporated. 
As Scavenius went to Berlin, Ribbentrop would not demand laws against the Jews, instead 
there was a strong German pressure to make Scavenius Prime Minister. National Socialist 
ministers were also demanded, but Scavenius wanted the demand in writing, cleverly calling 
                                                     
752  In the official and brief minutes Scavenius is quoted as stating “There would probably be made very strong demands regarding the question 
of the government in Denmark, as well as the issue of the Jewish question” / ”Der ville sikkert blive fremsat meget stærke krav med hensyn til 
regeringsspørgsmålet i Danmark, samt angående jødespørgsmålet…”“Ministermøde,” October 31, 1942, RA, Ministermøder 29.1.1940 - 
28.8.1943 . 
753 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:426“...det måtte de jo selv være 
stærkt interesseret i.” 
754 Ibid., 2:427. 
755 “Ministermøde,” October 31, 1942 The official minutes of the meeting are briefer, but there is not a clear denial of anti-Jewish laws. 
Vilhelm Buhl is quoted as saying he could not accept changes in government, but only had reservations (forbehold) on the issue of formal 
laws against the Jews. Most cited ministers agree with Buhl. The stance towards changes in the government thus appear more adamant. 
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Ribbentrop’s bluff.756 As Scavenius left Berlin, he was approached by Renthe-Fink who hoped 
Scavenius would continue to have confidential talks with Best as he had had with Renthe-Fink. 
During the conversation, Scavenius said, “It would be difficult to get the parliamentary ministers 
to commit hara-kiri”. The reference to collective suicide probably meant that many ministers 
were not only to be replaced, but also that the government was to sever its ties to parliament. 
The latter, at least did not transpire.757  
In Denmark, the result of negotiations with Best and tough discussions among the Danish 
ministers saw Scavenius becoming Prime Minister, while maintaining his position as Foreign 
Minister. The price for ensuring the Danish Nazis were not adopted into the government was 
the inclusion of additional ministers without party affiliation.758 The last government of the 
cooperation ended up having six non-affiliated ministers and seven ministers representing 
political parties. This was a significant change compared to the first coalition government in April 
1940 that only consisted of political ministers, while the second from July 1940 had had three 
non-affiliated ministers. The continued pressure to reshuffle the government had over time 
proven successful in some respects. At the same time, these concessions secured that the Danish 
National Socialists never became part of the government. 
Discussions on the restructuring of the government were also held in the Nine-Man 
Committee. Peter Munch feared the consequence of a possible break-down of the cooperation 
would result in the persecution of Jews and further arrests.759 Scavenius’ arguments for a change 
in government illustrated his firm belief in the cooperation. Using himself as an example, he 
stressed that the persons trusted by the Germans had better options during negotiations. He 
then used Slovakia as an example of what could be achieved if a nation adhered to German 
demands. His final argument came from biology; Denmark had to act as a chameleon and change 
its colors according to its situation.760 Scavenius’ position can be described in many ways, from 
unscrupulous to a political realist.761 However, his willingness to accept new and further German 
demands seemed to have had few limits. 
                                                     
756 “130. Paul Otto Schmidt: Aufzeichnung,” November 4, 1942, WBK Vol. 1. 
757 “128. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an Werner Best [WBK Vol. 1],” November 3, 1942, WBK Vol. 1. 
758 Christensen et al., Danmark besat: krig og hverdag 1940-45, 342–44. 
759 Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget, IV Regering og Rigsdag under besættelsen. Aktstykker. Stenografiske referater:729. 
760 Ibid., IV Regering og Rigsdag under besættelsen. Aktstykker. Stenografiske referater:731; See Tönsmeyer, “Kollaboration als 
handlungsleitendes Motiv? Die slowakische Elite und das NS-Regime” She shows how Slovakia accepted its role as “Schutzstaat”, and 
maintained maneuverability to pursue political elements that in the opinion of the one party state benefitted the nation . 
761 Hans Kirchhoff, “Erik Scavenius - landsforræder eller patriot?,” in Mennesker, politik og besættelse: fire biografiske skitser ; Erik Scavenius, 
Børge Thing, Arne Sørensen, Hans Hedtoft, ed. Niels Wium Olesen, 1. udg., 1. opl. (Esbjerg, 1996), 15, 25, 35. 
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Just around suppertime on November 7th 1942, in the final hours before the political parties 
and ministers decided to let Scavenius function as both Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, the Jews again became a discussion point among the ministers. Despite the fact that 
formal demands regarding the Jews had not been made, Scavenius was asked to state his 
position on joining the Axis powers, legislating against the Jews and possibly bringing German-
friendly persons into the government.762 The politicians wanted Scavenius to state his position 
on these points to avoid future conflicts on the issues. Scavenius replied that he felt he was an 
object of suspicion and would be unable to work under such inflexible conditions. He thought it 
was dangerous to take non-negotiable stands. Regarding the question of joining the Axis, he 
would not accept such demands, but he noted that the issue was no longer relevant. His recent 
visit to Berlin had revealed that the Germans did not want troops from Denmark. It would seem 
that Scavenius’ position had changed since December 1941. This was not due to a newly 
principled stance, but rather a German statement that buried the issue. Scavenius’ stance on the 
Jews remained flexible and again reveals his willingness to adopt parts of the German 
Judenpolitik should the need arise to maintain the cooperation:  
 
“Likewise, as he had repeatedly stated, he agreed in principle with the other 
members of the government, that one could not or should not be all for Jewish laws 
on the basis of the Nuremberg laws; while on the other hand everything had to be 
seen in relation to the actual circumstances and demands that were being raised. He 
thought he would accept a German demand to remove the Jewish civil servants or 
something similar; this could even be in the interest of the Jews in order to avoid 
something worse, but as he had stated previously, he could not and would not give 
any actual statement on these issues.”763 
 
In essence, Scavenius and some of the other ministers were ready to accept further formal 
measures against the Jews. The only concrete step mentioned was removing the Jewish civil 
servants. However, Scavenius’ statement allowed for further acceptances if such demands were 
made. This does open for a discussion on the cooperation functioning as a shield for the Jews.  
                                                     
762 “Ministermøde,” November 7, 1942, RA,  Ministermøder 29.1.1940 - 28.8.1943. 
763 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:464–65 ”Ligeledes var han jo, som 
han gang på gang havde udtalt, principielt enig med de andre regeringsmedlemmer i, at man ikke kunne eller burde gå ind for jødelove efter 
Nürnberglovenes stil, medens man på den anden side måtte se alt i relation til de faktiske forhold og de krav, der blev stillet. Således kunne 
han godt tænke sig at gå ind på et tysk krav om at fjerne jødiske embedsmænd eller lignende, dette kunne måske endda være i jødernes 
interesse for at undgå noget værre, men som sagt, han kunne ikke og ville ikke give nogen egentlig erklæring vedrørende disse emner.”. 
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A continuous German pressure had slowly shifted the attitude of a minority of ministers to be 
willing to accept formal anti-Jewish laws against Jewish civil servants. Contrary to the position 
that the Danish government would always reject proposed laws against the Jews, the discussions 
among politicians and ministers reveal that the issue was up for negotiation during crises in the 
Danish-German relationship. To a minority within the government, formal anti-Jewish laws, in 
some toned-down version, was considered a possible solution to remedy the Danish-German 
relationship, while maintaining some political power. As we shall see in section 8.8 the matter 
of Jews in prominent positions became a continuous concern and a subject of discussion during 
the period of Werner Best’s administration. 
8.4 A Visit from the Front Lines 
During this crucial crisis in the Danish-German relationship, 850 Danes who had volunteered 
for the Waffen-SS as members of the Frikorps Danmark were on leave in Copenhagen in 
September and October 1942. The Frikorps was part of Himmler’s idea to create national SS- 
legions outside of Germany who were to be engaged in the war against the Soviet Union. Three 
days after the invasion of Russia, the go-ahead to form the Frikorps was given. It is well 
established that the Frikorps was to blame for numerous incidents of violence and clashes 
between the volunteers and the Danish population.764 The visit at large was the cause of many 
discussions within the government.765 Yet, the incidents directed against Jews were not part of 
these. The episodes targeting Jews are included here as they provide an important victim 
perspective. 
The Frikorps volunteers were ideologically convinced, and instigated several anti-Semitic 
incidents, which have not been explored in detail.766 Most cases are described in several Danish 
police reports, as well as in a larger report summarizing these incidents.767 The large report 
reflects several cases of rumors, harassment and threats, but only a few incidents of physical 
abuse. The individual reports provide examples of Danish Jews being discriminated against on a 
more direct level. The police placed observers in several entertainment establishments in the 
                                                     
764 Hans Kirchhoff, John T. Lauridsen, and Aage Trommer, eds., Gads leksikon om dansk besættelsestid 1940-45, 1. udg., 1. opl. (København: 
Gad, 2002), 173–74; Christensen, Poulsen, and Smith, Under Hagekors og Dannebrog. Danskere i Waffen SS 1940-1945, 353–59. 
765 See Gunnar Larsen’s diary entries for September and partly October Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: 
dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942. 
766 Christensen, Poulsen, and Smith, Under Hagekors og Dannebrog. Danskere i Waffen SS 1940-1945, 358 The authors have a paragraph on 
these incidents, based on the overall report in the source collection printed immediately after the war. 
767 “90 Rapport om Frikorpsets besøg,” November 1942, RA, Statsadvokaten for særlige anliggender - diverse sager. 
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city based on risk evaluations and rumors. Their task was to observe and if need be closedown 
incidents involving the Frikorps. The majority of the cases are presented below, however it 
should be noted that these only reflect incidents which were reported and recorded by the 
police.  
Some Jewish artists experienced threats and verbal abuse. Max Skalka was the conductor of 
the orchestra at Restaurant Czardas. He contacted the police as he feared that members of the 
Frikorps were about to arrive at his residence. He stated nine uniformed men had approached 
him at the restaurant and threatened to appear at his home. Only a few days later, two members 
of the Frikorps demanded to be informed if Skalka was Jewish. Though Skalka denied it, the 
Frikorps member said, “You have to understand, Mr. Skalka, there is a movement in motion 
against Semites… This question has to be solved, and it has to be removed by the root without 
mercy and pardon.” Skalka had the impression the situation could have escalated, had it been 
confirmed he was Jewish.768 
The Jewish singer Rachel Rastenni experienced more direct anti-Semitism during her concerts 
at the National Scala in Copenhagen.769 On the 15th of October 1942, Danish police witnessed 
two members of the Frikorps began yelling at her: “There is the Jew swine.” Shortly after this, 
they chanted “Down with Jews” and “Death to the Jews.” They promised to show up the next 
day with more men if she was not removed. The next few days, the police were present at 
Rastenni’s concerts and witnessed the same behavior. The Danish police had learned that the 
Frikorps wanted to see off the “Jewess” in a violent manner on the 20th, but nothing came of 
it.770 Additional incidents of anti-Semitism occurred at the National Scala. A waiter was called a 
“Jew-swine” and a Jewish looking guest was insulted a few weeks later. Anti-Semitic propaganda 
was handed out and posters were hung on the toilet walls.771 
A similar incident happened at the restaurant Mynchen772, where members of the Frikorps 
and the German Navy loudly cheered “Death to the Jews”.773 At the Lulu Ziegler Cabaret two 
                                                     
768 “11078. Ang. SS. Soldater, der indfinder sig i restaurant "Czardas og søger oplysninger om Max Skalka,” September 22, 1942, RA, AS-Sager 
Kbh.“De må forstå Hr. Skalka, at der er en bevægelse i gang mod semitter...Dette spørgsmål skal løses og det skal rives op med roden uden 
skånsel og uden pardon.” 
769 In Bent Blüdnikow, Min fars flugt: jødiske skæbner i oktober 1943, 1. udgave (København: Berlingske, 2013), 72–74 Blüdnikow also points to 
these by using a postwar interview from Rastenni as well as in the diary of Journalist Vilhelm Bergstrøm. Unfortunately, only the diary is 
mentioned by name, and it reveals very little. The interview which is extensively quoted is unfortunately used without citation. 
770 “11430. (no title),” October 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh. 
771 “90 Rapport om Frikorpsets besøg,” 21, 31, 45. 
772 This is the correct spelling 
773 “11181. Ang. uoverensstemmelser i restaurant ‘Mynchen’ mellem tilfældige gæster og medlemmer af den tyske værnemagt.,” September 
28, 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh. 
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members of the Frikorps loudly called the place a “Jew joint” and threatened to bring scissors 
on their next visit as “…someone needed to get their hair cut…”.774  This possibly referred to the 
public humiliation of Jews in Eastern Europe, which involved cutting the beard and hair off 
orthodox Jews. In the restaurant La Bohemé, the piano player was threatened with beatings and 
called a “Jew-swine”. The piano player was forcibly removed from the premises and handed over 
to the Danish police for insulting the Danish volunteers.775 
The Danish police recorded several other incidents of public anti-Semitic utterances. A 
member of the Danish police could report he had witnessed 7-8 members of the Frikorps yelling 
to a Jewish person, “Ew, it smells like garlic here”. This gathered a crowd, which the police officer 
had to disperse, but the soldiers kept following the person. The police officer kept alert, but 
nothing further happened.776 There are several other minor incidents recorded e.g. the yelling 
of “Jew swine” to a merchant by a member of the SS.777 A non-Jewish man would explain his 
“Jewish looks” were presently against him as they apparently fit the stereotypes of anti-Semitic 
propaganda. He had been subject to several episodes of racial slur being yelled at him.778 
There are additional examples of threats and one example of violence. An intoxicated Danish 
Frikorps soldier had drawn his gun in an ice cream parlor in Copenhagen, threatening to kill the 
Jewish waiter if he did not remove himself from the premises, which he did. Two other 
customers were held at gun-point as the Dane and his partner, a German regular soldier, bragged 
about shooting 7,000 Jews and Bolsheviks. They claimed that the Danish Jews would be removed 
in two weeks. They were gone as police arrived.779 
Late in the evening of October 9th an incident of violence occurred in the city center of 
Copenhagen. A member of the Frikorps had yelled “Down with the Jews” several times. This had 
caused a civilian to slap the Frikorps member in the face, and as it was presumed the civilian was 
Jewish, the retaliation was swift: two blows with the butt end of the bayonet while being called 
a “Jew-swine”. Even though it later turned out the person was not Jewish, the Frikorps member 
was not aware of this during the fight.780 
                                                     
774 “11006. (no title),” September 17, 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh. 
775 “90 Rapport om Frikorpsets besøg,” 44. 
776 “11108. (No title),” September 24, 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh. 
777 “11212. Råb mod person,” September 29, 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh. 
778 “11115. Fornærmelse,” September 25, 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh. 
779 “11185. Isbaren,” September 29, 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh. 
780 “90 Rapport om Frikorpsets besøg,” 51. 
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The synagogue attracted repeated attention during the Frikorps’ leave. There were rumors 
that the synagogue and Freemasons’ hall would be bombed after a large recruitment meeting 
at the arena K.B. Hallen, as the soldiers apparently had smuggled explosives with them from the 
front. This caused the police to place guards at the premises.781 Nine days later, it was reported 
that a mixture of German soldiers and members of the Frikorps were seen on the premises of 
the synagogue looking for a Mr. Nathan.782 This happened again a week later, but this time the 
members of the Frikorps had urinated on the building.783  The Jewish community was concerned, 
and as the important Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur fell in September, the congregation requested 
additional security measures from Danish police. Five police officers would guard the synagogue 
during the daytime and four during the evening. In addition, a civilian police patrol of two men 
would be observing the area.784 
While the incidents might be regarded as mild compared to those elsewhere in Europe, they 
underscore that the Jews in Copenhagen were subject to public harassments such as yelling and 
threats by the Frikorps, and sometimes regular German soldiers. It is surprising to see that 
Frikorps members were joined by regular German soldiers as they have largely been regarded 
as two distinct groups. It raises the question if other irregular anti-Semitic incidents against Jews 
took place during the occupation. The role of the Danish police seems to have been quite 
important as they interfered if things appeared to escalate to violence but would otherwise not 
intervene. We now leave the streets of Copenhagen to return to political level and the arrival of 
Werner Best. 
8.5 Werner Best 
Werner Best came to Denmark by plane, landing at 12:30 on the 4th of November 1942. He 
was greeted at Copenhagen Airport by his SS colleague Kanstein and Nils Svenningsen.785 On the 
same day, Best had received his formal appointment from the Führer as Bevollmächtigten des 
Reiches in Dänemark and was appointed head of the German legation by Ribbentrop.786 Best 
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was promoted to SS-Gruppenführer by Hitler in November 1942, the 4th highest rank in the 
corps, despite being in the service of the Foreign Ministry.787 
Shortly after Best’s arrival, Franz Rademacher visited him to discuss further measures against 
the Jews in Denmark. It was agreed that these measures were to progress slowly, and Best was 
to report on his plans.788 In January 1943, Best had been in Berlin meeting with representatives 
from both the RSHA and the AA. The content of these meetings remains largely unknown, but 
shortly afterwards Best sent off the first of two larger reports on the Jews in Denmark. In the 
introduction to his first report in January, he specifically referred to his conversations in Berlin 
with Luther and Rademacher. This shows that the Judenpolitik in Denmark was a coordinated 
matter, and the content of the report hardly surprised the AA.789 
The report is divided into two main parts. The first one describes the current state of affairs 
and explains why formal Jewish laws cannot be introduced. The second part contains a host of 
suggestions on how to proceed against the Jews in an informal manner. Let us initially focus on 
the first part. Best wrote that anti-Jewish laws similar to the ones in Germany would be met with 
resistance and result in the collapse of the cooperation. Scavenius had said his government 
would step down if they were introduced, because the political parties as well as the King would 
not participate in such policies. Combined with Abwehr’s report on the King’s opposition to laws 
against the Jews as well as our knowledge on the discussions within the government, these 
bystander groups had set the limits for how far the German demands would be accommodated. 
Best guessed, that a removal of the government would result in his appointment as 
Reichskommissar.790 
Best’s arguments for not introducing Jewish laws come off as strategic, but also seem to 
reflect a fear of Danish public reactions rather than the government’s. He argued that Jewish 
laws would remove the last restraints the Danish population had at the moment, and direct 
them into active resistance. Even the Danish Nazi leader Frits Clausen had warned Best that the 
Danish population would react in favor of the Jews. Added resistance would lead to a need for 
more German police and military in Denmark. Best instead argued that it would be much easier 
to tie Denmark closer to Germany by keeping the Danish government in a state of hope and fear: 
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789 “76. Werner Best an das Auswärtige Amt,” January 13, 1943, WBK Vol. 2. 
790 Ibid. 
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the hope was tied to the continuation of the parliamentary system, while the fear of losing it 
would keep them in a deadlock position deeply dependent on Germany.791 Essentially, this was 
very similar to Renthe-Fink and Grundherr’s suggestions. (See section 8.2). At the same time, it 
seems Best had the Danes exactly where he wanted them – in a deadlock built on fear of losing 
power. Previous research argues that the first part of Best’s report is to be regarded as a way of 
postponing the formal laws against the Jews in Denmark, and also point to a surprising continuity 
in Renthe-Fink’s and Best’s Judenpolitik.792 Given the findings in this and previous chapters I 
would argue that this part of the report reflects a continuation of a well-established German 
Judenpolitik which was highly influenced and approved by the main actors in Berlin. This means 
that Best’s arguments can hardly be attributed to a personal strategy of preventing formal laws 
against the Jews Denmark. 
The second part of Best’s report did not contain arguments against introducing anti-Jewish 
laws in Denmark. Instead, it gave concrete suggestions on how to proceed against the Jews on 
the informal level in Denmark. Best’s vision for the Jews in Denmark was, in his own evident 
words, the ”total solution of the Jewish question in Denmark”,793 which he mentioned twice. We 
should not doubt Best’s intentions: the Jewish question would also be solved in Denmark, and 
this is not surprising. As Ulrich Herbert has pointed out it was a prevalent feature of Best’s career 
and world view to seek this goal.  
 
“But for Best, as for most other SS leaders, the removal of the Jews from the German 
sphere of influence was a political goal sui generis;….since the days of the völkisch 
student movement the goal of pushing the Jews out of the German sphere of 
influence had been at the center of his thinking – and in this sense Best had acted 
since the mid-1930s, first in Berlin, then in Paris, from a central and authoritative 
position in each case.”794 
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793 “76. Werner Best an das Auswärtige Amt”“...totale Lösung der Judenfrage in Dänemark...” 
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However, for the time being Best would have to limit his policies to prevent the Danish 
government from stepping down. The following suggestions were within these limits and 
intended as the first steps in reaching the long-term goal of a total solution. 
 
1. There was to be a systematic removal of Danish Jews from public life, especially  
a. in the Civil Service  
b. in public institutions  
c. in the press.  
2. Jews were to be removed from the German-Danish economy through the introduction 
of the informal rule that Jews could not be employed by Danish firms. This would be 
achieved by introducing a clause in future contracts between Danish and German 
firms stipulating that Danish companies could not employ Jews. 
3. There were to be some arrests of Jews on charges of political or criminal offences in 
order to threaten the Jewish minority.  
4. Best had begun building a registry of the Danish Jews, which were estimated at 6,000 
and concentrated in the capital. Essentially, this would “ease the later solution”, Best 
argued.795  
 
 His suggestions for further measures against the Jews were slightly harsher than those set in 
motion by Renthe-Fink in September, but fit the overall and long-term Judenpolitik of gradually 
excluding the Jews from more and more areas. 
Luther’s reply was one of approval:   
 
“The proposed measures from the Reich Plenipotentiary are to be considered a first 
step in the solution of the Jewish question in Denmark. It must be attempted, step 
by step, to clear-up the Jewish question in Denmark.”796 
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Ribbentrop also accepted Best’s suggestions. The Judenpolitik in Denmark, which was essentially 
a policy of exclusion, had now been expanded by Best and approved by Berlin.797 
Clearly, in order to certify Best’s intentions, it is also of great importance to examine if his 
suggestions were actually carried out. Previous research seems to have largely neglected to 
follow up on this. Suggestions two and three are the hardest to evaluate. It remains unclear if 
Best began ordering the arrests of Jews in order to threaten them. This would probably have to 
be done through the SPSA if it were to follow normal procedures, but the examined cases do not 
reveal such arrests. There is of course the possibility of having representatives of the legation 
question Jews under arrest, but this type of sources was probably destroyed shortly before the 
war ended.798 
The suggestion to remove Jewish employees from Danish companies who were trading with 
Germany went further than the previous Aryanization measures in Denmark, because it went 
beyond excluding importers, owners, board members or directors. It seems foggy, but plausible, 
that the initiative was carried out in a consistent manner.  We know that the members of the 
GCC from 1939 were asked to remove Jewish employees, and that companies with Jewish 
employees were present in Christensen’s large report on the Jews (see chapter seven). There is 
a Danish police report from May 1943 on the steel importer STAMEKO, that traded with 
Germany, which specifically stresses that the company does not employ Jews or have Jews in 
their leadership.799 These are indications of such steps being initiated, and if we view them in 
conjunction with Best’s other Aryanization initiatives (see chapter four) they also appear likely. 
However, an irrefutable answer can only be provided after a closer examination of contracts 
made between Danish and German companies in the period from February-August 1943. 
The evidence regarding the other initiatives is more convincing. Removing Jews from the civil 
service and public organizations, suggestions 1a and 1b, were discussed several times at the 
highest levels of the Danish government. Below, I will analyze these and show how the 
government reacted to these demands. Here, it will suffice to highlight the fact that Best 
monitored all reassignments and promotions of civil servants to secure Jews were not 
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appointed.800 In addition, Lorenz Christensen was ordered to compose a list of all Jews who held 
a law degree, and Best received it on in April 1943.801 The list contained the names of 65 Jews, 
including all details of kinship and their addresses. Christensen knew 21 of them were members 
of the Jewish congregation, and some also belonged to B’nai B’rith.802 The sources are silent on 
why this list was made, but it was designated as being addressed to German Legation and it fits 
into Best’s initiative 1b. It is possible that Best in due time would apply pressure on the Danish 
government to begin removing Jewish lawyers, as he had already secured the Danish 
government’s support to refrain from promoting or hire Jewish civil servants (see below). The 
list cannot be directly linked to these initiatives, but it seems unlikely it was made without a 
purpose. 
Suggestion 1c, the removal of Jews from the press is reflected in a request from Best for an 
updated overview of Jews in Danish media. This report was also written by Lorenz Christensen 
and as Best after the war would testify to meeting Christensen multiple times it seems that 
Christensen functioned as Best’s primary expert on Jewish matters.803 This brings us to an 
evaluation of suggestion 1c. 
 It remains unknown when Best ordered the report on the Danish press. It was finished after 
August 29th 1943 and presented before October 1943. Jürgen Schröder was head of the office 
for press affairs at this point as he had taken over from Meissner, who left in April 1943. After 
the war Schröder argued that the report had been ordered to appease fanatic National Socialists 
in Berlin and to prove Jews were not influential in the Danish press.804 If we examine the report 
more closely, the content is contrary to Schröder’s arguments. The report went to great lengths 
to prove a Jewish presence in the press. It seems more likely that Best ordered the report in 
order to fulfill the promise he had made to Berlin in January and to target specific individuals. 
Lorenz Christensen’s report on the press was highly anti-Semitic incriminating anyone with 
the slightest ties to Jews. “Jewish blood“ was certified by stretching family relations far, and 
mentioned all kinds of historical ties to Jewish companies or banks. He went through all the 
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major newspapers in this manner, and one example should suffice to show his method. The 
paper Berlingske Tidende no longer employed the Jewish board member, C.B. Henriques, who 
had first been pointed to as representing a problem for the Germans by Renthe-Fink in 
December 1941. The main editor Svend Aage Lund was characterized as having a Jewish mother, 
and several other board members were said to be connected to Jewish finance. Christensen 
argued that these networks had obstructed any critique of Jews in the paper. The editor of the 
law section was categorized as half-Jewish and the editor of the social pages was categorized as 
one-eighth Jewish. Among the staff, there was one full-Jew, two half-Jews and two one-eighth 
Jews. All were mentioned by name and detailed information on their heritage was provided. One 
other person was mentioned for his two marriages. First to a half-Jewish woman and then a 
quarter Jewish woman. This type of detailed analysis continued over 20 pages, addressing the 
papers of B.T., Nationaltidende, Aftenposten Politiken, Børsen, Kristeligt Dagblad, Aarhus 
Stiftstidende, Jyske Tidende, Aalborg Amtstidende and Vestkysten. It is worth noting that 
Christensen included a report he had written on the Union of Journalists’ financial ties to Jews 
in late 1941.805 
In a way these reports tie into suggestion four, the registration of Danish Jews.  We know 
from chapter five that the registration process had been taking place for a long period of time, 
but as we have also learned Troels Hoff stated in April 1943 that questions on race posed to 
Danish police were on the rise. This could be attributed to Best’s initiatives from January.  
8.6 Best’s Second Report 
In April 1943, Best wrote his second report by request from Ribbentrop. It was an overview 
of the progression of the Judenpolitik in Denmark. Ribbentrop especially wanted to know how 
many Jews were in prominent public positions or had a great influence in Denmark. In addition, 
the report was to include a section on the influence of the Jews in German-Danish trade. Lastly, 
Ribbentrop wanted Best to evaluate the possibility of the Danish government taking steps 
against the Jews. Ribbentrop’s proposal was limited as Scavenius and his government could not 
experience difficulties  (Schwierigkeiten) if these steps were initiated.806 
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Best could thus easily reject Ribbentrop’s suggestion as it would raise problems for Scavenius. 
Best stated the introduction of formal Jewish laws in Denmark would result in the Danish 
government stepping down. Most interpretations of this report view it as if Best is arguing 
against Jewish laws to protect the cooperation.807 However, Best’s rejection was in line with 
Ribbentrop’s limited proposal, and it seems that Berlin and Copenhagen agreed on how to 
proceed once again. Best argued that the role of the Jews was very minor and summarized their 
influence based on Lorenz Christensen’s reports. In the public administration, libraries, schools 
and universities, there were only 31 Jews, and in the press fourteen were identified, but none 
of them served as main editors. In the arts, only 21 Jews were known.808 The number of lawyers 
was set to 35, which is not consistent with Christensen’s most recent report, which mentioned 
65 Jews with a law degree.809 However, the number of 35 lawyers is much closer to the 41 
mentioned in Christensen’s report from January 1942. That list had only included barristers who 
could represent clients in Supreme Court or both the High Courts and the District Courts.810 It 
could be that Best only counted this type of lawyers or he purposely lowered the number. Taken 
together, and compared to the number of Jews in such positions in other countries, Best could 
easily and convincingly conclude that the “Jewish question in Denmark plays such a slight role 
qualitatively and factually that for the time being there is no practical necessity for specific 
measures to be taken.”811 He then moved on to describe the Jewish influence in trade and 
concluded that the Jewish influence in all important areas was so small that it would be harmful 
to German interests to move against them. He both reasoned and expected a coming 
comprehensive solution (Regelung) would be simple to complete due to the geographic 
concentration of the Jews and the registration work being done by his own men.812 
In the conclusion of the report, Best provided an opening for moving against the 1,351 
stateless Jews from Germany. His scheme was to let them regain their German citizenship and 
then deport them. Best reasoned this move would not judicially violate the sovereignty of 
Denmark and would not be “psychologically” damaging to Danish-German relations.813 The 
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suggestion was unsuccessful, and I will evaluate it more closely below. But before doing that, we 
should note that previous research has estimated the suggestion as a way of satisfying the 
hardliners in Berlin,814 while one author has pointed to the potential loss of life.815 Behind these 
positions lie the uncertainty of whether the proposition should be regarded as sincere or not.  
In evaluating Best’s proposal, we must at least recognize the possibility that it might have 
been accepted. For several reasons I will argue that we should regard it as sincere. Previous 
research has established Best was an educated and radical supporter of the National Socialist 
cause. His suggestion specifically targeted Jews from Germany. This minority had been the 
enemy of the party as well as the police organization Best had served almost his entire career. 
At the same time, he felt the move would not jeopardize the Danish-German relationship, which 
was the main concern for him and his superiors. A further substantiation of his sincerity lies in 
the way he ended his letter. Instead of asking for instructions, he moved on to writing how he 
would provide the plans for when and how the following measures were to be initiated. If we 
compare the proposal from April to the one sent in September 1943, where he proposes to 
arrest the Danish Jews, there is a notable difference in the way he finishes them.816 In September 
he would ask for further instructions on how to proceed, but this was not the case in April. 
Further, the April letter does not warn his recipients of practical difficulties that might arise 
either from returning citizenship or the potential risk of the reaction of the Danish public. These 
concerns were part of his suggestion in September. We should also take the deportation pattern 
in most other Western European countries into account. This largely followed a design which 
first deported foreign Jews and then moved on to attempt to deport Jewish nationals of the host 
country.817 In this manner Best’s suggestion follows a recognizable deportation pattern from 
Western Europe. In addition, Best had experience from France where he was behind organizing 
the first deportation of Jews from France.818 If Best’s proposal was accepted, he could secure a 
form of progress in the Judenpolitik in Denmark that was comparable to Western Europe while 
maintaining  the cooperation of the Danish government. The combined arguments of this 
paragraph strongly suggest that Best’s proposal was sincere.  
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Eberhard von Thadden had the suggestion to return citizenship to German Jews in Denmark 
evaluated in the offices of the AA. They reasoned that it was hardly feasible for two reasons. It 
would be necessary to partly rework the 11th revision of the Nuremberg laws in order to follow 
Best’s plan, and it did not address the Jewish question in the desired consistent manner. The 
arguments behind the rejections are telling. The application of a judicial hinderance is in stark 
contrast to the murderous campaign against the Jews that had already peaked.819 Yet, at the 
same time it underscores Holocaust’s haphazard and often contradictory path.820 The rejection 
based on the plan’s lack of consistency points to a wish to maintain this in the Judenpolitik. Yet, 
it remains unclear if it is to be understood as a reference to Denmark or Judenpolitik in general. 
Thadden’s evaluation was sent to Ribbentrop who decided to revisit the matter in June.821 We 
do not know the reason for Ribbentrop’s delay. It could be that Best’s suggestion was being 
evaluated further, or it could be that Ribbentrop was too busy to make a decision.  
On May 18th Himmler requested a meeting with Best through Ribbentrop.  Best was to travel 
to Berlin in July to, among other issues, discuss the progress on the Judenpolitik in Denmark with 
Himmler.822 Shortly before Bests arrival in late June 1943, Himmler decided that measures 
against the Jews in Denmark were to be postponed until he decided otherwise, and Ribbentrop 
agreed. Himmler’s decision was sent to Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who had replaced Reinhard 
Heydrich as head of the RSHA.823  
Were there serious plans to initiate steps against the Danish Jews since Himmler decided to 
postpone such measures? The fact that Kaltenbrunner needed to be informed points to a 
confirmation of this. Best met with both Himmler and Kaltenbrunner in early July, and it seems 
likely that Best was informed of the decision to not move against the Jews in Demark at this 
point, but his minutes of the meeting with Himmler do not disclose details on this issue. This 
might be because the minutes were intended for Ribbentrop.824 
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Leni Yahil has two contradictory interpretations of these events as she first claims that 
Himmler’s decision cannot be explained, and then later attributes Best’s positive reports on the 
general conditions in Denmark as the reason for Himmler’s decision.825 Danish historiography 
has taken over the latter interpretation and it fits the explanation that Best sought to keep the 
Jewish question out Denmark by e.g. writing “…he travelled to Berlin where he convinced both 
von Ribbentrop and Himmler to once again postpone the solution of the Jewish question in 
Denmark…”.826 This explanation runs contrary to the chronology of events, while interrogations 
at the Nuremburg trials placed the responsibility for Himmler’s change of heart with Horst 
Wagner and Adolf von Steengracht, who were coordinating Best’s visit.827 Both were in the AA, 
where Wagner had replaced Luther’s while Steengracht had taken over from Weizsäcker.828  
8.7 Best and Propaganda  
Werner Best is often credited with closing Kamptegnet829, but as Bak has showed, the weekly 
continued as part of the DNSAP’s paper. The leading editors of Kamptegnet, Aage H. Andersen 
and Olga Eggers, were sentenced to prison, but by German intervention they never served their 
sentences and were relocated to Germany. If we examine events more closely it seems that the 
Danish government was pressured to let the two anti-Semites go. 
The anti-Semitic weekly Kamptegnet had largely outplayed its role as an independent paper 
as Aage H. Andersen and Olga Eggers were facing prison sentences in the spring of 1943.830 
Andersen had apparently tried to activate his connections within the Antijüdische Weltliga (see 
chapter six) to avoid prison, and he requested to become a member of the Waffen-SS. The AA 
wanted Best’s opinion, but Best blamed Andersen for his own predicaments as Kamptegnet had 
been reduced to a gossip magazine. He recommended that German financial support be 
discontinued. He also reasoned that this type of propaganda was not beneficial for expanding 
the understanding of anti-Semitism among the Danish public. Following Best’s postwar 
testimony, the organizations Der Stürmerverlag and Institut für Judenforschung had requested 
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the weekly continued.831 Closing the weekly proved costly, as its debt was 10,500 RM, but the 
AA decided to pay the dues for several political reasons. It was considered very shameful to the 
let a weekly fold as it had for years been supported by the AA in the “anti-Jewish struggle”. The 
closure would be the laughing stock of world Jewry, and it would damage the relationship with 
foreign anti-Semites that the AA had been building up since 1933.832 
Best seems to have been involved in moving the subject matter of Kamptegnet into a page in 
the Danish Nazi party’s newspaper Nationalsocialisten. In this manner, Stürmer-type 
propaganda was reduced, but not cancelled.833 It could be viewed as a setback for the promotion 
of anti-Semitism, but as it was continued in a newspaper with more readers, one could in fact 
argue that it was enhanced. The result also seems to counter Best’s own opinion of the weekly 
as inappropriate propaganda for the anti-Semitic cause. 
The service of Andersen and Eggers was not forgotten as the legation paid the costs of the 
court cases, which amounted to 10,000 DKR (2017//217,264 DKR). Best was prepared to 
intervene and prevent Andersen and Eggers from serving their prison sentences. However, he 
would not accept Andersen becoming a member of the SS, as earlier cases had caused 
“unwanted political consequences”.834 On the 4th of May Best rejected a request from Berlin to 
let a representative from the Anti-Comintern visit Aage H. Andersen.835 
On the 14th, Eggers visited Friedrich Stalmann as she faced prison, because the Danish courts 
had rejected her pardon plea. Stalmann succeeded in postponing the imprisonment for ten days. 
Towards Danish police representatives he called it “very unfortunate” that Eggers had not been 
pardoned. Stalmann then moved on to threatening the Danish police, since refusing to pardon 
Eggers had the potential to raise the Jewish question in Denmark.836 Considering that Olga 
Eggers was despised by the Danish authorities and that the Germans had great interest in 
maintaining a functioning and cooperative government, the risks associated with this threat 
were high. However, it stresses the extent to which Eggers enjoyed the protection of German 
diplomacy. The case now went to a higher political level, as Ludwig Chantré from the German 
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836 “15094. Notits om Olga Eggers,” May 29, 1943, RA, AS-Sager Kbh. 
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legation negotiated with the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Justice, Eivind Larsen. As 
we know, both Andersen and Eggers were instead relocated to Germany.  
Olga Eggers was moved to a position at the Heinkel Factories in Warnemünde. She was very 
dissatisfied with this. She successfully convinced her friend Lorenz Christensen to argue for her 
return to Denmark. At the German legation, it seems very likely that it was Chantré who 
successfully secured Eggers’ return.837 Best agreed to let Andersen work for the Anti-Comintern 
in Berlin as long as Andersen would not interfere in Danish politics again.838 Yet, as we know, 
Andersen would later return to Denmark. Though Best’s role remains undisclosed, it seems 
unlikely that he was not involved in bypassing the Danish justice system. The cases proceeded 
as intended through the Danish courts, but the court’s rulings were undermined by letting 
Andersen and Eggers move to employment in Germany, and they returned to Denmark after 
August 1943. These cases thus come off as less impressive examples of Danish judicial 
independence. 
8.8 Administrative Discrimination 
Let us return to the Danish government’s discussions, that we left in November 1942. Until 
the summer of 1943 the continuous discussions reveal two important things: 1) certain aspects 
of Werner Best’s Judenpolitik, which are not found in the known German sources. 2) The fact 
that the Danish government enforced an informal and administrative discrimination towards 
Jews.  
In late November 1942, as we have seen, Werner Best wished to be informed of all 
reassignments and promotions of civil servants in Denmark. Consequently, Scavenius informed 
the department heads of all Danish ministries in order to deter the hiring process at an early 
stage. This piece of information became a central discussion point at the following cabinet 
meeting, as the ministers felt that the issue should have been brought directly to their attention. 
Scavenius explained that the German demand had probably been issued to avoid the promotion 
of Jews or persons hostile towards Germany.  Given Scavenius’ previous willingness to 
accommodate German demands in this area, and fully aware that most of his colleagues 
                                                     
837 “Rapport vedr. Dr. Lorenz Christensens forbindelse med afdøde forfatterinde Olga Eggers.”; “Justitsministeriet om løsladelse af Olga 
Eggers,” January 24, 1948, RA, Københavns byret. Retsopgøret: Straffeakter. 23-1947-86-I, pk. 441-442 Postwar Danish police wrote she did 
return and Best was also questioned on the matter. He remembered the case, but had conveniently forgotten his role in it. This appears 
unlikely as Eggers was an unusual case which had required negotiations at the highest level. 
838 “142. Werner Best an das Auswärtige Amt,” June 28, 1943, WBK Vol. 3. 
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disagreed, he had most likely wanted to circumvent the other ministers by keeping it at an 
administrative level.839 
The main concern for some of the ministers was that this would enable the Germans to 
overrule the government on employment issues. Gunnar Larsen agreed, but felt that the 
government was to blame as it had not been sensitive to Renthe-Fink’s many warnings. Larsen 
used the breach of the government’s promise to keep the Jews off the radio as an example (see 
chapter seven). Larsen argued that the lack of focus on these incidents had the potential to raise 
the Jewish question at large. Larsen believed this could  ”open all of hell’s torments against these 
people”.840 
The Minister of Finance Kristian H. Kofoed now revealed that he and Scavenius had decided 
not to follow protocol and reappoint Head of Department for Statistical Affairs Cohn as the head 
of The Royal Danish Mortgage Bank (Kongeriget Danmarks Hypotekbank) as his six-year term 
had run out. Normally he would have been automatically reappointed. As we recall Cohn had 
previously been singled out as one of the civil servants Renthe-Fink and others wanted removed. 
However, Minister of Trade Halfdan Hendriksen had just reappointed the members of the Board 
of the Price Control Committee (Priskontrolrådets Forretningsudvalg) and this included Cohn. 
Hendriksen believed this issue did not belong at this political level. The ensuing discussions 
ended in Cohn staying in both positions.841 
The diary from the new Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Valdemar Holbøll, supply us with a 
few more important details from this meeting. In the following positions Jews were not to be 
hired: “Permanent Secretaries, Head of Departments, all police positions, Rectors etc.”842  This 
meant that Jews were to be completely excluded from serving in the police. Holbøll also 
recorded Scavenius as stating “…that it might be necessary to sacrifice some, approximately 3 
or 4 cases have Jews in prominent positions, just as it had been necessary to sacrifice several 
politicians.”843 Erik Scavenius willingness to let go of the Jewish civil servants was also known by 
                                                     
839 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:506–7. 
840 Ibid., 2:507“...åbne op for alle helvedes kvaler for disse mennesker...” 
841 Ibid., 2:508. 
842 Non paginated diary the date is the 3rd. of December 1942 Valdemar Kragh Holbøll, “Dagbog fra 30.10.1942 til 30.08.1943,” 1943 1942, Det 
Kongelige Bibliotek“...departementschefer og afdelingschefer, alle politistillinger, rektorer osv.” 
843 Non paginated diary the date is the 3rd. of December 1942 ibid."...at man måske kunne komme ud for at måtte ofre enkelte, ca. 3-4 stykker 
sager har jøder i større stillinger, ligesom man tidligere havde måttet ofre flere politikere.” 
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the Swedish envoy Gustav Dardel who reported on it in December 1942.844 There seems to be 
little doubt that Scavenius was ready to go through with this if necessary. 
 
Larsen suggested to make the:  
 
 “…definitive agreement that in the future reappointments and appointments of Jews 
would not be done without previous submission at a cabinet meeting, and in 
addition I advised the outmost caution, especially in the area of education, as this 
area had proven particularly sensitive.”845 
 
According to Larsen, there was a consensus among the ministers to adopt his suggestion.846 
The discussion is only summed up in one sentence in the official minutes: 
 
 “…it was agreed to inform the Germans that the appointment of higher civil servants 
would be treated by the government as a whole, and that it would be attentive to 
not placing enemies of Germany in such positions.”847 
 
The editors of Larsen’s diary argue that Larsen’s suggestion crossed a moral line, as such a 
policy adhered to Nazi racism and anti-Semitism.848 However, he was far from alone, as it was a 
united government who committed to discriminate and prevent Jews from holding positions in 
the civil service. This largely corresponds to one of Best’s goals from his report in January 1943 
and it had been his predecessor’s as well. Now, it seems the logic of cooperation had secured 
that this goal had finally been reached. 
On the other hand, Scavenius had in his first discussion with Best informed him that the 
Jewish issue could not be raised. This had caused Best to react quite fiercely. However, Best 
seemed to have accepted the Danish method, which was to “administratively” keep it at bay.849 
                                                     
844 Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 112. 
845 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:508 ”…den definitive aftale, at man 
for fremtiden ikke foretog genudnævnelser eller udnævnelser af jøder uden forelæggelse på et ministermøde, og jeg henstillede ligeledes, at 
man yderst varsom med udnævnelser ikke mindst indenfor undervisningsministeriets område, da dette jo havde vist sig særdeles 
ømtåleligt.”. 
846 Ibid. 
847 “Ministermøde,” December 3, 1942, RA, Ministermøder 29.1.1940 - 28.8.1943 “…blev der enighed om at lade tyskerne tilgå meddelelse om, 
at udnævnelse af højere embedsmænd ville blive behandlet i det samlede ministerium, og at man ville være opmærksom på, at der ikke kom 
tyskfjendtlige personer i sådanne stillinger.” 
848 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:508 see note 22. . 
849 Ibid. 
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In this way Scavenius avoided the formal, and forced retirements. In addition, he succeeded in 
securing the cabinet’s participation to informally administer that Jews were not promoted or 
hired in public positions. 
The issue of Jewish civil servants continued to resurface in the Danish government to various 
degrees and did so only a week later during the discussion of the financing of new state loans. 
The Jewish firm Carl Otto Henriques was among the group of companies to fund the loan. 
Because Carl Otto Henriques was traditionally part of the funding and had participated in the 
preparatory work, the Minister of Finance, Kristian H. Kofoed, felt obliged to continue this 
principle. However, Scavenius and Kofoed had discussed the issue before the meeting. The 
Director of the Danish National Bank, Carl V. Bramsnæs, had assured them, that the loan 
arrangements could be constructed without Henriques. The firm was then excluded from the 
deal.850 
Larsen, as usual, supported Scavenius by arguing that the Jewish question had to be kept at 
bay to secure the political cooperation, as well as for the sake of the Jews themselves. He then 
explained how administrative discrimination functioned and why it should be applied:  
 
“…it was of the greatest importance, that we kept our part of the silent agreement, 
according to which we [the government] ourselves had to do everything in our 
administrative power to prevent the Jewish question from being raised in public or 
otherwise provoking it to the surface. I agreed with the Prime Minister that this was 
a typical example in which an administrative act could prevent the participation of 
the Henriques company.”851 
 
This expanded the administrative measures the Danish government was ready to perform in 
order to, on principle, exclude Jews from official dealings and positions. Larsen legitimized the 
action by calling it a part of a “silent agreement” on the Jewish question between the 
                                                     
850 Ibid., 2:508, 512; “Ministermøde,” December 10, 1942, RA, Ministermøder 29.1.1940 - 28.8.1943“Lånet blev tiltrådt på de af 
Finansministerens opgivne betingelser men under forudsætning af firmaet C.O. Henriques udtrådte af lånekonsortiet. // The loan was granted 
on the conditions stated by the Minister of Finance, but under the condition the company C.O. Henriques stepped out of the loan 
consortium.” 
851 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:508“…at det derfor var af den 
største betydning, at vi overholdt vor del af den stiltiende overenskomst i henhold til hvilken vi selv skulle gøre alt, hvad der stod i vor 
administrative magt for at forhindre, at spørgsmålet kom frem i offentligheden eller på anden måde blev provokeret frem. Jeg måtte give 
statsministeren ret i, at her var et typisk tilfælde, hvor man ved en administrativ handling kunne holde firmaet Henriques udenfor.” 
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government and the Germans.852 This raises the question whether other Jewish companies were 
excluded from deals with the Danish government, but never made it to the level of the cabinet. 
The case mentioned above seems to be the first known one in which the government began 
to administratively discriminate against and exclude Jews without a German pressure being 
applied beforehand. This case was quite far from the issue of promoting Jews to higher positions 
in the civil service. Yet, the incident has a grim tone of state-sponsored Aryanization attached to 
it as it removed a Jewish company from the state’s economy. In the government, the exclusion 
of Carl Otto Henriques was legitimized as a necessary precaution in order to avoid legal measures 
against Jews and jeopardizing the cooperation. However, it clearly went further than the 
agreement on Jewish civil servants made in the cabinet a week earlier. This was a form of active 
cooperation which was intended to maintain political stability, and possibly motivated by the 
fear of losing power. Essentially, the tactics Best had aimed for were working – the Danes reacted 
based on a “deadlock of fear” by moving in the German direction.   
The “silent agreement” mentioned above was elaborated upon in the spring of 1943. It 
appears that Scavenius and Best had struck a deal regarding the Jews. This argument can be 
substantiated if we follow Larsen’s and Scavenius’ repeated references to the Jewish question 
as one that had been buried. The two most remarkable instances of this were Gunnar Larsen’s 
description of Scavenius’ policy and Scavenius’ own words at a cabinet meeting in May 1943. 
Larsen’s praised Scavenius for having 
 
“…understood that we had to give in on quite insignificant areas which presented 
themselves, namely the avoidance of promoting Jews to public positions, the 
removal of Jews from the radio etc., and on this issue, I for once have to state that 
the political members of the government have fully understood this and have 
without difficulties agreed to it in order to achieve a higher goal; in addition I believe 
the Jews should be forever grateful to the Danish government for this; while I know 
they are not and they will probably later claim they had wanted to be turned into 
martyrs. This will of course also be easy to say afterwards, but it will hardly affect 
the realities.”853 
                                                     
852 Ibid., 2:509. 
853 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1943, 3:177–78“…idet denne har forstået 
her at give ind på de ganske uvæsentlige punkter, som her foreligget, nemlig undladelse af at forfremme jøder til offentlige stillinger, fjernelse 
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forstået dette og uden vanskeligheder er gået med hertil for at opnå det højere mål, som jeg i øvrigt mener, jøderne burde være den danske 
regering uendeligt taknemmelig for, hvad jeg imidlertid godt er klar over, at de ikke er, og senere hen vil de formentlig påberåbe sig, at de 
hellere ville være gjort til martyrer. Det vil naturligvis også være let at sige bagefter, men det kan næppe ændre realiteterne.” 
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According to Larsen, a unified government had now given in on several areas regarding the 
Jews,  and it seems very plausible that the government and Best had made an agreement on the 
issue. The government’s knowledge of what was happening in other countries probably played 
a significant role in Larsen’s, and possibly, the government’s acceptance of these informal 
measures.854 However, if we focus on the Danish setting we should acknowledge the continued 
expansion of measures against the Jews. With our present knowledge it is difficult not to 
acknowledge Larsen’s foresight. However, the Danes could not know how things would turn out 
at this point. We should also note the fact that Larsen mentions that he knows the Jews do not 
appreciate the government’s actions. While we are unaware of the actual relationship of the 
two groups the statement does indicate that it had become more troublesome. 
Scavenius’ statement at the cabinet meeting of May 4th 1943 further adds to the argument 
that an informal understanding had been made with Best.  
 
“…after this, Scavenius accounted for the Jewish question and stated that 
fortunately, by Best’s mediation, this question had been buried for the time being, 
but there was a silent precondition in which the Danish side was not to provoke the 
raising of the question by promoting Jews in the state…”855 
 
This agreement had been mentioned several other times in the spring of 1943. The first time 
Larsen mentions it was after discussing the release of the prominent professor and surgeon Ole 
Chievitz. In late 1942, Chievitz had been arrested by Danish police due to his resistance activities. 
After five months in prison he was released. The famous physicist Niels Bohr, who was Jewish, 
celebrated the release. Larsen argued the celebrations was careless as it could cause the Jewish 
question to be raised again, now that it had finally been buried.856 
8.8.1 Cases of Administrative Discrimination 
In the following I will trace the known examples of administrative discrimination. It is 
important to underscore that these examples appear to be the high-profile cases. They confirm 
                                                     
854 Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945, 224. 
855 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1943, 3:181 ”Herefter redegjorde Scavenius 
for jødespørgsmålet og udtalte, at man jo heldigvis ved Bests mellemkomst nu havde fået dette spørgsmål begravet indtil videre, men det var 
jo en stiltiende forudsætning, at man fra dansk side ikke provokerede spørgsmålet frem ved forfremmelser indenfor statstjenesten af 
jøder...”. 
856 Ibid., 3:162. 
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how adamantly the Danish government was enforcing the informal exclusion of Jews from the 
public sphere. At first glance, it would seem surprising if all such incidents were discussed in 
cabinet. Were they of such political importance that one needed the government’s stance in 
every case? Or were smaller cases solved by lower level administrative decisions? In a 
recruitment case at the School of Dentistry the applicant for a professorship had been 
administratively turned down by the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Education, Frederik 
Graae, stating that at the moment Jews could not be promoted to public office.857 Apparently, 
the case only made it to the cabinet because it made it to the bulletins of the resistance 
movement who wrote: “…but behind the back of the population the government has 
administratively approved and implemented rules of conduct which carry the character of 
Jewish laws…” The Jewish applicant had been informed that “…the government has decided not 
to hire Jewish civil servants to avoid insulting the German Nazis!”.858  Scavenius called the affair 
“very unfortunate” and blamed the Minister of Education, Jørgen Jørgensen, who later denied 
the existence of such a letter.859 It is unknown if the letter was a hoax or if the Minister of 
Education simply attempted to conceal it. However, Scavenius’ and Larsen’s reactions clearly 
show that the government was now enforcing the informal prohibition against promoting and 
hiring Jews as part of the German Judenpolitik in Denmark. 
Larsen had learned of Graae’s letter during a discussion with Professor Dr. Henning Lassen 
who was dissatisfied with the government’s position against the Jews. As a consequence of 
Graae’s rejection Lassen brought the up-coming competition for the professorship in pediatrics 
at the University of Copenhagen into the discussion as it involved a Jewish candidate, Dr. Rothe-
Meyer. Lassen wanted to cancel the competition as the applicants would be competing on unfair 
terms. That same evening, the hospital director in charge of the competition, K.M. Nielsen, 
entered into a discussion with Larsen concerning the Jews. Nielsen agreed with the 
government’s policy, but he felt that society would owe the Jews favors in the future as a 
consequence of this discrimination. Larsen took the opposite stand, arguing that the Jews should 
give the government credit for creating a “free state” for the Jews, unlike the rest of Europe. He 
                                                     
857 Ibid., 3:165–66, 172, 181. 
858 “Vort demokrati - og Jøderne! Bag professorkonkurrencens kulisser,” Frit Danmark, June 1943, 2. yr. no 3 edition, 1, 
www.illegalpresse.dk”…men bag befolkningens ryg har regeringen administrative vedtaget og gennemført forholdsregler af en jødelovs 
karakter…” // ”regeringen havde vedtaget ikke at ansætte jødiske embedsmænd for ikke at støde de tyske nazister!”. 
859 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1943, 3:165–66, 172, 181. 
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also remarked that the Jews did not agree with him.860 Again, the relationship between the 
government and the Danish Jews appear to be out of tune. The exchange of viewpoints 
illustrates the fact that outside the government there was knowledge of the discrimination going 
on, but also that there was criticism of the government’s policy. Even though K.M. Nielsen 
accepted the government’s position, he still felt it was necessary to point to a postwar re-
justification of this discrimination. Larsen’s reaction shows that he felt justified in his actions, 
and at the same time had little care for individual consequences. 
The competition for the professorship in pediatrics set off a round of discussions among the 
ministers who were all troubled at the possibility of the Jewish Dr. Rothe-Meyer winning the 
competition. Scavenius even felt the university was conducting independent politics, which 
could potentially bring down the government. The Minister of Education, Jørgen Jørgensen 
agreed: Dr. Rothe-Meyer could not be allowed to win the competition. Jørgensen feared some 
of the judges might vote for the Jewish candidate for political reasons in order to oppose the 
government. The competition could not be stopped, but it might be possible to sabotage it by 
preventing the Swedish member of the assessment committee, who was likely to vote for Dr. 
Rothe-Meyer, from entering Denmark. Jørgensen even considered requesting the Minister of 
Justice to obstruct the issuing of the travel permit. In the end, the cabinet decided not to 
interfere, but rather to rely on a minority decision, which placed the final decision in the hands 
of Jørgensen. This option was preferred as it had already been done once before, but it is 
unknown if this had involved a Jewish applicant.861 
The two candidates for the professorship in pediatrics and director of the polio clinic, Dr. 
Rothe-Meyer and Dr. Plum were evaluated on the 10th of January 1943. They both had their 
advantages, yet Dr. Rothe-Meyer had more practical experience at children’s clinics, having been 
employed at four different ones, including one in Baltimore, USA. Dr. Rothe-Meyer was særdeles 
velkvalificeret – extremely well qualified, while Dr. Plum was udmærket kvalificeret – excellently 
qualified. This made Dr. Rothe-Meyer’s rating the highest of the two.862 All the members of the 
assessment committee voted for Dr. Plum who remained in this position until 1976. Rothe-
                                                     
860 Ibid., 3:166. 
861 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:181–82 It is unknown if the previous 
case had involved a Jewish applicant. 
862 This is concluded on the advice from the Danish Medical Museum (Museion) in the spring of 2017. It should be noted the illegal paper 
argued Plum was selected, because of his qualifications. “Vort demokrati - og Jøderne! Bag professorkonkurrencens kulisser,” 1. 
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Meyer fled to Sweden in 1943. He worked as a doctor in both Sweden and Great Britain during 
the war, and afterwards became head physician at several Danish hospitals, but he never 
became a professor.863 There is reason to believe the government had played a decisive role in 
this decision, as it was discussed on such a high level. The illegal press seems well informed on 
the competition and saw the government’s meddling as an expression of its attempt to carry a 
mask of democracy while administrating as the German’s wanted them to. It was concluded 
that: “The decisive element is not the degree these provisions reach, but their character of 
unambiguous breaches of democracy’s leading principles.”864 
 In the spring, the Minister of Education intervened in the election for the position of rector 
at the University of Aarhus. The Jewish candidate Dr. Fritz Blatt was about to be elected, but the 
minister had made sure the other professors would refrain from voting for him. After this, Blatt 
withdrew his candidacy and the theologian Johannes Munck became rector. Blatt fled to Sweden 
in October 1943 but became rector in 1949-1951.865 It seems evident that the Danish 
government was enforcing the informal agreement made with Best. Some might even argue that 
the government became a vital and enforcing factor in the German Judenpolitik in Denmark. 
8.9 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the Judenpolitik pursued in Denmark from September 1942 to 
August 1943 to answer research questions two and three. It has shown that a German pressure 
was asserted on members of the Danish government in October 1942 to adopt anti-Jewish laws. 
The German perception of this pressure was positive. The discussion within the Danish 
government reveal that a minority was ready to accept such laws. However, a German demand 
was not made and it seems the Danish King would not agree to these.  
 Werner Best’s Judenpolitik was formulated in close coordination with his superiors in Berlin. 
Best applied a Judenpolitik that continuously sought to exclude Jewish companies and to prevent 
Jews from being hired in prominent positions in the civil service. Best secured this would happen 
by ordering the Danish government to report on reassignments and promotions of civil servants 
                                                     
863 Københavns Universitets årbog 1942-1943 afsnit II. Lærere og andre videnskabelige tjenestemænd samt censorer. (Schults Forlag, 1951), 
https://tidsskrift.dk/index.php/kuaarbog/article/viewFile/43391/82370; “Arne Rothe-Meyer,” Kraks Blå Bog, 1957 (Gad, 1957); Henrik Hertz, 
“Preben Plum,” Den store danske (Gyldendal), accessed May 16, 2017, 
http://denstoredanske.dk/Krop,_psyke_og_sundhed/Sundhedsvidenskab/L%C3%A6ger/Preben_Plum. 
864 “Vort demokrati - og Jøderne! Bag professorkonkurrencens kulisser,” 1–2“Det afgørende er ikke den grad, disse foranstaltninger når, men 
deres karakter af utvetydige krænkelser af demokratiets bærende principper.” 
865 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1943, 3:182 including note 17 on that page. 
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in Denmark. It seems registration measures were further enforced, and Best requested specific 
reports on Jewish lawyers and Jews in the press. Possibly, to begin excluding Jews completely 
from these areas as well. These were part of Best’s long-term goal: the ”total solution of the 
Jewish question in Denmark”. 
The Danish government came to play an important role in these measures as it agreed to 
administratively secure that Danish Jews were not hired in higher-ranking civil service positions 
as well as in the police. Scavenius and Knud Kristensen were willing to accept formal laws against 
the Jews, but the only identifiable law to be accepted was the removal of Danish-Jewish civil 
servants. 
Several stages of persecution are identifiable in this chapter. As in all previous chapters the 
Judenpolitik took on a well-organized informal form (stage one). Exclusive measures are also 
detectable within the civil service. The informal rule to prevent Jews from being hired in higher 
ranking civil service positions was enforced by the Danish government. It also appears that Jews 
were prevented from joining the police force and excluded from other areas as well. The case of 
the company Henriques opens up for questioning which other areas Jews might have been 
excluded from in this period by the Danish government. 
Taken together, the discussions on issues relating to Jews reveal the Danish government 
slowly solidified in an administrative discrimination in order to avoid formal laws against the 
Jews. However, there was a readiness among a minority of the ministers to initiate formal laws. 
Even after agreeing with Best to administratively exclude the Jews from public positions the 
Danish government discussed and discriminated Jews in other areas. This points to a 
government that had a more fluid and flexible stance in relation to the German Judenpolitik in 
Denmark than previously recognized.  
9 Epilogue:  After October 1943 
On the 5th of October 1943, Werner Best declared “Dänemark ist entjudet, da sich hier kein 
Jude…mehr legal aufhalten und betätigen kann.”866 Before Best could send this report to the AA, 
some of the most dramatic, and defining events of the occupation had occurred. In late July 
through August 1943 strikes and sabotages in major Danish provincial cities resulted in a German 
                                                     
866 “242. Werner Best an das Auswärtige Amt,” October 5, 1943, WBK Vol. 4“Denmark is entjudet, as no Jew can...legally reside or be active 
here.” 
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ultimatum.867 On August 28th the ultimatum demanding six measures, including the death 
penalty and prohibition of strikes, was presented to the Danish Government. The ultimatum was 
rejected, and the government stopped functioning, but was not formally dissolved. It is worth 
noting that attempts to form a new government were carried on into late September, but on 
the 29th of August, a state of emergency was announced. The German army arrested the Danish 
military during several skirmishes.868  
On the 8th of September 1943, during the state of emergency, Werner Best sent his famous 
telegram no. 1032 suggesting to arrest the Danish Jews and the freemasons.869 The theories on 
Best’s motives are many. Most Danish researchers rely on Hans Kirchhoff’s suggestion that Best 
wanted to prove himself towards Hitler. However, by disclosing the date of the action, he 
attempted to remain on good footing with the Danish civil servants who agreed to take over the 
administration of the Danish state. This idea builds on Best’s  later attempts to circumvent his 
suggestion to deport the Jews arguing it would cause too many problems for a continued 
cooperation. On the 17th of September this strategy failed as Hitler decided to deport the Jews 
in Denmark. Best decided to let the date for the event slip to his close associate Georg Ferdinand 
Duckwitz. Through Duckwitz’s network the information was passed on to Danish Social 
Democrats, and the warning found its way to most Jews, who went into hiding.870  
Most international researchers explain Best’s motives as being mainly ideological.871 Ulrich 
Herbert e.g. proposes Best realized the action had been compromised from early September, 
and the attempt to arrest the Jews would fail. Therefore, he passed on the information to 
Duckwitz for two reasons 1) to speed up the flight of the Jews and 2) in order to reach the 
ideological goal Best had been part of since 1935: removing the Jews. At the same time this 
might allow for an easier cooperation with the Danish civil servants.872  
Best’s motives will probably remain a recurring theme in future research discussions. The 
attempt to arrest the Jews during the night of 1st and 2nd of October 1943 was carried out 
through a restrained German effort. Because of the warning that had been communicated to 
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the Jewish congregation most Danish Jews avoided arrest.873 Approximately 480 Jews were 
deported to Theresienstadt where they remained for most of the war. 52 of them would perish 
in the camp. The so-called White Busses were allowed to travel from Denmark and Sweden to 
German concentration camps to extradite Scandinavian prisoners. The earliest extraditions took 
place in December 1944 but only in April 1945 were the Jewish survivors, who had been 
deported from Denmark, rescued from Theresienstadt and transported to Sweden. The Jews 
that were not apprehended in October 1943 fled the country with the assistance of many 
ordinary Danes. Most of the refugees paid local fishers to be smuggled across the narrow sound 
from occupied Denmark to Sweden. In spite of these events, the German Judenpolitik continued 
in Denmark. 
In the office at Dagmarhus containing the registry of Jews two German police officers put the 
catalogue cards back in their place. The cards had been used in the attempt to arrest the Danish 
Jews. During the following months one of the police officers would continue working in Renner’s 
official Gestapo office IV-4b in order to write new registry cards and note on existing cards if the 
individual had fled to Sweden or been deported. Despite the very low number of Jews in 
Denmark, the registration work continued after October 1943 as Lorenz Christensen continued 
to add cards to the registry.874 
As a consequence of the flight of the Jews Head of Rüstungsstab Dänemark, Walter 
Forstmann, reported there were no-longer Jewish companies in Denmark, and the ban on the 
six Jewish companies that had been removed as producers for the German war effort could be 
lifted.875 This message proved insufficient. The Aryanization measures set in motion by the RfA 
continued to influence the Danish-German trade relations even though Best attempted to end 
them in January 1944, stating that: “After the ‘Aktion’ against the Jews in Denmark the Jewish 
influence in the Danish business life has ceased to exist.”876 Although he focused on the events 
of October 1943, the purpose of his letter was to simplify trade relations.877 However, 
Aryanization procedures were still enforced, possibly by the RfA, as the GCC still supplied lists of 
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Danish importers to the RfA as late as December 1944.878 Krüger would also continue to 
correspond with the RfA until May 1944. 
The following case shows how being registered as a Jewish company continued to have lasting 
effects even after October 1943. The case also reveals how H. J. Simonsen & Co., a Danish-Jewish 
shipping company, was basically dismantled due to Aryanization measures. As a consequence of 
being a Jewish company, H.J. Simonsen & Co. had their shipping contracts cancelled by the Swiss-
Italian company Jacky, Maeder & Co. Slowly, H.J. Simonsen & Co. was excluded from the only 
international market available to them,  and as a consequence had to lay-off most of their 
employees. A former employee created the company B. C. Lundberg in 1942, and took over the 
Danish representation for Jacky, Maeder & Co as well as recruiting laid off employees from H. J. 
Simonsen & Co. In essence, this was a case of Aryanization in which the Jewish company was 
stripped of its business opportunities only to see them taken over by another company. 
However, in the summer of 1943 B.C. Lundberg was under suspicion of being Jewish, and it 
seems the company had inherited the racial stigma as well as the consequences from H. J. 
Simonsen & Co. B.C. Lundberg had been removed from RWM’s lists of approved shipping 
companies in Denmark. As a result, a shipment of goods from Switzerland was impounded in 
Lübeck, Germany. The race issue for B.C. Lundberg was only resolved in mid-1944. It did not 
matter that Jews were no longer present in Denmark, and the Danish Shipping Association 
(Dansk Speditørforening) the Danish Foreign Ministry, the Danish embassy in Berlin, and the 
RWM were all involved in removing the ban on the company.879 
After October 1943, Lorenz Christensen maintained an important role in Werner Best’s 
continued  Judenpolitik in Denmark. Only a week after the attempt to round up the Jews in 
October 1943, Werner Best requested a radio broadcast on why the Jews had left Denmark.880 
The draft was written by the Danish lawyer and National Socialist Knud Nordentoft.881 Lorenz 
Christensen was contacted to comment on the manuscript, but he rejected its contents. Instead, 
Christensen was paid for writing three pieces on historical anti-Semitism and these were 
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broadcast in March 1944.882 They were used to historically justify the perception of the Jews as 
having been a consistent foreign entity in Danish and Christian society. Christensen used the few 
public clashes between Christians and Jews in Danish history in order to argue that the Jews had 
a record as troublemakers. Postwar testimony reveals that these pieces were also ordered by 
Best. In this manner, Best pursued the legitimation of Judenpolitik and anti-Semitism in an 
intellectually sounding propaganda after most Jews fled the country.883 
In April 1944, Best sent Lorenz Christensen to a meeting of Judenreferenten (Jewish 
specialists) in Krummhübel (Karpacz) in Poland. Best had selected Christensen due to his in-
depth knowledge of the Jewish question, and Christensen served as the legation’s official 
representative.884 The meeting was part of an initiative made by a new department in the AA 
called the Information Office XIV – Anti-Jewish Action for Foreign Countries (Informationsstelle 
XIV – Anti-jüdische Auslandsaktion). Plans for this department had been initiated in the summer 
of 1943. It was created with the collaboration of Alfred Rosenberg, as he was planning a 
conference of all anti-Jewish bureaucrats in Europe.885 
On January 5th, 1944 the new department was official, and Rudolf Schleier from the AA was 
its manager. Many other ministries as well as the RSHA were represented in the department, 
which served as a multi-organizational entity joining forces to promote anti-Jewish propaganda 
in other countries. Another goal of the new department was to create a massive archive 
documenting Jews and anti-Jewish personalities. This included a collection of pictures and files 
documenting all the procedures undertaken regarding the Jewish question. This would have 
been a complete documentation of both Jews and their destruction.886 This stands in stark 
contrast to the attempt to destroy almost anything related to Jews as well as the attempts to 
conceal the genocide.887 
The workflow on the anti-Semitic propaganda was to collect newspaper articles locally, and 
send them to the AA for translation. These articles were daily  distributed among all units of the 
AA, the Ministry of Propaganda, Rosenberg’s offices, the Security Service (SD) and the Institut 
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zur Erforschung der Judenfrage (Institute for Researching the Jewish Question.) In many ways 
Informationsstelle XIV resembles the goals of Wurm’s Antijüdische Weltliga, but the 
Informationsstelle XIV published news in a circular reference system. Newspaper articles from 
Germany were published abroad without revealing the source, and the articles were then 
quoted in German papers as popular opinion in other countries. In order to push the argument 
that the Jews were a world-wide threat a diplomatic yearbook on the Jewish question was on 
the drawing board. Anti-Semitic radio programs aimed at regional audiences were also among 
the concrete initiatives.888 It might be in this context we find the reason behind Lorenz 
Christensen’s three radio programs from March 1944. 
On the basis of Hitler’s wishes, Horst Wagner took the initiative to the meeting in 
Krummhübel to broaden anti-Jewish propaganda initiatives into worldwide distribution. It was 
to consist of Judenreferenten and Arisierungsberater (Jewish experts and Aryanization advisors) 
from the SS.889 Himmler made sure the meeting was not held in Berlin, as he feared losing “all 
specialists in one area at once” due to the bombing raids on Berlin.890 
The Aryanization specialists had to cancel due to their engagement in Aryanizations in 
Hungary, which had been invaded by Germany three days prior to the meeting on the 3rd and 
4th of April 1944. The RSHA was represented by Karl Hoffman, the Police Attaché in Sofia. The 
AA was well represented, and the highest-profile member at the meeting was von Thadden. The 
minutes of the AA were intentionally minimal, but after the war von Thadden revealed that 
details on the extermination of the Jews in Eastern Europe as well as statistical information on 
the issue had been provided. The statistics came from Adolf Eichmann, and von Thadden had 
promised they would remain secret.891 
Lorenz Christensen participated in this meeting. He was placed among Judenreferenten from 
the German legations in Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, France, Italy, Sweden, Rumania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Slovakia and Turkey. It is worth noting that there were five such emissaries serving in 
neutral countries, while the representatives from Belgium and the Netherlands were missing.892 
Christensen wrote his own minutes of the meeting intended for Best, but in accordance with 
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von Thadden’s wishes they are not very revealing. His minutes mostly focus on who participated 
in the conference, as well as on Christensen’s own contribution to the anti-Jewish question. He 
voiced specific ideas on promoting the anti-Jewish cause by adapting initiatives to regional 
peculiarities.893 Christensen claims he was asked not to participate in von Thadden’s meeting 
concerning the “executive measures” against the Jews. His minutes only reveal a precise 
knowledge of the title, and it remains unknown if Christensen actually participated or not. 894  
On the 23rd of May 1944, Best promoted Lorenz Christensen to Judenreferent in Denmark, 
the first official bearer of that title. In a letter thanking Best for this promotion Christensen 
wrote: 
 
“In the meantime, I have learned, that I on the basis of your order of May 23rd 1944, 
I have been appointed as Judenreferenten at the local German mission. I hereby 
inform you that I accept the position and I cordially thank you for the trust you have 
shown me by this appointment”.895 
  
The promotion seems closely tied to Christensen’s participation in the meeting in 
Krummhübel. Despite Lorenz Christensen’s postwar claims of having reservations on how the 
Jewish question was solved in Denmark. He became the official expert on Jews in Denmark, and 
as such, he was probably informed that the Jews were murdered. This makes it increasingly likely 
he attended von Thadden’s speech. The creation of an official position of Judenreferent also 
shows that Best continued to work against Judaism. He was promoting anti-Semitism in a 
country without Jews. 
Several other developments underscore this, the most important being the visit from 
Friedrich Wilhelm Osiander in June 1944. He was head of family pedigrees, Ahnentafel, in the 
RuSHA, with the rank of SS-Sturmbahnführer. He had two items on his agenda in Copenhagen: 
1)  a meeting with Günther Pancke in order to establish a race office at the Schalburg Corps; 2) 
a meeting with Lorenz Christensen and Charles Hindborg. Osiander’s overall impression was the 
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need to construct a central racial office in Denmark to bridge the offices of the DNSAP, SS and 
the Schalburg Corps. Osiander wanted Pancke to monitor the race office at the Schalburg Corps 
and if necessary appoint its leadership. Hindborg was no longer head of the race office for the 
DNSAP, but was nevertheless interviewed by Osiander, who wrote positively of his merits. 
Osiander’s talks with Christensen had centered on the registries of Jews and “Judenmischlinge”. 
Christensen revealed that he had been dealing mainly with such questions for the last two years, 
and Osiander was promised the most important works on Danish genealogy. Osiander was 
shown the main sources of Christensen’s work: the Danish Royal Library, the Danish National 
Archives, and the Regional Archive of Copenhagen.896 Christensen would supply Osiander’s 
offices with relevant books and answered questions from RuSHA.897 
Judenpolitik in Denmark after October 1943 also targeted the published memory of the most 
important Jews in Denmark. The Danish Who is Who, Blå Bog  (literally Blue Book) contains short 
biographies of important Danes in the civil service, business, and culture. In the summer of 1943, 
the last edition of Blå Bog during the occupation was published. The editors had received 
information from the Danish Foreign Ministry that German authorities wanted to scrutinize the 
new edition before publication in 1944. The editors assumed this was in order to remove all 
Jewish biographies from the publication and to increase the number of German-friendly ones. 
The editors decided to stop production due to “technical difficulties”, specifically a lack of paper. 
After the war, the director indicated that the editors had been threatened to republish the book 
and promised all the paper they needed, but they still refused.898 This attempt underscores 
Judenpolitik’s ultimate intention of not only eradicating the Jews physically, but also the memory 
of their lives and roles in Danish society. This type of cultural and memorial elimination was seen 
in many countries in Europe. It was only a brief attempt but it is a testament to how important 
the issue of Jews continued to be for the German occupiers.  
Judenpolitik after October 1943 has not been researched closely but it would seem that it 
continued in Denmark in several areas. Companies were still examined for their racial 
composition, anti-Semitic propaganda was continued, a Judenreferent was appointed, 
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registration measures proceeded, and the publication containing the biographies of prominent 
Jews was to be rewritten along racial criteria. 
10 Conclusion and Perspectives 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, twenty-three individual nations re-examined their wartime 
relationships with Germany in commissions or by establishing permanent research 
organizations. One crucial part of their research would often address aspects of the persecution 
of the Jews. In Denmark, such encompassing initiatives were not pursued and thus the country 
stands out as a European exception. Instead, research has focused strongly on the dramatic 
events surrounding the flight of the Jews from Denmark in October 1943. These two 
observations highlight a gap in the status quo of Danish historiography, which so far has only 
selectively addressed the persecution of Jews before and during Denmark’s wartime relationship 
with Germany. One research desideratum is thus a more systematic analysis of the social, civil, 
and financial exclusion of Jews in Denmark before the well-described escape in October 1943 
This dissertation responds to this call by exploring and analyzing the German Judenpolitik in 
Denmark. Within the context of Judenpolitik it focuses on the Aryanization of Danish-German 
trade relations and anti-Jewish policies in Denmark from 1937 until August 1943. As a second 
research goal, it examines the reactions of the Danish government to the German Judenpolitik. 
The dissertation thus responds to these goals by posing the following research questions: 
 
1. How was Germany’s ambition to Aryanize its foreign trade developed into concrete 
policies, and how were these policies implemented into Danish-German trade relations 
as part of the German Judenpolitik in Denmark?   
2. How did the German legation assist in formulating and executing the German 
Judenpolitik in Denmark? 
3. How did the Danish government respond to the German Judenpolitik? 
4. Based on the model Stages of Persecution, which stages and forms of Judenpolitik can be 
identified in Denmark during 1937-August 1943? 
 
These questions have been answered through the use of qualitative historical sources by 
applying a historical method developed by Matthias Kipping, R. Daniel Wadhwani, and Marcelo 
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Bucheli consisting of 1) source criticism 2) triangulation, and 3) hermeneutics. The analytical 
approach consists of four tiers. The overarching one is Peter Longerich’s definition of 
Judenpolitik which is understood as a tool to describe and analyze the complex processes of 
German anti-Jewish policy and politics. This is applied to the Danish-German relationship in the 
period from 1937 to August 1943, which is defined as either collaboration or cooperation. 
Collaboration is defined as the support of the occupying forces for reasons of personal self-
interest or ideological conviction. Cooperation is understood as: the conscious acceptance of 
most political and socioeconomic elites to cooperate with representatives of Nazi Germany in a 
passive or activist manner. This was done in order to preserve political power from challengers 
on both sides of the political spectrum, while attempting to save Denmark’s political structures 
as well as maintaining material levels. These motives justified accepting increasing German 
demands in a self-enforcing logic of cooperation, which created unforeseen results. 
The third analytical approach is the perspectives of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders as 
introduced by Raul Hilberg. The main perspective is that of the perpetrators understood as the 
main organizations and relevant actors in the German Foreign Ministry but especially the 
German legation in Copenhagen and its leadership Cecil von Renthe-Fink and Werner Best. 
Included in this category is also the RfA, and to a much lesser degree the RWM as well as the 
NSDAP/AO. A secondary perspective is the bystander perspective which is mainly understood as 
the Danish government. This dissertation applies a processual bystander view to accommodate 
for changes in this position over time.  
The fourth analytical practice is the application of a ten-stage model: Stages of Persecution. 
This has been developed by building on previous research in order to identify the persecution 
stages of Judenpolitik present in Denmark. It consists of the following stages: 1) informal 
persecution 2) formal persecution 3) definition 4) identification and registration 5) exclusion 6) 
confiscation and robbery 7) public stigmatization 8) forced relocation 9) deportation 10) murder. 
10.1.1 Judenpolitik in Denmark 
Overall, this dissertation has shown that Denmark was subject to an intentional and racially 
motivated Judenpolitik between 1937 and August 1943. This mainly aimed at steadily excluding 
the Jews in Denmark from several areas of society. It was a patient and informal policy due to 
the nature of the cooperation between Denmark and Germany. In spite of this, a continuous 
 269 
progress in the exclusive Judenpolitik is traceable. We can identify the following typical stages 
of the persecution process in Denmark: informal persecution (stage one), and to a much lesser 
degree formal persecution (stage two). The definition of Jews (stage three), and identification 
and registration of Jews (stage four). The exclusion of Jews, especially through Aryanization 
measures (stage five). As a bystander the Danish government reacted to the German 
Judenpolitik by increasingly accepting more and more German demands as the war progressed. 
These overall results will be elaborated upon below. 
10.1.2 Aryanizing the German Foreign Trade and its Implementation in Denmark 
This dissertation has shown that the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel (RfA) became the main 
organization responsible for pursuing a global policy aiming at Aryanizing the German foreign 
trade. The organization was firmly tied to the dictatorship’s racist ideology and the overall 
Aryanization policies in Germany, but the RfA focused on Aryanizing international trade 
relations.  In the prewar period, this policy mainly targeted Jewish representatives of German 
companies abroad. Jewish companies and representatives in many countries were registered by 
the RfA with the intention to exclude them from German foreign trade. In the summer of 1940, 
these Aryanization measures were expanded to exclude all Jewish import and export companies 
in countries outside Germany.  
The prewar Aryanization attempts of the RfA have been largely overlooked in previous 
research, with the notable exception of research on Sweden. By analyzing these events in 
Denmark, it has been shown that the German Foreign Ministry and its diplomatic representation 
in Denmark were extensively involved in locally pursuing RfA’s Aryanization policies. The German 
legation in Copenhagen was the organizational entity responsible for gathering intelligence on 
Jews in Denmark. Historian Ole Brandenborg Jensen has previously suggested that Aryanization 
should be regarded as ad-hoc initiatives set in motion by the German Chamber of Commerce 
(GCC) or others. By contrast, this dissertation has shown that while the GCC was an integral part 
of this area of Judenpolitik, the legation carried the main responsibility for pursuing this policy 
in Denmark. 
Denmark was subjected to an intentional and deliberate German Aryanization process from 
1937 to 1943, which lasted well into 1944. The Aryanization measures are to be regarded as the 
most successful element of the Judenpolitik pursued in Denmark. We can conclude that all 
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Danish Jewish agents and representatives had been removed by September 1942.  In addition, 
most Jewish importers had been excluded from the German foreign trade by this date. This is 
concluded based on the German envoy Cecil von Renthe-Fink’s status reports. Moreover, the 
Danish Foreign Ministry’s main file on Aryanization dries out in May 1942, which seems to 
indicate the government no longer was involved in these cases. 
In January 1943, Werner Best introduced the Nuremberg race laws in order to define the 
Jewish companies in Denmark as proposed by Cecil von Renthe-Fink in September 1942. They 
were never publicized but seems to have been put into practice among German organizations. 
These laws served as the foundation for further Aryanization initiatives. The Nuremberg 
definitions of Jews and Jewish companies had informally served as the foundation for charting, 
registering, and excluding Danish-Jewish businesses trading with Germany since 1937. Though 
we lack a complete numerical overview and an exhaustive list of the names of the registered 
companies the communication between the RfA and the German legation indicates that all 
Danish companies trading with Germany were charted according to the Nuremberg laws.  
10.1.3 The German Legation’s Role in the Judenpolitik in Denmark 
As indicated above, the German legation was deeply involved in fulfilling the goals of the RfA 
by providing continuous local intelligence on Jewish companies. The Aryanization policies were 
but one part of an intentional German policy directed against the Jews in Denmark. During the 
occupation of Denmark, these policies were continuously extended and expanded. Anti-Semitic 
propaganda was endorsed by the German legation. It was assisted by the most ideologically 
committed and anti-Semitic Danish citizens known in the period. They became hired hands in 
supporting the Judenpolitik in Denmark. It has been ascertained that some of the anti-Semitic 
articles they authored in the anti-Semitic weekly Kamptegnet had a direct effect on the Danish 
Jewish minority’s ability to do business, as well as giving rise to more personal anti-Semitic 
incidents among the minority. 
From as early as 1933 the legation registered Jewish refugees. The Aryanization measures 
started by the RfA in 1937 possibly initiated a regular registration of Jewish companies, and their 
leadership, ensuring that at least 3,600 Danish businesses had been categorized by race before 
the occupation. During the occupation, registration measures became more effective as 
members of the Gestapo were relocated to the German legation in Copenhagen. They were 
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aided by Lorenz Christensen in registering communists and Jews. Three registries of Jews were 
kept at Dagmarhus containing the names of Danish Jews, Jewish companies, and foreign Jews. 
The registration effort was continuous, and it appears the more difficult cases were unraveled 
with the assistance of the Danish police who would perform racial investigations on behalf of 
the German police.  
The two main crises in the Danish-German relationship in 1941-1942, the Danish signature of 
the Anti-Comintern Pact in late 1941 and the so-called Telegram Crisis in the fall of 1942, are 
crucial in understanding the German anti-Jewish policies and their development. The pressure 
on the Danish politicians to introduce anti-Jewish laws in Denmark rose continuously, but 
especially during these crises. A previously unrecognized push in that direction was Renthe-
Fink’s suggestion to introduce such laws in December 1941. Although the government rejected 
these demands, Renthe-Fink immediately suggested informal discriminatory measures. These 
were: 1) Jews could not be recruited to or promoted in the civil service, 2) Jews could not be part 
of the management in large Danish companies, and 3) Jews were to be excluded from the Danish 
media. As part of the Aryanization measures, Renthe-Fink most likely succeeded in removing 
Jews from large Danish companies that exported to or directly imported from Germany. In 
August 1942 he also succeeded in excluding Jews from appearing on the radio. Even though 
these were informal measures, their success shows that Judenpolitik’s exclusive character was 
continuously expanded upon. At the same time, it seems as if most Jews were removed from 
Danish newspapers. We are able to conclude that they were at least purged from Berlingske 
Tidende and Nationaltidende. Renthe-Fink’s agenda was taken over by his successor Werner 
Best. In January 1943, Werner Best succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Danish 
government to not promote or hire Jews in the civil service. We can thus conclude that most of 
the suggestions for informal discrimination made by Renthe-Fink two years earlier had been 
achieved by January 1943. 
In light of the above, the relationship between Berlin and Copenhagen largely appears as a 
well-coordinated effort to informally and continuously exclude Jews from the civil service, 
companies, and the media. We should thus consider the relationship between the German 
actors, individual as well as organizational, in Denmark and Berlin, as generally being in 
accordance with one another. The perception of a radical Berlin compared to a more defensive 
stance on behalf of Renthe-Fink and Werner Best does not seem to hold. Most measures were 
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approved or initiated by the AA in Berlin, and actively pursued by Renthe-Fink or Werner Best. 
The examined documents only reveal a slight disharmony on the Jewish question in Denmark 
during the summer of 1942. This prompted Renthe-Fink to suggest further measures against the 
Jews in Denmark to accommodate for Berlin’s critique. The perception that there were general 
disagreements between the AA and its representatives in Denmark possibly has its roots in 
postwar testimonies by the former German representatives in Denmark who applied the well-
known tactic of postwar trials to push responsibility upwards in the hierarchy. 
The dominant perception of Renthe-Fink as an apolitical career diplomat, who kept the Jewish 
question at bay, is difficult to maintain. This dissertation has shown that Renthe-Fink followed 
instructions from Berlin with few delays or concerns. Additionally, he initiated policies against 
the Jews in Denmark of his own accord. In January 1942, he described the goal of Judenpolitik in 
Denmark as: to remove the Jewish influence in Denmark at any given opportunity.  In addition, 
he described his overall policy in Denmark as one which aimed at destroying the remnants of 
Danish democracy. He continuously pressured Danish politicians in order to achieve his 
objectives. His anti-Semitic views were most apparent in the report on Danish Jews sent to the 
AA in January 1942. 
Werner Best is often described in the same way: as someone who kept the Jewish question 
at bay in Denmark. Best’s two reports on Jewish matters in Denmark from January and April 
1943 contain sections which have been largely ignored or regarded as unimportant in previous 
research. A closer examination has shown that they were calculated and strategic. Best wanted 
to keep the Danish government deadlocked, making it highly dependent on his actions. He also 
stated that his goal was the totale Lösung der Judenfrage in Dänemark (the total solution of the 
Jewish question) in Denmark. Best enforced registration measures further and initiated specific 
research in order to e.g. locate Jewish lawyers. In addition, well-known Danish anti-Semites were 
employed by the German legation during most of the occupation, most notably Lorenz 
Christensen, who was appointed Judenreferent, Expert in Jewish Affairs, by Best in 1944. 
10.1.4 The Danish Government’s Response to Judenpolitik 
The responses of the Danish government to the German Judenpolitik varied. The Danish 
government did not assist the Danish Jewish business minority before or during the occupation. 
The Danish Jewish business minority was mainly left to fight its own battles. Upon German 
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request, the Danish police supplied the German legation with information on which companies 
were regarded as Jewish. This included supplying information on individuals who were part of 
these companies and who were regarded as either Jews or non-Jews. This information was most 
likely used to further Aryanize Danish-Jewish businesses. 
The examination of the Danish government’s reactions to the German Aryanization and anti-
Jewish policies has revealed a previously unrecognized flexibility as well as continued discussions 
on how to react in this policy area. This questions the dominant perception of the Danish 
government as repeatedly denying the existence of a Jewish problem. If we briefly recapture the 
instances where the government or a minority within the government showed flexibility in this 
area, they proceed as follows: In December 1941, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erik Scavenius, 
revealed that he would accept demands for legal measures against the Jews should it become a 
political necessity. He was supported by the Minister of the Interior, Knud Kristensen. Gunnar 
Larsen suggested to Scavenius that one should advice the Danish Jews to ask for discriminatory 
laws against themselves. We can conclude that at least three ministers in the government would 
accept formal anti-Jewish laws. These discussions also reveal a crisis in the cabinet, mostly 
between the political and non-affiliated ministers. After several meetings in December 1941, 
Scavenius accepted the position of the majority to stall formal anti-Jewish measures.  
In January 1942, part of the government agreed to prevent Jews from being promoted or 
hired in the civil service. The government had thus begun to enforce informal restrictions against 
the Jews in order to avoid formal laws. Combined with a mounting pressure on the Danish 
government, smaller and larger issues relating to the Jews in Denmark were brought to the 
highest levels of government. The informality of these policies resulted in a government that 
developed a hyper-sensitivity on issues concerning Jews. In this sense, the German pressure on 
the Danish government had proven successful, as the AA accepted these measures as progress. 
In the autumn of 1942, the Telegram Crisis also revealed that a minority of the ministers 
within the Danish government was willing to accept formal laws against the Jews. As the Danes 
awaited the appointment of Renthe-Fink’s successor, they were being pressured to accept both 
the death penalty for acts of sabotage and anti-Jewish laws. The German demands were rejected 
by Scavenius. However, to his colleagues he revealed he was not principally against accepting 
anti-Jewish laws, if this could secure other political assurances in the Danish-German 
relationship. 
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In the autumn of 1942, the cabinet discussions centered on locating the government’s 
position on a variety of issues that might be raised by the Germans. On the question of Jews 
these debates reveal that Erik Scavenius and Knud Kristensen would accept formal laws against 
the Jews, while the Minister of Education Jørgen Jørgensen was prepared to accept further 
informal measures. The positions of the other ministers remain uncertain, but in January 1943 
the government as a whole accepted and enforced the informal procedure of not promoting or 
hiring Jews in the Danish civil service or the police. The known cases of this administrative 
discrimination reveal that this policy was not limited to the civil service but was expanded to 
other areas as well. The Danish government thus informally administrated elements of the 
German Judenpolitik.  
In summary, the Danish government and the Danish-German cooperation as such were much 
more flexible regarding anti-Jewish measures than previously discussed. Danish-Jewish 
businesses were not protected from Aryanization measures, while Danish police actively 
participated in disclosing and registering who was Jewish, both in selected companies and in the 
population at large. This information was used for further discrimination. The internal 
discussions of the Danish government show that from December 1941 onwards, a minority was 
willing to accept laws against the Jews and from January 1943 an informal policy of 
discrimination was administered by the Danish government. 
The Danish government’s bystander role can be characterized as extremely cautious in the 
prewar period. In the occupation period, the bystander role progressed towards accepting an 
increasing number of German demands in order to maintain the cooperation with Germany. A 
number of ministers also argued that accepting these informal demands safeguarded the Jews 
against formal demands. As already mentioned the Danish Government largely decided to 
remain passive regarding Danish-Jewish businesses. A minority in the government would accept 
unspecified anti-Jewish laws in December 1941 and in the fall of 1942,  this was specified as 
removing the Jewish civil servants. The majority prevailed in these instances and formal laws 
were not adopted. However, German pressure did secure the removal of Jews from prominent 
positions. In the summer of 1942 the stance presented to the Germans was that Jewish civil 
servants could only be removed by German demand. In the winter of 1942 and early 1943 the 
Danish government’s bystander role progressed further as it accepted to administratively secure 
that Jews were not hired in public positions. 
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10.1.5  Stages of Persecution in Denmark 
In this dissertation the Judenpolitik in Denmark has been categorized by using the ten-stage 
model: Stages of Persecution. Here, we should recall that Raul Hilberg’s description of the 
persecution and destruction of the Jews as “not so much a product of laws and commands as it 
was a matter of spirit, of shared comprehension, of consonance and synchronization.”899 In this 
sense, Stage one, informal persecution, the most prevalent characteristic of the German policies 
against the Jews in Denmark, still targeted a well-defined minority within the idea of removing 
or destroying the Jews. The informal Judenpolitik in Denmark was mainly pursued by the German 
legation in cooperation with the Auswärtiges Amt, and only in the summer of 1942 can we detect 
differences between the two, which were smoothed out as Werner Best arrived in November 
1942. After his arrival the informal Judenpolitik was also enforced by the Danish government 
which actively prevented Jews from being hired in prominent public positions. Formal 
persecution, stage two, is seen in a few instances. The marriage laws of 1938 which prohibited 
German Jews to marry Aryans in Denmark, might be regarded as such, and while not targeting 
Danish Jews, it targeted Jewish travelers to Denmark.  The creation of a security area in Northern 
and Western Denmark in November 1940 officially restricted Jews from entering and living in a 
specific area of Denmark. This is also the only known example of forced relocations, stage eight, 
before October 1943, as Jewish refugees were removed from that area. 
The definition of Jews is stage three, and is closely tied to stage four: identification and 
registration of Jews. The Nuremberg definition of Jews was informally applied in numerous ways 
in Denmark. We can locate its use in the prewar years as a rising number of parishes were 
involved in supplying genealogical information to those seeking to prove their Aryan decent 
based on the National Socialist laws. Likewise, Danish company owners bought the assistance of 
private genealogical researchers to prove their Aryan descent. At the same time, the German 
legation, the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel, and the German Chamber of Commerce were 
applying these laws to determine if Jews were present in the leadership of Danish companies. 
The registration of Danish Jews thus began in the prewar period, and formed the foundation for 
a continued Aryanization process targeting Danish-Jewish representatives, company owners, 
and managers. 
                                                     
899 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 2003, 1:52. 
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This informal use of the definition of Jews became even closer tied to the registration 
procedures during the occupation. An official race office was formed in conjunction with the 
Danish Nazi party, the German legation, and the German SS (RuSHA). In addition, the members 
of the German police at the legation continued to register Jews, and after a continuous pressure 
received a copy of the Danish catalogue cards of Jewish refugees in February 1942. The German 
legation hired Danish anti-Semites to perform further genealogical investigations and 
registrations. The Danish State Prosecutor for Special Affairs (SPSA) also performed racial 
investigations upon request of the German legation, and used e.g. birth certificates, tax 
registries, and interviews to disclose if an individual was to be considered Jewish. This 
information was passed on to German police. The introduction of the definition of the 
Nuremberg Laws regarding Jewish companies was suggested in September 1942, and officially 
applied by the German legation in early 1943, but laws or decrees to certify this were not issued. 
We can detect several measures of exclusion, stage five, of Jews in prominent positions 
within the media, and through the prevention of Jews being hired to higher public positions. 
From a German perspective the most successful area was Aryanization, where Jewish directors 
and board members were removed if the company in question traded with Germany. 
Stage six: confiscation and robbery, does not appear to have taken place within the period 
examined in this dissertation. Stage seven: Public stigmatization understood as wearing a 
symbol of the Star of David in a specific design cannot be detected in Denmark, while the public 
identification of Jews in papers like Kamptegnet and Fædrelandet should not go without 
mention. Stage nine is deportations, and these occurred after the period examined in this 
dissertation. Stage ten, the murder of Jews, did not take place in Denmark. It should be noted 
that the Jews who were deported from Denmark to the concentration camp Theresienstadt 
were not sent to extermination camps. 
10.1.6 Perspectives 
While answering important questions regarding our understanding of the German 
Judenpolitik in Denmark and the Danish government’s position on the Jewish question, the 
results of this dissertation create the foundation for further research in a variety of areas.  
This dissertation has elaborated on existing research and more thoroughly examined the 
policies of the RfA. In order to fully evaluate the international Aryanization attempts of the RfA, 
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additional cases need examination to allow for cross case and international comparisons. This 
would warrant both business historians and Holocaust historians to gain further knowledge on 
the border-crossing anti-Jewish policies of the RfA and the AA. Yet, by introducing this 
international Aryanization aspect into the economics of the Holocaust, we have gained a deeper 
insight into how race policies, economy and foreign trade were intertwined into a formalized 
policy that raised racial trade barriers from 1937 onwards.  
Based on the results of the analysis of the policies of the RfA and the case of Denmark, I would 
argue we need to rethink our understanding of Aryanization especially in the prewar setting. 
Aryanization was not exclusive to Germany in those years, but a policy with international and 
border-crossing elements with the potential to affect Jewish companies and Jews outside of 
Germany. This realization raises a host of additional questions to the overall research theme of 
Aryanization. For example, how did the United States react to German Aryanization policies 
being pursued in the country? How did smaller European countries react? What was the role of 
German companies in these prewar, but international Aryanization measures? How did foreign 
companies from smaller European nations located in Germany react towards the hostility 
against Jews, and Aryanization demands? It could be interesting to follow the reaction of 
companies of smaller nations who became bystanders to the events in Germany in order to trace 
their reactions and motives. 
This dissertation has explored the field of Aryanization in Denmark. We now possess an 
overview of the process and how it functioned. This has the potential to secure that further 
research will be able to gain a full overview of the companies and individuals targeted. If this 
was successful, it would provide us with the data needed to analyze both companies and specific 
business areas, as well as closely following the consequences for individuals who had to leave 
their businesses. The cases used in this dissertation certainly uncover examples of the personal 
and economic consequences of Aryanization. However, more comprehensive information would 
allow for an analysis of how Danish-Jewish businesses coped with the risk of hostile take-overs. 
In addition, detailed information would make it possible to trace transfers of ownership from 
Jews to non-Jews. In the James Polack case we saw how he was paid far less than the value of 
his stock. Transfers like this indicate a loss of valuables within the Jewish minority, but was this 
just one case out of many or few? Were those who had to leave the boards of businesses 
compensated in some way, and how did they cope? Who took over these positions, and did they 
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benefit from it? The issue of reentering the Danish business environment after the war also 
seems relevant to examine in order to disclose how this process unfolded. How many could 
reenter their positions as e.g. CEO after returning to Denmark? We should also recognize the 
use of proof of race in the period from 1933-1945. It remains a relevant and unexamined 
question how deeply it penetrated into Danish society: e.g. how many non-Jewish businesses 
adapted to German demands either by proving their race or removing Jewish employees if 
requested? 
10.1.7 Cooperation Revisited  
The results also ask for a reexamination of the Danish police in the first years of the 
collaboration. How many questions on both race and other personal information were 
investigated and passed on to both the German police as well as the German military 
intelligence? A further investigation into the consequences of this information exchange would 
provide us with answers on other policies the Germans successfully pursued in Denmark. 
The successful flight and survival of 98% of the Jews in Denmark remains a remarkable 
occurrence. It stands out as one of the few positive events in an otherwise dark chapter of recent 
European history. However, it is worth discussing if this success has shaped our perception of 
the previous years? Is this why previous interpretations have largely seen the discrimination 
against Jews as unimportant compared to the fact that most Jews survived? And how did 
Denmark manage to remain largely untouched by the wave of research initiatives on the 
European continent after the 1990s, which examined the persecution of the Jews? Danish 
newspapers from the 1990s reported on this type of research in other countries, but they are 
silent on the Danish case. How far have these trends been guided by the narrative that “it did 
not happen here”? 
The fact that formal laws against the Jews were discussed within the Danish government and 
that a minority was willing to accept such laws, give rise to a discussion of the purpose of the 
cooperation. Was it to maintain any shred of sovereignty within the logic of cooperation as 
suggested by Hans Kirchhoff, and if so where does this place the flexibility on issues relating to 
Jews in Denmark? Especially, if we consider the government’s willingness to arrest and intern 
the Danish communists and offhand multiple categories of German refugees, such as 
communists, Social Democrats, and Jews, as well as the proposition of interning the Danish Jews 
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in a camp in Denmark in late September 1943? If we categorize these groups as enemies of 
Germany, the Danish government actually went quite far in order to maintain the cooperation 
with Germany. 
Given the interest in the period it is interesting to find that many of the cabinet ministers 
have not been subjected to contemporary research, which might provide further insights into 
the discussions on the Jews in Denmark, as well as many other areas. These could help us 
determine where other ministers drew the line in important negotiations during the 
cooperation. Lastly, we should examine what consequences the discrimination administered by 
the Danish government had. Did it e.g. have life-long consequences as in the case of Dr. Rothe-
Meyer who never became a professor due to racial discrimination? And how many were actually 
administratively prevented from entering into the civil service? How many other examples of 
discrimination exist?  
All things considered, we still lack thorough research in many areas regarding the first years 
of the cooperation, especially compared to the rest of Europe. It is telling that important source 
collections and diaries have only recently become publicly available. Compared to research on 
the Jewish experience in the rest of Europe, Denmark remains an unexplained dark spot on 
issues such as the possible existence of looted art, Jewish bank accounts and the reentry of the 
Danish-Jewish business minority in Denmark. This dissertation has only examined selected 
aspects of the social, civil and financial exclusion of Jews before October 1943, but points to the 
existence of further unanswered historical questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Danish Governments and Parties 1937-1943 
Socialdemokratiet – The Social Democrats (S) 
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Venstre – The Liberal Party (V) 
Det Radikale Venstre – The Social Liberal Party (R) 
Kommunisterne – The Communists (K)  
Det Konservative Folkeparti – The Conservative Party (C) 
 
Government from 4-11-1935 to 15-9-1939. The Social Democrats and the Social Liberal Party  
Prime Minister: Thorvald Stauning (S) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Peter Munch (R) 
Minister of Finance: Hans Peter Hansen (S), (1935 to 20.7.1937) 
Minister of Finance: Vilhelm Buhl (S), (20.7.1937 to 15.9.1939) 
Minister of Defence: Alsing Andersen (S) 
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Johannes Hansen (S) 
Minister of Education: Jørgen Jørgensen (R)  
Minister of Justice: Karl Kristian Steincke (S) 
Minister of the Interior: Bertel Dahlgaard (R)  
Minister of Public Works (Traffic): Niels Peter Fisker (S) 
Minister of Agriculture and Fishery: Kristen Bording (S) 
Minister of Industry, Trade and Maritime Affairs: Johannes Kjærbøl (S)  
Minister of Social Affairs: Ludvig Christensen (S) 
 
Government 19-9-1939 to 10-4-1940 The Social Democrats and the Social Liberal Party  
Prime Minister: Thorvald Stauning (S) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Peter Munch (R) 
Minister of Finance: Vilhelm Buhl (S) 
Minister of Defence: Alsing Andersen (S) 
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Johannes Hansen (S) 
Minister of Education: Jørgen Jørgensen (R)  
Minister of Justice: Sven Unmack Larsen (S) 
Minister of the Interior: Bertel Dahlgaard (R)  
Minister of Public Works (Traffic): Axel Sørensen (S) 
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Minister of Agriculture and Fishery: Kristen Bording (S) 
Minister of Industri, Trade and Maritime Affairs: Johanne Kjærbøl (S)  
Minister of Social Affairs: Ludvig Christensen (S) 
 
1st Coalition Government 10-4-1940 to 8-7-1940 The Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party, The 
Conservative People’s Party and The Liberal Party 
Prime Minister: Thorvald Stauning (S) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Peter Munch (R) 
Minister of Finance: Vilhelm Buhl (S) 
Minister of Defence: Alsing Andersen (S) 
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Johannes Hansen (S) 
Minister of Education: Jørgen Jørgensen (R)  
Minister of Justice: Sven Unmack Larsen (S) 
Minister of the Interior: Bertel Dahlgaard (R)  
Minister of Public Works (Traffic): Axel Sørensen (S) 
Minister of Agriculture and Fishery: Kristen Bording (S) 
Minister of Industri, Trade and Maritime Affairs: Johanne Kjærbøl (S)  
Minister of Social Affairs: Ludvig Christensen (S) 
Ministers without portfolios: Søren Brorson (V), Oluf Krag (V), Henning Hasle (C), John 
Christmas Møller (C), Vilhelm Fibiger (C) 
 
2nd Coalition Government 8-7-1940 – 4-5-1942 The Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party, The 
Conservative People’s Party and The Liberal Party 
Prime Minister: Thorvald Stauning (S) († 3.5.1942) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Erik Scavenius (unaffiliated) 
Minister of Finance: Vilhelm Buhl (S) 
Minister of Defence: Søren Brorson (V) 
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Vilhelm Fibiger (C) 
Minister of Education: Jørgen Jørgensen (R)  
Minister of Justice: Harald Petersen (unaffiliated) until  9.7.1941 
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Minister of Justice: Eigil Thune Jacobsen (unaffiliated) from 9.7.1941 
Minister of the Interior: Knud Kristensen (V)  
Minister of Public Works (Traffic): Gunnar Larsen (unaffiliated) 
Minister of Agriculture and Fishery: Kristen Bording (S) 
Minister of Industry, Trade and Maritime Affairs: John Christmas Møller (C) until 3.10.1940 
Minister of Industry, Trade and Maritime Affairs: Halfdan Hendriksen (C) from 3.10.1940  
Minister for Employment and Social Affairs: Johannes Kjærbøl (S) 
 
3rd Coalition Government 4-5-1942-9.11.1942 The Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party, The 
Conservative People’s Party and The Liberal Party 
Prime Minister: Vilhelm Buhl 
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Erik Scavenius (unaffiliated) 
Minister of Finance: Vilhelm Buhl (S) until 16.7.1942 
Minister of Finance: Alsing Andersen (S) from 16.7.1942 
Minister of Defence: Søren Brorson (V) 
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Vilhelm Fibiger (C) 
Minister of Education: Jørgen Jørgensen (R)  
Minister of Justice: Eigil Thune Jacobsen (unaffiliated)  
Minister of the Interior: Knud Kristensen (V)  
Minister of Public Works (Traffic): Gunnar Larsen (unaffiliated) 
Minister of Agriculture and Fishery: Kristen Bording (S) 
Minister of Industry, Trade and Maritime Affairs: Halfdan Hendriksen (C)  
Minister For Employment and Social Affairs: Johannes Kjærbøl (S) 
 
4th Coalition Government 9.11.1942 to 29.8.1943 The Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party, 
The Conservative People’s Party and The Liberal Party 
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs: Erik Scavenius (unaffiliated) 
Minister of Finance: K. H. Kofoed (unaffiliated)  
Minister of Defence: Søren Brorson (V) 
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Valdemar Holbøll (unaffiliated) 
Minister of Education: A.C. Højberg-Christensen (unaffiliated)  
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Minister of Justice: Eigil Thune Jacobsen (unaffiliated)  
Minister of the Interior: Jørgen Jørgensen (R)  
Minister of Public Works: Gunnar Larsen (unaffiliated) 
Minister of Traffic: N. Elgaard (V) 
Minister of Agriculture and Fishery: Kristen Bording (S) 
Minister of Industry, Trade and Maritime Affairs: Halfdan Hendriksen (C)  
Minister For Employment: Johannes Kjærbøl (S) 
Minister For Social Affairs: Laurits Hansen (S) 
 
Appendix 2: Selected Biographies 
B 
Barandon, Paul (1881-1971). Barandon was the Gesandter, envoy, and deputy manager of the 
German legation from January 1942. He headed the legation in the period between Cecil von 
Renthe-Fink and Werner Best. He had been in the AA since the beginning of his career.900 
Member of the party in 1937, and recalled to Berlin in January 1945. According to postwar 
interrogations Joachim von Ribbentrop moved Barandon to a position as AA’s representative at 
the German Military high-command (OKH) until March 1945. According to Barandon, Ribbentrop 
wanted to be informed of the work of the OKH.901 In 1934 Paul Barandon was temporary leader 
of the Justice department of the AA. In this capacity he led a thorough investigation into his 
colleague Georg von Broich-Oppert’s ancestry in an attempt to disclose if he was Jewish. In the 
five months the investigation lasted Barandon ordered personnel files and adoption files on 
Broich-Oppert’s relatives. He also questioned his relatives and friends while obtaining references 
from colleagues and school mates. While receiving extremely good recommendations from his 
colleagues, but also the Nazi Party and SA- leadership in Austria the racial argument was the 
weightiest. Broich-Oppert was Jewish and while it could not be ascertained if he had lied when 
asked about his ancestry he was pensioned in April 1935.902  
 
                                                     
900 Kirchhoff, “Paul Barandon.” 
901 “Zeugenschriftum, Barandon, Paul.” 
902 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 53–55. 
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Baumgartner, Eugen (1884-?). Came from an unknown career in a company to the RWM in 1934. 
He took over the leadership of the RfA in 1937.903 
 
Best, Werner (1903-1989). Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark from 1942 to 1945. Doctor of Law 
and member of the party in 1930, and the SS a year later. He had a successful career in the 
dictatorship’s secret police until he was outmaneuvered by his competitor Reinhard Heydrich. 
Before coming to Denmark, he had been involved in making the first Einsatzgruppen in Poland 
and deporting Jews from France. He was flexible in his policy making in Denmark, and he adapted 
well to the situation. His long term goal was that Denmark should lose more and more of its 
independence.904 
 
Bloch, Carl Edvard, Dr. med. (1872-1956). Head (Rektor) of the University of Copenhagen from 
1931 to 1932 and from 1936 to 1942. He functioned as professor (professor ordinaries) from 
1916. Specialized in the pediatric area. He was head of the clinic for children’s diseases in 1910-
1943.905 
 
Buhl, Vilhelm (1881-1954). Member of Parliament for the Social Democrats from 1932 to 1953. 
Prime Minister from 3.5.1942 until November. He was Thorvald Stauning’s successor. He was 
also the first Prime Minister after the war in 1945 for five months. He was educated as a lawyer, 
and Minister of Finance from 1937 to 1942. Buhl remained a leading personality in the 
Government despite not having the title of minister after November 1942. He maintained a 
position as the de facto leader of the government after it had withdrawn in August 1943. He 
cooperated with the leadership of the resistance movement in order to secure Denmark was 
recognized as an allied nation, as well as issuing army directives. He was crucial in the 
negotiations with the resistance movement in creating the first Danish government after the 
war.906  
 
                                                     
903 “Personalakten Eugen Baumgartner” His file appears incomplete. He is not mentioned in the usual handbooks on staff of the government. 
904 Kirchhoff, “Dr. Best i medvind og modvind,” 250–215; Klee, Das Personen Lexikon Zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945, 45. 
905 V. Meisen, “C.E. Bloch,” Den Store Danske (Gyldendal), accessed April 24, 2017, http://denstoredanske.dk/index.php?sideId=287180. 
906 Niels Wium Olesen, “Vilhelm Buhl,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: Gad, 2005), 52–54. 
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Bunke, Erich (1907-  ). Head of the Gestapo’s counter sabotage efforts in Copenhagen from 1943 
to 1945. He worked in customs in 1934. Two years later he worked for Reinhard Heydrich’s office 
to prevent Jews from leaving Germany with valuables. In 1936 he became a member of the SS.  
Bunke arrived in Denmark in the spring of 1943 and from September he headed several central 
offices in the Gestapo HQ in Copenhagen.  He was deeply involved in combating the Danish 
resistance in the last years of the occupation. Remarkably, he escaped to Germany, and the 
Danish authorities were unable to find him, though he lived undisguised in Frankfurt am Main. 
He never faced any trials for his deeds in Denmark.907 
 
Bülow-Schwante, Vicco von (1891-1970). Leader of dept. Deutschland in the AA from 1933. He 
had initially pursued a military career that ended due to a horseback riding accident. He was an 
anti-republican who was politically engaged, and from 1928 he was a member of the German 
National People’s Party, Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP). As head of dept. Deutschland, he 
was responsible for justifying the National Socialists’ racial policies by providing statistical 
material intended to substantiate the perceived negative Jewish influences.908 
 
C 
Chantré, Ludwig (????-19??). SS-Sturmbannführer, Regierungsrat at the German legation in 
Denmark. Leader of department B – Inner Affairs under Stalmann’s leadership of Dept. II. 
Verwaltung und Innenpolitik.909 
 
Clausen, Frits (1893-1947). Head of the Danish National Socialist Worker’s Party (DNSAP). 
Educated as a Doctor. Brought up in a Danish-minded home in the north of Germany.  
Conscripted to fight on the German side during the First World War. His negative views of the 
Bolshevik revolution and Jewish Marxists were shaped during his three-year stay in Russian 
prison camps as a prisoner of war. During the referendum in 1920 he agitated for the Danish 
side. He joined the Danish Nazi party in 1931 due to dissatisfaction in not achieving a higher 
position in the Conservative party. He became Führer of DNSAP in July 1933. Despite his 
                                                     
907 Henrik Lundtofte, “Erich Bunke,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (Gad, 2005), 56. 
908 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 43–47. 
909 Lauridsen, “Introduktion til tillæg 4.,” 155. 
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adoration for National Socialist Germany, he was largely ignored by NSDAP until April 1940. 
However, he proved unsuccessful in his many attempts to become part of the Danish 
government or take over power. He maintained leadership of DNSAP until the party lost its three 
seats in the Danish Parliament in the elections in March 1943. He temporarily stepped down and 
joined the SS as a doctor. He never saw front service, but provided medical assistance during 
bombing raids in Germany. Upon his return to Denmark he was ousted of the party in February 
1944,  and in November he was excluded from the party.  He was arrested immediately at the 
end of the war in Denmark, but he died in 1947 before appearing in court.910 
 
D 
Darré, Richard Walther (1895-1953). Minister of Reichsministerium für Ernährung und 
Landwirtschaft. The author of the influential Blut und Boden texts, and a great supporter of 
Nazism’s racial ideas.911  
 
F 
Fest, Anton (1908- ?). Fest was educated in law in 1930 and joined the NSDAP in 1933. He 
became part of the SS in 1934, and a year later he joined the Gestapo. He was located in Berlin 
in 1935 and recruited for the RSHA. In April 1940 he was attached to the German Legation in 
Copenhagen as Police Attaché. He was basically the Gestapo leader in Denmark, disguised with 
a diplomatic title.912 He left Denmark with a recent promotion to the rank of 
Obersturmbannführer in September 1943.913 
 
Fibiger, Vilhelm (1886-1978). Head of the Conservative party from 1939. Minister of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs from July 8th 1940 to November 1942. The first Minister of Trade after the 
war. Member of parliament from 1920 to 1957.914 
 
G 
                                                     
910 John T. Lauridsen, “Frits Clausen,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: Gad, 2005), 72–73. 
911 “Wareneinfuhr”; “Richard Walther Darré (1895-1953).” 
912 Lundtofte, Gestapo!, 23. 
913 Lundtofte, “Anton Fest.” 
914 Hans Kirchhoff, “Vilhlem Fibiger,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: Gad, 2005), 100–101. 
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Grundherr, Werner von (1888-1968). Head of the AA’s department for Scandinavia. Educated in 
political science and history. Entered the AA in 1918. German envoy to Finland from 1925 to 
1934. From 1934 to 1945  he was head of the department for Scandinavian and the Baltic 
countries. Imprisoned by the Americans from 1945 to 1947. He reentered the civil service in 
1950, but after preliminary investigations he was retired in 1952.915 
 
Göring, Hermann (1893-1946). Carried a multitude of leaderships during the National Socialist 
period and had joined the party in 1922. Minister of Aviation in 1933 and Supreme Commander 
of the Airforce in 1936. Leader of the Four Year Plan in 1936. He ordered Heydrich to plan the 
murder of the Jews in the summer of 1941. Sentenced to death at the Nuremburg trials, but 
committed suicide before being executed.916 
 
H 
Heydrich, Reinhard, (1904-1942). Began a military career, but was discharged for not honoring 
a marriage agreement in 1931. Member of the NSDAP and SS in 1931. Closely associated with 
Himmler and held several high-ranking positions in the party’s police organization during the 
1930s. Head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) in 1939 which controlled the security 
police and SD. The RSHA was a leading organization in implementing the murder of the Jews, 
and Heydrich is considered a key architect behind these policies. He also chaired the Wannsee 
Conference in January 1942. Deadly wounded by Czech resistance in 1942.917 
 
Henriques, Carl Bertel (1870-1957). Supreme Court Justice (1906). Part of the Jewish 
congregation’s leadership from 1905 and its manager from 1930. After successfully fleeing to 
Sweden in October 1943, he returned home in 1945 and stepped down.918 
 
Hewel, Walt(h)er (1904-1945). Carried the flag at Hitler’s failed attempt to take-over power in 
Germany in 1923. In 1938 Legationsrat I kl. In the German Foreign Ministry. In 1942 he was SS-
Brigadeführer. Hewel was Ribbentrop’s permanent officer at Hitler’s chancellery. Hitler had 
                                                     
915 Kirchhoff, “Werner von Grundherr.” 
916 Ernst Klee, “Hermann Göring,” Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945 (Nikol Verlag, 2016), 189–90. 
917 Ernst Klee, “Reinhard Heydrich,” Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945 (Nikol Verlag, 2016), 253. 
918 Knud Waaben, “C.B. Henriques,” Dansk Biografisk Leksikon (Gyldendal, 1984 1979), http://denstoredanske.dk/index.php?sideId=291174. 
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sympathies for Hewel who managed to gain a certain degree of independence from 
Ribbentrop.919 
 
Himmler, Heinrich (1900-1945). Reichsführer-SS and head of the German police. Responsible for 
the murder of leading members of the SA in 1934. He built the SS to become a powerful and 
ideologically convinced entity. He organized the structure of the concentration camps in 
Germany. He was responsible for planning and monitoring the Holocaust.920  
 
J 
Jacobsen, Thune (1880 – 1949). Educated as a lawyer in 1905 and began a career in the police.  
He is also labeled as the creator of the modern Danish police. Minister of Justice from 1941 to 
1943 without any party affiliation. A full supporter of the cooperation and behind the law against 
the Danish communists from August 1941. Fiercely attacked in the papers of the resistance and 
after the war a hated personality.921 
 
Jørgensen, Jørgensen (1888-1974). Educated as a farmer and member of parliament for the 
Social Liberals (R) 1929-1964. Minister of Education from 1935. After the reshuffling of the 
government in November 1942 Jørgensen was appointed Minister of the Interior. He supported 
the cooperation but not as actively as Erik Scavenius. Jørgensen was very skeptical of the 
Resistance movement. In August 1943 he joined the expanded Nine-Man Committee, the 
Thirteen-Man Committee, as one of four former ministers. Head of the Social Liberal group in 
parliament from 1945 to 1947. Minister of Education from 1957 to 1961. He was behind two 
major reforms of the public school system in 1937 and 1958.922 
 
 
K 
                                                     
919 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 155–56 Spelled with an H in 
the first name, but not in ; Klee, Das Personen Lexikon Zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945, 252 Here it is spelled without and 
“h”. However, dates and data are the same. 
920 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Heinrich Himmler,” Holocaust Encyclopedia, accessed January 12, 2017, 
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007407. 
921 Trommer, “Thune Jacobsen”; Kirchhoff and Rünitz, Udsendt til Tyskland, 64–65. 
922 Bo Lidegaard, “Jørgen Jørgensen,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: Gad, 2005), 194–95; Henrik S. Nissen, “Jørgen Jørgensen,” Den 
Store Danske (Gyldendal), accessed March 20, 2018, 
http://denstoredanske.dk/Danmarks_geografi_og_historie/Danmarks_historie/Danmark_efter_1945/J%C3%B8rgen_J%C3%B8rgensen. 
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Kanstein, Paul (1899-1980). Kanstein was SS-Brigadeführer from 1942. He had made a career in 
the German police. From 1937 he was the leader of the Stapoleitstelle Berlin and in 1939 Vice 
President for the police in Berlin. He was stationed in Denmark from April 1940, and his main 
responsibility was the security of the German troops and the police department at the German 
legation. He was on good terms with the Danish Minister of Justice,  Thune Jacobsen. He viewed 
the collapse of the cooperation as a personal defeat and left Denmark in October 1943.923 
 
Kofoed, Kristian Hansen (1879-1951). Member of Parliament for The Social Liberal Party (R) 
from 1913-1920. In 1924 he became Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance. He was 
Minister of Finance from November 1942.924 
 
Krüger, Ernst (1877- ????). He was German Consul General and Trade Attaché at the German 
legation. He came to Denmark in 1915. In 1919 he received the title of consul. He worked as a 
trade attaché from 1919. In 1937 he was promoted to Consul General. He was highly esteemed 
after the war described as being against Nazism.925 He handled all correspondence on behalf of 
the German legation to the RfA, and was directly involved in the Aryanization processes in 
Denmark. 
 
L 
Larsen, Gunnar (1905-1973). Educated as a chemical engineer in the USA in 1926. Took over as 
CEO and head of the board of directors in F.L. Smidth & Co. in 1935. A company which had been 
co-founded by his father and largely produced cement but also developed new kinds of cement. 
He was held in high regard in Danish business life as the occupation began, and became an 
unpolitical Minister of Public works in July 1940. He initiated many public building projects, 
which helped decrease employment numbers. As these projects often involved the use of 
cement he was criticized for catering to F.L. Smidth’s interests. He had left the company upon 
becoming minister but maintained the majority of the stocks, and still had a decisive role. He 
was a strong proponent of the cooperation and supporter of Erik Scavenius. As the only minister 
                                                     
923 Stevnsborg, “Der Beauftragte Paul Kanstein.” 
924 Hans Kirchhoff, “K.H. Kofoed,” Den Store Danske (Gyldendal), accessed March 20, 2017, 
http://denstoredanske.dk/Danmarks_geografi_og_historie/Danmarks_historie/Danmark_1849-1945/Kristian_Hansen_Kofoed. 
925 “Ernst Krüger.” 
 290 
he was after the war he was sentenced for værnemageri (economic cooperation with the 
German occupier), but he was acquitted by the Supreme Court in 1948. He then left Denmark 
and settled in Ireland.926  
 
Luther, Martin (1895-1945). Unterstaatssekretär. From 1938 part of the AA, and from 1940 
Head of Abteilung Deutschland, which handled Jewish questions and matters of race. The 
department also coordinated these efforts with the RSHA as well as office D III – which handled 
the Jewish and Race polices and information on these issues from the German legations. He 
worked closely with Adolf Eichmann’s department to diplomatically prepare and secure the 
deportations of Jews. He was in 1941 promoted to Unterstaatssekretär. Part of the Wannsee 
conference in 1942. After unsuccessfully attempting to remove Ribbentrop,  he was a privileged 
prisoner in the concentration camp Sachsenhausen from February 1943. He died a month after 
the Russians liberated the camp in 1945.927 
 
M 
Meissner, Gustav (1910-1995). Gustav Meissner, Presse Attaché of the German legation in 
Copenhagen 1940-1943. He grew up in the northern part of Germany and attended school in 
Flensburg. He was fluent in German and Danish. He became a reporter at Flensburger 
Nachrichten. He was an early member of the Nazi party, and was employed at Dienststelle 
Ribbentrop in 1937 with Nordschleswig as his area of expertise. He was associated with Martin 
Luther, in the 1930’ies Meissner benefitted from this connection during his years in Denmark. 
As the Second World War broke out he became part of the German legation. He was the liaison 
between the German legation and the Danish Nazis, and he promoted their claim for political 
power. Best did not side with Meissner’s ambitions and as Meissner’s protégé Luther was 
removed in February 1943,  Meissner joined the soldiers at the front. He survived the war, and 
was never put on trial. His involvement in censoring Danish papers, the pressure to remove Jews 
from the press or his support for Danish Nazis thus remained untried. To his death he maintained 
and defended the mind-set from the National Socialist period.928 
                                                     
926 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1:14–25. 
927 Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz, “Martin Luther.” 
928 Kreth, “Gustav Meissner.” 
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Munch, Peter Rochegune (1870-1953). Member of Parliament for The Social Liberal Party, Det 
Radikale Venstre, 1909-1945. Part of founding the party in 1905, and leader of the Party from 
1927. Minister of Defence from 1913-1920. Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1929-1940. He was 
an educated and practicing historian, while also being a pacifist  supporter of international 
justice. Part of the group of politicians attempting to keep Denmark out of the Second World 
War. He argued for a minimal defense in order to not attract military attention. He believed 
smaller states would survive by international rules of justice, while preserving their cultural traits 
through a national community with a broad redistribution of wealth. In July 1940 he left the 
government, but remained a vital member of the Nine-Man Committee during the occupation. 
He was criticized for his views and politics during and after the war.929 
 
O 
Odmar, Jens Peter (1896-1978). Hired by Danish police in 1918. Head of police personnel in the 
special police department attached to the offices of the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs. 
During the occupation he accumulated more and more power. He headed the arrests and 
searches against the Communists in Copenhagen in June 1941. In January 1942 he took over 
leadership of section D. He was central to handing over 155 immigrants to the German police.  
He was tough on the resistance movement,  which he primarily considered a communist affair. 
In the fall of 1943 he was responsible for sending  a delegation of Danish  policemen to Sweden 
to point out Danish resistance fighters amongst the Danish refugees in Sweden. However, he 
was on good terms with the non-communist parts of the Danish resistance movement, and the 
Danish military intelligence. After the war he continued to serve in the Danish police.930 
 
R 
Rademacher, Franz (1906-1973). Educated as a lawyer and entered the party in 1933. Reached 
the rank of SS-Obersturmführer. From 1940, head of office D III, the main office for Jewish 
Matters in Dept. Deutschland.  Office D III was headed by Franz Rademacher in 1940, but he was 
                                                     
929 Carsten Due-Nielsen, “P. Munch,” Den Store Danske (Gyldendal), accessed June 14, 2017, 
http://denstoredanske.dk/index.php?sideId=128398. 
930 Henrik Stevnsborg, “Jens Peter Odmar,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: Gad, 2005), 279–80. 
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removed when Luther was imprisoned in February 1943. Rademacher was the second 
Judenreferent and worked closely with Luther. Rademacher was deeply involved in writing 
several of the key documents of the so-called Madagascar plan. The plan envisioned the 
deportation of the German Jews to the, at the time, French Island, and this is regarded as the 
first territorial final solution. Rademacher was generally involved in arranging deportations from 
all over Europe. After Luther’s removal Rademacher served in the navy for the duration of the 
war. He served two postwar prison sentences, became advisor to the Syrian government and 
spied for West Germany. Sentenced to prison in 1968, but released due to illness.931  
 
Renthe-Fink, Cecil Karl-August Timon Ernst Anton von (1885-1964). Since 1936, the German 
diplomatic envoy in Denmark. As Denmark was occupied he was promoted to 
Reichsbevollmächtigter. He is usually characterized as a career diplomat. He was a Doctor of Law 
and had participated in the First World War from 1914-1916, and had been decorated with the 
Iron Cross II and I degrees. A year before the outbreak of the First World War his diplomatic 
career began. A peak in his early career was the position as deputy head of section II in the AA 
in 1933. He became a National Socialist party member in 1938. In Denmark he attempted to 
increase the cooperation between Denmark and Germany. After being summoned to Berlin and 
replaced by Werner Best, he was a special envoy, diplomatischen Sonderbeauftragten, in Vichy 
France.932 
 
Ribbentrop, Joachim von (1893-1946). Imported and exported liqueur in Berlin in the 1920s, 
and received nobility by adoption. Joined the party in 1932, and Hitler’s foreign policy advisor 
before becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1938. Reached the rank of SS-
Obergruppenführer.933  
 
S 
                                                     
931 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 184, 254; USA and National 
Archives and Records Administration, Hitler’s Shadow, 29; Breitman, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis, 161–62; Klee, “Franz Rademacher,” 476–
77. 
932 Franz, “Cecil von Renthe-Fink,” 438–39; Kirchhoff, Den gode tysker: Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz: de danske jøders redningsmand, 68–69. 
933 Ernst Klee, “Joachim von Ribbentrop,” Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945 (Nikol Verlag, 2016), 494. 
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Scavenius, Erik (1877-1962). Educated in political science he began a career in the Foreign 
Ministry and became its minister several times (1910-1922, 1913-1920 and June 1940-1943). He 
held this position while also being Prime Minister from November 1942. He basic perception of 
Denmark’s geo political position was that it depended on Germany. He was a cool headed 
diplomat, but often cynical and unsentimental in evaluating the political power positions. He 
rarely waivered from his analysis of events and is often characterized as stubborn. He also had 
a temper and quite a few enemies. He pursued an active cooperation line to gain goodwill in 
Berlin. To oust the Danish Nazis from becoming part of the government meant joining the 
European new order according to Scavenius. Fierce discussions between Scavenius and the 
political ministers were the norm on several issues during the cooperation. However, none were 
willing to replace him though he threatened leaving the government several times. He 
developed an extraordinary relationship with Werner Best. They exchanged letters and kept in 
touch after the war until Scavenius died. Scavenius was after the war one of the few who kept 
defending the reasons for the cooperation, while many of his political colleagues would not. 
Scavenius remains a contested figure in Danish history.934 
 
Schacht, Hjalmar (1877-1970). Born in Tinglev, a Danish town since 1920. Co-founder of the 
German Democratic Party in 1920. Top negotiator in both the Dawes- and Young plans. Part of 
a party coalition against the Weimar Republic in 1931. President of the Reichsbank and a year 
later Minister for economic affairs, but released from this post in 1939. Arrested in 1944 due to 
contacts among the persons who attempted to murder Hitler. Acquitted at the Nuremberg trials, 
but sentenced as a main culprit in the denazification process, and sentenced to eight years in a 
labor camp. He was released after only serving one year. Financial advisor for Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Syria from 1950 to 1953 where he created his own Bank. He retired 10 
years later.935 
 
 
Schumburg, Emil (1898- ? ). The first Judenreferent of the AA from 1936-1940. He became part 
of the AA in 1926. He was briefly leader of dept. Deutschland in the AA in 1939, which he had 
                                                     
934 Kirchhoff, Hans, “Erik Scavenius,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: Gad, 2005), 316–18. 
935 Gabriel Eikenberg, “Hjalmar Schacht,” LEMO, accessed April 2, 2017, https://www.dhm.de/lemo/biografie/biografie-hjalmar-schacht.html. 
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been working for since 1933. Decorated in the First World War the Iron Cross second and first 
class. Received his doctoral degree in law in 1922. He expressed firm beliefs in the German 
people and National Socialist ideology, but did not join the party until 1936. He was behind 
drafting some of the reports Vicco von Bülow-Schwante would send to the legations. In 1936, 
he was adopted into the SS by Himmler.936 
 
Stalmann, Friedrich, (1902-?). Stalmann was Dr. Jur. and had the title of Regierungsdirektor at 
the German legation. He came to Denmark in 1940. His previous career he had been in the 
Gestapo from 1934-1939. He was the right hand of Kanstein.937 
 
Stauning, Thorvald August Marinus, (1873-3.5.1942). The first Danish Social Democratic Prime 
Minister from 1924-26. He regained office in 1929, and maintained it until his death in 1942. He 
came from a working class background in Copenhagen, but received formal education. He 
became a cigar sorter while attending evening classes. From 1899 he was the treasurer of the 
Social Democratic Party. He was a member of Parliament from 1906-1942. During the turbulent 
1930’ies he was a defender of Democracy and respected by his regular adversaries, while fencing 
off extreme currents from the left and right side of the political spectrum. He headed the 
coalition government during the occupation until his death.938 
 
Steincke, Karl Kristian, (1880-1963). Doctor of Law in 1906 and Social Democrat. Member of 
parliament from 1918 and Minister of Justice from 1924-1926, and 1935-1939. He briefly had a 
third term as Minister of Justice in 1950. He was Minister of Social Affairs from 1929-1935. He 
left Parliament in 1952. He is known for introducing Europe’s first eugenic laws allowing for 
sterilization in 1929. These laws were expanded in 1934 and 1938. Steincke had in 1920 
legitimized eugenics as part of social reform in order to save money on health care.939 
 
                                                     
936 Browning, Die “Endlösung” und das Auswärtige Amt: Das Referat D III der Abteilung Deutschland 1940-1943., 27-28/pos. 507 in Kindle; 
Döscher, Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich: Diplomatie im Schatten der “Endlösung,” 119–29; Conze et al., Das Amt und die 
Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 45. 
937 Hans Kirchhoff, “Friedrich Stalmann,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: Gad, 2005), 339–40. 
938 Niels Finn Christiansen, “Th. Stauning,” Den Store Danske (Gyldendal), accessed June 16, 2017, 
http://denstoredanske.dk/index.php?sideId=164401. 
939 Jacob Christensen, “K. K. Steincke,” Den Store Danske (Gyldendal), accessed June 10, 2017, 
http://denstoredanske.dk/index.php?sideId=164591. 
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Svenningsen, Nils (1894-1985). Svenningsen was a prominent civil servant in the Danish Foreign 
Ministry becoming Permanent Secretary in the fall of 1941. He served in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs for his entire career beginning in 1920. He was stationed six years at the Danish legation 
in Berlin from 1924-1930. In the late 1930’ies he headed negotiations in the Danish-German 
Trade Committee. After becoming Permanent Secretary, he supported minister Erik Scavenius, 
and drafted many of the ministry’s statements and announcements during the war. After the 
Danish government discontinued in August 1943,  Svenningsen took over as head of the Civil 
Servants in what has become known as the Departementschefstyret – or The Permanent 
Secretaries’ Management. He sought to keep as much control in Danish hands as possible just 
like his political predecessors. He negotiated directly with Werner Best and other leading 
Germans in Denmark in order to steer the country through the war. After the war he was labelled 
as a collaborator, and became Denmark’s ambassador to Sweden until 1951. The next ten years 
he served as Permanent Secretary. His last important post was as Denmark’s ambassador in 
London from 1961-1964.940 
 
W 
Walter, Alex (1888-1949). German civil servant and Doctor of Law. Head of the German-Danish 
trade committee on behalf of Germany. His superior was Staatsekretär, Permanent Secretary,  
Herbert Backe who in May 1942 became the Minister of Food and agriculture. Walter was well 
connected in Berlin, and he negotiated on behalf of Germany during the war. He is described as 
a good negotiator. His articles from 1941-1943 reveal him as a supporter of the National Socialist 
cause. He was a party member and SS-Sturmbahnführer.941 
 
Weizsäcker, Ernst Freiherr von (1882-1951). Marine officer in the first world war and decorated 
with the Iron Cross second and first class. Became part of the AA in 1921. Gesandtschaftsrat in 
Copenhagen from 1924 to 1927. Weizsäcker requested a transfer and returned to Berlin. In 1931 
German envoy in Norway.  Leader of the political department in 1937 and Staatssekretär from 
1938-1943. The highest civil service position in the AA just below Ribbentrop. German Envoy at 
                                                     
940 Hans Kirchhoff, “Nils Svenningsen,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: Gad, 2005), 348–49. 
941 Mogens R. Nissen, “Alex Walter,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: Gad, 2005), 377–79. 
 296 
the Vatican State from 1943. Captured in Rome by allied troops in 1944. Sentenced to prison for 
seven years in 1949, but released in 1950.942 
 
Wingen, Oskar (1889-1945). Wingen had a doctoral degree in Political Science with a career start 
in maritime transport and world economy from 1915. He came to the AA in 1919 and worked as 
a scientific aid. Head of the archives before becoming part of department P – press matters in 
1921. In the 1930s he had a briefer, but important position at the Propaganda Ministry from 
1933 to 1934,  and was Saarbevollmächtigen des Reichskanzlers 1934-1935. He reentered the 
AA in 1935 and headed department X from October 1938. He retired in November 1944. He died 
in a Russian prison camp in Germany 1945.943 
Y  
Yde, Marinus L. (1879-1947). Danish Consul General in Hamburg 1921-1945. 
 
Appendix 3: The Office Names of the RfA.  
Leadership 
Dept I. General Affairs 
• Off. I/1A. Administration 
• Off. I/1B. Military matters & Communication  
• Off. I/1C. Library 
• Off. I/2A. General and Organisation matters f. Außenhandelsstellen 
• Off. I/2B. Management of the German "Wirtschaftsdienstes"  
• Off. I/3. Special tasks of disseminating trade news 
• Dept II. News service and Library (Shrifttum) 
• Off. II/1a Official Foreign News Material 
• Off. II/1b. Information Service f. German Trade 
• Off. II/1c. Trade News 
• Off. II/1d. Handbook f. Foreign Trade 
• Off. II/2a. World Trade/ Trade Policy 
                                                     
942 “Ernst Freiherr von Weizsäcker.” 
943 Isphording, Keiper, and Kröger, “Oskar Wingen.” 
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• Off. II/2b. Ordinary Trade Services 
• Off. II/2c. Industrial News 
• Off.II/2d. Transport 
• Off.II/2e. Duty and import/export rules 
• Off.II/2f. Conferences and Archive 
Dept III. International Trade 
• Off. III/1a. Regulations from RWM/Prohibitions on Imports and Exports 
• Off. III/1b. Trade Political Reports/Co-operation w. Offices of 
Commerce. 
• Off. III/1c. Collecting and analysis of reports f. German 
Offices of Commerce 
• Off. III/1d. Questions of Representatives and Sales 
• Off. III/1e.  Archive of Industries 
• Off. III/1f. Representative's search 
• Off. III/2a. Trade: Legal Issues 
• Off. III/2b. Transport Regulation 
• Off. III/3 British World incl. USA 
• Off. III/3a. Brit. India, AUS, NZ, USA. 
• Off. III/3b. Specialty areas: E.g. Optics 
• Off. III/3c. Special Assignment: Monitoring enemy 
trade 
• Off. III/4 Pacific Area 
• Off. III/4a. JP, CH, MN, TH, PH, IN, AUS, NZ 
• Off. III/4b. Specialty areas e.g. Transport 
• Off. III/4c. General Colonial Questions 
• Off. III/5 Mediterranean 
• Off. III/5a. PT, ESP, SCH 
• Off. III/5b. ITA (ALB, LY, ET) 
• Off. III/5c. Specialty areas e.g. Glass 
• Off. III/6 Western Europe 
• Off. III/6a. NL, BEL, FRA + Colonies 
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• Off. III/6b. Specialty Areas e.g. Machinery 
• Off. III/7 North and Eastern Europe 
• Off. III/7a. DK, SWE, NOR, FI, USSR 
• Off. III/7b. Specialty areas e.g. Means of transportation 
• Off. III/8a Middle - and South America 
• Off. III/8b. Special areas e.g. Metals 
• Off. III/9 The Orient 
• III/9a. Egt, Arabia, CY, IRK, IRN, PAL, Trans Jordania, SUD, TYR, YE,  
• III/9b. Specialty Areas e.g. Paper/wool goods 
• Off. III/10 The Balkans 
• Off. III/10a Phasing out Bohemia, Yugoslavia, RUM, SLO, HUN 
• Off. III/10b BUL, GRE 
• Off. III/10c. Specialty areas e.g. Leather, textiles 
Dept. IV. Company and Credit information service 
• Off. IV/1. Documentation for German Goods and Suppliers.  
• Off. IV/2. Information on Companies 
• Off. IV/3. Determining Race in foreign countries and "Entjudung" of 
Representatives abroad.  
 
Dept. V. Duty Service 
No individual offices. 
 
Appendix 4: Ministers’ of Justice and State Prosecutors’ for Special 
Affairs in Denmark 1940-1943  
Ministers of Justice 
 Svend Unmack Larsen (April 1940- June 1940) 
 Harald Petersen (June 1940 – July 1941) 
 Thune Jacobsen (July 1941 – August 1943) 
State Prosecutors for Special Affairs in Denmark 
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 Harald Petersen (April 1940 – June 1940) 
 Eivind Larsen (July 1940 – June 1941) 
 Poul Kjalke (June 1941 – February 1942) 
 Troels Hoff (February 1942 – August 1943)  
Head of the Police Section of the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs  
 Jens Peter Odmar (1940-1943) 
 
 
Appendix 5: Visits to the German Gesandtschaft944 
Werner von Grundherr in Copenhagen  
16th to 20th October, 1940 
15th to 18th September, 1941 
1st to 3rd of December, 1941 
29th to 30th of August, 1942 
Rademacher in Copenhagen 
5th to 9th of April, 1941 
10th to 14th of June, 1941 
11th to 17th of December, 1941 
24th of March,  1942 
16th to 21st of June, 1942 
8th to 16th of December, 1942 
Cecil von Renthe-Fink in Berlin 
1940 
15th to 18th of May  
16th to 18th of July   
12th to 15th of November   
15th to 18th of December 
1941 
                                                     
944 Based on “Auswärtiges Amt an Leni Yahil,” September 10, 1962, NL756 Nachlass Renthe-Fink Leni Yahil requested an overview these trips, 
and the list was compiled by the AA. 
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3rd to 6th of January  
8th to 19th of July 
24th to 28th of November  
1942 
10th to 16th of April  
29th of July to 7th of August 
23rd to 27th of September 
 
Officially withdrawn to Berlin on the 28th of December 1942 according to the AA.    
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